The Policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia

MIROSLAV IVANOV VASILEV

BRILL

MNEMOSYNE SUPPLEMENTS HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

The Policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia

Mnemosyne Supplements

HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY
OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

Series Editor

Hans van Wees (*University College London*)

Associate Editors

Jan Paul Crielaard (*Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam*)
Benet Salway (*University College London*)

VOLUME 379

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/mns-haca*

The Policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia

By

Miroslav Ivanov Vasilev

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Vasilev, Miroslav Ivanov.
The policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia / by Miroslav Ivanov Vasilev.
pages cm. – (Mnemosyne supplements. History and archaeology of classical antiquity, ISSN 2352-8656 ; volume 379)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-28214-8 (hardback : acid-free paper) – ISBN 978-90-04-28215-5 (e-book)
1. Darius I, King of Persia, 548 B.C.-485 B.C.–Military leadership. 2. Xerxes I, King of Persia, 519 B.C.-465 B.C. or 464 B.C.–Military leadership. 3. Iran–Military policy. 4. Iran–Relations–Thrace. 5. Iran–Relations–Macedonia. 6. Thrace–Relations–Iran. 7. Macedonia–Relations–Iran. 8. Power (Social sciences)–History–To 1500. 9. Thrace–Politics and government. 10. Macedonia–Politics and government. I. Title.

DS282.7.V37 2015
938'.03–dc23

2014047081

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual "Brill" typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2352-8656
ISBN 978-90-04-28214-8 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-28215-5 (e-book)

Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

Acknowledgements VII
Preface IX
Abbreviations X

Introduction 1

1 **The Policy of Darius towards Thrace and Macedonia (514–512)** 40

2 **The Policy of Darius towards Thrace and Macedonia (499/8–492/1)** 124

3 **The Policy of Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia (480–479)** 162

4 **The Expulsion of the Persians from Europe** 212

Conclusion 227

Works Cited 233
Index 254

Acknowledgements

To my parents Evgenia and Ivan

I owe my most sincere thanks to Michael Zahrnt, Christopher Tuplin, and Ioannis Xydopoulos, who kindly agreed to read and comment on the text. I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewer as well, whose remarks were particularly useful for improving some parts of the manuscript concerning the early history of Macedonia. Without their critical and detailed comments the study would hardly be as it is. Of course, it is the author alone who is fully responsible for both the conclusions and the possible mistakes. I am also indebted to many colleagues who were so good as to send me articles, even books, they had published, as well as literature inaccessible to me: Michael Zahrnt, Christopher Tuplin, Stavros Paspalas, Bruno Tripodi, Kalin Porozhanov, Maria-Gabriela Parissaki, Nevena Panova, Catharine Lorber, Ioannis Xydopoulos, Paula Rose, Ivan Jordovich, Salvatore Constanca, Miroslav Izdimirski, and Plamen Petkov, with whom I have been linked by the bonds of a long-standing friendship. I am grateful to Johannes Heinrichs, who gave me permission to reproduce a picture of a Macedonian coin whose obverse displays a horseman with a short sword. I am also grateful to Dimitra Tzangari (Alpha Bank) and Travis Markel and Dale Tatro (Classical Numismatic Group), who have sent me pictures of other coins from the same series. I could hardly omit the late Zlatozara Gocheva, who encouraged me to visit the Hardt Foundation (Geneva), and the scientific secretary of the Foundation, Monica Brunner, who made my double stay there possible (in November 2008 and November 2009). This is where I obtained a considerable amount of the bibliography material I subsequently used while carrying out the present study. I would especially like to thank Kalin Porozhanov for the unstinting support he has given me over the years at important points in my academic career. I am also grateful to Engin Beksac who promised full cooperation, including on trips to the European part of Turkey I had planned and which, unfortunately, for financial reasons I was not able to realize. The contact with Beksac became possible thanks to Valeria Fol, who offered constant support while I was a doctoral student. I am also indebted to my friend and colleague Stephen O'Connor who, though extremely

busy, kindly agreed to revise parts of the English version of the manuscript (Preface, Chapter 4, and the Conclusion) and especially to the Brill publishing company in the persons of Jennifer Pavelko and Tessel Jonquière, who made the revision of the rest of the text possible. Special thanks are also due to Timothy Beck for his punctilious work in that process. My last and greatest debt is to my wife Hristina for being patient and understanding of my scientific work, and I ask her forgiveness if I have ever neglected her or our children, Martin and Eva.

Miroslav Vasilev
Troyan, June 2014

Preface

The idea for the present study was conceived in April 2011. By that time it had been six months since the successful defense of my dissertation and I found myself wavering whether I should pursue further my studies in the field of Thracian–Macedonian relations, or devote the forthcoming years to a study of the history of Macedonia prior to the accession of Philip II. Due to the chronic shortage of specialized literature in Bulgaria, the development of both subjects required visits to foreign libraries, which was beyond my financial capabilities. For this reason, and due to the fact that much of the requisite literature was available to me, I decided to focus my pursuit on examining the issues relevant to the policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia. This was not a new topic of research for me, for part of my dissertation related precisely to these issues, which is in itself an indication of the keen interest in the topic that I nurtured then and continue to nurture now.

The beginning was made in June 2011. In the months that followed I worked hard on my research and also established contact with Michael Zahrnt and Christopher Tuplin, who kindly agreed to read and comment on the entire text. Though from the very outset a huge amount of scientific literature was available to me, I contacted during my work a number of fellow researchers, who were kind enough to send to me not only publications of their own, but also several studies by other researchers which were currently inaccessible to me. To some extent this entailed certain difficulties, since I had to take into account the newly acquired literature, to analyse the issues they addressed and to incorporate their data at the appropriate places within the text, which had already emerged in a partly finished state. In spite of these difficulties, I believe that this challenging task has been successfully completed. In July 2013 the text was finished and sent to Brill for review. Only after receiving the review (in late February 2014) did I find out that three books relevant to my topic had been newly published. They were also included in the footnotes and the bibliographical apparatus of the monograph: *Herodotus Histories. Book V* (2013), by Simon Hornblower; *Persomacedonica. Македонија и Персија пред Александър* (2013), by Vojislav Sarakinski; and *История на племената в Югозападна Тракия през I хил. пр. Хр.* (2014), by an author whom I regard with the highest esteem, Peter Delev, who in the years 2004–2006 mentored the writing of my master's thesis.

Abbreviations

AA	*Archäologischer Anzeiger*
AAASH	*Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*
ABSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
AFO	*Archiv für Orientforschung*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
AJPh	*American Journal of Philology*
AMI	*Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*
ANES	*Ancient Near Eastern Studies*
ASNSP	*Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*
AW	*Ancient World*
AWE	*Ancient West & East*
BCH	*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*
CHI	*Cambridge History of Iran*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CNG	*Classical Numismatic Group*
CPh	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CSCA	*California Studies in Classical Antiquity*
GIF	*Giornale Italiano di Filologia*
G&R	*Greece & Rome*
GRBS	*Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HSCPh	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
ICS	*Illinois Classical Studies*
IM	*Istanbuler Mitteilungen*
JCPh	*Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JRAIGBI	*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*
JRGS	*Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
PAPhS	*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*
PP	*La Parola del passato*
RE	*Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*

REG	*Revue des Études Grecques*
RhMPh	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
SB	*Studia Balcanica*
SNG ABC	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. The Alpha Bank Collection*
TAB	Terra Antiqua Balcanica
TAPhA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association* (*1869–1896*)
ZA	*Ziva Antika*
ZN	*Zeitschrift für Numismatik*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*
ВДИ	*Вестник древний истории*
ГСУИФ	*Годишник на Софийския университет исторически факултет*
ГСУФЗФ	*Годишник на Софийския университет факултет по западни филологии*
ГСУФИФ	*Годишник на Софийския университет филолого-исторически факултет*
ГСУФФ	*Годишник на Софийския университет филологически факултет*
ИБАИ	*Известия на българския археологически институт*
ИВАД	*Известия на варненското археологическо дружество*
ИИБЕ	*Известия на института за български език*
ИНМВ	*Известия на народния музей Варна*

Introduction

The campaigns of the Persian kings Darius and Xerxes in Europe led to the subjugation of part of southern Thrace and the Greek cities situated between Byzantium and the Strymon River, along with the subordination of Macedonia. While the relations between Persians and Greeks are well developed by numerous publications, including many monographs, the policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia appears undeservedly neglected. There are a limited number of articles that are dedicated to different aspects of the problems here examined and a number of studies examine Persian policy in Europe, but as a rule these issues have been dealt with sporadically and largely in the context of Greco–Persian relations. A number of works devoted to the history of Macedonia and to a lesser degree to Thrace present greater detail, but to my knowledge no monograph has been published dealing with Persian policy towards these two areas in the indicated chronological period. Hopefully this study will fill the gap and shed more light on the issues concerned.

Aims and Methodology

The main goal of this monograph is the thorough study of various aspects of Persian power in Thrace and Macedonia in the period from ca. 513 to ca. 465.[1] The upper chronological limit is associated with the campaign of Darius I in Scythia, when the Persian army first set foot on European soil, an act which entailed almost immediately the subordination of a part of Thrace and the vassalage of Macedonia. The lower chronological limit corresponds to the expulsion of the last Persian garrisons from Thrace except in Doriscus, ending this stage of Persian policy towards Thrace and Macedonia. The period from the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace to the crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander the Great will be the subject, hopefully, of a future study.

There are three main aims of the study. First comes the analysis of the political situation in Thrace and Macedonia for the duration of the Persian presence. From ca. 513 to ca. 465, the situation in this region was dynamic: the Persians transferred a large army into Europe three times (ca. 513, 492, 480) but due to Greek resistance (499–494 and 479 onwards) they failed to impose their

1 All dates are BC, unless otherwise stated.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_002

authority for a longer period. In order to obtain a clearer idea of these processes, it is necessary to examine the causes, aims, and results of the campaigns of Darius, Megabazus, Mardonius, and Xerxes, including the route followed by the Persian army and the response of the local Thracians, Paeonians, Greeks, and Macedonians. The expulsion of the Persians from Europe must also be examined, along with its influence on the political processes in Thrace and Macedonia. The second aim of the study is to identify the nature of Persian power in the newly conquered lands. It is important to clarify whether a Persian satrapy was formed and whether the population was obliged to pay annual tribute and perform services. It is further necessary to clarify the status of Macedonia and its rulers Amyntas and Alexander I, and of the tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, Miltiades the Younger. The third aim of the study is to locate the various Thracian and Paeonian tribes that were directly or indirectly connected with the events considered. Of particular importance is the location of cities, rivers, lakes, and mountains that directly relate to the route followed by Persian military commanders and define the scope of their conquests.

The study primarily addresses literary evidence which, though scarce, conveys a fairly clear idea of the state of affairs during the period examined. In most cases, preference is given to information provided by Herodotus, since his work alone chronicles the full extent of the Persian presence in Thrace and Macedonia. The information provided by him is approached with the necessary criticism, especially when it comes to the deeds of the Macedonian ruler Alexander I. The same critical approach is adopted regarding other ancient authors that provide diverse information with historical, geographical, mythographic, and ethnographic focus. Of these scattered reports some are unique, others are contrary to the assertions of Herodotus, and still others supplement or confirm them. Along with the literary evidence, the numismatic and archaeological finds are considered, as well as related epigraphic inscriptions.

Literary Evidence

In the following section, a brief biographical survey is made of authors whose evidence is analysed in the text. Aside from Herodotus himself, I have selected mainly those authors who give information that is either completely lacking or is substantially different from that of Herodotus. Their works are listed and reference is made to the information they offer relevant to the issues discussed in this study.

Hecataeus of Miletus (*Ἑκαταῖος Ἡγησάνδρου Μιλήσιος*)

Hecataeus of Miletus, son of Hegesandros, was the most famous among the logographers.[2] The information about his life is very scarce. The Suda lexicon mentions that he was a contemporary of Dionysius of Miletus and that he flourished at the time of the Persian king Darius I. There is a chronological note as well—the sixty-fifth Olympiad (i.e., 520–516).[3] This statement is confirmed by Herodotus, who mentions Hecataeus in regard to the Ionian Revolt (499–494). It appears that at that time he was an adult and one of the leaders of the city, for he was twice involved in making important decisions, but in either case his advice was ignored.[4] After the suppression of the revolt Hecataeus was sent by his fellow citizens to negotiate with Artaphrenes.[5] Excluding a controversial statement of the Suda,[6] this is the latest chronological information about his life. It is not known when or where he died.

Hecataeus was the author of two works, one of which had a mythographic and the other a geographic nature: *Genealogiae, Tales of the Heroes, or Researches* (Γενεηλογίαι, Ἡρωολογία, Ἱστορίαι) and *Periegesis* (Περιήγησις, Περίοδος Γῆς). Due to the fact that he survives only in quotation mostly by later authors, and due to doubts expressed even in antiquity about the authorship of the *Periegesis*,[7] it is assumed that his works were lost some time after Herodotus, but before Aristotle. According to this assumption, probably in the 3rd century in Alexandria, a text was released that was subsequently quoted by later writers under the name of Hecataeus.[8] Others, however, hold the opinion that the text quoted by the late authors was actually a work of Hecataeus.[9] The mention of the Persian polis Boryza, if anything, is an indication that at least some of the fragments referring to Thrace may reflect the situation during the Persian presence in Europe and, therefore, at the time of Hecataeus.[10]

---

2 See the fragments by Jacoby (*FGrH* 1). For Hecataeus and his works see Cobet 1883: 1–7; Diels 1887: 411–444; Wells 1909: 41–52; Caspari 1910: 236–248; Jacoby 1912: 2667–750; Grossstephan 1915; Pearson 1939: 25–108.

3 Suid. s.v. Ἑκαταῖος = *FGrH* 1 T 1.

4 Hdt. V.36.1–3, 124.1–126.1.

5 Diod. X.25.4 = *FGrH* 1 T 7.

6 Suid. s.v. Ἑλλάνικος.

7 *FGrH* 1 T 15a–c.

8 Cobet 1883: 1–7; Wells 1909: 41–52.

9 Diels 1887: 411–444; Caspari 1910: 236–248; Jacoby 1912: 2673–2675; Pearson 1939: 31–34.

10 See also Caspari 1910: 246 and n40.

Hecataeus was the first author to write prose, both in the field of geography and mythography. With his method of writing, combining geography, ethnography, and history, he was a predecessor of Herodotus, and together with Anaximander Hecataeus was one of the pioneers in geography.[11] It is possible that the geographical map which Aristagoras showed to the Spartan king Cleomenes was exactly his work.[12] Hecataeus acquired some of his information by autopsy. According to Herodotus, he visited Egypt and communicated with the local priests.[13] Agathemerus called him a 'much-travelled man' (ἀνὴρ πολυπλανής),[14] which may mean that he visited not only Egypt, but also other places. It is difficult to assess whether his information on Thrace and Macedonia was acquired by autopsy. Both areas were not far from Miletus and to some extent (a part of Thrace) were under the authority of the Great King. A trip to the Macedonian and Thracian coast was entirely possible. Otherwise, it must be assumed that Hecataeus received information from other travelers or traders from Miletus, who had a strong interest in the northern Aegean and the western Pontic coasts.

The fragments analysed in this text are derived from references in the *Periegesis* to Thrace and the Thracians.[15] Almost all are quoted from Stephanus of Byzantium, who due to the nature of his work is extremely laconic. This fact makes these fragments almost useless for the present study. However, the excerpts for Satrae,[16] Satrocentae,[17] and the poleis Chalastra,[18] Galepsus,[19] and Zone[20] are of great importance. Essential is the fragment cited by Herodianus that mentions the Persian polis Boryza: μετὰ δὲ Βόρυζα, πόλις Περσέων· μετὰ δὲ Θυνίας.[21] The existence of this settlement on the Thracian coast indicates a Persian desire to assert their authority in this area. At the same time, the short period of its existence indicates that Hecataeus had current information on the state of affairs on the Thracian coast.

11 *FGrH* 1 T 11b, T 12a–b.
12 Hdt. v.49.1–7.
13 Ibid. II.143.1, 3.
14 *FGrH* 1 T 12a.
15 For these fragments see Fol 1975: 19–33; Xydopoulos 2007: 39–61.
16 *FGrH* 1 F 157.
17 Ibid. F 181.
18 Ibid. F 146.
19 Ibid. F 152.
20 Ibid. F 161.
21 Ibid. F 166.

Aeschylus of Athens (*Αἰσχύλος Ἀθηναῖος*)

The Athenian Aeschylus, son of Euphorion, was a native of the deme of Eleusis.[22] According to the Marmor Parium, Aeschylus died at the age of sixty-nine in 456/5 and at the time of the Battle of Marathon (490) he was thirty-five.[23] If this information is correct, he was born in 525/4.[24] Aeschylus took part in the Battle of Marathon in which his brother Cynegirus died.[25] His participation in the Battle of Salamis and Plataea together with his other brother Ameinias remains debatable.[26] In 476, or a bit later, Aeschylus left for Sicily.[27] In 472 he was back in Athens, where he presented the play *Persae*. Four years later he was defeated in a theatrical contest by the young Sophocles. According to some sources, angered by the decision of the judges, Aeschylus returned to Sicily.[28] At some point he presented his *Persae* again, this time for a Sicilian audience.[29] It is possible that in 458 he resided in Athens and set the trilogy of plays comprising the *Oresteia* (Ὀρέστεια). According to the *Vita*, Aeschylus won thirteen theatrical contests,[30] whereas the Suda lexicon claims that his victories were twenty-eight.[31] Aeschylus was the author of approximately ninety plays,[32] from which only seven remain intact. The Marmor Parium dates his death in 456/5 in the Sicilian polis Gela.[33]

Some information from *Persae* (Πέρσαι) is analysed in the text.[34] Some evidence agrees with that provided by Herodotus: the number of the ships in

22 *Vit. Aesch.* 1 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff); Hdt. II.156.6; Suid. s.v. Αἰσχύλος. For Aeschylus and his works see Sihler 1877: 109–122; Dieterich 1894: 1065–1084; Herington 1967: 74–85; Winnington-Ingram 1983; Debnar 2005: 7–11; Saïd 2005: 215–232; Kyriakou 2011: 17–184.

23 Marm. Par. Ep. 48, 59.

24 See the discussion by Dieterich 1894: 1065–1066.

25 *Vit. Aesch.* 4 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff); Hdt. VI.114.1; Marm. Par. Ep. 48; Paus. I.14.5; Suid. s.v. Αἰσχύλος.

26 *Vit. Aesch.* 4 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff); Diod. XI.27.2; Paus. I.14.5; Aelian *VH* V.19. Herodotus (VIII.84.1–2), however, mentiones Ameinias of Pallene.

27 *Vit. Aesch.* 9 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff).

28 *Vit. Aesch.* 9, 18 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff); Plut. *Cim.* 8.8.

29 *Vit. Aesch.* 18 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff). It is possible that *Persae* was performed in Sicily between 471 and 469. If this is the case, this means that Aeschylus visited the island at least three times. See Dieterich 1894: 1067

30 *Vit. Aesch.* 13 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff).

31 Suid. s.v. Αἰσχύλος.

32 Ibid.

33 Marm. Par. Ep. 59.

34 For *Persae* see Welcker 1837: 204–249; Prien 1850: 208–245; Keiper 1877; Dieterich 1894: 1075–1076; Winnington-Ingram 1983: 1–15; Debnar 2005: 7–9; Kyriakou 2011: 17–35.

Xerxes' navy[35] and the difficulties accompanying the retreat of the Great King to Asia.[36] On the other hand, the route followed by the corps escorting Xerxes is represented differently by the two authors,[37] allowing the withdrawal of the Great King to be reconstructed in two different ways.

Herodotus of Halicarnassus (*Ἡρόδοτος Ἁλικαρνησσεύς*)

Herodotus, son of Lyxes and Dryo or Rhaeo, was a native of the Dorian polis Halicarnassus.[38] According to Aulus Gellius, who quotes Pamphila, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (*initio belli Peloponnesiaci*) Hellanicus was at the age of sixty-five, Herodotus was fifty-three, and Thucydides was forty.[39] It is tempting to accept this evidence and assume that Herodotus was born in 484. Diels, however, believes that it is a synchronization whereby Pamphila, whose source might have been Apollodorus, not only demonstrates that the authors in question were living at one and the same time, but also that the most important events during their lives happened when they were forty years old—Thucydides was forty years old at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and Herodotus was at the same age when he participated in the founding of Thurii.[40] This supposition appears plausible, for it is not very likely that Hellenistic authors possessed precise information about the age of their predecessors. At some time Herodotus was forced to leave Halicarnassus with his family and settle in Samos. Subsequently he returned to Halicarnassus (before 454/3) and participated in the overthrow of the tyrant Lygdamis.[41] Probably in the next ten years he made a number of travels and settled in Athens.[42] In 444/3 he was among the colonists who founded Thurii in Italy. It was there that he died.[43] The latest securely dated event in his work takes place in 430,[44] suggesting that the final revision of *Histories* and Herodotus' subsequent death must

35 Aesch. *Pers.* 341–343; Hdt. VII.89.1.

36 Aesch. *Pers.* 480–514; Hdt. VIII.115.1–3.

37 Aesch. *Pers.* 480–514; Hdt. VIII.115.3, 118.1–120.1.

38 Suid. s.v. Ἡρόδοτος, Πανύασις. Herodotus was a close relative of the epic poet Panyassis and his brother's name was Theodorus. For Herodotus and his works see Macan 1895: I, IX–CXVIII; Meyer 1899: 196–268; Macan 1908: I.1, XV–XCVII; Jacoby 1913: 205–520; Beloch II.2: 1–5; Struve 1952: 60–78; Marincola 2001: 19–60; Bakker, de Jong, van Wees 2002; Rhodes 2003: 58–72; Dewald, Marincola 2006.

39 Gell. XV.23.1–2.

40 Diels 1876: 12–14, 47–54.

41 Suid. s.v. Ἡρόδοτος.

42 For Herodotus' travels see Jacoby 1913: 247–276.

43 Strabo XIV.2.16; Pliny *NH* XII.8.18; Plut. *De Ex.* 13; Suid. s.v. Ἡρόδοτος.

44 Hdt. VII.137.2–3.

be placed after that date. Herodotus does mention the ravaging of Attica by the Lacedaemonians,[45] pointing to their annual invasions in that region in the years 431–425.[46] He, however, does not cite the fortification of Decelea by the Spartans in 413.[47] Moreover, he makes no mention of the plague in Athens in the summer of 430 though there is an appropriate place in his work for recording this tragic event.[48] This fact and the possibility that the *Histories* were not completed due to the death of Herodotus leads Jacoby to date his death between 430 and 424.[49] Other scholars place both the death of Herodotus and the completion of his work to the time after the end of the Archidamian war.[50]

The only work of Herodotus is his *Histories* (Ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις), divided into nine books.[51] Herodotus himself says that the main goal of his work is to preserve the memory of great deeds and to explain the reasons for the wars between Greeks and barbarians.[52] The first three books describe the history, geography, customs, traditions, and religion of the Persians and the peoples conquered by them. The fourth book is devoted mainly to the Scythians and the campaign of Darius in their lands, and to the Persian expedition in Libya and the history of Cyrene. The fifth and sixth books narrate events from the withdrawal of Darius from Scythia to the campaign of Xerxes against Greece. Moreover, there are a number of historical digressions concerning Athens and Sparta, the Bacchiadae of Corinth, Miltiades son of Cypselus and his nephew Miltiades the Younger, and so forth. The final three books detail the campaign of Xerxes against Greece and (in brief) the subsequent counter-offensive of the Greeks. The work ends with the capture of Sestus by the Athenians.

Herodotus' *Histories* was a new and original work. He was the originator of a new genre of prose through which the author sought to demonstrate his complex knowledge of history, geography, religion, and the manners and customs of the tribes described by him. He acquired this knowledge from the works of his predecessors, from his own observations, and especially from oral tradition. Herodotus states that he is obliged to tell everything he had heard

45 Ibid. IX.73.3.

46 Thuc. II.19.1–2, 55.1, 57.1–2; III.1.1–2, 26.1–4; IV.2.1.

47 Ibid. VII.19.1–2. How, Wells 1928: ad IX.73.

48 Hdt. VII.133.1–2. Jacoby 1913: 232. Cf. Paus. III.12.7.

49 Jacoby 1913: 230–232, 372–379.

50 Todd 1922: 35–36; Fornara 1971: 25–34.

51 The division of *Histories* into nine books was not made by Herodotus, but probably by the philologists of Alexandria. At the time of Diodorus (XI.37.6) the division into nine books was already a fact.

52 Hdt. I.1.0.

(though he was not obliged to believe it).[53] His work is therefore variegated with digressions devoted to sightseeing, myths, miracles, and legends. Even in antiquity he was defined by some authors as a narrator of myths[54] and was accused of a conscious misinterpretation of the facts.[55] Some modern scholars maintain a skeptical attitude toward information provided by Herodotus.[56]

Thrace and Macedonia occupy an insignificant portion of the work of Herodotus. Excluding the Thracian *logos*,[57] the information about Thracians is sporadic and incomplete, usually given in regard to the campaigns of Darius and Xerxes or their military commanders. Even within the Thracian *logos* there is a lack of detailed and systematic information about the history, geography, and ethnography of Thrace. Herodotus' discussion of the Thracian rivers flowing into the Istros[58] and the description of a number of tribes, rivers, and lakes,[59] as well as of the religious customs of the Getae,[60] remains outside the *logos*. Herodotus obtained his information about Thrace and the Thracians mostly from the oral tradition,[61] and presumably also from preceding authors, particularly Hecataeus.[62] It is obvious that only some of his information was obtained through autopsy, because it is not logical to assume that Herodotus personally explored the river Istros, thus learning about the geographical order and the names of its Thracian tributaries,[63] or even that he visited the Thracians living in the lands above the Crestones.[64] This, however, does not decrease the value of his evidence, especially with respect to those facts that are essential for the present study. They are discussed in detail in the appropriate places in the text.

The information about Macedonia is even scarcer. Not only are a historical retrospection and a geographical excursus lacking, but also information about

53 Ibid. II.123.1; VII.152.3.

54 *FGrH* 688 T 8a; Diod. I.69.7; Strabo XI.6.2–3.

55 Plut. *Herod. Malign.* 1, 26, 39, 43; Lucian *VH* 2.31.

56 Fehling 1971; Armayor 1978: 45–62; 1980: 51–74; 1985; West 1985: 278–305. See, however, Pritchett 1993 who criticizes these authors.

57 For Herodotus' evidence of Thrace and Thracians see Fol 1976: 7–26; Asheri 1990: 131–163; Xydopoulos 2007: 86–109.

58 Hdt. IV.49.1.

59 Ibid. VII.108.2–115.2.

60 Ibid. IV.94.1–96.2.

61 Ibid. IV.90.1, 95.1–5; V.10.1; VI.46.3–47.1; VII.55.3; VIII.120.1.

62 For this possibility see Herrmann 1911: 382–384; Jacoby 1912: 2713–2715; Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 67–69; Zahrnt 2008: 108–115.

63 Hdt. IV.49.1.

64 Ibid. V.5.1.

the religion and customs of the Macedonians. Indeed, apart from the passage dedicated to Perdiccas I and his brothers[65] and some scattered pieces of information,[66] the information on Macedonia mainly refers to the deeds of its ruler Alexander[67] and to a considerably lesser degree to those of his predecessor Amyntas.[68]

In most cases Herodotus mentions Macedonia and the Macedonians in regard to events directly related to the issues examined in this study. Some stories in which Alexander is the protagonist are rightly questioned by scholars and are often viewed as a product of his propaganda after the Battle of Plataea (479), when the Macedonian ruler sought to erase the memory of his cooperation with the Persians (480/79). These stories may have been told to Herodotus personally by Alexander or by his son Perdiccas II, or by another member of the dynasty.[69] The possibility that some of the information was obtained by an Athenian source should not be rejected. Despite doubts over the authenticity of some stories, Herodotus remains a valuable and even indispensable source for the early history of Macedonia, due to the lack of detailed and reliable information in other ancient authors.

Apart from Thrace and Macedonia, Paeonia also finds its place in the work of Herodotus. Information about the Paeonians refers mostly to Persian activity in the Thraco-Macedonian region,[70] but there are also facts related to their way of living and their customs.[71] They are mentioned as part of the Persian army in the Battle of Plataea[72] as well as in two anecdotes,[73] in one of which some scholars find a real historical background.[74] The information about the Paeonians is useful in determining the territorial scope of the lands conquered by Megabazus and Mardonius and it partially answers whether the Great King lost his subordinate lands in Europe during the Ionian Revolt. Moreover, it leads

65 Ibid. VIII.137.1–139.1.

66 Ibid. V.17.1; VI.44.1, 45.1; VII.25.2, 73.1, 108.1, 127.1, 131.1; VIII.115.3–4, 121.2, 126.2; IX.31.5, 89.4.

67 Ibid. V.17.2, 19.1–22.2; VII.173.3–4; VIII.34.1, 136.1–3, 140A.1–140B.4; IX.44.1–45.3.

68 Ibid. V.18.1–5; V.94.1.

69 Ibid. V.22.1—Ἕλληνας δὲ εἶναι τούτους τοὺς ἀπὸ Περδίκκεω γεγονότας, κατά περ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι; ibid. VII.73.1—ὡς Μακεδόνες λέγουσι; ibid. VIII.138.3—ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων. These passages are not connected directly to Alexander's deeds, but are strong evidence (at least the first one) for the possibility that he, or some of his successors, was Herodotus' source.

70 Ibid. V.14.1–16.1, 17.1, 23.1, 98.1–4; VII.115.2, 124.1, 185.2; VIII.115.3–4

71 Ibid. V.16.1–4.

72 Ibid. IX.32.1.

73 Ibid. V.1.1–2.1, 12.1–14.1.

74 Merker 1965: 40; Hammond 1979: 56.

scholars to different conclusions about the movement of the army of Xerxes both during the expedition against Greece and during his withdrawal to Asia.

Thucydides of Athens (*Θουκυδίδης Ὀλόρου Ἀθηναῖος*)

The Athenian Thucydides, son of Hegesipyle and Oloros,[75] was a native of the deme Halimus.[76] It is known that he shared Thracian ancestry and that he was a relative of Miltiades the Younger and Cimon.[77] According to Pamphila, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war he was at the age of forty (i.e., he was born in 471).[78] This dating, however, is questioned by scholars.[79] Thucydides was born certainly not later than 454 for in 424/3 he was appointed *strategos*,[80] a position with a minimum age requirement of thirty. This does not mean, however, that he was appointed *strategos* at the age of thirty, considering that Alcibiades, who became a *strategos* when he was about thirty, was defined by his colleague Nicias as too young (νεώτερος).[81] Thucydides himself indicates that he was old enough to understand events at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.[82] For these reasons it is generally accepted that Thucydides was born between 460 and 455. The date of his death is also controversial, as it may be considered certain that he was alive even after the end of the war (404).[83] Clues in his work lead scholars to believe that Thucydides was still writing during the last years of the rule of Archelaus, or even after his death (400/399).[84]

Almost nothing is known about the early years of Thucydides' life. The vivid description of the epidemic plague in the summer of 430 and the fact that Thucydides himself suffered from it[85] suggest he was in Athens at this

75 For the name of Thucydides' father, Oloros or Orolos, see Luschnat 1970: 1088; Canfora 2006: 3–6.

76 Plut. *Cim.* 4.2. For Thucydides and his work see Wilamowitz-Moelendorff 1877: 326–367; Schöll 1878: 433– 51; Laqueur 1937: 316–357; Pearson 1942: 27–48; Luschnat 1970: 1085–1354; Marincola 2001: 61–104; Rengakos, Tsakmakis 2006.

77 Plut. *Cim.* 4.1. Marcellin. *Vita Thucydidis* 2, 14–18; Suid. s.v. Θουκυδίδης.

78 Gell. XV.23.2.

79 See the discussion by Diels 1876: 47–49; Luschnat 1970: 1093–1094.

80 Thuc. IV.104.4.

81 Ibid. VI.12.2. See also VI.17.1.

82 Ibid. I.1.1; V.26.5.

83 Ibid. V.26.1–5. See also D.H. *Th.* 24; Marcellin. *Vita Thucydidis* 45.

84 Thuc. II.100.2—ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ᾠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τἆλλα διεκόσμησε τά τε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσονι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτὼ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι. See Luschnat 1970: 1094–1095; Canfora 2006: 17–20.

85 Thuc. II.47.3–51.6.

time. Six years later he was already an Athenian *strategos* and as such he unsuccessfully tried to prevent the conquest of Amphipolis by the Spartan commander Brasidas.[86] While he did manage to save Eion, this success was not enough for the Athenians and he was forced to spend twenty years in exile.[87] It is not known when (or whether) he returned to Athens[88] or where he died.[89]

The work of Thucydides, traditionally called a *History of the Peloponnesian War*,[90] was subsequently divided into eight books[91] describing events to 411.[92] Thucydides himself states that he began his work immediately after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, for he realized that it would be large and would surpass in importance all previous wars.[93] It is logical to assume that his plans included the description of events up to the end of the war (404), but because of his death the work remained unfinished.

The *History of the Peloponnesian War* is different from everything written before. The author's goal is to describe the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians.[94] In contrast to the logographers he criticizes,[95] he strictly adheres to his initial intentions, omitting the digressions in Herodotus' style. In Thucydides' work digressions are rare, generally brief and do not contain

86 Ibid. IV.103.1–107.2. For Thucydides' *strategia* see Luschnat: 1097–103; Canfora 2006: 11–13.

87 Thuc. V.26.5.

88 Arist. *Fr.* 137 (Rose); Plut. *Cim.* 4.2; Paus. I.23.9. For the possibility that Thucydides was in Athens in the years 413–411 see Canfora 2006: 15–16.

89 Plut. *Cim.* 4.2; Paus. I.23.9; Marcellin. *Vita Thucydidis* 31–33.

90 For the title of Thucydides' work see Luschnat 1970: 1108–1112.

91 The division of Thucydides' work into eight books was a fact at the time of Dionysius Halicarnassus (*Th.* 16, 24). See also Plut. *De Garr.* 21; Marcellin. *Vita Thucydidis* 43. Diodorus (XII.37.2; XIII.42.5) also mentions eight books, but adds that there was a division of Thucydides' work into nine books, as well.

92 All surviving manuscripts end with the events of 411. It appears that this was also valid for the time of Marcellinus (*Vita Thucydidis* 45), who claims that Thucydides' work ended with the twenty-first year of the war, i.e. 411. Apart from that, he adds that the events of the last six years of the war were described by Xenophon and Theopompus in their works entitled Ἑλληνικά and Ἑλληνικαὶ ἱστορίαι. Diodorus (XIII.42.5) states that the works of Xenophon and Theopompus begin at the point where Thucydides had left off. He, however, records that the twenty-second year of the war was the last in Thucydides' narrative (ibid. XII.37.2; XIII.42.5—codices P F J M T mention the twenty-fourth year of the war). According to Plutarch (*De Garr.* 21), the eighth book of Thucydides ends with the second withdrawal of Alcibiades (407). See, however, Xen. *Hell.* I.5.16–17.

93 Thuc. I.1.1.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid. I.21.1.

information about myths, miracles, interesting events, etc.[96] They do not violate the integrity of the text and in most cases can be considered an important supplement to it.[97] The same applies to the *Archaeology*, which briefly surveys the history of Greece before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.[98] Thucydides uses this historical retrospection to substantiate his statement that this war was the most important that had been waged until then. On the other hand, his work abounds with speeches of various natures, delivered by protagonists or minor characters. From a modern point of view, the inserted speeches violate the integrity of the text. This was, however, a traditional technique that gave the author the opportunity not only to introduce the readers into the environment but also to enhance the impact of the historical narrative and in a relatively neutral way to present his thoughts and views on the issues examined. This approach, of course, does not diminish the value of the work of Thucydides, which is distinguished by its precision and rationality.

Thucydides was a contemporary and partially a participant in the events he describes.[99] This gave him the opportunity to gather information both from personal experience and from people who took part in the war,[100] and in some cases from formal inscriptions.[101] It is logical to assume that the information available to him about Thrace and Macedonia was obtained both during his *strategia* and his long exile in Thrace.[102] The possibility that he visited Macedonia should not be rejected, taking into consideration that his Thracian domain was situated not far from this country[103] and in particular because of the excursus dedicated to Archelaus,[104] a ruler famous for extending hospitality to educated Greeks.

---

96 Even when he describes the epidemic in Athens (in the beginning of the summer of 430) Thucydides (II.47.3–51.6) does not connect this heartrending event to the will of the Gods or the sins of the Athenians.

97 See for example Thuc. II.96.1–97.6, 99.1–6; VI.1.1–5.3.

98 Ibid. I.1.1–18.3.

99 Ibid. I.22.2; II.48.3; IV.104.4–107.2.

100 Ibid. I.22.1.

101 For that issue see Canfora 2006: 26–29; Smarczyk 2006: 495–522.

102 See Zahrnt 2006: 589–614; Xydopoulos 2007: 129–143.

103 Plut. *Cim*. 4.1–2; Marcellin. *Vita Thucydidis* 14.

104 Thuc. II.100.2. Hammond 1979: 137 analyses the information provided by Thucydides (I.57.3–5; IV.79.2, 128.5, 132.1, and I.62.2; IV.103.3, 107.3; also II.80.7, 101.5 and IV.83.5, 125.1) and concludes that he visited Macedonia not only at the time of Archelaus, but also at the time of Perdiccas II.

The passages of Thucydides relevant to this study can be divided into two groups. The first contains evidence related to tribes,[105] toponyms,[106] and hydronyms,[107] as well as other useful information,[108] in some cases confirming and in other cases supplementing and specifying Herodotus' evidence. The second group contains information about events during the Pentekontaetia and were associated with the expulsion of the Persians from Europe.[109] These passages are not unique, but some have certain nuances which raise a discussion in the literature.[110] The same group includes the passages dedicated to Pausanias,[111] which are examined and discussed in the text in regard to the possibility of the re-establishment of Persian authority in Byzantium and Sestus.

Ctesias of Cnidus (*Κτησίας*)

Ctesias of Cnidus, son of Ctesiarchos or Ctesiochos, was a physician who served for seventeen years at the court of the Persian king Artaxerxes II.[112] Having left Persia (probably in 398/7), he came back to Cnidus and visited Sparta. It is assumed that he was put on trial in Rhodes, but this part of his biography remains controversial.[113] Ctesias was the author of several works from which only fragments survived: *Periodos, Periploi or Periegesis* (Περίοδος, Περίπλους or Περιήγησις), at least in three books,[114] *Indica* (Ἰνδικά), in one book[115] and *Persica* (Περσικά) in twenty-three books.[116] He probably wrote medical treatises as well,[117] and also the treatise *On the Tributes of Asia* (Περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν φόρων),[118] as it is not clear whether it was a separate work or a part of *Persica*.

---

105 Thuc. II.96.2–3, 98.4, 99.3, 5, 101.3; VII.27.1–2.

106 Ibid. II.98.2, 99.1.

107 Ibid. IV.108.1; V.7.4.

108 Ibid. I.100.3; II.96.1, 97.1, 99.6; IV.102.2–3.

109 Ibid. I.89.1–3, 94.2, 98.1.

110 See for example Thucydides' claim (I.89.2) that Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont laid siege to Sestus. Cf. Hdt. IX.114.2; Diod. XI.37.4–5.

111 Thuc. I.94.1–95.6, 128.3–131.1.

112 *FGrH* 688 T 1a–3a. For the duration of Ctesias' stay in the court of Artaxerxes II see Jacoby 1922: 2033–2036; Brown 1978: 1–10; Stronk 2010: 6–9.

113 *FGrH* 688 F 30—Κτησίου εἰς Κνίδον τὴν πατρίδα ἄφιξις καὶ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ κρίσις πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀγγέλους ἐν Ῥόδωι καὶ ἄφεσις. See Jacoby 1922: 2036; Brown 1978: 18; Lenfant 2004: XX–XXII.

114 *FGrH* 688 F 59.

115 Ibid. T 10.

116 Ibid. T 8a.

117 Ibid. F 67–68.

118 Ibid. F 53–54.

The works *On Rivers* (Περὶ ποταμῶν)[119] and *On Mountains* (Περὶ ὀρῶν),[120] are also attributed to Ctesias, but it is disputed whether they were separate treatises or parts of his other works.[121]

Information about the life of Ctesias is obtained almost entirely from his own works. It is true that Xenophon mentions him in connection with the Battle of Cunaxa, but it appears that he had no source independent of Ctesias, and simply retold his statements.[122] Ctesias states in his work that in his research he used the Persian royal archives and that, as far as *Persica* is concerned, he was witness to some of the events he described, and others he learned personally from the Persians.[123] From the surviving fragments it is clear that he was inclined to tell miracle stories (especially in *Indica*)[124] and that he did not fail to note his personal participation in a number of events. Even in ancient times he was viewed as a writer of fictional stories and for this reason he was often accused of misrepresentation of the facts.[125] The evaluation of the majority of modern authors is not less critical. Jacoby, for example, believes that the information provided by Ctesias has no historical value.[126] Dorati, for his part, concludes that Ctesias never actually left Cnidus and instead gathered his information from circulated rumours and the works of other authors.[127] In regard to *Persica*, Bichler assumes that Ctesias simply played a provocative game directed mainly against Herodotus.[128]

---

119 Ibid. F 74.

120 Ibid. F 73.

121 See the fragments by Jacoby (*FGrH* 688); Lenfant 2004. For Ctesias and his works see Jacoby 1922: 2032–2073; Bigwood 1978: 19–41; Brown 1978: 1–19; Dorati 1995: 33–52; Bichler 2004: 105–116; Lenfant 2004; 2007: 202–205; Stronk 2007: 25–58; 2010: 2–54; Wiesehöfer, Rollinger, Lanfranchi 2011.

122 Xen. Anab. 1.8.26—σὺν τούτοις δὲ ὢν καθορᾷ βασιλέα καὶ τὸ ἁμφ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στῖφος: καὶ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὼν τὸν ἄνδρα ὁρῶ ἵετο ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ παίει κατὰ τὸ στέρνον καὶ τιτρώσκει διὰ τοῦ θώρακος, ὥς φησι Κτησίας ὁ ἰατρός, καὶ ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸς τὸ τραῦμά φησι. 1.8.27—παίοντα δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀκοντίζει τις παλτῷ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν βιαίως: καὶ ἐνταῦθα μαχόμενοι καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ Κῦρος καὶ οἱ ἁμφ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρου, ὁπόσοι μὲν τῶν ἀμφὶ βασιλέα ἀπέθνῃσκον Κτησίας λέγει: παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἦν: Κῦρος δὲ αὐτός τε ἀπέθανε καὶ ὀκτὼ οἱ ἄριστοι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔκειντο ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ.

123 *FGrH* 688 T 3, 8a. For the existence of the Persian royal archives and the possibility that Ctesias used them see Jacoby 1922: 2047–2049; Lenfant 2004: XXXVI–XXXIX; Stronk 2010: 15–25.

124 *FGrH* 688 T 13, 19.

125 Ibid. T 7b, 11a–fβ, 11gγ–hδ.

126 Jacoby 1922: 2047—'In allen übrigen Teilen aber ist der historische Wert seiner Nachrichten gleich Null.'

127 Dorati 1995: 33–52. See also Dorati 2011: 81–109.

128 Bichler 2004: 105–116.

Persica is the only work of Ctesias which is important to this study. In the first six books he decribes the history of the Assyrians (I–III) and the Medes (IV–VI); the remaining seventeen books are devoted to the Persians (VII–XXIII). Fragments are preserved in a number of authors but for the most part are quoted by Diodorus, Nicolaus Damascenus, Plutarch, and Photios' epitome.[129] It is logical to assume that Ctesias started to write *Persica* after he had left Persia (probably in 398/7) but the possibility should not be rejected that he recorded some events during his stay at the court of Artaxerxes II. The last event mentioned concerns the year of 393/2,[130] which is the *terminus post quem* for the final revision of *Persica*. The records of Patriarch Photios make it clear that Ctesias adheres to events and avoids the digressions in Herodotus' style.[131] It is Photios again who claims that Ctesias differs (in almost everything) from Herodotus (σχεδὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀντικείμενα Ἡροδότῳ ἱστορῶν), whom he calls a liar and author of fictional stories.[132] At the same time the extant fragments suggest that in certain places he uses Herodotus as a source, but misrepresents information provided by him.

In the monograph I analyse only parts of fragment 13 (after Jacoby) of *Persica*.[133] They are important, for they present an alternative to Herodotus' information. For example, Ctesias mentions an expedition against the Scythians led by the satrap of Cappadocia Ariaramnes, which preceded the Scythian campaign of Darius. He tells about the massacre of eighty thousand Persian warriors left in Europe after the campaign in question and the punishment of the citizens of Chalcedon for their disloyalty to Darius. This information is either missing in Herodotus or presented differently. All these difficult problems are discussed at the appropriate places in the text.

Speusippus of Athens (*Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος*)

The Athenian Speusippus was the son of Eurymedon and Potone, the sister of Plato.[134] He was a student at the academy of his uncle, and after his death he

129 According to the Suda (Παμφίλη = *FGrH* 688 T 16) Pamphila of Epidaurus, the daughter of Soteridas, wrote an epitome of Ctesias' work in three books. This statement rises doubts as to whether Photios had access to the work of Ctesias, or was familiar with Pamphila's epitome only. See Jacoby 1922: 2066; Bigwood 1976: 2; Stronk 2010: 34–35.

130 *FGrH* 688 F 27.71.

131 Ibid. T 13.

132 Ibid. T 8a.

133 Ibid. F 13.20–22.

134 For Speusippus and his works see Stenzel 1929: 1636–1669; Markle 1976: 92–97; Tarán 1981; Natoli 2004.

headed it for eight years (348/7–340/39).[135] Speusippus was the author of a large number of treatises and dialogues, of which only fragments survived.[136] *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II* remains intact, but its authorship is disputed.[137] It is important because it contains information about the early history of Macedonia that differs from Herodotus. *The Letter to Philip* claims that the Macedonian ruler Alexander killed the emissaries sent by Xerxes to Greece to demand 'earth and water.' Moreover, it is mentioned that Alexander rescued the Greeks camping at Heracleium after informing them of the betrayal of the Aleuadae and the Thessalians.[138] It appears that this information derives from Damastes of Sigeon (καίτοι τούτων χρῆν μὴ μόνον Ἡρόδοτον καὶ Δαμάστην μεμνῆσθαι τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν), a near-contemporary of Herodotus.[139]

Cornelius Nepos (*Cornelius Nepos*)

Cornelius Nepos was a native of Transpadane Gaul.[140] The supposition that he was born in Ticinum remains debatable.[141] Nepos lived and worked in the 1st century but the precise dates of his birth and death are unknown. The words of Nepos himself make it clear that he outlived Titus Pomponius Atticus, whose death can be dated to the year 32.[142] Additional information is provided by Pliny the Elder, according to whom he died at the time of Octavian Augustus (i.e., after the year 27).[143] Pliny the Elder, quoting Nepos, also claims that the sailor Eudoxus of Cyzicus was Nepos' contemporary.[144] This fact and the information that Atticus was his close friend[145] is an indication that he belonged to the generation of Atticus and Cicero and was probably born at the time of transition between the two centuries. Not later than the year 65 Cornelius Nepos moved to Rome. Almost nothing is known about his career in the city except that he never became a senator.[146] It appears, however, that

135 D.L. IV.1.1, 2.14; Suid. s.v. Σπεύσιππος.

136 D.L. IV.1.4–5. See the fragments and the commentary on them by Tarán 1981: 114–456.

137 See the discussion by Stenzel 1929: 1668–1669; Natoli 2004: 23–31.

138 Speus. *Letter to Philip* 3–4.

139 Suid. s.v. Δαμάσης.

140 Pliny *NH* III.18.127–128. See also Cic. *Fam.* XV.16.1; Plin. *Ep.* IV.28.1. For Nepos and his works see Wissowa 1900: 1408–1417; Dionisotti 1988: 35–49; Titchener 2003: 85–99; Pryzwansky 2009: 97–108; Beneker 2009: 109–121; Stem 2012.

141 Mommsen 1869: 62n1.

142 Nepos *Att.* 22.3.

143 Pliny *NH* IX.63.137; X.30.60.

144 Ibid. II.67.169. For Eudoxus' travels see Strabo II.3.4–5.

145 Nepos *Att.* 13.7.

146 Plin. *Ep.* V.3.6.

he was a respected person—to a certain extent proved by his correspondence with Cicero.[147]

Cornelius Nepos was the author of significant number of works: *Chronica* in three books,[148] *Exempla* in (at least) five books,[149] *Life of Cato* (Vita Catonis),[150] *Life of Cicero* (Vita Ciceronis)[151] and *On Famous men* (De viris illustribus) in not less than sixteen books.[152] Moreover, Nepos wrote lyric poems[153] and is assumed to have written a geographical work, too.[154] His main work, *On famous men*, contained biographies of a number of eminent personalities—historians, poets, military commanders, grammarians, and others. Part of it survives under the name *De excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium*. It contains twenty-two biographies of foreign military commanders, one dedicated to the Athenian Miltiades.[155] Some aspects of the biography in question are analysed in the present study.

A number of pieces of information in the biography of Miltiades present alternatives to Herodotus' information: the Carians peopling Lemnos,[156] the escape of Miltiades from the Thracian Chersonesus due to the advice given at Istros,[157] some events at the Battle of Marathon,[158] the expedition against Paros,[159] and the trial against Miltiades.[160] Due to the silence of Cornelius Nepos, his sources remain controversial. It is assumed that he uses Ephorus and through him Dionysius of Miletus.[161] Some scholars reconstruct events differently depending on their preference for following Herodotus or Nepos. Serious errors in the biography of Miltiades, however, cast doubt not so much on the quality of Nepos' sources, as on his ability to handle adequately the information available to him. For example, he mixes the personalities of the

147 Suet. *Jul.* 55; Macr. *Sat.* II.1.14.
148 Catul. 1; Gell. XVII.21.3; Aus. *Ep.* 12.
149 Gell. VI.18.11.
150 Nepos *Cat.* 3.5.
151 Gell. XV.28.1–2.
152 Charis. P.141, 13K.
153 Plin. *Ep.* V.3.6.
154 See Pliny *NH* V.1.4.
155 For this biography see Casson 1915: 69–90.
156 Nepos *Miltiades*. 1.4–3.1. Cf. Hdt. VI.138.1–140.2.
157 Nepos *Miltiades*. 3.1–6. Cf. Hdt. VI.40.1–2.
158 Nepos *Miltiades*. 4.2–5.5. Cf. Hdt. VI.102.1–108.1, 109.1–114.1. See Casson's analysis 1915: 72–78.
159 Nepos *Miltiades*. 7.1–4. Cf. Hdt. VI.132.1–135.1. See Casson 1915: 78–81.
160 Nepos *Miltiades*. 7.5–6. Cf. Hdt. VI.136.1–3. See Casson 1915: 81–83.
161 Casson 1915: 85–88.

Elder and Younder Miltiades and states that during the trial against Miltiades the Younger he was defended by his brother Stesagoras, who at that time was already dead. Despite these errors, some scholars prefer to follow Nepos rather than Herodotus.[162] Most important for this study is the assertion of Nepos that Miltiades imposed his power in Lemnos about the time (*eisdem temporibus*) of Darius' campaign in Scythia. In this case there is no difference in the information provided by Herodotus and Nepos, because Herodotus gives no specific dating of this event. Nonetheless, by making further analysis of the source basis, the study concludes that the assertion of Nepos should be rejected.

***Strabo of Amaseia* (*Στράβων Ἀμασεύς*)**

Strabo was a native of Amaseia, located in northeast Asia Minor.[163] There is no information about his family on his father's side. By his maternal line, he had strong family relations to the Pontic dynasty: his mother's great-grandfather (πρόπαππος τῆς μητρὸς ἡμῶν), named Dorylaus, was a friend of Mithridates Euergetes, and Dorylaus' nephew, also named Dorylaus, was appointed priest of Comana thanks to his personal friendship with Mithridates Eupator. He was subsequently charged with treason and removed from his position. Strabo's mother's uncle, Moaphernes, was a friend of Mithridates Eupator. His maternal grandfather, like Dorylaus, betrayed the Pontic king after coming into contact with the Roman commander Lucullus.[164]

The dates of Strabo's birth and death are unknown. According to various assumptions, he was born between 68 and 50. Due to the fact that he mentions (in *Geography*) the death of the Mauritanian King Juba and the coronation of his son Ptolemy,[165] his death can be rightly dated after AD 23.[166] Strabo traveled widely. He visited lands from Armenia in the east to Tirrenia in the west and from Pontus in the north to Ethiopia in the south.[167] At different points in *Geography* he mentions places he visited: Rome,[168] Gyaros,[169]

162 Ibid. 1915: 69–90.

163 Strabo XII.3.15, 39. For Strabo and his works see Niese 1878: 33–45; 1883: 567–602; Sihler 1923: 134–144; Aly 1931: 76–155; Waddy 1963: 296–300; Schenkeveld 1976: 52–64; Clarke 1997: 92–110; Pothecary 1997: 235–246; 1999: 691–704; Dueck 1999: 467–478; 2000; Dueck, Lindsay, Pothecary 2005.

164 Strabo X.4.10; XI.2.18; XII.3.33. See the stemma by Aly 1931: 77–78.

165 Strabo XVII.3.7.

166 For Strabo's birth and death see Niese 1883: 567–575; Aly 1931: 76–78; Pothecary 1997: 245. See also Niese 1878: 35–36n1, who dates Juba's death in AD 18, and not in AD 23.

167 Strabo II.5.11.

168 Ibid. VI.2.6; VIII.6.23.

169 Ibid. X.5.3.

Egypt,[170] Cappadocia,[171] Nysa (where he attended the lectures of Aristodemus[172]), etc. He probably visited other places, too, including cities in Italy, but did not deem it necessary to name them.[173]

Strabo probably wrote two works. The first, *Historical Commentaries* (Ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα), consists of two parts. The second part is a continuation of the work of Polybius (Τὰ μετὰ Πολύβιον). It is divided into forty-three books,[174] from which only eighteen fragments survive.[175] As its title indicates, the work examined the events after 145/4 to the time of Strabo. The latest event mentioned in the fragments refers to the murder of the Jewish king Antigonus (37),[176] but it is logical to assume that the period covered by the work extended at least to the time of the occupation of Egypt by Octavian (30) or even to the year 27. These forty-three books were preceded by four other books (i.e., the first part of the work, probably προπαρασκευή),[177] whose chronological scope is unknown. It is generally assumed that a part of them was dedicated to the deeds of Alexander the Great,[178] but others presume that the first part of the work began with the history of the Diadochi, and τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις was a separate work of Strabo.[179]

The second work of Strabo is *Geography* (Γεωγραφικά), divided into seventeen books. As noted above, in *Geography* the death of the Mauritanian king Juba is mentioned, which is a sign that its final revision should be dated after AD 23. It remains debatable whether the work was written at once or additions were subsequently added to the already finished text.[180]

Geography is essentially a compilation in which hundreds of ancient authors are quoted,[181] but some of the information was acquired by autopsy. In the first two books Strabo disputes with his predecessors and sketches briefly the world known at that time, and in the remaining fifteen books he describes

170 Ibid. II.5.12; XVII.1.24.

171 Ibid. XII.2.3.

172 Ibid. XIV.1.48.

173 For Strabo's travels see Aly 1931: 81–85; Waddy 1963: 296–300; Clarke 1997: 99–102; Dueck 2000: 15–30.

174 *FGrH* 91 T 2.

175 See the fragments by Jacoby (*FGrH* 91 F 1–19). Fragment 3 refers to the deeds of Alexander. For Strabo's historical work see Bauer 1899: 298–302; Aly 1931: 85–90.

176 *FGrH* 91 F 18.

177 Ibid. F 1.

178 Ibid. F 3.

179 See Bauer 1899: 298–302.

180 Niese 1878: 33–36; Sihler 1923: 134–135; Clarke 1997: 102–105; Dueck 1999: 467–478.

181 For Strabo's sources see Aly 1931: 103–147.

the different areas. Along with purely geographical information they contain reports having mythographic, ethnographic, and historical focus, accompanied by references to a number of ancient authors whose works are completely or partially lost. Though this work was not particularly popular in antiquity, the availability of these references gives great value to *Geography* for modern scholars.

Of importance for this study is the information contained in the seventh book, as well as some information from the twelfth and thirteenth books. The seventh is the only book not fully preserved. The reconstruction of its last sheets is based on two *epitomes* and the commentaries of Eustathius. A large part is devoted to Thrace and Macedonia. In the chapters of the monograph are analysed a number of passages relating to the location of some tribes,[182] settlements,[183] regions,[184] mountains,[185] lakes,[186] and other geographical objects,[187] as well as some historical events.[188] Most of them are directly related to the problems examined by Herodotus and can be used to supplement, specify, and correct the information provided by him. It appears, however, that in certain places Strabo uses Herodotus as a source: the identification of Phrygians with Brygi, the story of the campaign of the Paeonians against Perinthus and the localization of the Agrianes by Pangaeum.[189] The last piece of information is important, for if its source was Herodotus, then the passage V.16.1, repeatedly discussed in the literature, was written by him, not by a medieval scribe.

Pliny the Elder (*Plinius Secundus*)

Pliny the Elder of Novum Comum[190] was born in the second half of the year AD 23, or in the first half of the year AD 24.[191] According to his nephew Pliny the Younger he died at the age of fifty-six on August 25, in the year AD 79.[192]

182 Strabo VII.3.2, 7.8; VII. fr. 25, 44 (Meineke).
183 Ibid. VII. fr. 48 (Meineke).
184 Ibid. VII. fr. 36 (Meineke).
185 Ibid. VII. fr. 10 (Meineke).
186 Ibid. VII. fr. 36 (Meineke).
187 Ibid. VII.6.1; XII.3.3.
188 Ibid. VII.3.15; VII. fr. 41 (Meineke); XIII.1.22.
189 Ibid. VII. fr. 25, 41 (Meineke).
190 Suet. *Vita Plinii Secundi*.
191 For Pliny and his works see Münzer 1897; Aly 1951: 294–299; Gundel 1951: 285–294; Hanslik 1951: 341–392; Kroll 1951: 285, 294, 299–341, 392–439; Ziegler 1951: 271–285; Syme 1969: 201–236; Gibson, Morello 2011.
192 Plin. *Ep*. III.5.7; VI.16.

In his early years (probably until AD 59), Pliny served in the Roman army on the Rhine.[193] Subsequently he might have been appointed procurator in four provinces—Narbonensis, Africa, Tarraconensis, and Belgica—but only his appointment in Spain can be considered certain.[194] It appears that later Pliny occupied an important position in Rome, for according to his nephew he had a habit of visiting the Emperor Vespasian before dawn, and then taking up his assigned duties (*ad delegatum sibi officium*).[195] Moreover, to the very end of his life he was the commander of the navy at Misenum, but it is unclear when he received this appointment.[196] It was in this capacity that Pliny met his death while trying to rescue his friends during the eruption of Mt Vesuvius.[197]

Pliny the Elder was the author of seven works. They are listed in order of their composition in a letter of his nephew to his friend Macer: *On Cavalry Javelin Exercise* (*De iaculatione equestri*) in one book, *The Life of Pomponius Secundus* (*De vita Pomponi Secundi*) in two books, *The German Wars* (*Bellorum Germaniae*) in twenty books,[198] *The Student* (*Studiosi*) in three books, *On Doubtful Phraseology* (*Dubii sermonis*) in eight books,[199] *A Continuation of the History of Aufidius Bassus* (*A fine Aufidi Bassi*) in thirty-one books[200] and *Natural history* (*Naturae historiarum*) in thirty-seven books.[201] Of these works only the last survived. It has an encyclopedic nature. Books III–VI of *Natural history* have a geographical focus. Relevant to this study are some passages of the fourth book, part of which is devoted to Thrace and Macedonia.[202] The description of the areas in question is lean and monotonous. Pliny lists a number of tribes, cities, rivers, and mountains, sometimes specifying distances between settlements, but he rarely provides additional information of a historical, or any other nature. Some of his pieces of information are unique and others differ significantly from those of other ancient authors. For example, only Pliny notes the existence of a settlement named Thynias[203] and only he mentiones

193 Ibid. III.5.4. For the military service of Pliny see Ziegler 1951: 273–276; Syme 1969: 204–208.

194 Plin. *Ep.* III.5.17. For that issue see Ziegler 1951: 276–280; Syme 1969: 208–218, 224–226.

195 Plin. *Ep.* III.5.9.

196 Ibid. VI.16.4.

197 Ibid. VI.16.

198 See Gundel 1951: 285–289.

199 See Aly 1951: 294–299.

200 See Gundel 1951: 289–294.

201 Plin. *Ep.* III.5.1–6. For *Natural History* see Hanslik 1951: 341–392; Kroll 1951: 299–341, 392–439.

202 Pliny *NH* IV.10.33–11.51. For that issue see Gerov 1978: 3–20.

203 Ibid. IV.11.45.

the Diobessi and localizes the settlements of the Bottiaei and the Edoni by Hebrus.[204] *Natural history* contains information about tribes, rivers, and mountains mentioned by Herodotus with regard to Persian activity in Europe. A part of it confirms and supplements Herodotus, for example the location of the Sapaei, while another part allows scholars to make different interpretations of some of the relevant issues: the identification of the Tearus River and Mt Orbelus.

Plutarch of Chaeronea (Πλούταρχος Χαιρωνεὺς τῆς Βοιωτίας)

The precise birth date of Plutarch, son of Autobulos,[205] is unknown.[206] He states that during the visit of Emperor Nero in Greece (AD 66/67) he listened to the lectures of the Egyptian philosopher Ammonies in Athens.[207] Taking into account this information and other clues in the sources, it can be concluded that Plutarch was born approximately in AD 46–48.[208] When he was very young he was sent by his fellow citizens on a political mission to the proconsul of Achaea.[209] Subsequently, he visited parts of Greece, Macedonia, Crete, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Italy, including Rome (during the reign of Vespasian).[210] Probably in the 90s of the 1st century AD he became a priest in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.[211] The latest information about Plutarch refers to AD 119, when he was appointed procurator of Achaea.[212]

Plutarch was an extremely prolific author with diverse works.[213] In the monograph are analysed important pieces of information from the biography of Cimon, which is a part of *Parallel Lives* (Βίοι παράλληλοι). Some information does not appear in other ancient authors. This is especially true of Cimon's

---

204 Ibid. IV.11.40–41.

205 For Plutarch's family see Ziegler 1951a: 641–651. It is well known that his father's name was Autobulos, his grandfather's name Lamprias, his brothers' names Lamprias and Timon, and his wife's name Timoxena. He had a daughter Timoxena and four sons, one of whom was named Autobulos and another Plutarch. For his circle of friends see ibid. 665–696.

206 For Plutarch and his works see Mommsen 1870: 295–297; Ziegler 1951a: 636–962; Russell 1968: 130–146; Pelling 1979: 74–96; Hershbell 1993: 143–163; Beck 2014.

207 Plut. *De E ap. Delphos* 1.

208 Mommsen 1870: 295–297; Ziegler 1951a: 639–640.

209 Plut. *Praec. Ger. Reip*. 20.

210 Plut. *De Soll. Anim*. 19. For the early years and travels of Plutarch see Ziegler 1951a: 651–657.

211 For Plutarch's priesthood see ibid. 1951a: 659–662.

212 Euseb. Chron. year 2135—Πλούταρχος Χαιρωνεὺς φιλόσοφος ἐπιτροπεύειν Ἑλλάδος κατεστάθη γηραιός.

213 For Plutarch's works see Ziegler 1951a: 702–947.

campaign against the Persians in the Thracian Chersonese.[214] The information is of particular value, for it shows that even in the mid-460s the Persians controlled parts of their former European possessions, in an important area. Many questions arise from a passage quoting Ion of Chios, who argues that Cimon distributed the booty of Sestus and Byzantium at one and the same time.[215] This piece of information spurs a lively debate in scholarly literature as to whether it was possible for the Persians to mount a counterattack after the conquest of Byzantium by the Greeks (478), aiming at the restoration of the power of the Great King over the cities in question. This possibility raises discussion about the duration of Pausanias' rule over Byzantium. Some of the remaining pieces of information from Plutarch duplicate information provided by Herodotus, others give additional information, and still others refer to events not mentioned by him.

***Mark Justin* (*Marcus Iunianus/Iunianius Iustinus*)**

Almost nothing is known of Justin. He was the author of *Trogi Pompei historiarum Philippicarum epitome*. In this epitome, some indirect clues suggest that Justin lived during the Roman imperial period, in the 2nd or 3rd century AD,[216] or according to some scholars, even in the 4th century AD.[217] It is possible that he was not a citizen of Rome, though it is certain that he lived there for some time.[218] It was during his stay that Justin wrote an epitome of the work of Pompeius Trogus, *Historiarum Philippicarum*, which itself has not survived. This work is a universal history, divided into forty-four books, describing the events from the reign of the kings of Assyria to the time of Octavian Augustus. The first book briefly reviews the history of Assyria, Media, and Persia. The second book is dedicated to Scythia and the history of Athens from the earliest times to the time of Cimon, son of Miltiades. The next four books review the struggles between the Greek poleis to the death of Epaminondas. Books VII–XII trace the history of Macedonia to the death of Alexander the Great, and the remaining books detail the history of the Hellenistic kingdoms and the parallel history of Rome. As Justin's excerpts from the end of the forty-third book make clear, Pompeius Trogus descended from the tribe of Vocontians.[219] Due to his participation in the Sertorian War (77–72) his grandfather, also named Pompeius

214 Plut. *Cim.* 14.1.

215 Ibid. *Cim.* 9.1–4.

216 Steele 1917: 24–26; Alonso-Núñez 1987: 61; Yardley 2000: 632–634; 2003: 5.

217 Klotz 1913: 548; Syme 1988: 358–371.

218 Just. Praefatio 4—per otium quo in urbe versabamur.

219 Ibid. XLIII.5.11–12.

Trogus, received Roman citizenship from Gnaeus Pompeius. The uncle of Pompeius Trogus led a troop of cavalry (*turba equitum*) under the same Pompeius in the war with Mithridates (66–63). His father served under Julius Caesar, and had charge of his correspondence, of receiving embassies and of his ring. All this information, as well as the fact that the work probably ends with the events of the year 19,[220] is a sign that Pompeius Trogus likely lived and wrote at the time of Octavian Augustus.[221]

The epitome of Justin preserves the structure of the original work. It is also divided into forty-four books, each of them accompanied with a prologue, briefly describing the content of the individual books. It is the prologues that make clear how much information is missing from the original volume of *Historiarum Philippicarum*. At the same time they indicate that there are many digressions in the original work that are devoted to the origins of tribes, cities, and countries, as well as digressions having geographical orientation (*situs*). It appears that Justin selected the available material rather randomly by including the most important and interesting moments (according to his own vision) of *Historiarum Philippicarum* in the epitome. His method led to the mutilation of the work of Pompeius Trogus, since the omission of entire sections not only violates the integrity of the text and precludes readers from the possibility of getting a clear picture of the events, but it also deprives scholars from the acquisition of valuable information. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how much information in the epitome derives from the *Historiarum Philippicarum*, and how much is interference from Justin.

The current study discusses parts of the second and seventh book of the epitome. The second book briefly narrates the expedition of Darius against the Scythians,[222] whereas the seventh book is about the relations between Macedonia and Persia during the rule of Amyntas and his son Alexander.[223] With the exception of the story of the massacre of Persian envoys by the young Alexander, the remaining information from the epitome either differs from that of Herodotus, or contains evidence that is missing in his work. This raises the question of the sources used by Justin. Hammond, trying to resolve this issue, concludes that for the early history of Macedonia he uses as sources Marsyas of

220 Ibid. XLIV.5.8.

221 For Pompeius Trogus and Justin see Klotz 1913: 546–548; Steele 1917: 19–41; Kroll 1918: 956–958; Klotz 1952: 2300–2313; Alonso-Núñez 1987: 56–72; Syme 1988: 358–371; Yardley 2000: 632–634; 2003; Levene 2007: 287–289.

222 Just. II.5.8–11.

223 Ibid. VII.3.1–4.2.

Pella and probably Marsyas of Philippi.[224] Due to the highly fragmented nature of their works (only 25 fragments)[225] making a firm conclusion on this issue is extremely risky. Due to the fact that Justin's information is alternative to Herodotus', it is preferred by some scholars for their reconstruction of the early history of Macedonia.[226] Their views are presented and analysed in the text.

Coins

In addition to written sources, the coins of the so-called Thraco-Macedonian tribes, as well as some of the coins attributed to the Macedonian ruler Alexander I are also important for the present study. A huge amount of literature has been accumulated examining the weight standard,[227] the iconography,[228] and the chronology[229] of the specimens available. Discussions have been conducted concerning the reasons of the emergence and termination of this coinage,[230] as well as the location and identity of the tribes, cities (?), and rulers who have implemented it.[231] It is assumed that the tribes that minted these coins created a monetary alliance that at a certain stage was transformed into a military one.[232]

---

224 Hammond 1991: 497, 501–502.

225 *FGrH* 135/6.

226 See for example Hammond 1979: 58–60.

227 Head 1887: 169–170; Raymond 1953: 18–42; Price 1974: 3–4; Youroukova 1992: 14–15; Draganov 2000: 41–43; Lorber 2000: 118–121; Dahmen 2010: 44; Psoma, Zannis 2011: 37–38; Delev 2014: 259–264.

228 Svoronos 1919: 1–28, 36–59, 63–68, 75–90, 100–111; Raymond 1953: 43–48; Zlatkovskaya 1971: 180–181; Price 1974: 4–10; Hammond 1979: 74–82; Youroukova 1992: 11–13; Draganov 2000: 28–41; Lorber 2000: 122–125; Dahmen 2010: 45–46; Psoma, Zannis 2011: 31–33.

229 Head 1887: 169–170, 174; Raymond 1953: 48–59; Zlatkovskaya 1971: 179; Price 1974: 11; Price, Waggoner 1975: 29–30, 34–35, 38–39, 117, 120–121; Hammond 1979: 84–91; Fried 1987: 9; Kagan 1987: 22–24; Price 1987: 44–45; Youroukova 1992: 26–27; Draganov 2000: 44–51; Dahmen 2010: 45–46; Psoma, Zannis 2011: 31; Delev 2014: 89–95, 99–105.

230 Zlatkovskaya 1971: 179; Kraay 1976: 139; Price 1987: 47; Youroukova 1992: 27–28; Draganov 2000: 51–56; Dahmen 2010: 44–45.

231 Head 1887: 169–170, 174–180; Gaebler 1897: 292–293; Head 1911: 197–202; Svoronos 1919: 1–28, 36–59, 63–68, 75–90, 100–111; Raymond 1953: 49–51; Kraay 1976: 139–141; Hammond 1979: 74–82; Lorber 2000: 130–133; Dahmen 2010: 45; Psoma, Zannis 2011: 38–44; Delev 2014: 268–273.

232 Raymond 1953: 58–59. See also Zlatkovskaya 1971: 182–194.

It is interesting to note that from the inscribed pieces, only the names of Bisaltae, Edoni, Laeaeans, and Siriopaeones are known from the works of ancient authors. Those of Zaieleis, Orrescii, Derrones, and Diony(?sii) are hapax and it is considered that the coins of type *Ichnaei*, *Letaei*, and *Tinte* were possibly minted by cities rather than tribes. Moreover, on some of the specimens is inscribed the name of the ruler who minted them: the Edonian king Getas, Doki(?mus), and Mosses. It is assumed that the coins with the legend ΛΙΤΑ, ΒΙΣΑΛΤΙΚΟΣ, and ΔΕΡΡΟΝΙΚΟΣ have also names of rulers inscribed on them.[233] The indisputable identification of some of the tribes and the great iconographic resemblance in most of the specimens suggest that this coinage was minted in the area between Axios and Pangaeum. The discovery of the hoard of Asyut and the Lycian hoard enables the precision of its chronological frames—generally in the period between 530–460. This means that emissions were put into circulation before the emergence of the Persians in Europe and after their expulsion. It appears, however, that it was exactly during the Persian rule over Thrace and Macedonia when tribal coinage experienced its greatest prosperity, not only because of the large number of tribes emitting coins, but also because of the variety of types and denominations and of the high production volume. It is logical to assume that at least a certain part of the coin production (due to its large denomination) represented the tax that the local tribes were obliged to pay to the Great King.[234]

The earliest Macedonian coins are also important for this study, specifically staters and diobols of type *goat*. A part of them has the monogram ΔΕ inscribed, and another part has the inscription ΑΛ or ΛΑ. Usually the depicted goat and the monogram ΔΕ are associated with Edessa, while ΑΛ and ΛΑ with the personality of Alexander I.[235] This identification is disputed by some scholars. Lorber, for example, holds the opinion that the coins of type *goat* belonged to the Mygdones.[236] According to others, the monogram ΔΕ is related to the Derrones,[237] or Bisaltae,[238] ΑΛ and ΛΑ to the Laeaeans.[239] Thus, the allegation that the coins of type *goat* were the earliest Macedonian coins remains debatable.

233 Head 1887: 180; Svoronos 1919: 44–45; Hammond 1979: 76–77.

234 Hdt. III.96.1; VII.108.1.

235 See for example Babelon 1907: 1097–1098, 1102–1103; Head 1911: 198–199; Mushmov 1912: 379; Geyer 1930: 46; Gaebler 1935: 19–20, 150; Raymond 1953: 49–51; Price 1974: 9.

236 Lorber 2000: 130–133.

237 Svoronos 1919: 6–7, 34–36.

238 Hammond 1979: 81.

239 Svoronos 1919: 22–23, 34–36.

More important in this case is a series of coins attributed to Alexander I, which depicts a horseman with a short sword, probably a Persian *akinakes*.[240] It is assumed that the coins in question were minted in the winter of 480/79 and that on their obverse was depicted the image of the Macedonian ruler with an *akinakes*.[241] The proposed interpretation, combined with reports of ancient authors and Persian royal inscriptions, raises the important topic of the status of Alexander I under Xerxes. This problem is properly addressed at the appropriate places in the text.

Epigraphic Evidence

Persian royal inscriptions also provide information on the extension of the power of the Great King in Europe. Some mention the people Yaunā takabarā and Skudra,[242] which are often identified with the tribes peopling the northern coast of the Aegean Sea, and the Macedonians.[243] Some scholars believe that the new European lands conquered by the Persians formed a new satrapy named Skudra. On the other hand, the identification of Skudra and Yaunā takabarā with the above-mentioned tribes remains controversial.[244] Furthermore, as a linguistic study of Cameron has demonstrated, it is possible that the Persian royal inscriptions list only the conquered people, not the administrative units of the empire.[245] All this, combined with reports from Greek authors, generates lively discussion on whether the subordinate lands of the Great King formed a separate satrapy, and if this is the case, whether this satrapy was formed after the campaign of Megabazus, or after that of Mardonius.

In the monograph are quoted other epigraphic inscriptions that have a different value in terms of the issues under consideration. Such is the case of the *Tabula Capitolina* (AD 15),[246] which is the only official document mentioning the date of the Scythian expedition of Darius, and of the inscriptions giving

240 Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 283–287, 306.

241 Ibid. 285–287, 294–295.

242 DSe 29 (Kent 1950: 141–142); DSm 10–11 (Kent 1950: 145); DNa 29 (Kent 1950: 137–138); XPh 27 (Kent 1950: 151); A?P 25–26 (Kent 1950: 156).

243 See different opinions by Rollinger 2006: 373–374n37; Henkelman, Stolper 2009: 293–299.

244 Rollinger 2006: 365–400; Henkelman, Stolper 2009: 293–299.

245 Cameron 1973: 47–56.

246 *IG* XIV.1297; II. 20–25.

information on the location of Berge[247] and Heraclea Sintica.[248] In view of the assumption of Hatzopoulos for identification of Lake Prasias with Lake Pravi, the study examines a fragmentary inscription from Philippi that possibly mentions Mt Dysoron.[249] An Athenian casualty list which records deaths (Athenians, Madytioi, Byzantioi, and citizens at least from one other city) both in the Hellespont and on Thasos is also important.[250] It confirms the information provided only by Plutarch for a campaign led by Cimon (460s) against the Persians unwilling to leave the Thracian Chersonese.[251]

Historiographical Review

In 1832 the first volume of *Geschichte Macedoniens und der Reiche, welche von macedonischen Königen beherrscht wurden* by Ludwig Flathe was published in Leipzig. It appears that Flathe was first to claim that a Persian satrapy was formed in Thrace and Megabazus was appointed as its satrap.[252] Fifteen years later, Otto Abel, in his study on the history of Macedonia before Philip II, concluded that after the campaign of Megabazus, the Macedonian ruler Amyntas became a Persian satrap.[253] The assumptions expressed by Flathe and Abel provoked a debate on whether a separate Persian satrapy was formed in the subordinate European lands of the Great King. This debate, however, raged with full force in the next century.

The works of scholars from the 19th century are devoted to other problems. In these works some aspects of the policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia are mentioned in passing. This was the time of monumental studies devoted to the history of ancient Greece. In the chapters are quoted those written by such eminent scholars as Thirlwall,[254] Grote,[255] Busolt,[256] Abbott,[257] etc. As a rule, these researchs trace in chronological sequence the

247 Bonias 2000: 227–246.
248 Mitrev 2003: 263–272.
249 Vatin 1984: 259–270; Missitzis 1985: 3–14.
250 *IG* i.^{2} 928; *SEG* X.405.
251 Plut. *Cim.* 14.1.
252 Flathe 1832: 20.
253 Abel 1847: 149.
254 Thirlwall 1836.
255 Grote 1853; 1861.
256 Busolt 1888; 1897.
257 Abbott 1892.

history of Greece from the earliest times to the Battle of Chaeronea, or its subjugation by the Romans. These studies pay special attention to the Greco–Persian Wars and the Persian campaigns in Europe mounted by Darius, Megabazus, Mardonius, and Xerxes, and the expansion of the Athenians and their allies after the Battle of Plataea. In most cases, however, apart from some problems, the policy of the Persian kings against Thrace and Macedonia is neglected. The same conclusion is true for studies that represent not only the history of Greece, but also the history of the ancient world, either as a whole, or some apects of it.[258]

From the middle of 19th century, a number of commentaries on Herodotus were published, written by erudite philologists such as Blakesley,[259] Stein,[260] Rawlinson,[261] Abicht,[262] Shuckburgh,[263] Abbott,[264] etc. Although these works have a philological nature, they contain a considerable number of valuable comments on some historical issues. The commentaries of Macan deserve special attention, the first of which were published in two volumes in 1895.[265] The first volume contains the Greek text of Books IV–VI of *Histories*, accompanied by a number of mainly philological observations. The second volume consists of fourteen appendices with analyses of important aspects of the work of Herodotus. Essential for this study are mostly Appendices III and IV, which examine the Scythian campaign of Darius, the Persian power in Thrace until the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt, and, briefly, the expedition of Mardonius. Appendix V, dedicated to the chronolgy of the Ionian Revolt, is also important. With some exceptions (Appendix V), the problems are not analysed in depth, which does not invalidate the conclusions made, since the required argumentation is sufficiently presented. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Macan was the first to express the supposition that the Hellespontic cities had been subjugated before Darius' campaign against the Scythians.[266]

The second part of Macan's commentaries, published in 1908, has the same structure.[267] The first volume, divided into two parts, contains the Greek text

258 Niebuhr 1847; Duncker 1877; 1882; Meyer 1892; 1899.
259 Blakesley 1854.
260 Stein 1859–1862, 1868.
261 Rawlinson 1860.
262 Abicht 1862; 1882; 1883
263 Shuckburgh 1887; 1903; 1906; 1908.
264 Abbott 1893.
265 Macan 1895.
266 Ibid: II.55–56.
267 Macan 1908.

of Books VII–IX, accompanied by many notes with a mainly philological character. The second part consists of nine appendices, of which Appendix II refers to the preparations of Xerxes for the campaign against Greece and the route followed by his army in Asia Minor and Europe. It is particularly useful for any researcher interested in these issues.

In 1876 was published the monography of Cox, *The Greeks and the Persians*.[268] As its title makes clear, it is devoted to the Greco–Persian Wars, but the initial chapters consist of the history of Greece and Persia before the beginning of the conflict. The aim of the author, however, was not related to the analysis of the policy of the Persian kings towards Thrace and Macedonia. Due to this fact he only marks certain events, and his book is useless for authors interested in this topic.

In 1891 and 1892 were published two articles of Welzhofer, which discuss some problems associated with the Greco–Persian Wars.[269] He was first to suggest that the expedition of Mardonius was irrelevant to the conquest of Athens and Eretria, as Herodotus argues, but rather that it aimed to restore the authority of the Great King in the Thraco-Macedonian region, which had been lost during the Ionian Revolt.[270] His opinion is accepted by Beloch, and subsequently by other scholars.

Bury's (1897) article analysing the reasons for the expedition of Darius in Scythia is also interesting.[271] The author expresses the new and original view that the main purpose of the Great King was to establish control over the gold mines of the Agathyrsi, which he localises in Transylvania.[272]

In the second half of 19th century some geographical works and travelogues were published, in which attempts were made for localization of numerous toponyms, hydronyms, and oronyms in Thrace and Macedonia.[273] In his travalogue General Jochmus identifies the river Tearos with Semerdere,[274] and in Kiepert's atlas, Lake Prasias is identified with Butkovo.[275] The supposition of Kiepert marks the beginning of a lively discussion in the literature as to

268 Cox 1876.

269 Welzhofer 1891: 145–149; 1892: 145–166, 657–674, 729–751.

270 Welzhofer 1891: 145–149.

271 Bury 1897: 277–282.

272 Ibid. 281–282.

273 Jochmus 1854: 36–85; Desdevises 1863; Kiepert 1869: Dimitsas 1870. See also Leak 1835 and Kiepert 1848 whose works were published in the first half of 19th century.

274 Jochmus 1854: 44–45.

275 Kiepert 1869: Tab. V (see, however, Kiepert 1848: 28 and Map VII).

the identifiacation of Prasias, which before Kiepert was considered, with few exceptions,[276] as identical with Lake Takhinos.[277]

In the last decade of 19th century, the fundamental work of Wilhelm Tomaschek—*Die Alten Thraker. Eine ethnologische Untersuchung*—was published in two parts.[278] This work marks the beginning of a thorough study of the history, ethnography, geography and language of various Thracian tribes and has been repeatedly quoted by scholars interested in Thrace and Thracians.[279] The first part is an overview of Thracian and some Paeonian tribes. The second part is devoted to the language of the Thracians. It presents Thracian glosses, personal names, names of mountains, rivers, settlements, etc. In the present monograph are listed and discussed some of Tomaschek's localizations of rivers and Thracian tribes.

In the 19th century there was an increased interest in numismatics related to the emissions of the so-called Thraco-Macedonian tribes and to the earliest Macedonian coins.[280] In these studies are described some coins and an attempt is made to localize the tribes that minted them. It was at this time that the assumption was made that the legends ΒΙΣΑΛΤΙΚΟΣ and ΔΕΡΡΟΝΙΚΟΣ inscribed on some specimens represented names of rulers, not tribes.[281]

The early history of Macedonia was not of particular interest in the studies of the 19th century. As a rule, it was seen as a part of the history of Greece and in most cases due attention was paid only to the reign of Philip II and Alexander the Great and, to a much lesser extent, to that of Amyntas I and Alexander I. Even more frustrating is research on various issues relating to Thrace and the Thracians. As already noted, the only comprehensive work on the issue in question was that of Tomaschek. Taking into account this situation, it is not surprising that to the end of 19th century the policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia was not well examined and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, with few exceptions, there was a lack of serious interest in the development of this problem by the scholars working at that time.

---

276 D'Anville 1762: Graeciae Antiquae; Sickler 1824: 405; Larcher 1824: 7nX; Billerbeck 1826: 296; Cramer 1828: 278; Cousinéry 1831: 93.

277 Leak 1835: III.210–211; Abel 1847: 60n6; Stein III: ad V.15; Rawlinson 1860: III.185n3; Desdevises 1863: 49.

278 Tomaschek 1893; 1894.

279 Before Tomaschek's work other studies devoted to the history of the Thracians were published; see Cary 1752: 1–80; Höck 1891: 76–117.

280 Imhoof-Blumer 1883: 65–66, 78–82; Head 1887: 169–181; Gaebler 1897: 289–299.

281 Head 1887: 180.

In the first half of the 20th century, the publication of books devoted to the history of Greece continued.[282] The same is true for articles examining the career of eminent Greeks,[283] as well as for comments on Herodotus' *Histories*.[284] Among them, attention must be paid to the second edition of the four volumes (each divided into two parts) of *Griechische Geschichte* by Karl Julius Beloch. Of particular importance are his observations on certain aspects of the expedition of Mardonius[285] and most of all on particular moments in the career of Pausanias.[286] The commentaries on the text of *Histories* in the revised edition of How and Wells (1928) are also important.[287] Of the study's twenty-three appendixes, Appendix XII examines the Scythian expedition of Darius, and Appendix XIX the size of the army and navy during Xerxes' large-scale campaign against Greece (480/79). One should not dismiss the original—though generally rejected—opinion of Obst in his article *Hat Miltiades am Skythenzug teilgenommen,* according to which Miltiades the Younger did not take part in the Scythian expedition.[288]

In the years 1893–1972, the multi-volume encyclopedia *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* was published. Sixteen supplemental volumes were added to it (1903–1980), the last of which represents an alphabetical register. The encyclopedia is a major achievement of German scholarship and contains a number of valuable and very thorough articles. Relevant to the study are the profound articles by Felix Jacoby on Hecataeus[289] and Herodotus,[290] by Fritz Geyer on Macedonia,[291] and by Brunhilde Lenk on Thrace.[292] Other articles examining the relevant issues are also quoted.[293] The view of Lenk that Thrace never received the status of a Persian satrapy is worth mentioning,[294] as well as Jacoby's conclusion that Herodotus uses Hecataeus as

282 Bury 1900; Glotz 1938.
283 Heinlein 1909: 341–351; Casson 1915: 69–90.
284 Smith 1908; Legrand 1945; 1946.
285 Beloch II.2: 84–85.
286 Ibid. 154–159, 185–188.
287 How, Wells 1928.
288 Obst 1913: 413–415.
289 Jacoby 1912: 2667–2750.
290 Jacoby 1913: 205–520.
291 Geyer 1928: 697–771.
292 Lenk 1936a: 414–452.
293 Hirschfeld 1896: 1458; Meyer 1897: 510–524; Oberhummer 1905: 1566–1567; Lenk 1931: 1072–1074; Obst 1932: 1679–1705; Lenk 1936: 734–735; 1937: 1900–1903.
294 Lenk 1936a: 420.

a source when he enumerates cities, regions, rivers, lakes, and tribes in regard to Xerxes' march from Doriscus to Therme.[295]

Almost parallel with *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, the first of the two multivolume editions of the *Cambridge Ancient History* (1924–1939) was published in Great Britain. It traces the history of the Ancient World from the earliest times to late antiquity. Volume IV examines the expansion of the Persians in Europe, and Volume V considers the events of the Pentekontaetia. To some extent the events in Thrace and Macedonia during the examined period are neglected and the individual articles do not significantly contribute to the topic.[296]

Grundy's *The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries* was published in 1901. In this voluminous work almost thirty pages are devoted to the Scythian campaign, to the deeds of the Persian generals Megabazus and Otanes and to the Thracian venture of Histiaeus of Miletus.[297] As his predecessors, the author discusses the dating of Darius' campaign and the reasons for its realization, but he is extremely laconic as to the route followed by Darius' army. The sources describing the deeds of Megabazus and Otanes are considered, as the accent is on the reasons for the implementation of their tasks. The campaign of Mardonius is examined on only three pages.[298] The route of the army of Xerxes from Doriscus to Therme is traced on two pages.[299] Stories in which Alexander I was involved are noted, but it appears that the author is not interested in the personality of this Macedonian ruler. Generally in this otherwise solid monograph there is nothing new as to the Persian policy towards Thrace and Macedonia, or at least to certain problems accompanying the issue.

The same conclusion is true for the work of Obst, *Der Feldzug des Xerxes*,[300] and for articles published during the examined period (1901–1950) relating to the problems of the Greco–Persian wars,[301] as well as for the works dedicated to Persian[302] and Macedonian history.[303] An exception is Geyer's *Makedonien bis zur thronbesteigung Philipps II*, in which, though only on five pages, inter-

295 Jacoby 1912: 2713–2715.
296 Walker 1927: 33–67, 466–467; Cary 1930: 173–228; Munro 1930: 268–316.
297 Grundy 1901: 48–76.
298 Ibid: 150–152.
299 Ibid: 220–221.
300 Obst 1913.
301 Munro 1902: 294–332; Olmstead 1939: 305–322.
302 Junge 1944; Olmstead 1948.
303 Kazarow 1922; Casson 1926; Paribeni 1947.

esting assumptions are made about the relations between the Persians and the Macedonians in the years 513–479.[304]

In the first half of the 20th century important numismatic works were published. Among them is the *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines* by Babelon, in which approximately seventy pages are devoted to tribal coinage,[305] the enlarged second edition of *Historia numorum* by Head[306] and *Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands* by Hugo Gaebler.[307] Fundamental to Thraco-Macedonian coinage, however, remains the work of Svoronos, *L'hellénisme primitif de la Macédoine: prouvé par la numismatique et l'or du Pangée*.[308] He describes a large number of coins and makes an attempt to localize the tribes who minted them. For those of the coins whose legend does not establish with absolute certainty who minted them, Svoronos makes a number of original conclusions. The work of Doris Raymond (1953) is fundamental in regard to the emissions of the earlier Macedonian rulers and significantly contributes to the debate about the weight standard and the chronology of the tribal coinage.[309] The proposed chronology was partially disputed only after the discovery of the Asyut and Decadrachm hoards.

In the second half of the 20th century studies related to various aspects of the history, geography, and ethnography of Thrace and Macedonia received a huge boost. The relations between Macedonians and Persians, and in particular the deeds of Alexander I, received attention in a number of monographs and articles.[310] The attempted localizations of toponyms, hydronyms, and oronyms are also essential.[311] Taking into account the insignificance of preceding studies devoted to Thrace and the Thracians, the emergence of works and articles related to this issue appears even more impressive.[312] In these studies, however, Persian policy towards Thrace and Macedonia is either

304 Geyer 1930: 42–46.

305 Babelon 1907: 1039–1078, 1095–1109, 1113–1126.

306 Head 1911.

307 Gaebler 1935.

308 Svoronos 1919.

309 Raymond 1953.

310 Kanatsoulis 1964; Edson 1970: 17–44; Cole 1978: 37–49; Hammond 1979; Errington 1981: 139–143; Zahrnt 1984: 325–368; Errington 1986; Rosen 1987: 25–51; Scaife 1989: 129–137; Borza 1992; Badian 1994: 107–130.

311 Papageorgiou 1970: 1–22; Samsaris 1976; Papazoglou 1988; Borza 1995: 89–95.

312 In the chapters are quoted Wiesner 1963; Velkov 1963: 25–33; 1968: 79–85; Danov 1969; Zlatkovskaya 1971; Fol 1972; Sarafov 1973: 119–189; Detschew 1976; Duridanov 1976; Hoddinott 1981; Asheri 1990: 131–163; Tacheva 1995; Archibald 1998.

missing, or only partly examined. This is also true for the monographs dedicated to the history of Greece,[313] Persia,[314] and the Greco–Persian wars,[315] as well as for articles concerning the Scythian expedition of Darius. These articles follow the standard scheme in analysing the causes and the date of the campaign, but their authors are not interested in the march of the Persian army from Byzantium to Istros or in Persian relationships with local Thracian tribes.[316] An exception is Venedikov, who tries to trace the route followed by the Persian army through Thrace and to localize the hydronyms mentioned by Herodotus.[317]

Different in nature are a number of studies dealing with Persian activity in the Thraco-Macedonian region. The articles on the expedition of Mardonius by Instinsky[318] and Michael Zahrnt[319] are essential. The study of Zahrnt represents a thorough research of various aspects of Herodotus' story about the campaign led by Mardonius. It is divided into four parts, of which the first two are essential for this monograph. The first relates to the purpose of the campaign and the second examines both the status of Macedonia after the expedition of Megabazus and the rejection of the Persian power during the Ionian Revolt. The study lacks speculative assertions, and the conclusions are logical and have the necessary justification.

During the period in question several articles tracing the route of Xerxes' army through Thrace were published.[320] Especially productive was Müller, who besides the cited two articles, wrote a topographic commentary on Herodotus' *Histories* in two volumes.[321] Highly valuable are the parts concerning Thrace and Macedonia. Though published in 2003, it is relevant to mention here the article of Tuplin, *Xerxes' March from Doriscus to Therme*.[322] The author proposes the possible routes used by the three columns of the Persian army, and he often enters into polemics with Müller, which makes his article useful for any researcher interested in this issue.

313 Fine 1983; Bengtson 1996.

314 Herzfeld 1968; Dandamaev 1989.

315 Hignett 1963; Burn 1984; Balcer 1995. See also Walser 1984.

316 Balcer 1972: 99–132; Cameron 1975: 77–87; Masetti 1982: 106–110; Gardiner-Garden 1987: 326–350; Georges 1987: 97–147.

317 Venedikov 1970: 25–32.

318 Instinsky 1956: 477–494.

319 Zahrnt 1992: 237–279.

320 Müller 1975: 1–11; 1994: 17–38; Kienast 1996: 285–313.

321 Müller 1987; 1997.

322 Tuplin 2003: 385–409.

Over the last three decades of the 20th century several articles were published dealing with the status of the European lands of the Great King. They started in 1972 with the article of Helmut Castritius, *Die Okkupation Thrakiens durch die Perser und der Sturz des athenischen Tyrannen Hippias*.[323] Analysing the available Greek and Persian sources, the author concludes that the Persian satrapy in Europe was formed after the campaign of Mardonius (492), while before that the power of the Persians was not very stable.

Most consistent and explicit in his conclusions about the formation of the satrapy Skudra is Nicholas Hammond. His views are expressed in the second volume of his *A History of Macedonia*,[324] in his article *The Extent of Persian Occupation in Thrace*,[325] and in the fourth volume of the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*.[326] According to Hammond, after the campaign of Megabazus, Thrace and Macedonia were organized as a Persian satrapy named Skudra, whose borders spread from the Danube River in the north to the Peneus River in the south. Hammond believes that the Persians favoured the Macedonians and the Thracians over the Greeks and that the satrapy remained loyal to the Great King during the Ionian Revolt.

Another prominent supporter of the existence of a satrapy named Skudra in Europe is Pajakowski. In his article *Einige Bemerkungen zur Lokalisierung der persischen Provinz* (*Satrapie*) *Skudra*[327] he aims to prove that the Brygi conquered by Mardonius peopled Illyria, that the conquests of this Persian general stretch as far as Lake Lychnitis, and that the center of the satrapy was Sestus on the Thracian Chersonese.

As a response to the article of Pajakowski the useful study of Balcer appeared, *Persian Occupied Thrace* (*Skudra*).[328] Initially he rejects the assumption expressed by the Polish scholar for the presence of a satrapian center in Skudra. Balcer convincingly demostrates that Herodotus' usage of the title ὕπαρχος does not apply to rulers of satrapies only. He recognizes six phases of the Persian con-

323 Castritius 1972: 1–15.

324 Hammond 1979: 58–60.

325 Hammond 1980: 53–61.

326 Fol, Hammond 1988: 234–253. It appears that only Hammond's conclusions are presented at length as to the borders of the satrapy of Skudra—'There are two views about the extent of this satrapy in Thrace. One view is based upon the statements of Herodotus in the preceding paragraph, and it is that of one of the authors of this chapter; he has argued it elsewhere. The other view is that the satrapy consisted only of coastal areas and did not include central Thrace.'

327 Pajakowski 1983: 243–255.

328 Balcer 1988: 1–21.

quest of Thrace, concluding that a European satrapy was never organized and that the *hyparchoi* of the European territories of the empire were subjected to the satrap of Sardis.

At the very end of the 20th century, two articles were published that also examined the Persian presence in Thrace. The first was by Strong, *Crossing the Straits: The Persians in Thrace*.[329] In its greater part he discusses the importance of the Straits for Persia, and only in approximately three pages does the author pay attention to the satrapy Skudra. Strong concludes that it was possible that the European lands of the Empire formed a satrapy, but he is not convinced of its existence. The second article is by Michael Zahrnt, *Die Perser in Thrakien*.[330] It contains a short critical review on the issue of Persian power in Thrace.

In the 1970s, the interest in the Thraco-Macedonian coinage was renewed. The initial impetus came with the discovery of the Asyut Hoard, which contains a number of coins of tribal emissions.[331] Not less important is the Decadrachm Hoard, in which sixty-eight Bisaltaean octodrachms were contained. Their mintage is dated 480/75–460.[332] Both hoards make it possible to redate the chronology proposed by Raymond, according to which the majority of tribal coinage was realized in the 6th century.

The increased interest in issues related to the early history of Macedonia[333] and to some aspects of the history of the Thracians,[334] directly related to the problems examined in this monograph, continued in the beginning of the 21st century. In the monograph are quoted a number of studies of a different nature: commentaries on Herodotus' *Histories*,[335] works devoted to the history of Persia[336] and to the Greco–Persian wars,[337] articles partially examining the Persian presence in Thrace,[338] and others in which the authors make attempts to identify the peoples of Skudra[339] and Yaunā takabarā,[340] mentioned in the Persian royal inscriptions.

329 Stronk 1998–1999: 55–72.
330 Zahrnt 1997: 91–98.
331 Price, Waggoner 1975: 28–35.
332 Fried 1987: 1–20; Kagan 1987: 21–28; Price 1987: 43–45.
333 Sprawski 2010: 127–144; Mari 2011: 79–92; Zahrnt 2011: 761–777.
334 Tacheva 2006; Tzvetkova 2008; Porozhanov 2011.
335 Flower, Marincola 2002; Scott 2005; Bowie 2007; Hornblower 2013.
336 Briant 2002; Kuhrt 2007.
337 Cawkwell 2005.
338 Badian 2007: 36–43; Tuplin 2010: 281–312.
339 Henkelman, Stolper 2009: 271–329.
340 Rollinger 2006: 365–400.

Special attention should be paid to two articles. The first was published in 2008 by the Greek scholar Miltiades Hatzopoulos, *Retour à la vallée du Strymon*.[341] Of particular interest is the first part of the article, in which the author, by analysing written and epigraphic evidence, identifies Prasias with Pravi, Dysoron with Menoikion, and Orbelus with Lekani and Phalakron. The proposed identifications allow Hatzopoulos to assume that at certain times the subordinate lands of the Macedonian ruler Alexander extended not only east of the Strymon, but also beyond Menoikion.

The second article was written by Heinrichs and Müller, *Ein persisches Statussymbol auf Münzen Alexanders I. von Makedonien*.[342] It examines a series of Macedonian coins from the time of Alexander I, whose obverse depicts a horseman with a short sword, probably an *akinakes*. According to the authors, these coins depict the Macedonian ruler, who was personally presented with an *akinakes* by Xerxes himself during his stay in Macedonia. This, for its part, indicates the status of Alexander, who at this time was totally dependent on his benefactor.

There are also articles that deal with Persian policy in Thrace. These are Jordanov's article, *Achaemenido–Thracica: опити за политически и административен контрол* (*ок. 515–466г.пр.Хр.*),[343] Izdimirski's article, *Персийската администрация в древна Тракия*,[344] and Bacheva's article, *Detecting a Satrapy: The Skudra Case*.[345] Jordanov supports the view that after Megabazus' campaign a separate satrapy was formed from the subjugated lands in Europe, whereas Izdimirski and Bacheva believe that a European satrapy was never created. The approach of Bacheva is interesting, since she arrives at this conclusion by comparing the lands subordinate to the Great King in Europe and Asia Minor.

It is worth mentioning the studies of Boteva[346] that are completed in her article *Re-reading Herodotus on the Persian Campaigns in Thrace*.[347] Boteva is the author who most consistently supports the hypothesis that prior to the Scythian march, a Persian campaign led by Megabazus was carried out in Europe. Her conclusions are analysed in the appropriate places in the monograph.

---

341 Hatzopoulos 2008: 13–54.

342 Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 283–309.

343 Jordanov 2003: 21–34.

344 Izdimirski 2008: 129–136.

345 Bacheva 2012: 11–26.

346 Boteva-Boyanova 2000; Boteva 2008: 121–128.

347 Boteva 2011: 735–759.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the book of Vojislav Sarakinski, *Persomacedonica. Македонија и Персија пред Александър*, published in 2013.[348] Taking into consideration the issues examined in the present monograph, Sarakinski's book stands closest to it thematically. The first part of the work of Sarakinski is devoted to Persian expansion in the Thraco-Macedonian region, the second to the policy of Philip II against Persia. The relations between Macedonia and Persia in the years 513–479 are discussed in detail and with sufficient depth. Attention is also paid to the Scythian march of Darius and, to some extent, to his policy towards the Paeonians. Sarakinski discusses at length the debatable question of the formation of the satrapy Skudra. Thrace and the Thracians remain almost absent from Sarakinski's book, but given the title of his work this fact appears quite understandable.

348 Sarakinski 2013.

CHAPTER 1

The Policy of Darius towards Thrace and Macedonia (514–512)

In the 540s in the Aegean region a new power appeared: Persia. Persia was, for a couple of decades, to play a major political and economic role in the area of Propontis, Hellespont, and the north Aegean coast. Persian policy led to the subjugation of part of southern Thrace and the Greek cities situated between Byzantium and the Strymon River, as well as to the subordination of Macedonia. The appearance of the Persians on the west coast of Asia Minor is dated ca. 546, when the Persian king Cyrus succeeded in destroying the Lydian kingdom and annexing its territory to Persia.[1] Pressed by circumstances, the coastal Greek cities agreed to submit to Cyrus, on condition that they would maintain the status they had held under the rule of Croesus. Their proposal was rejected and only Miletus was allowed to sign an oath contract, making the city the first Persian ally in the region.[2] All the rest were conquered by the imperial vicar Harpagus—an act which resulted in the bloodless conquest of the nearby islands.[3] The dependent position of the aforementioned Greek cities in the region is later confirmed by the participation of their contingents in the Persian army during Cambyses' march against Egypt (525).[4]

Further Persian actions are connected with the conquest of Samos, usually dated to 516.[5] The importance of the enterprise can be judged by the fact that the operation was under the command of the high-standing Otanes, who was one of the seven Persians.[6] The seizure of the city was accompanied

1 Hdt.I.75.1–80.6; 84.1–5.

2 Ibid. I.141.1–4.

3 Ibid. I.162.1–163.1; 164.1–3; 168.1–169.2.

4 Ibid. II.1.2; III.1.1.

5 Ibid. III.139.1–149.1.

6 Ibid. III.141.1. In Herodotus' view (III.67.1–79.3) the seven Persians, among whom was the future Great King Darius, were Persians of noble blood who, through conspiracy, dethroned the usurper Smerdis. His information is proved by the Behistun Inscription (DB IV.80–86; Kent 1950: 130, 132; Schmitt 1991: 72–73), where Darius mentions six of his adherents who helped him carry out the enterprise. In the inscription, the usurper is under the name of Gaumata. For the possibility that Darius was the real usurper against the authority of the legal heir to the throne Bardiya, see Briant 2002: 97–109; Kuhrt 2007: 136–138.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_003

by a massacre, and people from the continent were brought to compensate for the depopulation that followed. The Samian Syloson, who according to Herodotus was one of Darius' benefactors, was appointed governor of the island. In fact, the story itself illustrates the way Darius intended to organize the Persian government over those territories—through personal dependency of local tyrants on him.

The Aims of Darius' Scythian Campaign

The conquest of western Asia Minor and some islands in the Aegean Sea provided the Persians with the chance not only to control trade in the region but also, if necessary, to use military force against the neighbouring Greeks and Thracians. And indeed the Persian invasion in Europe was not long in coming. However, the main target of the Persian attack proved not, as may be expected, to be the Greeks and Thracians but rather the Pontic Scythians occupying the lands north at the Istros delta and having no common boundary with Persia.

What could the reason for the purposeful attack against the Scythians be? Three different versions are presented by the ancient authors. In Herodotus' view, the motive for the march against the Scythians stems from Darius' strong wish to take revenge for their invasion of Media directed against the Medes who, at the time, had power over it.[7] Ctesias, on the other hand, claims that after Ariaramnes' sea campaign Darius and the Scythian king Scytharbes exchanged offensive letters, which became the reason for the Great King, leading a huge army, to invade Scythia.[8] Justin offers a third version, according to which the unwillingness of the Scythian king to give Darius his daughter in marriage led to a war between Persia and the Scythians.[9]

It is clear that the information ancient authors give does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the campaign against the Scythians. Scholars accordingly give different interpretations. Some suppose that the purpose of the Scythian expedition was purely economic (i.e., that Darius undertook that enterprise in search of Scythian gold).[10] Others think that the intention of the

7 Hdt. IV.1.1–2.

8 *FGrH* 688 F 13.20.

9 Just. II.5.8–9.

10 Bury 1897: 281–282 believes that Darius' main purpose was the gold mines of the Agathyrsi, whose settlements he locates in Transylvania. See also Balcer 1972: 131–132, who thinks that the purpose of the Scythian march was not the conquest of Thrace and Scythia but to acquire the means needed for the suppression of the Egyptian Revolt and the

Great King was to establish the Persian boundary at the river Istros[11] or even to turn the Black Sea into a Persian lake.[12] A third group believes that Darius' policy was rather preventive and due to the strong interest of the Scythians in territories south of the Istros River;[13] and a fourth group holds the opinion that the attack against the Scythians was closely related to Darius' intention to conquer Greece.[14]

---

scheduled expedition to India. A similar reconstruction of events is certainly possible only on condition that an early date for the Scythian expedition—519, lately utterly rejected—is accepted. It also seems hardly possible that funds for a future military campaign would be raised in a marginal and unknown country that did not even have a common border with Persia. It is true that Herodotus mentions Scythian gold many times (IV.5.3, 7.1–2, 10.1–3, 13.1, 26.2, 27.1, 65.1, 71.4), but he obviously has no information about the presence of gold mines in Scythia, in contrast to his knowledge of gold fields in Thrace (V.23.2). As can be seen from the description of the Scythian march, the actions of Darius were not connected with the purposeful search for gold. In a later work Balcer 1995: 148 arrives at the conclusion that Darius' purpose was connected not only to the search for financial profit but also to an attempt to preempt future Scythian attacks against Persia.

11 Hignett 1963: 84; Kuhrt 2007: 183.

12 Niebuhr 1847: 169.

13 Dandamaev 1989: 148; Gardiner-Garden 1987: 343–345 accepts the possibility that Darius carried out the Scythian march at the suggestion of the Ionians. In his view it was in the interest of the Ionians to have their Euxine trading partners brought into the Empire, due to the Athenian wares that challenged the predominance of 'Ionian culture' in the Euxine cities. Moreover, according to the author, the trade interests of the Ionians on the west coast of Pontus were harmed by the growing presence of the Scythians south of the Istros. Hence the conclusion is made that the presence of the Scythians in the region of present-day Dobruja 'was perceived as a threat to the commercial relations between the Greek cities of the West Euxine coast and the grain producing indigenous peoples in their cities' hinterland. It may have been that the Dobrudja cities were increasingly having to purchase their grain indirectly through Scythian overlords or to pay the Scythians tribute to ensure their own lands were not ravaged.' Therefore, due to their seriously compromised interests, the Ionians managed to persuade Darius to undertake the Scythian adventure. It is an interesting hypothesis, but the presence of the Scythians at the time south of the Istros cannot be proved. This is the exact place where Darius fought against the Getae (Hdt. IV.93.1), not against the Scythians. It was only at a three-day distance north of the Istros that the Persians encountered the front lines of the Scythian cavalry (Hdt. IV.122.1). It also seems doubtful whether the Ionians could persuade Darius to organize a march of such dimensions only to please their interests and search for Scythian gold. The parallel to Aristagoras' actions, who was allowed by the Great King to organize an expedition against Naxos (Hdt.V.30.1–32.1), is not convincing, for the two enterprises were of different dimensions and the Scythian march was headed by Darius himself.

14 Rostovtzeff 1922: 84; Hoddinott 1981: 101.

The purposes of a campaign of such magnitude may be both political and economic, as is likely the case. The lack of a common boundary between the Persians and the Scythians in Europe, as well as the considerable distance between the two lands separated by obstacles such as the Bosporus and the Istros River, imply that the march in Scythia was not an ordinary adventure but a well designed scheme. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that Darius himself led the army. Undoubtedly, his main purpose was a devastating attack on the Scythians, signaled by the deployment of a vast navy, part of which was to transfer troops not only across the Bosporus, but across the Istros into Scythian territory as well.[15] The fact that Darius, sharing no boundary with the Scythians, had the courage to attack them directly may imply either that his counselors looked upon both the local coastal Thracian tribes and Greek cities as minor opponents that might be easily defeated on the move, or that the relations with the Thracians living south of Haemus had been preliminarily established, and thus no resistance on their part was expected. Hence, the conquest of Thracian lands on the west coast of Pontus, and probably of the Greek cities located there as well, was part of Darius' original scheme. The events that followed showed that the Persian headquarters had formed an accurate judgement about the strength of their opponents, or at least about those occupying the territories south of the river Istros.

Did Darius really intend to conquer Scythia? He could obtain information about the coastal distance of the region at least (from the Istros River to Borysthenes) from his Ionian subjects as well as from his own scouts, if Ctesias' information about the attack by sea against Scythians, which had taken place before Darius' march, proved to be true.[16] Taking this into consideration, the Great King was well aware that to conquer Scythia he would need the support of a navy to provide him both with the provisions necessary for the long journey and a safe passage across the Tyras and especially the river Borysthenes, whose greatness impressed Herodotus.[17] The fact that after crossing the Istros he ordered the soldiers from the ships to follow him by land and thus continued his way accompanied only by the infantry[18] may imply that he had no intention to conquer the Pontic Scythians, or at least not the whole of the territory they

15 Hdt. IV.89.1. Herodotus at several points (III.134.4; IV.1.1, 91.2) mentions that the primary purpose of Darius was war against the Scythians.

16 *FGrH* 688 F 13.20.

17 Hdt. IV.53.1.

18 Ibid. IV.97.1—Δαρεῖος δὲ ὡς ἀπίκετο καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμ' αὐτῷ στρατὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἴστρον, ἐνθαῦτα διαβάντων πάντων Δαρεῖος ἐκέλευσε τούς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδίην λύσαντας ἕπεσθαι κατ' ἤπειρον ἑωυτῷ καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν νεῶν στρατόν.

occupied, but only intended to attack them in a way powerful enough to reduce their strength. If that assumption is true, then the unwillingness to conquer Scythia, as part of his overall design, will be a result of a lack of real financial and strategic interest rather than fear of the Scythian military power or of the vastness of the Scythian land that had to be conquered.

The idea to attack the Pontic Scythians is likely to have something in common with a previous march of Darius' against the Asian Sacae (Sakā tigraxaudā).[19] According to one reconstruction of the events in column five of the Behistun inscription, the attack against the Sacae was a response to their raids in the lands of the Persian Empire.[20] Darius' counselors were undoubtedly aware that at that very time the empire was vulnerable to Scythian attacks from two sides—from the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. On that condition a supposition can be made that the problems caused by the Asian Sacae made Darius decide to attack their European tribesmen with the intention to sever the bonds supposedly existent between the two, and to eliminate the possibility of a Scythian attack in the region of the Caucasus and thus to eliminate potential enemies of the Persian Empire. To a certain extent, it appears that Darius continued the policy of Cyrus, who at the very end of his reign invaded the lands of the Massagetae.[21] Darius, however, not only attacked the Asiatic Sacae, but also mounted a campaign against Pontic Scythians, which act introduced a new element in the strategy of the Persian kings in regard to the Scythians.

Planning such a campaign against the Scythians through the Balkan peninsula—not across the Caucasus, which was much more difficult—would inevitably lead to the attempted conquest both of the previously autonomous Thracian tribes occupying the coastal lands between the Bosporus and the Istros delta, as well as the Greek cities situated on the north coast of Propontis, and probably those on the western Pontic. In that case the presumable intention of establishing the Persian boundary at the Istros delta appears quite reasonable, for a good defense would turn the water into an obstacle for the warlike but fleetless Scythians.

Darius' aims, formulated in this way, exclude the possibility of viewing the annexation of southern Thrace and the purposeful attack against the Scythians as a preparation for even a partial conquest of Greece.[22] This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact that in the decade after the Scythian campaign

19 DB V.21–30 (Kent 1950: 133–134; Schmitt 1991: 76).

20 Harmatta 1976: 23.

21 Hdt. I.201.1–214.5.

22 Contra Rostovtzeff 1922: 84; Hoddinott 1981: 101.

there were no Persian military actions against Greece. In fact, even after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt, the aims of Darius were limited only to punishing the disobedient Athenians[23] and Eretria for the help they had rendered to the Ionian rebels.

Persian Activities in Thrace before Darius' Scythian Campaign

Herodotus, the main source of the subject of discussion, makes no mention of Persian military or diplomatic actions in southeastern Thrace and Scythia, prior to the Persian invasion of the region. Nevertheless, some scholars, on the basis of Ctesias' story and their interpretation of some excerpts from Herodotus' text, hold the opinion that Darius' enterprise against the Scythians was preceded by a land campaign in Europe,[24] in the region of the Hellespont and southeast Thrace, and a marine campaign along the coast of Scythia.[25]

The putative marine campaign is based on a report of Ctesias according to which Darius ordered Ariaramnes, the satrap of Cappadocia, to set sail for Scythia and capture a great number of men and women.[26] Ariaramnes, in charge of thirty ships, succeeded in carrying out the task he had been assigned. One of the captives was Marsagetes who, according to Ctesias, was brother of the king of Scythia, Scytharbes.[27] Furious at the Persian campaign, the king of the Scythians sent Darius an abusive letter that became the very reason for the march that followed.

The events described by Ctesias were unknown to Herodotus, which means they were unknown to his sources as well, namely the Ionian logographers and Greeks from the northern Pontic cities, if one accepts that he visited them. If the

23 In 507 the Athenian envoys in Sardis gave 'earth and water' to Darius (Hdt. v.73.1–3). It appears that, from that moment on, the Persians viewed Athenians as subjects to the Great King—indeed Artaphrenes later ordered the Athenians to receive their former tyrant Hippias back (Hdt. v.96.2). Therefore, from the Persian point of view, the Athenian participation in the Ionian Revolt was simply ἀπόστασις.

24 Macan 1895: II.55–56; Struve 1949: 19–20; Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 40–45; Boteva 2008: 121–124; Boteva 2011: 741, 743–748; Mitrev 2012: 24–25, 42; Izdimirski (forthcoming).

25 Rostovtzeff 1922: 84; Olmstead 1939: 308; 1948: 147; Burn 1984: 131; 1985: 301; Fol, Hammond 1988: 239–240; Dandamaev 1989: 148; Balcer 1995: 149; Archibald 1998: 81; Summerer 2005: 244; Nieling 2010: 125. According to Georges 1987: 133–134 the campaign Ariaramnes led was against the east and north coasts of the Pontus and the Sea of Azov, and paralleled Darius' expedition against the Scythians, as the idea was a double blow to the Scythians.

26 *FGrH* 688 F 13.20.

27 Ms M reads Σκυθάρχης, i.e. the leader of the Scythians.

story told by Ctesias reflects the real state of affairs his source must have been Persian. Struve supposes that Ctesias' report is an inaccurate description of Darius' march against the Asian Sacae perpetuated in column five of the Behistun Inscription.[28] As an additional argument he offers the name of Marsagetes mentioned by Ctesias—a name which, according to him, corresponds to the ethnonym Massagetae. Struve concludes that in his eagerness to correct the work of Herodotus and to say something novel, Ctesias used the Persian reports available to him on Darius' march against the Massagetae, referring it instead to the campaign against the Pontic Scythians.

There are similarities between the Behistun Inscription and Ctesias' report; both texts involve a marine campaign in which a Scythian aristocrat was captured. The differences, however, are significant: a discrepancy in the two names and the status of the captured aristocrat, the mention of Cappadocia by Ctesias, as well as the name of the commander-in-chief who according to Ctesias was the satrap Ariaramnes, while according to the Behistun Inscription Darius himself led the Persians. Beyond that, according to Ctesias Ariaramnes was in charge of ships hardly reaching the number of thirty while the Behistun Inscription conveys the impression that Darius stood in the lead of considerable military forces. In the Behistun Inscription it is also claimed that in place of the captured Skunkha the Great King put somebody else to rule the Sacae—information absent from Ctesias' report.

It is clear that the differences between the two texts are considerably greater in number than the similarities. What is more, the similarities are far too general and can hardly serve as evidence that the story Ctesias tells has anything to do with Darius' campaign against the Asian Sacae. It is probable that Ctesias' report is rather about a minor reconnaissance mission under the command of Ariaramnes carried out just before the campaign against the Pontic Scythians. Such a reconnaissance mission preceding the Scythian campaign sounds plausible, but due to Ctesias' controversial reputation[29] his story (or at least its details) remains debatable.

The case of the purported land campaign is different. Herodotus mentions nothing about such a campaign, but indirect information in his story about the attack against the Scythians gives some scholars reason to assume that there were Persian diplomatic and military actions against the Hellespontic cities and southeast Thracian lands prior to the Scythian expedition. Boteva, whose

28 Struve 1949: 15–16.

29 Jacoby 1922: 2047—'In allen übrigen Teilen aber ist der historische Wert seiner Nachrichten gleich Null.' Dorati 1995: 33–52; Bichler 2004: 105–116; Dorati 2011: 81–109.

hypothesis raises some interesting questions, is the most consistent author in arguing this view.[30] She notes that the tyrants of the Thracian Chersonese and Byzantium, Miltiades and Ariston, took part in the Scythian campaign, and she logically accepts this fact as evidence that at that time they acknowledged Darius' authority. Boteva furthermore notes that on its march through the Thracian lands south of Haemus the Persian army met no resistance from the local Thracians[31] (i.e., they had already submitted to the Persians and even paid taxes to the Great King).[32] These facts are well known, noticed by Macan[33] and Struve.[34] The discussion, however, is moved to a new stage by Boteva's observation of the different descriptions given by Herodotus of the positions held by Megabazus: *strategos* of Europa,[35] *strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont[36] and *strategos* of Thrace.[37] In her view, Megabazus was bestowed the title '*strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont' before the Scythian expedition, with regard to his campaign in Europe, which led to the subjection of the Thracian Chersonese and the territories confined within the limits of Byzantium, Salmydessus, and the river Artescus, which she is inclined to identify with the Tonzos River, or the water basin the present-day rivers Tonzos and Marica form in the area where they flow from north to south.[38] Boteva finds indirect proof of the conquest of this territory in particular in an interesting report of Herodotus, according to which when Darius reached the river Artescus, he ordered every single soldier of his army to throw a stone onto the chosen place. She considers this act to establish the border of an already conquered territory, and from that point they entered lands of a different status. To prove that the conquest of the territory was due to Megabazus and nobody else, Boteva adduces a story told by Herodotus, according to which Darius once did the Persian commander-in-chief great honour, saying that he preferred that there were as many Megabazuses as there were seeds in a pomegranate rather than to have Greece under his rule. The fact that the anecdote is told immediately after it has been specified that Megabazus was appointed *strategos* of Europa prompts Boteva to conclude that prior to the

30 Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 40–45; Boteva 2008: 121–124; Boteva 2011: 741, 743–748.

31 Hdt. IV.89.1–92.1.

32 Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 44.

33 Macan 1895: II.55–56.

34 Struve 1949: 19.

35 Hdt. IV.143.1.

36 Ibid. IV.144.3.

37 Ibid. V.14.1.

38 Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 29–30; Boteva 2011: 742–743.

Scythian expedition the commander, in the position of '*strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont,' had a successful career in Europe, and for that reason, after the expedition he gained another title: *strategos* of Europa.[39]

In accordance with Boteva's hypothesis, Megabazus was appointed *strategos* of Europa after the Scythian campaign, due to the territorial expansion of the Persian lands in Europe related to the subjection of different Thracian tribes, including the Getae. Later his title was changed once more. For the successful execution of Darius' order to conquer new territories in Thrace, Megabazus was bestowed the title *strategos* of Thrace. Finally Boteva takes into account the observation of Zahrnt according to which Herodotus describes countries at the time of their first contact with the Persians.[40] Thus she concludes that, since Herodotus' description of Thrace is given after he speaks about Megabazus' conquest of Perinthus (V.2.1, 3.1–10.1), not after Darius' entry into European lands (IV.89.1), the activity of Megabazus in Thrace is the earliest Persian activity in Europe, preceding the Scythian expedition. On the basis of the interpretation suggested by Masetti[41] of the part of *The Dynastic Prophecy* that mentions a war of an unknown ruler against the country Hani,[42] Boteva dates Megabazus' putative expedition to the year 515, and the Scythian campaign, according to information in the *Tabula Capitolina*, to 513/12.[43]

The suggested hypothesis raise some difficult problems to solve. For convenience of argument, the comments on the conclusions above may be divided into two parts, as the first concerns Megabazus' purported career in Thrace before the Scythian expedition, and the second refers to the status of Greek cities on the north coast of the Propontis during the same period of time.

The portion of *The Dynastic Prophecy* Masetti and Boteva relate to the reign of Darius I is usually associated with Darius III Codomannus,[44] or even with Seleucus I.[45] If the supposition Lambert makes about two columns missing from the text, approximating one hundred lines, corresponds to the real state of affairs,[46] it is groundless to relate this particular text to Darius I.[47] What is

39 Boteva 2008: 121–122; Boteva 2011: 745–746.

40 Zahrnt 1997: 95–96.

41 Masetti 1982: 106–110.

42 Grayson 1975: 34–35, III.6–23; Van der Spek 2003: 316–317, V.6–23

43 Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 41–42; Boteva 2011: 744–745.

44 See Van der Spek 2003: 311–342 and Neujahr 2005: 101–107, where some earlier opinions on the issue are quoted.

45 Geller 1990: 5–7.

46 Lambert 1978: 13; Van der Spek 2003: 311–312, 320, III–IV.

47 Tuplin 2010: 307n46.

more, it appears that in those cases in which the text speaks about a definite number of years, it is merely about the period of time the reign of a given ruler lasted, not about an event dated in accordance with the serial year of his rule.[48] If this conclusion is correct, then the five years related to the anonymous king who fought a war against the country Hani will not correspond to the fifth year of the rule of Darius I (or to his rule at all) as Masetti and Boteva think, but will relate to the entire period of time an anonymous ruler reigned, whether it was Darius III or someone else. Even if one accepts that the above-mentioned text concerns Darius I, its relation to Megabazus' putative expedition preceding the Scythian campaign, and not to the campaign itself, remains speculative, and accordingly cannot serve as evidence for its existence.

Zahrnt's observation about Herodotus' method of describing the separate countries and the tribes that peopled them is correct,[49] yet it must be said that in contrast to Boteva he dates Megabazus' actions subsequent to Darius' return from Scythia.[50] The Scythian *logos* arises from Darius' primary goal of taking revenge on the Scythians, and that is why Herodotus does not use his Thracian *logos* at this point, even though it was probably when the Persians first crossed Thrace and forced the submission of some Thracian tribes (IV.89.1–93.1). The description of Thrace and the Thracians is made in connection with Darius' order for the conquest of πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ πᾶν ἔθνος situated in the region; the conquest of Thrace was the Persians' main purpose and for this reason the Thracian *logos* is used at that very point (V.2.2–10.1).

The anecdote Boteva quotes about Megabazus is likely to have no historical basis, for Herodotus tells almost the same story with regard to the high esteem in which the noble Persian Zopyrus was held by Darius—the Great King preferred to have a single unmutilated Zopyrus rather than twenty Babylons.[51] Even if one accepts that the anecdote Boteva quotes speaks about events that did occur, it can serve as no evidence of Megabazus' career in Thrace before the Scythian expedition. In Herodotus' view, Darius told his brother that he preferred that there were as many Megabazuses as seeds in a pomegranate rather than to have Greece under his rule.[52] The very mention of Greece and, accordingly its subordination, is a sign that the conversation between the Great King

48 Van der Spek 2003: 315–317—II.6, II.13; V.4, (V.8) (see also I.25; VI.7–8).

49 Compare, for example, Herodotus' description of the Assyrians (I.178.1), the Massagetae (I.201.1), the Egyptians (II.1.2), the Scythians (IV.1.1–3), the Libyans (IV.145.1), the Thracians (V.2.2), and the Paeonians (V.14.2, 16.1).

50 Zahrnt 1997: 97–98.

51 Hdt. III.160.1.

52 Ibid. IV.143.1–2.

and his brother took place much later than Boteva believes, and not immediately after the Scythian campaign. Until the start of the Ionian Revolt (499/8), Darius had no intention to conquer Greece. What is more, if Herodotus is strictly followed, it turns out that, until then, Darius did not even know about the existence of the Athenians.[53] It is logical to relate the anecdote to the time after the Ionian Revolt, or even after the Battle of Marathon (490), so that Darius, considering the failure of the expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes, would be able to estimate accordingly Megabazus' merits and say that he preferred that there were as many Megabazuses as there were seeds in a pomegranate, rather than to have Greece under his rule. The suggested dating also takes account of the fact that Artabanus was still alive during the expedition of Xerxes (480),[54] which means that there was no obstacle for him to take part in such a conversation ten years earlier. In conclusion, it can be said that the anecdote is told immediately after it has been specified that Megabazus was appointed *strategos* of Europa not because this was the exact time the conversation between Darius and Artabanus took place and was accordingly in direct relation to the particular appointment, but probably because, in Herodotus' view, it was the right time for curious facts of his life to be told—a clarification follows that the Persian commander-in-chief was left behind in Europe, head of an army numbering eighty thousand people, and right after that another anecdote is told, also concerning Megabazus.

According to Boteva, before the Scythian campaign Megabazus conquered the territories situated between Byzantium, Salmydessus, and Artescus, as well as the Thracian Chersonese, for which he was titled '*strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont.' This supposition is based not only on the aforesaid title, but also on the lack of Thracian resistance in the particular lands during the Scythian expedition. Here it should be noted that the territorial span of the lands supposedly subjected by Megabazus before the attack against the Scythians does not comply with the title '*strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont.' The lands included in the catchment area of the rivers Marica and Tonzos where, in Boteva's view, the Artescus should be located, were not part of 'the lands of the people of Hellespont.' According to Herodotus the Artescus and Tearus are rivers flowing across Thrace—Δαρεῖος δὲ ὡς διέβη τὸν Βόσπορον κατὰ τὴν σχεδίην, ἐπορεύετο διὰ τῆς Θρηίκης, ἀπικόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ Τεάρου ποταμοῦ.[55] This means that, if Megabazus had really been endowed the title '*strategos* of

53 Ibid. v.105.1. See also v.73.1–4, where the Athenians had to explain to Artaphrenes the ruler of Sardis who they were and where they lived.

54 Ibid. vii.10.1–10a.2, 46.1–53.1; viii.54.1.

55 Ibid. iv.89.3.

the lands of the people of Hellespont' before the Scythian expedition, then his rights in Europe would only concern the poleis of Hellespont, and not the Thracian lands in the interior. Thus, it may be concluded that the title στρατηγὸς ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Ἑλλησποντίων cannot serve as evidence of the existence of Persian military and administrative control over the Thracians peopling the lands located between Byzantium, Salmydessus, and the Artescus before the Scythian expedition.

As to the lack of resistance from those Thracians living in the region at the time when Darius was crossing their lands, the same conclusion is true. Herodotus speaks about the voluntary submission during the expedition of the Skyrmiadai, Nipsaei, and the Thracians occupying Salmydessus only.[56] However, these are all tribes living close to the coast and—more precisely—in the hinterland of the Greek cities, and Herodotus could easily gain the necessary information. It appears that as far as the tribes occupying the interior are concerned, he knows neither when they were conquered by the Persians, nor how they behaved during the campaign against the Scythians. It is possible they willingly surrendered during the expedition, or gave 'earth and water' before its start. Evidence of the first possibility is the fact that the Thracians occupying Salmydessus surrendered, offering no resistance, at the time of the expedition itself (i.e., they were not visited by Persians envoys wanting 'earth and water' before it started). The Thracians in question, together with the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei, occupied strategically important territories that the king's army had to cross, and it is not logical for the Persian envoys to have ignored them, if envoys had been sent to the neighbouring Thracians that peopled the lands between Byzantium, Salmydessus, and the Artescus. If this conclusion is correct, it will mean that the Thracian tribes living in the above-mentioned area, just as the Thracians occupying Salmydessus, were not visited by Persian envoys before the start of the Scythian expedition, but instead peacefully submitted at the time of Darius' progress towards the Istros.[57]

56 Ibid. IV.93.1.

57 Tzvetkova 2008: 162 offers a different reconstruction of events, according to which the easy and non-problematic progress the Persian army made across the lands of the southeastern Thracian tribes was due to the intermediary activity of Miltiades the Younger, who, according to her hypothesis, 'enjoyed a friendly relationship with the Thracians.' Tzvetkova's conclusions are accepted and further developed by Porozhanov 2011: 146–149, who arrives at the conclusion that Miltiades' father-in-law Olorus was an Odrysian king, and the marriage to his daughter Hegesipyle provided the tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese with the position to help Darius easily cross Thrace. The assumpion is an interesting one but finds no support in the reports of the ancient authors. Olorus, no matter what his origin was,

The second part of Boteva's hypothesis about Persian action in Europe preceding the Scythian campaign concerns the Hellespontic cities. The fact that Herodotus claims that the tyrants of the Thracian Chersonese and Byzantium, Miltiades and Ariston, took part in the Scythian expedition is a significant argument in its favour.[58] This, of course, is a sure sign that at that time they both recognized the Great King's authority. Herodotus, however, says nothing about the participation of other European tyrants, which may mean that just before the campaign against the Scythians, it was only the Thracian Chersonese and Byzantium that were under the Great King's control. The conclusion is confirmed by Herodotus' assertion that Perinthus was the first Hellespontic polis Megabazus conquered after Darius returned from Scythia.[59] The reason for the Persian attack against Perinthus was the refusal of its citizens to yield to the Great King. Herodotus' story leaves the impression that it is not about ἀπόστασις[60] and, accordingly, re-establishment of Persian authority, but rather about an initial military conflict between Perinthus and Persia, taking place just after the Scythian expedition. The same conclusion is valid for the rest of the Hellespontic cities, also unwilling to bear the burden of Persian authority, and also

---

was probably a ruler who had the power to influence events in the region of the Thracian Chersonese only, and not throughout the whole of southeastern Thrace. It is notable that the Thracians occupying Salmydessus surrendered to Darius himself while he was making progress to Scythia. What is more, at that point the issue is not about a temporary neutrality, but about direct submission, leading to the loss of independence of the tribes in question and, accordingly, to tribute liabilities to the Great King.

58 Hdt. IV.137.1, 138.1–2. Obst 1909: 413–415; 1932: 1683 defends the position that Miltiades did not take part whatsoever in the Scythian march. He is criticized by Gardiner-Garden 1987: 341–342, according to whom: 'If he had not been involved, his supporters would hardly have found it necessary to stress that this involvement did not constitute Medizing.'

59 Hdt. V.1.1.

60 Cf. ibid. III.128.3–4—ἀποπειρώμενος δὲ τῶν δορυφόρων ἐδίδου τὰ βυβλία ὁ Βαγαῖος, εἴ οἱ ἐνδεξαίατο *ἀπόστασιν* ἀπὸ Ὀροίτεω; ibid. V.35.1–2—Ἀρισταγόρης δὲ οὐκ εἶχε τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν τῷ Ἀρταφρένεϊ ἐκτελέσαι· ἅμα δὲ ἐπίεζέ μιν ἡ δαπάνη τῆς στρατιῆς ἀπαιτεομένη, ἀρρώδεέ τε τοῦ στρατοῦ πρήξαντος κακῶς καὶ Μεγαβάτῃ διαβεβλημένος, ἐδόκεέ τε τὴν βασιληίην τῆς Μιλήτου ἀπαιρεθήσεσθαι. ἀρρωδέων δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα ἐβουλεύετο *ἀπόστασιν*· συνέπιπτε γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἐστιγμένον τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπῖχθαι ἐκ Σούσων παρὰ Ἰστιαίου, σημαίνοντα ἀπίστασθαι Ἀρισταγόρην ἀπὸ βασιλέος. Ibid. V.113.2—τετραμμένου δὲ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἄλλοι τε ἔπεσον πολλοὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ Ὀνήσιλός τε ὁ Χέρσιος, ὅς περ τὴν Κυπρίων *ἀπόστασιν* ἔπρηξε. Ibid. VI.46.1—δευτέρῳ δὲ ἔτεϊ τούτων ὁ Δαρεῖος πρῶτα μὲν Θασίους διαβληθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων ὡς *ἀπόστασιν* μηχανώμτο, πέμψας ἄγγελον ἐκέλευέ σφεας τὸ τεῖχος περιαιρέειν καὶ τὰς νέας ἐς Ἄβδηρα κομίζειν. Ibid. VII.4.1—ἀποδέξας δὲ βασιλέα Πέρσῃσι Ξέρξεα Δαρεῖος ὁρμᾶτο στρατεύεσθαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μετὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ Αἰγύπτου *ἀπόστασιν* …

brought for the first time under direct Persian control after Darius' campaign against the Scythians.[61] From what Herodotus says it is not clear what their destiny was, but his statement that after Perinthus was conquered Megabazus headed for Thrace may mean that, fearing they might suffer the same fate, they voluntarily surrendered to the Persian commander-in-chief, and thus, provided him with the opportunity, with no further delay, to execute the new order given by the Great King.[62]

The situation of the people of the Hellespont subjected to Miltiades and Ariston appears different. As has already been noted, their participation in the Scythian expedition is a sign that at that time, in one way or another, they were already Darius' subjects. Herodotus, however, does not say clearly when and how that had happened.

Miltiades son of Cimon became tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese before Darius' campaign against the Scythians.[63] He was sent to the peninsula by Pisistratus' sons to succeed his brother Stesagoras, who had been murdered. Through cunning, Miltiades eventually secured his position by winning over five hundred mercenaries. What is more, in the pursuit of protection, probably against the neighbouring Thracians, he married Hegesipyle, the daughter of the Thracian king Olorus.

The ancient authors mention nothing about Miltiades' relations with the Persians before the Scythian expedition. Bearing in mind the important strategic location of the Thracian Chersonese, it is a well grounded supposition that relations with Miltiades were established some time before the beginning of the march. No doubt Miltiades offered no resistance, for otherwise the Persians would not have let him rule and he certainly would not have taken part in the march against the Scythians. The authority of the Persians was probably imposed in the customary way—through an emissary demanding 'earth and water.'[64] One should not dismiss the possibility that this demand was fol-

61 Ibid. IV.144.3—οὗτος δὴ ὢν τότε ὁ Μεγάβαζος στρατηγὸς λειφθεὶς ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Ἑλλησποντίων τοὺς μὴ μηδίζοντας κατεστρέφετο; V.1.1—οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ τῶν Περσέων καταλειφθέντες ὑπὸ Δαρείου, τῶν ὁ Μεγάβαζος ἦρχε, πρώτους μὲν Περινθίους Ἑλλησποντίων οὐ βουλομένους ὑπηκόους εἶναι Δαρείου κατεστρέψαντο.

62 Ibid. V.2.2.

63 Ibid. VI.39.1–2.

64 Cf. ibid. VI.48.1–49.1 and VII.32.1, where part of the cities in Greece gave Darius' and Xerxes' envoys 'earth and water' without being under direct military pressure. According to Beloch II.2: 86 the story about the envoys being sent immediately after Mardonius' march is unreal and that is why it should not be taken into account. The same opinion is shared by Westlake 1936: 15n11 and Hignett 1963: 87. Kraft 1964: 144–151 on his part arrives

lowed by the disembarkation of the Persian army on the Thracian Chersonese, in preparation for the forthcoming campaign against the Scythians. Such an act would secure a route to Asia, in the case of an eventual failure in southeast Thrace, rather than in Scythia. What is more, if the decision to conquer the northern Aegean coast had in fact already been taken, then the subjection of the Thracian Chersonese would be necessary. It is certainly possible, however, that the penetration of the peninsula by Persian armies first became a fact only after the retreat from Scythia.[65] It appears the Persians had no hesitation in demanding army contingents from lands that were not directly dependent on the Great King and which had never before been under Persian control: Otanes conquered Lemnos and Imbros on the grounds that they had refused to take part in the campaign against the Scythians.[66]

Herodotus' initial information about Ariston the tyrant of Byzantium relates to his participation in the Scythian campaign, a sure sign that at the time he, just as Miltiades, acknowledged the authority of the Great King. It is in fact possible that Ariston became tyrant with the help of the Persians. An indirect indication of this may be found in Herodotus' report of the speech of the Milesian tyrant Histiaeus, in which it is said that the tyrants of the Hellespontic and Ionian cities owed their power to Darius.[67] That speech as well as the entire story about the argument over the preservation of the pontoon-bridge over the Istros delta might not be true, but the dependence of the tyrants on Darius should not be questioned. It is not clear from the text whether the tyrants, excluding Miltiades, owed their authority to Darius or whether he only allowed them to retain their positions. The answer to that question is important, because if Ariston had been tyrant of Byzantium before the arrival of the Persians it would mean that he submitted with no resistance and was eventually allowed to rule. If, on the other hand, he was granted his power from

---

at the conclusion that the mission of the envoys sent by Darius (491) was real. See analysis of different opinions by Zahrnt 1992: 276–279. The debate certainly does not change the supposition made in the text.

65 Hdt. IV.143.1.

66 Ibid. V.26.1–27.2. In fact, Herodotus says that after the Scythian expedition Otanes subjected the people of Byzantion, Chalcedon, Antandrus, Lamponium, as well as the islands Lemnos and Imbros, on the grounds that some refused to take part in the campaign against the Scythians, and others caused damage to the Persian army on their way back from Scythia. Considering the improbability of the people of Lemnos and Imbros hindering the movements of the Persian army, it is necessary to conclude that they refused to participate in the Scythian expedition—for which they were eventually severely punished.

67 Ibid. IV.137.2.—διὰ Δαρεῖον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τυραννεύει πόλιος …

the Persians, it might be a sign that the city was captured before the Scythian expedition and Ariston became tyrant due to his strong positions among them. A third possibility is that the democratic government of Byzantium submitted with no resistance, while the Persians, considering the policy toward Greek cities they had so far followed, rejected that form of government and appointed a tyrant.

The sources provide no information about a war between Byzantium and Persia before the Scythian march.[68] Only Dionysius of Byzantium mentions that the Persians who accompanied Darius in his campaign against the Scythians set fire to a temple of Hera, thus taking revenge (on behalf of the Great King) on the citizens of Byzantium for their transgression.[69] Dionysius does not quote his source, but it appears that he uses Herodotus (V.26.1–28.1), or an author who follows him, for at least a part of the information he provides (with the exception of the detail about the temple of Hera). If Herodotus is the ultimate source, this means that Dionysius' information cannot serve as proof of a clash between Byzantium and the Persians during the Scythian campaign. Herodotus says that Otanes, the son of Sisamnes, conquered Byzantium, Chalcedon, Antandrus, Lamponium, and the islands of Lemnos and Imbros as well,

68 Struve 1949: 19–20 accepts that Herodotus gives information about the conquest of parts of the European coast of Propontis before the Scythian expedition. He relates the annexation of the particular lands to the actions of Otanes, who subjected Samos, and was one of the seven Persians (Hdt. III.141.1, 147.1–2, 149.1). He thinks it is possible that, to a certain extent, Herodotus confuses the information from his sources about the activity of the two Persian commanders with the name of Otanes. In other words, the conquest of Byzantium Herodotus ascribes to Otanes, Megabazus' successor (Hdt. V.26.1–28.1), may be related to the activity of Otanes, conqueror of Samos, and accordingly, realized before the Scythian campaign. This hypothesis contradicts Herodotus' report in which the capture of Byzantium, Chalcedon, Antandrus, Lamponium, and the islands Lemnos and Imbros by Otanes, Megabazus' successor, refers to the time after the march against the Scythians and was a response to the unwillingness of part of the enumerated cities to take part in it and to the aggressive actions of others towards the Persian army on its return from Scythia. Apart from that, according to Herodotus the two generals named Otanes were not common people: the one who captured Samos was one of the seven Persians, while the other who captured Byzantium was son of the royal justice Sisamnes. The Sisamnes in question was executed on Cambyses' orders for abusing power. His son Otanes eventually succeded to his father's post and became a royal justice (Hdt. V.25.1–2). Thus, the possibility for Herodotus and his sources to mix up the activity of these renowned commanders is not great.

69 Dion. Byz. (Wescher) 14—Κατὰ δὲ ἀπόβασιν τῆς θαλάττης δύο νεὼ, Ἡρᾶς καὶ Πλούτωνος· λέγεται δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν, ὅτι μὴ τοὔνομα· τὸν μὲν γὰρ οἱ σὺν Δαρείῳ κατὰ τὴν Περσῶν ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἔλασιν ἐνέπρησαν, τῷ βασιλεῖ τιμωροῦντες ἀνθ' ὧν ᾐτιᾶτο τὴν πόλιν·

and places these actions after Darius' return to Asia.[70] In addition, Herodotus makes clear that this was a response to the unwillingness of part of these poleis to participate in the campaign against the Scythians, as well as to the hostile actions of another part against the Persian army on their return from Scythia. Given that Ariston took part in the expedition, the conquest of Byzantium by Otanes should relate to a revolt of its citizens against the authority of the Great King. The fact that a riot erupted in the polis is likely to mean that there was no Persian garrison at the time. The probable absence of a garrison may be considerd indirect evidence that Byzantium surrendered voluntarily before the Scythian campaign, and was not conquered by force.

Finally, attention should be paid to the passage of Herodotus that speaks about Megabazus as '*strategos* of the lands of the people of Hellespont' and which Boteva accepts as evidence that a Persian action was carried out in Europe before the Scythian expedition.[71] In this particular case the passage is from a short text utterly dedicated to Megabazus. First, Herodotus says that after Darius returned from Scythia, he left Megabazus as *strategos* of Europa. He narrates a further story of the Persian commander-in-chief and, right after that, specifies that he had an army of eighty thousand men. Another anecdote follows concerning Megabazus and the people of the Hellespont, after which there is a specification that he was left *strategos* of their lands and assigned the task of subjecting those hostile to the Persians—οὗτος δὴ ὢν τότε ὁ Μεγάβαζος στρατηγὸς λειφθεὶς ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Ἑλλησποντίων τοὺς μὴ μηδίζοντας κατεστρέφετο. Boteva accepts that the quoted passage (IV.144.3) gives information about an action in Europe led by Megabazus prior to the Scythian expedition. If her supposition is followed, then Herodotus' story develops chronologically in two different directions—before the campaign against the Scythians (IV.144.3—στρατηγὸς ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Ἑλλησποντίων) and after it (IV.143.1, 3—στρατηγὸν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ). Detailed analysis, however, shows that the narrated events concern one of the periods only: according to Herodotus (IV.144.3) Megabazus was 'left' (λειφθείς) '*strategos* in the lands of the people of the Hellespont' (i.e., he was left there by Darius as he departed from Europe),[72] rather than sent there before the Scythian expedition. That the act should relate to Darius' departure is obvious from the beginning of the fifth book, where Herodotus once again mentions

70 Hdt. V.26.1–28.1.

71 Ibid. IV. 143.1–144.3.

72 Cf. ibid. IV.143.1—Δαρεῖος δὲ διὰ τῆς Θρηίκης πορευόμενος ἀπίκετο ἐς Σηστὸν τῆς Χερσονήσου· ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν διέβη τῇσι νηυσὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην, *λείπει* δὲ στρατηγὸν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην … and ibid. V.14.1—ἐνθαῦτα Δαρεῖος γράφει γράμματα Μεγαβάζῳ, τὸν *ἔλιπε* ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ στρατηγόν …

the people of the Hellespont—οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ τῶν Περσέων καταλειφθέντες ὑπὸ Δαρείου, τῶν ὁ Μεγάβαζος ἦρχε, πρώτους μὲν Περινθίους Ἑλλησποντίων οὐ βουλομένους ὑπηκόους εἶναι Δαρείου κατεστρέψαντο …[73] The passage is essentially a flashback to IV.144.3, where Herodotus says that Megabazus' task was to conquer the disobedient people of the Hellespont, whereas in V.1.1 he speaks about its implementation.

As to the different descriptions Herodotus uses of the position occupied by Megabazus—στρατηγὸν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, στρατηγὸς ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Ἑλλησποντίων and ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ στρατηγόν—they cannot be related to separate stages of his career in Europe. It is hardly possible for his status to have been changed three or four times over a span of three or four years.[74] Herodotus uses different sources to gain the information, and this may be the reason why he uses different wording to describe Megabazus' status. Taking into account the dimensions of his activity in Europe, the most logical conclusion is that after the Scythian campaign he was appointed commander of all available Persian forces in European lands (i.e., Herodotus' '*strategos* of Europa'), and he then occupied the same position until his retreat to Asia.

This analysis, made above on the basis of the available sources, shows that before the Scythian expedition there was no Persian administrative control over Southeast Thrace and, accordingly, no military actions were performed under the command of Megabazus, or any other Persian commander. What is more, it is most probable that envoys demanding 'earth and water' were not sent to the Thracians. The same is also valid for Perinthus and the Hellespontic cities whose names Herodotus does not mention, with the clarification that diplomatic activity may have taken place. It can, however, be certainly claimed that the Thracian Chersonese and Byzantium were under Darius' control even before his action against the Pontic Scythians. It appears quite possible for Persian authority to be imposed without force, through getting 'earth and

73 Ibid. V.1.1.

74 In Herodotus' view (V.25.1, 26.1) Darius chose Otanes for deputy of Megabazus, who received the title στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν, i.e. it is possible a fourth position held by Megabazus during the time of his career in Europe to have been here indirectly mentioned. As prof. Tuplin has brought to my notice, one should not ignore the possibility that Megabazus was στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν before the Scythian expedition with regard to Anatolia only. Later, during the time of his successor Otanes, considering the newly conquered European territories, the geographical limit of the position might have been considerably increased. It is possible, of course, that it was increased as early as when Megabazus first occupied the position in question, i.e. that this was his fourth position during his service in Europe, according to the information Herodotus gives.

water.' Undoubtedly, the purpose of that act was to provide safe passage for the Persian army on its way to Scythia, and eventually to establish complete control over the strategically important straits. It may be supposed that the submission of the Thracian Chersonese and Byzantium had taken place not more than a year or two before the Scythian march, for only a military threat or the expectation of one could lead to the voluntary recognition of exterior authority. One should not dismiss the possibility that this act was followed by the disembarkation of the Persian army either on the peninsula or on the European coast of the Bosporus, considering the forthcoming campaign against the Scythians. It seems that at first the Great King exercised control over the region only through diplomatic arrangements, but that this posed no obstacle to his demanding contingents for his future enterprise. Upon the return of the Persians from Scythia, Darius' fictive power became real and those of the cities that denied Persian hegemony were instantly punished.[75]

Darius in Thrace

The Scythian march is variably dated from 519 to 512. The earlier date, based mainly on the march against the Sakā tigraxaudā described in the Behistun Inscription,[76] can now be considered totally rejected.[77] Later dating is based mainly on a Greek inscription from AD 15: the *Tabula Capitolina*,[78] the only official document mentioning the date of the march. According to it, five hundred and twenty-seven years had passed since the bridge over the Bosporus was built[79] and since Hipparchus was killed in Athens (i.e., in 513/12). However, due to chronological discrepancies in the inscription the date can be further questioned.[80] On the other hand, the discrepancy seems minor and the dating

75 Hdt. IV.144.3; V.1.1; 26.1; *FGrH* 688 F 13.21.

76 DB V.21–30 (Kent 1950: 133–134; Schmitt 1991: 76).

77 The early dating of the Scythian march (519) is suggested by Balcer 1972: 99–132 and accepted by Cameron 1975: 77–87, and the two of them believe that the events described in column five in the Behistun Inscription relate to Darius' march against Pontic Scythians. That supposition, as well as the dating based on it, is criticized by Harmatta 1976: 15–24. Balcer himself 1988: 8n26, eventually admits the flimsiness of his hypothesis.

78 *IG* XIV 1297. II. 20–25.

79 Actually, it is Cimmerian Bosporus that is described in the inscription (II.25), which most probably is a mistake of the author of that late text. Cf. Hdt. IV.83.1; *FGrH* 688 F 13.21; Polyb. IV.43.2.

80 Balcer 1972: 103–110.

of the march could fluctuate from 514, the earliest possible date of Hipparchus' murder, to 512 at the latest, according to the *Tabula Capitolina*.[81] In fact, despite numerous attempts, the Scythian march cannot be precisely dated on the basis of present sources.

Probably within 514–512, after elaborate preparations, Darius set out in the spring from Susa to the Thracian Bosporus.[82] In Herodotus' view the land forces numbered seven hundred thousand,[83] no doubt an exaggerated figure that has to be reduced several times. The size of the navy—six hundred ships—appears to match the importance of the campaign, and for that reason is considered by some scholars authentic.[84] This is instead a Herodotean stereotype and, accordingly, hardly conforms with reality.[85] After crossing the bridge over the Bosporus, Darius ordered the Ionians to set off for the Istros, where they were to build a new pontoon-bridge and wait for him. He himself entered Thrace at the head of the infantry.[86]

Herodotus clearly defines both the initial and the final point of the march of the Persians across Thrace, from Byzantium to the Istros delta. Apart from that, he describes in a comparatively detailed way the progress of the army from Byzantium to Haemus, initially on the basis of hydronyms such as the rivers Tearus and Artescus,[87] and eventually with the help of ethnonyms: the Thracians occupying Salmydessus, and the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei living above Apollonia and Mesambria.[88] Only later, in the seventh book, does Herodotus adds that on the march against the Scythians Darius garrisoned the fortress of Doriscus.[89]

Despite Herodotus' report, the route of the Persian army cannot be strictly traced. The main problem arises from the two hydronyms mentioned here, Tearus and Artescus. Both rivers seem to be unknown or known only to a

81 In Harmatta's view 1976: 17, the parallel dates in the *Tabula Capitolina* are real, as the possible difference is at maximum three years. He dates the Scythian march back to the years of 515–513, and adds that there is a sixty percent possibility for the year to be 514/13.

82 Hdt. IV.83.1–2.

83 Ibid. IV.87.1.

84 Fol, Hammond 1988: 238.

85 Hdt. VI.9.1—600 ships, VI.95.2—600, V.32.1—200 and VI.44.3, where 300 ships are said to have been lost near Athos. At this point the number of the Persian navy at Doriscus may be added—1207 ships (ibid. VII.89.1), where the same pattern is followed, though in this case it is not a round number.

86 Ibid. IV.89.1–3.

87 Ibid. IV. 89.3, 92.1.

88 Ibid. IV.93.1.

89 Ibid. VII.59.1.

small degree to his readers. In order to explain the exact location of the Tearus River, Herodotus says that it flowed into Contadesdus which was a tributary of the Agrianes River, which in turn flowed into the Hebrus. Additionally, he mentions that the Tearus has thirty-eight hot and cold springs at a two-day distance from the city of Apollonia, and a two-day distance from Heraion, a city near Perinthus.[90] Undoubtedly, as he himself claims (ὁ δὲ Τέαρος λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν περιοίκων …), his main sources both for the location of the thirty-eight springs and for their medicinal characteristics are the people living in the place where it flowed (i.e., the local Thracians he may have met in the Hellespontic cities).[91]

Herodotus makes a detailed description of the location of the Tearus springs. Despite his precision, however, because of the hydronymy in the present-day Turkish part of Thrace, the exact location of the river Tearus is not possible to be determined. A river called Tearus is familiar to Simonides[92] and Pliny,[93] but in comparison to the information Herodotus gives theirs is rather general and cannot help solve the problem.[94] There are many attempts to identify the Tearus either with the Semerdere,[95] or with the Buyukdere,[96] or with the Kryonero by Pinarhisar,[97] or with the springs near the village of Jana situated near Pinarhisar,[98] and others. An interesting supposition is made by Ajanov, who identifies the Tearus with the Mandalica, which is actually the name of the upper stream of the Buyukdere.[99] His strongest arguments are the existence of forty-two springs in the region which in cold weather would steam.[100] What is

90 Ibid. IV.90.1–2.

91 Jacoby 1913: 259 assumes that during one of his journeys Herodotus visited the Tearus springs in person.

92 Anthol. Pal. VII.514.

93 Pliny *NH* IV.11.45.

94 Beševliev 1975: 20–21, after analysing the geographical order of the cities and rivers enumerated by Pliny and Simonides' epigram as well, concludes that there were two rivers called Tearus: the first, inner one, mentioned by Herodotus and the second mentioned by Pliny which, according to Beševliev flowed into the Black Sea and could be identified either with the present-day Veleka or Rezovska Rivers.

95 Jochmus 1854: 44–45.

96 Jireček 1877: 49–50.

97 Tomaschek 1894: II.2. 97.

98 Unger 1915: 3–16.

99 Ajanov 1946: 107–109.

100 The fact that Herodotus mentions thirty-eight springs, not forty-two, does not belittle Ajanov's supposition, since the number of the springs is dependent on geological changes that might occur over time.

more, in his view these springs were located at comparatively the same distance both from Apollonia and Perinthus. In fact, the two arguments have been also presented by Jochmus, who, however, does not tell the precise number of the springs he found.[101]

The location of the Tearus River appears to remain debatable, unless something that may be identified with the stele placed on Darius' order is found.[102] The fact that it is impossible to precisely locate the Tearus is not of particular significance, for the distance between the rivers mentioned above is minor, and one can reasonably conclude that the Persian army camped in a place near the south hillsides of Strandja for three days. How did the army reach the place? Herodotus' mention of the peaceful submission of the Thracians occupying Salmydessus, no matter whether it is about the coast or the polis bearing that name, cannot be accidental. He notes that the act had taken place before Darius crossed the Istros. That might mean two things: either the whole army led by the Great King reached Salmydessus and subdued the local Thracians, or the task was assigned to only a small part of it, while the main army made progress towards the Tearus across the interior.

Herodotus mentions nothing about the division of the army into parts. If he had such information, he would probably have shared it with his readers, just as he does about the army led by Xerxes.[103] In that case, it should be accepted that the whole Persian army moved close to the coast from Byzantium to Salmydessus. From a report by Xenophon it is clear that at the end of the fifth century a coastal road existed in that direction or at least in part of it.[104] The road mentioned by Xenophon probably existed even at the time when the Scythian march took place. Progress along the coast towards Salmydessus implies an advance in the company of part of the navy, for the whole navy would not have been sent to prepare the pontoon-bridges over the Istros—in Herodotus' view that task was assigned to the Ionians,[105] though it may be assumed that others took part, not only for its greatness and the need for quick realization, but also for the fact that the Ionians probably did not have enough ships to join the pontoons themselves. Herodotus makes no mention of any but the Greek navy, but a bit earlier in his text he explicitly states that Darius mobilized contingents from all the nations under his rule.[106] His clarification

101 Jochmus 1854: 44–45.

102 For the possibility that such a discovery has already been made, see Unger 1915: 13–16.

103 Hdt. VII.121.2–3.

104 Xen. *Anab.* VII.5.1, 12.

105 Hdt. IV.89.1.

106 Ibid. IV.87.1.

that the Ionians, Aeolians, and the people of the Hellespont were in charge of the navy (τὸ γὰρ δὴ ναυτικὸν ἦγον Ἴωνές τε καὶ Αἰολέες καὶ Ἑλλησπόντιοι) is also significant as an indication of the participation of other non-Greek contingents in the affair. What is more, when entering foreign and unknown territories, at least part of the navy had to be assigned the logistical task of supplying the infantry, where this was possible and necessary.

According to Pseudo-Scymnus[107] and Strabo,[108] the Pontic coast of Salmydessus was seven hundred stadia long, spread to Cyaneae, and was rocky and harborless. Thus, to supply the infantry with provisions by sea was difficult, if not impossible. Undoubtedly, Darius had detailed information about the difficulties beforehand, and so his progress on the short coastal road between Byzantium and Salmydessus should not be associated with the idea of provisioning the infantry.

Many scholars suppose that Darius intended to go from Byzantium to Istros close to the coast. This conclusion, however, contradicts the actions of the Great King who, after he had accepted the submission of the Thracians occupying Salmydessus, did not continue north towards the present-day Rezovska River and the Gulf of Burgas, but instead headed west–northwest towards the Tearus River and, as will become clear from the text below, circumvented Strandja from the west. His decision not to continue north probably relates to the fact that the coastal road from Salmydessus to Apollonia was difficult for a large army to walk. It is true that, according to the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, a coastal road between Istria and Constantinople existed in Roman times,[109] but there is no available proof that it was used for military purposes, at least by such an army the size of Darius'.

What reason would Darius have to take the coastal road to Salmydessus, knowing that during the journey it would be almost impossible for supplies to be provided by the navy and that the coastal road to Apollonia was inconvenient for the large Persian army? Xenophon mentions shoals by the coast of Salmydessus that caused frequent shipwrecks and that the local Thracians took advantage of this fact and robbed the castaways.[110] From a fragment of Archilochus it is clear that some two hundred and fifty years before Xenophon,

107 Ps.Scymn. 724–727.

108 Strabo VII.6.1.

109 IR. col. 495–516 (Miller)—Apollonia XII—Thera X—Buatico XII—Scyllam XII—Philias (ca XV)—is missing XX—Thimea XII—Sycas—Constantinopolis. After Buatico, Miller adds the stations Tinias and Salmydessos.

110 Xen. *Anab.* VII.5.12–14. See later reports of Pseudo-Scymnus (724–727) and Strabo (VII.6.1).

the Thracians of Salmydessus had been occupied with the same activity.[111] The situation at the time of the Scythian march was probably similar. In that case the submission of the local Thracians might be the main purpose of the march from Byzantium to Salmydessus. Darius may have gained information about the situation of merchants passing by Salmydessus from the Ionians and the people of the Hellespont and, considering the coast of Pontus his possession, he decided to eliminate the local Thracian robbers. That would not cause either a serious delay or a great change of purpose. The local Thracians submitted with no resistance, and Darius set off for the Tearus River without difficulty.

The second hydronym mentioned by Herodotus is the Artescus. It is important for the exact location of that river to be defined, for it is one of the supporting points mentioned by Herodotus concerning the progress of the Persians towards the Istros. The river, however, not only seems to be unfamiliar to Herodotus' readers, but he himself cannot locate it precisely, which may mean that he did not have local sources.

Herodotus' only clear geographical statement is that the Artescus flowed across the lands of the Odrysae.[112] On the basis of that information some scholars believe that the Artescus flowed through the land initially peopled by the tribal core of the Odrysae.[113] Suppositions are made either about military conflict between the Persians and the Odrysae[114] or about the peaceful submission of the Odrysae,[115] as well as about a dynastic marriage between an Odrysian aristocrat and a Persian noble woman.[116] Such suppositions are unconvincing, for Herodotus uses the present tense when he specifies that the Artescus River flowed across the land of the Odrysae—ποταμὸν τῷ οὔνομα Ἀρτησκός ἐστι, ὃς διὰ Ὀδρυσέων ῥέει … (i.e., he does not refer to the time of the Scythian march but illustrates the state of affairs in the mid-fifth century[117]). This means that the bare mention of the Odrysians is not of great help for defining the exact location of the Artescus River, because in Herodotus' time the Odrysian kingdom was powerful and covered a vast expanse of territory.

111 Archil. fr. 79a.

112 Hdt. IV.92.1.

113 Fol, Hammond 1988: 239; Mihailov 1991: 605–606; Petkov 2012: 59.

114 Fol 1972: 116.

115 Wiesner 1963: 87; Hammond 1980: 55.

116 Tacheva 2006: 24; Gergova 2010: 69–70.

117 Macan 1895: II.56; Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 26; Boteva 2011: 740.

The Artescus is often identified with the present-day Ardas,[118] as well as with the Tonzos River,[119] with Teke,[120] with Veleka or the Rezovska River,[121] with Fakia,[122] and even with the Kamchiya River,[123] which flows north of Haemus. Other authors do not name a particular river but note that the Artescus probably disgorged its waters into the sea near the Gulf of Burgas[124] or more generally between the Tonzos River and the Black Sea.[125] Due to differing opinions of the river's location, separate authors reconstruct differently the route of the Persian army. Those who identify the Artescus with the Ardas River propose that from the Tearus springs Darius headed for the Hebrus, crossed it, and then subdued the local people. The fact that during the march against the Scythians Darius garrisoned Doriscus, which was situated west of the Hebrus,[126] is often used as an argument for the identification of the rivers with one another. Such a reconstruction of the route of the Persian army seems unconvincing. Nowhere in the text does Herodotus mention the Persians crossing the Hebrus River. Such a detour westward would be an enormous strategic mistake that,

118 Kiepert 1869: Tab. v; Hirschfeld 1896: 1458; Velkov 1968: 82–84; Venedikov 1970: 30–32; Venedikov, Gerasimov 1973: 42; Sarafov 1974: 156; Hammond 1980: 54; Fol, Hammond 1988: 239; Mihailov 1991: 605; Archibald 1998: 82. It appears that Sarakinski 2013: 54 shares the same opinion—Персијците релативно брзо стасале во сливот на Хеброс (ден. Марица), најголемата река во средна Тракија, а потоа се префрлиле на нејзиниот западен брег и навлегле во долината на Артеск, населена од тракиските Одриси.

119 Tomaschek 1894: II.2. 92; Detschew 1976: 29; Georgiev 1977: 160.

120 Jochmus 1854: 46–47; Rawlinson 1860: III.69n8; Abicht 1862: ad IV.92; How, Wells 1928: ad IV.92; Schorpil 1934: 11; van Groningen 1950: ad IV.92; Georges 1987: 131; Müller 1997: 788. See also Duncker 1877: 494—'Teke deresi oder Ressowa.'

121 Delev 1983: 223; Beševliev 1990: 15.

122 Yanakieva 2009: 39.

123 Legrand 1945: 104n2. See also Stein 1868: ad IV.92—'Die ursprünglichen Sitze der Odrysen müssen nach Thuc. II.96 im nördlichen und mittleren Thrakien, an beiden Ufern der Tundja, gesucht werden. Hiernach bestimmt sich der Ἀρτησκός (vielleicht schon von Hesiod. Th. 345 als Ἄρδησκος genannt) als einen der auf dem Haemos entspringenden Küstenflüsse (Kamtschyk?).'

124 Lenk 1937: 1901. Delev 1983: 223—'En ce cas Artescos peut être identifié avec un des affluents nord de l'Ergéné ou avec unde des rivières qui traversent le Nord de Strandja et s'écoulent dans la mer Noire—Rezovska, Veleka, Karaagač, Ropotamo ou quelque autre—mais avec la Tundža ou l'Arda.' Zahrnt 1997: 95—'Die Landschaft Salmydessos erstreckte sich nordöstlich des Quellgebiets des Tearos an der Küste, Apollonia und Mesambria lagen nördlich davon beiderseits des heutigen Burgas, und der Arteskos mag ein Küstenfluss dieses Gebietes gewesen sein.'

125 Tonev 1942: 179–180.

126 Strabo VII. fr. 48 (Meineke); Pliny *NH* IV.11.43; Mela II.28.

considering Darius' main purpose was to reach Scythia, could lead to a fatal delay. The Great King would hardly undertake a campaign west of the Hebrus that would separate his forces from the navy, given the unpredictable consequences. After the Scythian march it was Megabazus who was assigned the task to conquer the lands west of the Hebrus River, while Darius himself probably continued his way towards the Istros without such a lengthy detour to the west and so without crossing the Hebrus.

It has been mentioned earlier that Herodotus was not able to define the precise location of the Artescus. That may mean that the Artescus did not flow into the Pontus, for otherwise it would have been known to the inhabitants of the Greek cities in the region, namely Apollonia and Mesambria, and Herodotus would accordingly have gained more information about it. If he had such information, he would have defined its location by mentioning the names of nearby cities in the way he does with the location of the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei. The information about the Artescus River flowing across the lands of the Odrysae serves as indirect proof that the river flowed away from Greek cities, both Pontic and Hellespontic. There is one more fact that should not be overlooked: the name Ἀρτησκός (Ἀρτισκός P S V, Ἀρτίσκος B, Ἀρτικός R) is a hapax[127] yet further proof that the river did not flow into the Pontus near the Gulf of Burgas, but rather crossed the inland and flowed into the Hebrus or into one of its tributaries. Thus its name, found mentioned only by Herodotus, was quickly forgotten. If that is true, the Artescus can be identified with the Tonzos River,[128] or more probably with one of the rivers that flowed into the Agrianes, crossing the land between the Tonzos and Teke Dere, or even with the Teke Dere itself. If the Teke Dere and Artescus are one and the same river, then it was quite

127 Hesiod *Theog*. 345 mentions a river called Ἄρδησκος. Hammond 1980: 54n4 identifies the river mentioned by Hesiod with the Hebrus lower stream, for which he is criticized by Zahrnt 1997: 94n13. Velkov 1968: 83 identifies Hesiod's Ἄρδησκος with Herodotus' Ἀρτησκός and believes that it is the present-day Ardas River. Stein 1868: ad IV.92 also assumes that it is possible for Hesiod's Ἄρδησκος and Herodotus' Ἀρτησκός to have been one and the same river, but he thinks that, in the particular case, the river under discussion is the Kamchiya.

128 Harpocr. (Dindorf) Καβύλη—πρὸς τῷ Τάξῳ ποταμῷ κατὰ μέσον τῆς Θρᾴκης; Suid. Καβύλη—πρὸς τῷ Τάξῳ ποταμῷ κατὰ μέσον τῆς Θρᾴκης; Zosim. II.22.—ὃ Τωνος εειος ποταμὸς τῷ Ἕβρῳ συμβάλλει (L τῶνος εειος; P τῶνος εκειος; L. margo τῶνος ἐτρός); Ptolemy (III.11.12—Nobbe) mentions a polis named Τόνζος, situated in Thrace. See also Ptolemy (III.11.4—Nobbe)—Τόνζου(ς). Because of the genitive used by Ptolemy Detschew 1976: 511 offers Τόνζου (ποταμοῦ ἐκβολαί) and arrives at the following conclusion: 'zwischen Apollonia und Perontikon (nach der irrigen Ansicht, dass die Tundža nicht in den Hebros, sondern in das Schwarze Meer einmündet).' The version Τόνζου (ἄκρα), however, is also possible, or Nobbe's—Τόνζου(ς).

possible for the Persian army to have eventually crossed Strandja towards the present-day villages of Kofcaz and Fakia in the direction of Deultum.[129] As an indirect proof of that may serve the fact that Darius camped near the springs of the Tearus River (i.e., his army was closely situated by the south hillsides of Strandja). In addition, in Roman times a road existed in the area.[130] On the other hand, it is logical to ask whether it was reasonable for a large army to cross the mountain and encounter difficulties on its way, given that the circumvention of Mt Strandja would delay the army for not more than a couple of days.

After Darius left the Artescus behind and most probably circumvented Mt Strandja from the west, he headed for the hinterland of Apollonia. Herodotus mentions the peaceful submission of the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei occupying the lands above Apollonia and Mesambria.[131] He provides his readers with information about the location of the two tribes in question by mentioning two western Pontic cities.[132] Herodotus, however, mentions nothing about Darius' attitude towards Apollonia and the rest of the Greek cities in the north as far as the Istros. It is logical to accept that north of the Gulf of Burgas the Persian army closely followed the coast, for going into the interior of Thrace would separate his forces from the navy and raise the unnecessary risk of turning the army from its pursued aim. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the conquered Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei lived in the hinterland of Apollonia and Mesambria.

Undoubtedly, the ports of the Greek cities were the most suitable for contact with the part of the navy that was not assigned the task of connecting the pontoons. However, a visit of Darius to some of the poleis in question would make a strong impression on their citizens. One may expect that the memory of that event would still be vivid during the time of Herodotus several decades later, and that the story would be popular enough that he would have become acquainted with it. The attention paid to Xerxes' visit to Acanthus and Abdera shows that Herodotus is interested in such stories.[133] The fact that he mentions nothing is a sign that Darius did not visit any of those Greek cities north of

129 A similar assumption is made by Ajanov 1946: 109–110, whose view is accepted by Velkov 1963: 27 and Jordanov 2009: 221. For possible crossing through Strandja see also Schorpil: 1934: 11; Delev 1983: 223.

130 IAA 229.3–230.5—Debelco m.p.XXIIII—Sadame m.p.XVIII—Tarpodizo m.p.XVIII—Ostodizo m.p.XXXII—Burtudizo m.p.XVIII—Bergule m.p.XVIII.

131 Hdt. IV.93.1. In some codices (A B C P) the name Κυρμιάναι is used.

132 Lenk 1931: 1073; Isaac 1986: 250n230; Boteva–Boyanova 2000: 24; Boteva 2011: 739.

133 Hdt. VII.116.1–117.2; VIII.120.1.

Salmydessus whose existence at the time is not questioned, namely Apollonia, Odessos, and Histria.

For geographical reasons the refusal to approach the walls of Apollonia appears understandable. If Darius planned to circumvent Strandja from the west with the intention of going through the east slopes of Haemus in the quickest possible way, then approaching Apollonia would involve unnecessary deviation from his route. Yet, if contact with the navy was needed, it may have been made north of the Gulf of Burgas without serious delay of the infantry's progress. Perhaps Herodotus did not mention Odessos and Histria with regard to the progress of the Persian army because Darius had to fight the Getae, and accordingly did not consider it necessary to focus his attention on Odessos. Histria itself was very close to the pontoon bridges, the final destination of the route from Byzantium to the Istros. It is possibile that Darius was not interested in visiting any of the Greek cities. If the lack of information about any visit of Darius to the Pontic cities is not due to Herodotus' lack of knowledge, but rather reflects the real situation, then it is possible that only part of the Persian army was sent to these cities, or that their conquest was assigned to the navy only.

Going further to the north Darius crossed the Haemus and probably entered the lands of the Getae through one of its eastern passes. In contrast to the tribes living south of the Haemus the Getae resisted submission. At that time their territories reached as far as the Istros delta and the pontoon-bridge.[134] They accordingly had to be conquered in order for the rear of the Persian army to be supplied and for the bridge to be preserved. The Getae seem to have been quickly conquered and made to follow the Persian army.[135] Next the army led by Darius reached the Istros where the pontoon-bridge stood ready. Hammond presumes that in a two-day journey the navy reached Cerna Voda where it joined the pontoon-bridge together.[136] This supposition cannot be confirmed by the ancient authors. In Herodotus' opinion the bridge was joined in the place where the Istros divided into separate branches (i.e., just above its delta),[137] while Strabo claims that it was done in the lower part of the Peuke island.[138]

134 Ibid. IV.118.1–2. See also ibid. IV.118.5–119.1 where it is noted that the Getae and the Scythians were neighboring tribes, as well as ibid. IV.122.1 where it is clarified that the Persians met the Scythian vanguard at a three-day distance, north of the Istros, i.e. at that time the lands south of the Istros delta were not under Scythian control.

135 Ibid. IV.93.1, 96.2.

136 Hammond 1980: 54.

137 Hdt. IV.89.1–2.

138 Strabo VII.3.15.

Herodotus' report appears more logical, for otherwise, if Strabo's assertion is followed, the Ionians formed several pontoon-bridges in order to reach the Scythian coast.

After spending time in Scythia[139] trying unsuccessfully to meet the Scythians in open battle, Darius crossed the Istros for the second time and reached the Chersonese through the lands of the Thracians.[140] On the basis of a chronologically uncertain passage by Herodotus[141] and on the information provided by Ctesias[142] and Strabo,[143] some scholars assume that immediately after the Persian retreat from Scythia, or at maximum a year or two later, the Scythians invaded Thrace as far as the Thracian Chersonese and banished Miltiades from his lands.[144]

Of the reports of the three authors mentioned above, Herodotus' passage, though most controversial, is the basis of the hypothesis of a Scythian invasion as far as the Chersonese after the march of Darius:

> οὗτος δὲ ὁ Κίμωνος Μιλτιάδης νεωστὶ μὲν ἐληλύθεε ἐς τὴν Χερσόνησον, κατελάμβανε δέ μιν ἐλθόντα ἄλλα τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων χαλεπώτερα. τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔτεϊ τούτων Σκύθας ἐκφεύγει· Σκύθαι γὰρ οἱ νομάδες ἐρεθισθέντες ὑπὸ βασιλέος Δαρείου συνεστράφησαν καὶ ἤλασαν μέχρι τῆς Χερσονήσου ταύτης. τούτους ἐπιόντας οὐκ ὑπομείνας ὁ Μιλτιάδης ἔφευγε Χερσόνησον, ἐς ὃ οἵ τε Σκύθαι ἀπαλλάχθησαν καί μιν οἱ Δόλογκοι κατήγαγον ὀπίσω. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τρίτῳ ἔτεϊ πρότερον ἐγεγόνεε τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων

The quoted passage has been repeatedly discussed in secondary literature. Various attempts at correcting the text have been accepted or criticized by researchers. The expression νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε seems key to defining the precise

139 In Herodotus' view (IV.98.1–2, 136.3) Darius campaign in Scythia took more than sixty days. Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 13.21) states, however, that Darius advance lasted only fifteen days, while Strabo (VII.3.14) claims that the Persians did not reach further than Tyras because there was a risk that the people might die of thirst.

140 Hdt. IV.143.1.

141 Ibid. VI.40.1–2.

142 *FGrH* 688 F 13.21.

143 Strabo XIII.1.22.

144 Busolt 1888: 16–17; Herbst 1890: 146–147; Casson 1915: 72; Wade-Gery 1951: 216–217; Hammond 1956: 118–119; Evans 1963: 115–116; Wiesner 1963: 81, 88; Berve 1967: I.82; II.567; Prontera 1972: 111–123; Venedikov, Gerasimov 1973: 42; Fol 1975a: 160–163; 1976: 12; Chernenco 1984: 107; Isaac 1986: 174; Gardiner-Garden 1987: 338–340; Loukopoulou 1989: 90–91; Balcer 1995: 152.

date of the Scythian invasion into the Chersonese and Miltiades' expulsion from the peninsula. It is often taken to refer to Herodotus' transitional passage in which he describes how Miltiades the Younger succeeded in imposing his authority over the Chersonese (i.e., his first coming to the peninsula, which undoubtedly should be dated before the Scythian campaign).[145] Others hold the opinion that the expression may refer to Miltiades' second arrival in the Chersonese after the retreat of the Scythians, whose invasion may be dated around 496.[146] If νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε is examined, it is logical to conclude that the expression relates to Miltiades' first arrival. The impression is heightened by the use of ἐρεθισθέντες, which in Scott's view is strong and decisive evidence for the meaning of νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε.[147] If νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε does refer to Miltiades' first arrival in the Chersonese, then it should be accepted that the Scythian invasion took place three years later—τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔτεϊ τούτων.

In what way does the conclusion correspond to Herodotus' final sentence—ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τρίτῳ ἔτεϊ πρότερον ἐγεγόνεε τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων? What is of paramount importance here are the events ταῦτα concerns. Hammond relates ταῦτα to the re-establishment of Miltiades' authority only, and believes that after his escape from the Scythians in 511/10 he returned to the Chersonese no earlier than 496/5, only to leave it once and for all in 494/3.[148] In this way, he assumes that Miltiades was absent from the Chersonese for a comparatively long period of time, which not only leads to a large gap in his biography, but raises the question as well whether it is logical to assume that the Dolonci called him back fifteen years after his escape from the Scythians. Apart from that, it is hardly accidental that Herodotus twice mentions the period of the three years after the particular event. In the first case he offers no concrete dating, as he does in the second by using πρότερον. The coincidence of numbers is too evident for Hammond's dating to be accepted, in whose view the escape from the Scythians had happened three years after Miltiades first arrived in the Chersonese, and his return to the peninsula had taken place three years before the

145 Herbst 1890: 146–147; Beloch II.2: 39; Powell 1935: 160–161; Hammond 1956: 118–119; Prontera 1972: 117; Gardiner-Garden 1987: 339; Scott 2005: 525.

146 Blakesley 1854: 108n95; Stein III: ad VI.40; Abicht 1883: ad VI.40; Abbott 1893: ad VI.40; Macan 1895: I. ad VI.40; Shuckburgh 1908: 111–112; How, Wells 1928: ad VI.40; van Groningen 1950: ad VI.40; Viviers 1993: 236. Rawlinson 1860: III.91n5, 362n4 dates the Scythian attack back to the year of 495, but accepts, at the same time, that νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε refers to the Miltiades' first arrival in the Chersonese.

147 Scott 2005: 525.

148 Hammond 1956: 119. The same opinion is shared by Casson 1915: 72 and Prontera 1972: 122–123 who, however, dates the Scythian attack in 514/13.

arrival of the Phoenician navy. It was probably a brief absence, followed by a quick return—τούτους ἐπιόντας οὐκ ὑπομείνας ὁ Μιλτιάδης ἔφευγε Χερσόνησον, ἐς ὃ οἵ τε Σκύθαι ἀπαλλάχθησαν καί μιν οἱ Δόλογκοι κατήγαγον ὀπίσω. If that is true, due to the use of πρότερον it may be assumed that the Scythian invasion and Miltiades' escape took place three years earlier than the arrival of the Phoenician navy (i.e., in 496). Hence, νεωστὶ ἐληλύθεε should be related to Miltiades' second return to the Chersonese and it should be accepted that the Scythians' anger lasted unsuppressed for fifteen years. This second supposition does not appear so unusual, for Herodotus elsewhere says that the Scythians, according to the Spartans, sent envoys to Sparta to offer collective action against the Persians, eager to take revenge on Darius.[149] Although the story itself is questionable, the fact that it became widespread during this time and also relates to the death of the Spartan king Cleomenes suggests that Herodotus' sources, and probably Herodotus himself, believed that the Scythians had not given up their desire to take revenge on Darius some twenty years after his expedition in Scythia.[150]

The acceptance of the later dating of the Scythian invasion into the Chersonese (496) raises problems of a different nature that also call for correction of the text.[151] If the text remains uncorrected, and the possibility of a later transcription error is excluded, then, due to the final sentence of the quoted passage, according to Herodotus Miltiades' escape from the Scythians had taken place three years before the arrival of the Phoenician navy. Herodotus appears to define the precise chronology of the events in this particular sentence and to summarize all that has been spoken on the topic so far—ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τρίτῳ ἔτεϊ πρότερον ἐγεγόνεε τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων.

Some observations on other passages of Herodotus can serve as supporting arguments. If an early dating of the Scythian invasion in the Chersonese is accepted, having in mind that Herodotus chronologically specifies 'the third year,' then it was either at the time of the retreat of the Persian army from

149 Hdt. VI.84.1–3.

150 See also Hdt. III.48.1; IV.1.1 where it is noted that both the Corinthians and Darius were willing to take due revenge on the Samians and the Scythians for events that had taken place in a rather distant period of time.

151 Stein 1871: VI.40—τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔτεϊ πρὸ τούτων Σκύθας ἐκφεύγει; Macan 1895: I. ad VI.40; Powell 1935: 160–161; Wade-Gery 1951: 216–217. See also Herbst 1890: 146–147, who dates the Scythian attack back to 513 and offers a correction of the text, according to which Miltiades returned to the Chersonese in 507, i.e. not three but thirteen years before the Phoenician navy devastated the peninsula—'An dieser zweiten Stelle wird nicht τρίτῳ ἔτεϊ, sondern τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτεϊ, nicht γ sondern ιγ zu lessen sein.'

Thrace, or a bit later after the Scythian march (i.e., at maximum a year or two later). Herodotus himself, however, describing Darius' actions just after the march, does not mention the chase of the Persian army by the Scythians as far as the Chersonese—an act that would make a dramatic and excellent end of his story about the Scythian march. Instead, he dryly mentions that after crossing the Istros the Persians made a successful escape from the Scythians (ἐκφεύγουσι) and that after his arrival in the Chersonese Darius titled Megabazus '*strategos* of Europa' and afterwards moved to Asia.[152] Similarly in the description of the actions of Megabazus and Otanes there is no hint of them having fought the Scythians. Megabazus even went untroubled through the Chersonese from Europe to Asia, bringing Paeonian captives.[153] The lack of information about being at war with the Scythians at the time of the retreat across Thrace and in the years that followed might mean that the above-discussed passage of Herodotus refers to the time of the Ionian Revolt.

The second author quoted to prove the early invasion of the Scythians in the Chersonese is Strabo.[154] He says that after his return from the Scythian march, Darius gained information about an attack which had been in preparation on the part of the Scythians and, fearing that Hellespontic cities might join them, ordered their cities burned. Strabo clearly states that Abydus was one of the destroyed cities. The very mention of Abydus is a sign that his report most probably relates to the time of the Ionian Revolt. In Herodotus' view this was when Abydos, as well as other Hellespontic cities, was conquered by the Persians.[155] This act is usually dated to 497, which suggests that, though Herodotus himself does not draw such a parallel, on the basis of Herodotus' report, Strabo relates the burning-down of Abydus to the Scythian invasion. If this conclusion is correct, then Strabo's report cannot serve as evidence for an early Scythian invasion in the Chersonese.

The last of the three authors who discuss the subject is Ctesias. He claims that after destroying the pontoon-bridge over the Istros, Darius left behind eighty thousand soldiers in Europe, who were killed by the Scythian King Scytharbes, and later adds that Darius burned down the city of the Chalchedonians.[156] If Photios' excerpts follow a chronological order, it should be accepted that the fight or fights in which the Persian army were killed took place immediately after the Scythian march. At this point, however, the topic is not the

152 Hdt. IV.142.1, 143.1, 144.3.

153 Ibid. V.23.1.

154 Strabo XIII.1.22.

155 Hdt. V.117.1.

156 *FGrH* 688 F 13.21.

pursuit of the army withdrawing from Scythia, but rather a war against the army troops left in Europe. It cannot pass unnoticed that the eighty thousand soldiers mentioned by Ctesias are identical in number to the soldiers Herodotus states the Great King provided Megabazus.[157] In comparison to Ctesias, Herodotus mentions nothing about Megabazus' war with the Scythians accompanied by a crushing defeat. Such a progression of events would be a catastrophe for Persian ambitions in Europe and would lead to the impossibility of Megabazus' campaigns taking place in the way Herodotus describes them. If this conclusion as well as the above analysis of the information provided by Herodotus and Strabo is taken into account, then the statement Ctesias makes about the defeat of the Persian army Darius left in Europe can be rightly denied. It is possible that Ctesias simply misrepresents Herodotus' story about the exhausted Persian soldiers Darius left in Scythia.[158]

In Herodotus' view, upon returning from Scythia Darius crossed Thrace and reached the polis of Sestus in the Chersonese.[159] He does not speak clearly about the route of the Persian army in retreat, but further in his report he mentions the Doriscus fortress garrisoned by Darius' soldiers at the time of the march against the Scythians.[160] Normally, on the basis of the expression used by Herodotus (ἐπείτε ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἐστρατεύετο) it is claimed that the Persian garrison was installed at the beginning of the march on Darius' way to the north.[161] In that case, as How and Wells note, the expression refers rather to the campaign against the Scythians as a whole, and accordingly, does not relate to its beginning.[162] Taking the expression to lack an exact chronological status is much more suitable, for in Herodotus' view the Persian army returning from Scythia arrived in the Thracian Chersonese, only dozens of kilometers from Doriscus. Apart from that, as has already been mentioned above, in his progress towards Scythia Darius hardly would have made such a lengthy detour to the west. In that case, if a garrison was actually put in Doriscus during the Scythian campaign and was not a later act of Megabazus,

157 Hdt. IV.143.3.

158 Ibid. IV.134.3–136.1.

159 Ibid. IV.143.1.

160 Ibid. VII. 59.1.

161 Hammond 1980: 54; Isaac 1986: 137. See also Chernenco 1984: 62, who relates the act of placing a garrison in Doriscus to the one of sending military troops which took a different-from-the-main route followed by the advancing-through-Thrace Persian army. He thinks that there is yet another variant according to which one part of the army reached Doriscus, having swapped over from Asia to Europe via Hellespont.

162 How, Wells 1928: ad VII.59. See also Stein IV: ad VII.59.

it should be accepted that it happened at the return of the Persian army from Scythia.[163] That, for its own part, is an important indication that on his way back Darius took a westward detour around Strandja. This time, however, he headed not for the Tearus and Byzantium but for the place where the present-day rivers Ardas, Maritsa, and Tundzha meet. From that point there were two ways for Darius to reach Sestus. The first would lead Darius and the main part of his army along the road of the future *via diagonalis* to the present-day city of Corlu, while some of his troops headed for Doriscus. According to the Roman itineraries, a road leading from modern Corlu to Perinthus existed,[164] as did a road from Perinthus to Sestus.[165] If Darius did arrive at Perinthus with the main part of his army, then Herodotus' statement that Megabazus attacked the inhabitants of that city first, and not any of the other disobedient cities, would find its satisfactory explanation.[166] On the other hand, if Herodotus' text is strictly followed, it is impossible for Darius' progress from Perinthus to Sestus to have taken place without Megabazus, since he clearly relates Megabazus' appointment as '*strategos* of Europa' to Darius' sailing from Sestus.[167]

The second route supposes the Great King went downstream the Hebrus and at a certain point turned towards the Chersonese, while at the same time troops were sent in the direction of Doriscus, since Darius himself hardly reached that point with his entire army.[168]

Herodotus defines Doriscus as a τεῖχος, which in general means a fortress.[169] It appears to be a frontier fort at the time, whose function was not only to control the traffic on the coastal road and the Hebrus downstream, but also to serve as a base for the scheduled invasion to the west. From the evidence of

163 Stein IV: ad VII.59 and Balcer 1988: 9, 14 arrive at the same conclusion. As far as Doriscus is concerned see Burn 1984: 222, 329, who assumes that the fortress had been built by the time of Darius' march, but became a Persian post only on Mardonius' march. See also Macan 1895: II.60n2, 74n1; 1908: I.1 ad VII.59.

164 IR. col. 528–540 Miller; IAA. 138.1–2, 230.7–8, 323.4–5; IB. 569.10–570.2.

165 IR. col. 587–590 Miller.

166 Hdt. V.1.1.

167 Ibid. IV.143.1.

168 Contra Balcer 1988: 9, who assumes that the whole army led by Darius went downstream the Hebrus River as far as the sea, where Doriscus was founded.

169 Hdt. VII.59.1. According to Stephanus of Byzantium Doriscus was a polis—Δορίσκος, πόλις Θράκης. His statement contradicts the information provided by the contemporary of the events Herodotus, and by other ancient authors as well (Aeschin. III.82; Scyl. 67; Liv. XXXI.16.4), and so can be rightly denied.

the ancient authors, it is clear that Doriscus was located west of the Hebrus' mouth.[170] The location of the fortress suggested by Müller is accepted by most scholars.[171]

Due to the paucity of sources, the north Persian border after Darius' march cannot be precisely defined. It is clear that after that enterprise the Persians did not establish their power to the north of the river Istros. The case of the presumed Persian dominance over the Getae is more complicated. As has already been noted, on his way to Scythia Darius subdued them by force.[172] It is logical to wonder when the Getae as well as the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei rejected Persian authority, and why the sources give no information about Persian punitive actions.

Mardonius' march to deal with the consequences of the Ionian Revolt in Europe (492) had no concern with the lands north of Mt Strandja (i.e., towards those of the aforementioned tribes).[173] That may mean two things: either that at the time of the Ionian Revolt the Getae, Skyrmiadai, and Nipsaei were loyal to the Persians and accordingly there was no need for their punishment, or that the Persians had power over them at a time distant from Mardonius' march, and no longer had any claims on the lands north of Mt Strandja.

The first supposition may be based only on the Naqsh-i Rustam inscription, in which together with the other conquered peoples, the 'Saka paradraya' are mentioned (i.e., 'the Sacae across the sea').[174] The aforementioned Sacae are usually identified with the Pontic Scythians, but due to the fact that the Persians never succeeded in subjugating them, some scholars suppose that 'Saka paradraya' refers to the Getae or even to the Odrysae.[175] And since the inscription is dated from the last years of Darius' reign, these authors arrive at the conclusion that the Getae rejected Persian authority around the years between 492 and 480. The fact that 'Saka paradraya' are absent from the catalogues of subjected peoples in Xerxes' time serves as an additional argument.

Such a supposition appears hard to prove true. In the period between 492 and 480 the Persian control over the European territorial possessions of the empire was comparatively stronger than earlier and subsequent times, and each act of rebellion would probably be severely punished. Sources, how-

170 Strabo VII. fr. 48 (Meineke); Pliny *NH* IV. 11. 43; Mela II.28.

171 Müller 1987: 50–53.

172 Hdt. IV.93.1, 96.2.

173 Ibid. VI.44.1–45.2.

174 DNa 28–29 (Kent 1950: 137–138).

175 Hammond 1980: 58; Burn 1984: 110; Fol, Hammond 1988: 247.

ever, supply no information about any punitive action on the part of Persia in the period between 492 and 480 against the Getae, nor against the tribes occupying the territories between Strandja and Haemus. Apart from that, as has been noted, around the year 496 the Scythians, quite untroubled, reached the Thracian Chersonese, an indication of the non-existence of Persian power over the lands north of Strandja at the time. In fact, such an ascertainment is valid for all Persian power over Europe at the time of the Ionian Revolt (499–494). In this line of thought, if 'Saka paradraya' in Naqsh-i Rustam's inscription really refers to the Persian territorial possessions in Europe,[176] then they have to be identified with the Pontic Scythians, not with the Getae, the Odrysae, nor with any of the Thracian tribes. The listing of the Pontic Scythians among the conquered people was probably Darius' imperial ambition, connected with the unsuccessful march in Scythia. His son and successor Xerxes, who obviously had no connection to that enterprise and accordingly was not burdened with such ambitions, merely presented the actual state of affairs and did not add 'Saka paradraya' in the list of his subordinates.

On the basis of the evidence examined so far, it can be concluded that at the time of the Ionian Revolt, and apparently after that, the Persians had no control over the lands north of Mt Strandja. That can be indirectly proved by a report of Herodotus, according to which the citizens of Byzantium, unwilling to wait for the Persian revenge, left their city, sailed into the Pontus, and πόλιν Μεσαμβρίην οἴκησαν (494/3).[177] Balcer argues that this is an indication Mesambria was not under Persian control at that time.[178] Here it might be added that those who escaped from Byzantium did not fear being chased in that area, suggesting not only that it was out of Persian control at the time, but also that the control had been lost long before the start of the Ionian Revolt (i.e., during the years right after the Scythian expedition), and, accordingly, a punitive action was not expected similar to the one realized by the Phoenician navy and Mardonius

176 According to Struve 1949: 23 'Saka paradraya' should refer to the Sacae-Massagetae living by the Aral Sea. His approach to that problem differs from other scholars. He divides the Naqsh-i Rustam inscription into two parts. He assigns the first twenty-two peoples to the early period of Darius' rule, i.e. those were his subordinate peoples around the year 517, listed on a geographical principle. In Struve's view, in regard to the peoples numbered from twenty-three to twenty-nine a historical not a geographical principle was applied, i.e. the succession of their conquest. Thus he arrives at the conclusion that 'Saka pradraya' were not related to the Pontic Scythians but to the Sacae by the Aral Sea.

177 Hdt. VI.33.2.

178 Balcer 1988: 12.

in the lands along the Hellespont, Propontis, and the Aegean coast formerly possessed by the Persians.[179]

Hence it can be logically concluded that the rejection of Persian power by the Getae, Skyrmiadai, and Nipsaei was accomplished just after the retreat of the Great King from Scythia. Herodotus does not mention any Thracian attack against the retreating Persian army, which probably means that, after having no success meeting the Scythians in an open fight and having gained information about the revolt of the Hellespontic cities, Darius decided not to impose military and administrative control over the lands between Mt Strandja and the Istros. In this case the loss was not great because, as eventually becomes clear, Darius' major purpose was to acquire control over the straits and the north coast of the Aegean Sea, while the land between Mt Strandja and the Istros River, judging by the arguments mentioned above, seems to be given the role of a buffer zone to the Scythians. In this way it can be concluded that after Darius' march the span of Persian power spread north at most as far as Mt Strandja and the area where the present-day Maritsa, Ardas, and Tundzha Rivers meet.[180]

---

179 Pseudo-Scymnus (738–742) relates the foundation of Mesambria to Darius' Scythian march—Καλχηδόνιοι ταύτην δὲ Μεγαρεῖς τ' ᾠκισαν, ὅτ' ἐπὶ Σκύθας Δαρεῖος ἐστρατεύετο. Duncker 1882: 67 views this act in particular as a result of the conquest of Chalcedon by Otanes. If his interpretation is correct, this will confirm the conclusion arrived at in the present study, namely that the Persians lost control over the lands north of Strandja right after their retreat from Scythia, or at most a year or two later, depending on the exact time when Otanes conquered Chalcedon. If, however, Pseudo-Scymnus is strictly followed, the foundation of Mesambria will have to date from the time of the Scythian expedition and, accordingly, have no relation to Otanes' actions. Speaking about the citizens of Megara participating in the process, it can as well be considered a sign that it was no consequence of the conquest of Chalcedon by the aforesaid Persian commander-in-chief, but was rather an act performed at a time the polis led a peaceful life. See the discussion about the dating of Mesambria's foundation offered by Boshnakov 2004: 145–153, who quotes earlier opinions. Finally, he concludes: 'Aus allen bisherigen Zwischenergebnissen lässt sich anschliessend herausstellen, dass im 741. Vers von Pseudo-Skymnos (Semos v. Delos) Καλχηδόνιοι ταύτην δὲ Μεγαρεῖς τ' ᾠκισαν die erwarteten Βυζάντιοι durch Μεγαρεῖς ersetzt wurden. Das soll ein weiterer "Fingerabdruck" des Kallatianers Demetrios sein (s.o.).' Zahrnt 2008: 88n1 thinks that during Darius' campaign Mesambria did exist already as well as that Pseudo-Scymnus incorrectly interprets Herodotus' story (IV.93.1), and that is why his dating of the foundation of the polis should be ignored. Müller 1997: 881 relies on the information provided by Pseudo-Scymnus.

180 Deinon (Plut. *Alex*. 36.2) claims that the Persian kings kept pots full of water from the rivers Nile and Istros in their treasure-houses as proof of their power. It may be assumed

As in the case of the northern Persian border in Thrace, there is no information about the status of the Greek cities on the west coast of Pontus. In fact there is no information about the character of their relations neither with Darius nor with his successor Xerxes. The silence of the ancient authors might mean that no direct Persian control was imposed over those cities. Nevertheless, it sounds illogical for a large Persian navy and infantry army to pass by and not to make an attempt to put the cities into a somewhat submitted position. Token submission might have happened through an agreement, but as is clear from the case of the Byzantines Persian dominance in the region north of Strandja was short-term and ended immediately after the Scythian march.

Yet it appears that since the time of Darius' reign the Persians had not been indifferent to the western Pontic coast. Proof might be found in two available reports, from Hecataeus[181] and Stephanus of Byzantium,[182] that mention a polis named Boryza. Stephanus considers Boryza a Pontic city, and so situated on the Pontic coast, not in the interior. Hecataeus in *Europe* says that next to the Persian polis Boryza is Thynias—μετὰ δὲ Βόρυζα, πόλις Περσέων· μετὰ δὲ Θυνίας. This is an indication that the polis in question should be located on the western Pontic coast or, more precisely, between Apollonia and Byzantium. The fragment is quoted by Herodianus who, due to the nature of his work, does not think it necessary either to say which typonym or hydronym precedes the mention of Boryza, or to make it clear what exactly Hecataeus means when he speaks about Thynias.[183] From other fragments of Hecataeus, it becomes clear that in a geographical order, he enumerates rivers, lakes, and poleis, which shows that, before Boryza, there may be either a toponym or a hydronym. What is more, even laconically enumerating them, Hecataeus is precise to the highest degree and says clearly whether a certain name belongs to a river, lake, polis, or something else.[184] In the quoted excerpt of Herodianus a similar

according to the report that at a certain time the Persian borders reached as far as the Istros. A similar territorial expansion was only possible to have taken place during Darius' reign and the early years of his son Xerxes. Deinon lived in the second half of the fourth century. Even if his statement is true, one should not accept it as evidence that the Persian border was established on the Istros for a long period of time. Deinon's statement is probably political propaganda of the Persian kings, based only on Darius' crossing the Istros during the Scythian expedition.

181 *FGrH* 1 F 166.

182 St. Byz. Βόρυζα, πόλις Ποντική.

183 Hdn. *Peri Monerus*. 11.31. Μᾶζα.

184 St. Byz. Ὕοψ, πόλις ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ χερρόνησου. Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ· μετὰ δὲ Ὕοψ πόλις, μετὰ δὲ

clarification about Thynias is missing, which, together with the uncertainty over the direction the order of enumeration follows (from south to north or vice versa), makes locating Boryza almost impossible.

The ancient authors' reports show that, as far as Europe is concerned, the name Thynias denotes a settlement, a district, and a cape. Pliny is the only one who speaks about a settlement named Thynias, which he enumerates together with Salmydessus, Develt, and Phinopolis.[185] The presence of Develt between Salmydessus and Phinopolis shows that a precise geographical order is missing, as well as that it is possible for Thynias to have been located not on the coast itself but at a certain distance from it.[186] If this is true, then the name Θυνίας mentioned by Hecataeus would have no relation to the settlement in question, for the author, before mentioning the polis of Boryza situated on the Pontic coast, speaks about another typonym or hydronym (μετὰ δὲ Βόρυζα), which makes a coast-interior order of enumeration illogical. If the settlement of Thynias was on the coast and if it is identified with Hecataeus' Θυνίας, then it should be accepted that at least two of the settlements situated on the Pontic coast in the area between Byzantium and Apollonia, namely Thynias and Boryza, are unfamiliar to any of the many authors describing that region, except Hecataeus and Pliny. This conclusion appears hardly possible, and, together with the late appearance of the settlement Thynias in Pliny, is a sign that it is likely to have nothing to do with Hecataeus' Θυνίας.[187]

Λεσυρὸς ποταμός; St. Byz. Ὠρικὸς, πόλις ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ. Ἑκαταῖος λιμένα καλεῖ Ἠπείρου τὸν Ὠρικὸν, ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ· μετὰ δὲ Βουθρωτὸς πόλις· μετὰ δὲ Ὠρικὸς λιμήν; St. Byz. Ναγίδος, πόλις μεταξὺ Κιλικίας καὶ Παμφυλίας. Ἑκαταῖος Ἀσίᾳ· μετὰ δὲ Ναγίδος πόλις; St. Byz. Σίξος, πόλις Μαστιηνῶν, Ἑκαταῖος· μετὰ δὲ Σίξος πόλις; St. Byz. Σμίλα, πόλις Θρᾴκες. Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ· μετὰ δὲ Σμίλα πόλις.

185 Pliny *NH* IV.11.45 (Mayhoff)—oppida Thynias, Halmydesos, Develcon cum stagno quod nunc Deultum vocatur veteranorum, Phinopolis, iuxta quam Bosporos.

186 Mela II.24 mentions a settlement named Bytinis, which was not on the Pontic coast—deinde est Bosphorus et Propontis, in Bosphoro Byzantion, in Propontide Selymbria, Perinthos, Bytinis; amnesque qui interfluunt Erginos et Atyras. Its identification with Pliny's Thynias is controversial and accordingly cannot serve as evidence that Thynias was not on the Pontus coast, but somewhere in the interior.

187 Porozhanov 2012: 217 holds the opinion that the settlement Pliny speaks about should be identified with the cape of Thynias. It is true that when describing Thrace Pliny does not mention the well-known cape of Thynias widely pointed out by the authors before him, and only speaks about a settlement with the same name, but it is the familiarity with the cape that is a sign that it is hardly possible for such a mistake to be made.

An area with the name Thynias existed in both Asia Minor and Europe.[188] At the end of the fifth century, Xenophon places the settlements of the Thynoi in Europe from Perinthus to the southeast slopes of Mt Strandja and beyond.[189] It is not clear, however, whether they spread to the Pontic coast, where Xenophon locates the Thracian Melinophagoi.[190] The geographical range Xenophon draws might also be valid for an earlier period (i.e., the first part of the fifth century), because according to him the Thynoi in the same area defeated Teres,[191] who is rightly considered the first powerful Odrysian ruler.[192] Apart from that, Herodotus, with regard to Darius' campaign against the Scythians, claims that the Skyrmiadai lived above Apollonia,[193] which is a sign that at the end of the sixth and during the first half of the fifth century the settlements of the Thynoi did not spread north of Strandja.[194] Hence, having in mind the quoted reports of Herodotus and Xenophon, it may be assumed that the coastal part of the Thynias area spread from Cyaneae to the polis of Salmydessus in Hecataeus' time as well, or even to the Rezovska mouth, if it is accepted that the cape of Thynias had its name from at least the end of the sixth century. The coast south of Thynias, however, is known as Salmydessus and seems never to have borne the name Thynias.[195] If that is true, then Hecataeus' Θυνίας should be identified

188 Apoll. Rhod. II.460, 548; Schol. Apoll. Rhod. II.460. Thynias is also mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Θυνία), who does not make it clear whether it was in Thrace or in Asia Minor. At another point of his work he has Thynias in Asia Minor in mind—Ψίλιον, ποταμὸς μεταξὺ Θυνίας καὶ Βιθυνίας.

189 Xen. *Anab*. VII.2.11–22; VII.3.42–4.24. See also ibid. VI.4.1–2.

190 Ibid. VII.5.12. An area named Bythinia near Salmydessus is spoken about in Schol. Apoll. Rhod. II.177 (Keil—Codex Laurentianus)—ἀντιπέρην γαίῃ Θυνηίδι· δίτταί εἰσι Βιθυνίαι, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης περὶ Σαλμυδησσὸν κεῖται ἐπὶ τῆς Θρᾴκης. (Schaefer—Codex Paris)—Ἰστέον δὲ, ὅτι δύο εἰσὶ Βιθυνίαι· μία μὲν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ περὶ τὸν Σαλμυδησσόν· According to Tomaschek 1893: I.66 the Bythinia marked near Salmydessus should be replaced by Thynias. The same opinion is also held by Meyer 1897: 513; Detschew 1976: 212.

191 Xen. *Anab*. VII.2.22.

192 Thuc. II.29.3.

193 Hdt. IV.93.1.

194 But see Lenk 1936: 735, who, on the basis of a report by Stephanus of Byzantium, arrives at the conclusion that the Nipsaei were part of the Thynoi (Λαδεψοί, καὶ Τρανιψοί, ἔθνη Βιθυνῶν. Θεόπομπος ὀγδόῳ Ἑλληνικῶν = *FGrH* 115 F 16). Even if this supposition is true, the settlements of the Nipsaei would still be outside the area of Thynias, for Herodotus places them far in the north, in the hinterland of Mesambria.

195 Ps.Scymn. 724–725; Strabo VII.6.1; Ptolemy III.11.4 (Nobbe); Peripl.P.Eux. 89. The early reports lack a similar precision in defining the coast named Salmydessus, yet it appears

with the well-known cape of Thynias, not with the above-mentioned coast or the settlement of the same name.

The cape of Thynias is often mentioned in reports describing the Pontic coast.[196] It can be identified with the present-day cape of Ineada, located in the European part of Turkey. Hecataeus' expression μετὰ δὲ Βόρυζα, πόλις Περσέων· μετὰ δὲ Θυνίας shows that Boryza should be located either north or south of that cape, depending on the direction of enumeration followed. If one accepts that before Boryza a polis is mentioned, it is logical for it to be Apollonia, following a north–south enumeration.[197] Therefore it can be concluded that Boryza was close to one of the rivers flowing into the Pontus somewhere between Apollonia and the cape of Thynias—the Ropotamo, Veleka, or Rezovska, or even one of the smaller rivers, the Dyavolska or the Kitenska. A preference can be expressed for the rivers Veleka and Rezovska located futher to the south, due to Herodotus' report that the citizens of Byzantium and Chalcedon abandoned their homes and πόλιν Μεσαμβρίην οἴκησαν[198] (i.e., they settled in a place that was a safe distance from Persian territories). To a certain extent, the same location would also be valid if Hecataeus enumerates a hydronym before Boryza. That hydronym may refer to the rivers Ropotamo, Veleka, or Rezovska, which were south of Apollonia, a polis Hecataeus cannot leave unmarked, and which were large enough to attract his attention. In such a case Boryza should be located south of one of those three rivers.

If, however, the enumeration is from the south to the north, and if another polis is mentioned before Boryza, then this should be Salmydessus and accordingly Boryza should be between it and the cape of Thynias—close to one of the small rivers emptying into the Pontus or near the present-day city of Ineada, located in close proximity to the cape with the same name. If Hecataeus makes reference instead to a hydronym, then this hydronym should be north of Salmydessus, a polis that like Apollonia cannot remain unmarked by Hecateus, who enumerates even non-Greek settlements. The problem is that between Salmy-

---

that some of them do refer to at least one part of the coast (Arch. Fr. 79a). The polis of Salmydessus is also mentioned in a comparatively early period (Soph. *Antig*. 969–970). It is not clear what Herodotus means when he speaks about the Thracians occupying Salmydessus—the coast or the polis bearing that name. See the reports with comments on Salmydessus by Porozhanov 2012: 224–237.

196 Ps.Scymn. 728–730; Strabo XII.3.3; Mela II.23; Ptolemy III.11.4 (Nobbe); Arr. *Peripl.P.Eux*. 36; Peripl.P.Eux. 87–88.

197 For the possibility that the enumeration is in a north–south direction see Grossstephan 1915: 8–9.

198 Hdt. VI.33.2.

dessus and the cape of Thynias there was no large river to attract Hecataeus' attention. If it is accepted that he speaks about one of the small rivers flowing into the Pontus, then Boryza can once again be located near the present day city of Ineada.

The date of Boryza's foundation by the Persians, as well as the period of its existence, are questionable. Georges rightly notes that in order to be noticed by Hecataeus, the polis should have existed for quite a long time.[199] If a controversial report of the Suda is taken into consideration, the death of Hecataeus is possibly dated after the Battle of Plataea (479).[200] In that case it is possible that Boryza was founded immediately after the Scythian march or long after that, at the time of the suppression of the Ionian Revolt. The only probable argument in favour of the later dating is a rarely cited, and respectively often neglected report from Ctesias, according to which at his return from Pontus, Datis, at the head of the Persian navy, devastated Greece and the islands.[201] What the task assigned to Datis in Pontus was can be only guessed, but as it has been argued above it was hardly connected to any putative action north of Strandja. In that case it can be assumed that it was Datis who was responsible for Boryza's foundation.

On the other hand, the evidence of the Suda cited above (in the entry devoted to Hellanicus of Lesbos—Ἑκαταίῳ τῷ Μιλησίῳ ἐπέβαλε γεγονότι κατὰ τὰ Περσικὰ), does not correspond to the information given in the article related to Hecataeus himself—Ἑκαταῖος Ἡγησάνδρου Μιλήσιος γένε κατὰ τοὺς Δαρείου χρόνους τοῦ μετὰ Καμβύσην βασιλεύσαντος, ὅτε καὶ Διονύσιος ἦν ὁ Μιλήσιος, ἐπὶ τῆς ξέ ὀλυμπιάδος. Chronologically viewed, this means that the latest reliable evidence about Hecataeus was related to the Ionian Revolt: Aristagoras' escape from Miletus[202] and the negotiations at its very end between him and Artaphrenes.[203] If Hecataeus died shortly after these events, then the foundation of

199 Georges 1987: 131–132. However, he locates Boryza far to the north, near the present-day cape of Kaliakra which, according to the analysis made in the present study, seems illogical. Apart from that, he draws a large-scale picture of Persian power to the north, with supportive positions in Boryza and the place later known as Gherla, situated in Transylvania. His entire construction is based on the old Persian inscription, published by Harmatta (1954: 1–14), in which the building of a Persian fortress is mentioned. The spread of Persian power up to Transylvania appears fictional. Boryza's furthest location to the north is offered by Herzfeld 1968: 349, who places it near today's Odessa.

200 Suid. Ἑλλάνικος—Ἑκαταίῳ τῷ Μιλησίῳ ἐπέβαλε γεγονότι κατὰ Περσικὰ.

201 *FGrH* 688 F 13.22—Δᾶτις δὲ ἐπαινιὼν ἐκ Πόντου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ στόλου ἡγούμενος …

202 Hdt. v.125.1.

203 Diod. x.25.4—ὅτι Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος πρεσβευτὴς ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰώνων, ἠρώτησε

Boryza should date immediately after the Scythian campaign. Apart from that, according to Herodotus, Hecataeus disagreed with Aristagoras and his supporters as far as their plans for revolt against the Great King are concerned, by pointing out his power. To support his words he enumerates all the peoples subjected to Darius (καταλέγων τά τε ἔθνεα πάντα τῶν ἦρχε Δαρεῖος).[204] The listing of the peoples indicates that by this time (499) the *Periegesis* had already been completed, or nearly so. This suggests that the polis of Boryza was founded before the beginning of the Ionian Revolt. It is possible, however, that Hecataeus' words were invented by Herodotus, who probably would have considered it appropriate for the speech of the author of the *Periegesis* to include an enumeration of the people subjected to Darius.

Even if the later date of Hecataeus' death is accepted and his words during the dispute with Aristagoras and his supporters are rejected as inventions of Herodotus, the earlier foundation of Boryza appears far more logical, for such an act perfectly matched Darius' policy after his return from Scythia. A garrison was put in Doriscus[205] at precisely that time and the place of Myrcinus was fortified.[206] Undoubtedly, by establishing strong points in strategic places on the Aegean coast, Darius aspired to strengthen control over the newly-submitted territory. Having this in mind, it is not only logical but obligatory for a location such as Boryza's on the Pontic coast to be fortified as well.

From the arguments above, it can be concluded that after the Scythian march the Persian power in Europe was restricted to the coast of the Propontis, the Thracian Chersonese, and the lands near the south slopes of Mt Strandja. Apart from that, the Persians were in control of the coast from Byzantium to the cape of Thynias, or at most up to Apollonia, if it is accepted that Boryza was situated north of Thynias. Taking into account the purposes of the Scythian march outlined in the present study—the submission of the Thracian tribes occupying the lands close to the Pontic coast from the Bosporus to

---

δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἀπιστεῖ αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀρταφέρνης. τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος, μήποτε ὑπὲρ ὧν καταπολεμηθέντες κακῶς ἔπαθον μνησικακήσωσιν, οὐκοῦν, ἔφησεν, εἰ τὸ πεπονθέναι κακῶς τὴν ἀπιστίαν περιποιεῖ, τὸ παθεῖν ἄρα εὖ ποιήσει τὰς πόλεις Πέρσαις εὐνοούσας. ἀποδεξάμενος δὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὁ Ἀρταφέρνης ἀπέδωκε τοὺς νόμους ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τακτοὺς φόρους κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπέταξεν. Though the dialogue between them has an anecdotal character, the mission ascribed to Hecataeus seems plausible; Hecataeus was highly respected in his native city (Hdt. v.36.1–3, 124.1–126.1), and the events described by Diodorus happened only a few years after Aristagoras' escape from Miletus, i.e. perhaps Hecataeus was still alive at this time.

204 Hdt. v.36.2.

205 Ibid. vii.59.1.

206 Ibid. v.23.1.

the Istros delta, the assumption of power over the western Pontic cities and those situated on the north coast of the Propontis, as well as the violent attack against the Scythians—the enterprise undertaken by Darius should be considered unsuccessful. He succeeded neither in defeating the Sythians in battle, nor in spreading his control as far as the Istros River. What is more, the lack of success in Scythia damaged Darius' prestige and led to revolts in some of the Hellespontic cities. These events compelled Darius to give up his ambitions to rule further north and to concentrate his efforts instead on the Aegean coast, where undoubtedly he would realize bigger strategic and economic gains.

The Chronology of the Revolt of the Hellespontic Cities

After he returned from the Scythian march, Darius transferred to the Asian coast—but across the Hellespont, not the Bosporus. This is often considered a sure sign that at the time the Persians no longer exercised control over the Bosporus. The supposition is based mainly on Herodotus' report that the Persian general Otanes conquered the cities of Byzantium, Chalcedon, Antandrus, and Lamponium. Undoubtedly, these actions should be refered to the time immediately after the Scythian march, for further in his text Herodotus makes it clear that the reason for the conquest of the aforementioned cities was rooted in the unwillingness of some of them to participate in the march against the Scythians, and in the damages which the rest of them caused the Persian army on their way back from Scythia.[207] Others beside Herodotus who mention these events are Ctesias,[208] and probably Polyaenus as well, whose report, however, is not chronologically oriented.[209] From Photios' excerpts it becomes evident that Ctesias mentions the burning of Chalcedon as taking place just after Darius' setting foot on the Asian coast. It appears that he relates the conquest of that city to the personality of Darius, which is in contrast to the information provided by Herodotus, according to which, after crossing over to Asia via the Hellespont, Darius went directly to Sardis,[210] and Chalcedon was conquered by Otanes much later.

Given the sources quoted above the assumption that the Hellespontic cities opposed the Persian authority immediately after the unsuccessful march in

207 Ibid. v.26.1–27.2.

208 *FGrH* 688 F 13.21.

209 Polyaen. vii.11.5.

210 Hdt. v.11.1—Δαρεῖος δὲ ὡς διαβὰς τάχιστα τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀπίκετο ἐς Σάρδις …

Scythia seems well-grounded. On the other hand, Herodotus explicitly states that Otanes was Megabazus' successor and the abovementioned cities were conquered at the time when he was head of the army. Herodotus' assertion places scholars in a difficult situation, for if it is accepted that Byzantium and Chalcedon rebelled at the time of Darius' return from Scythia, then it is illogical for their act of disobedience to remain unpunished by the Persians for a year or two, until Otanes took command of Megabazus' army. In order to solve this problem it is necessary either to accept that the revolt of Byzantium and Chalcedon took place at least one or two years after the Scythian march, or that the action against these two cities undertaken by Otanes paralleled Megabazus action against Perinthus and the other Hellespontic cities.[211]

If Herodotus is strictly followed, then the first hypothesis has the advantage. In that case Tuplin's supposition that Darius chose to go from Europe to Asia through the Chersonese, as it was the shortest way to Anatolia, will be completely logical.[212] On the other hand, as Tuplin himself notes, it is not evident what would make Byzantium and Chalcedon rebel some years later, after the opportune time for a revolt had gone—after the failure in Scythia, and after the firm assumption of Persian power over the Hellespont and the Thracian coast, thanks to Megabazus' efforts. Apart from that, Herodotus suggests Otanes' actions were a response to the refusal of some cities to supply contingents for the war against the Scythians, and to the damage caused by the Persian army after their retreat from Scythia.[213] This fact, if nothing else,

211 Duncker 1877: 512; Macan 1895: II.59–60. Heinlein 1909: 341–342 offers a different solution to the problem. According to him the expeditions led by Megabazus and Otanes took place one after the other as the one headed by Megabazus was realized before Darius' campaign against the Scythians, while the expedition Otanes led took place right after it.

212 Tuplin 2010: 282–283.

213 Hdt. V.27.2—αἰτίῃ δὲ τούτου ἥδε· πάντας ἠνδραποδίζετο καὶ κατεστρέφετο, τοὺς μὲν λιποστρατίης ἐπὶ Σκύθας αἰτιώμενος, τοὺς δὲ σίνεσθαι τὸν Δαρείου στρατὸν ἀπὸ Σκυθέων ὀπίσω ἀποκομιζόμενον. The expression αἰτίῃ δὲ τούτου ἥδε probably refers to Otanes' activity (V.26.1–27.1) and respectively bears no relation to Lycaretus, about whom, the only thing Herodotus (V.27.1–2) mentions, with regard to the conquest of Lemnos, is that he was appointed by the Persians governor of the island, and adds that he died there as such. For a different opinion see Hammond 1956: 124–125, who arrives at the conclusion that αἰτίῃ δὲ τούτου ἥδε relates in his view to Lycaretus' actions, i.e. to the expulsion of the Pelasgians from Lemnos (according to Hammond πάντας definitely refers to no other but them: 'all the persons concerned, i.e. Pelasgians of Lemnos'). From the quoted passage, however, it becomes clear that πάντας does not refer to the Pelasgians of Lemnos only, since, being islanders, they were unable to do any harm to the Persian army (τὸν Δαρείου στρατὸν) while return-

means that even at the time of the campaign some Hellespontic cities, including Byzantium and Chalcedon, opposed Persian authority, and others resisted being turned from fictive into actual subjects of the Persian Empire after Darius' return from Scythia. Considering this, it may be accepted that the conquest of Byzantium and Chalcedon was carried out parallel to Megabazus' campaign against the people of the Hellespont. Otherwise, one must accept the strategically absurd idea that after conquering Perinthus Megabazus left behind him the rebellious Byzantium and Chalcedon and headed west to the lands of the still independent Thracians and Paeonians.

To support the hypothesis that Megabazus and Otanes waged parallel campaigns, an often neglected passage of Herodotus can be mentioned, according to which Megabazus stayed in Byzantium for some time.[214] Herodotus' report is not chronologically oriented, but, taking into consideration the conclusions made in the present study, the possibility of Megabazus' presence there before the Scythian campaign can be dismissed. It also seems hardly probable that he visited Byzantium after he was removed from the position he had occupied in Europe. In that case it may be accepted that Megabazus visited Byzantium when he held the position of *strategos* of the Persian army in Europe (i.e., immediately after the Scythian march). Whether he helped Otanes to conquer the city or visited him after it had been conquered is difficult to say. Yet, from the analysis made so far, it can be concluded that Megabazus' campaign against the people of the Hellespont was parallel to that against Byzantium and Chalcedon carried out by Otanes. The fact that Herodotus explicitly refers the conquest of the two cities by Otanes to a later time might be the result of the use of different sources, which, when combined, led to contradictory observations in his study.

---

ing from Scythia. That is why πάντας should relate not only to the Lemnian citizens, who obviously refused to take part in the expedition against the Scythians, but also the citizens of Byzantium, Chalcedon, Antandrus, Lamponium, and Imbros, part of whom at least rejected the Great King's authority. Hence it may be logically concluded that αἰτίη δὲ τούτου ἥδε has nothing to do with Lycaretus, for in the position of governor of Lemnos he could have hardly been able to make decisions as to the destiny of the enumerated poleis. It appears that v.27.2 states the reasons for Otanes' punitive act against the disobedient Greek poleis and the citizens of both Lemnos and Imbros, which means that αἰτίη δὲ τούτου ἥδε should refer to that Persian commander only. It is also indicative that Herodotus' final sentence (v.28.1) concerns Otanes, too—οὗτος μέν νυν τοσαῦτα ἐξεργάσατο στρατηγήσας.

214 Hdt. iv.144.1–3.

Megabazus in Thrace and Paeonia

Before he went to Asia, Darius appointed Megabazus *strategos* of the Persian army in Europe.[215] His first task was to subject those people of the Hellespont who were unwilling to be burdened with Persian authority.[216] Hammond and Fol suppose that the attack against the people of the Hellespont was realized in the winter months (i.e., immediately after the return from Scythia).[217] This supposition appears logical, judging by the situation in the region. Herodotus does not give detailed information about Megabazus' campaign. He mentions only that the first conquered were the people of Perinthus, and adds that their defeat was due to the superior numbers of the Persians.[218] Perinthus is of special interest to an Athenian audience. In Herodotus' time that city was part of the Athenian *arche*[219] and played an important role for the Athenians. For this very reason, and probably due to the brave resistance of its people, its conquest is paid special attention. Herodotus, however, stops at that point and gives no further details about the destiny of the other Hellespontic cities. Undoubtedly, they were also made to accept Persian dominance, but probably did not offer resistance, for Herodotus mentions that after the conquest of Perinthus, Megabazus headed for Thrace (i.e., it was not necessary for Megabazus to lay siege to them).[220]

Taking into account the conclusions above, it can be assumed that at the same time Otanes was busy with the siege of Byzantium and Chalcedon. Only after the subjection of these cities, or at least of European Byzantium, could Megabazus afford to direct his attention to his next targets: the coastal lands between the Hebrus and Strymon. If Doriscus was garrisoned at the retreat of the army from Scythia, then the decision to conquer these lands should have been made before the suppression of the people of the Hellespont. Herodotus first mentions that Megabazus was given an order by Darius to establish control over every single polis and tribe (πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ πᾶν ἔθνος) in Thrace.[221] He further makes it evident that Megabazus succeeded in conquering the lands by the sea only.[222] If these two texts are taken literally, the result will be

215 Ibid. IV.143.1.
216 Ibid. IV.144.3.
217 Fol, Hammond 1988: 243.
218 Hdt. V.1.1, 2.1.
219 Meiggs 1973: 546–547.
220 Ibid. V.2.2.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid. V.10.1.

acceptance of a number of complicated and controversial hypotheses.[223] As Zahrnt's analysis shows, things are probably far simpler: Herodotus mentions an order given by the Great King to conquer the whole of Thrace, for such an order provides a good reason for his Thracian *logos* to be inserted here, while Megabazus' actual purposes are precisely defined only after Thrace and the Thracians have been described.[224] Hence, it can be accepted that the task assigned to Megabazus was connected with the submission of the coastal lands located between the Hebrus and the Strymon Rivers, and certainly included control over local Greek cities as well.

Unfortunately, as with the conquest of the Hellespontic cities, Herodotus does not mention anything about Megabazus' actions. The lack of information about any battles with the local Greeks and Thracians probably means that the people occupying the territory between the Hebrus and Strymon River offered no resistance significant enough for Herodotus to mention, or that he knew nothing about it. Bearing in mind Megabazus' purposes, it is logical to accept that after crossing the Hebrus River, the Persian army stayed close to the coast (where possible) and, circumventing Mt Pangaeum from the south, reached as far as the mouth of the Strymon River. The route suggested here is confirmed by the fact that, for the moment, the Paeonians who occupied the inner land were still unconquered.

Due to Herodotus' silence, it is difficult to define precisely the span of the territory between the Hebrus and Strymon conquered by Megabazus. On the basis of indirect information, it can be assumed that he was not satisfied with control only over the mouth of the Strymon, and so progressed north to the region of Myrcinus, where Histiaeus later founded a polis bearing the same name. The fact that Histiaeus founded a city in that place probably means that the region was already under Persian control (i.e., that it had been conquered earlier by Megabazus). Samsaris locates Myrcinus where the Angites empties into the Strymon (Δοξόμπους),[225] whereas Papazoglou locates it near the present-day village of Paleokomi.[226] Both locations suggest Persian progress towards the Angites, a river that might serve as a natural border with the Paeonians living northwest of its course. Herodotus explicitly states that Myrcinus was near the Strymon River, in the lands of the Edoni.[227] However,

223 See different opinions by Hammond 1980: 55n7, 55–56.

224 Zahrnt 1997: 95–96.

225 Samsaris 1976: 140–141.

226 Papazoglou 1988: 390–391.

227 Hdt. v.11.2, 23.1, 124.2.

he does not mention anything about resistance on their part, which may mean that they voluntarily accepted Persian dominance.

The report of the foundation of Myrcinus comes from Herodotus.[228] According to him, after his arrival in Sardis Darius summoned the tyrant of Miletus, Histiaeus, and also Coes of Mytilene. The wish of the Great King was to award them for their loyal service at the time of the Scythian march—Coes for his advice to organize a defense of the pontoon-bridge over the Istros,[229] and Histiaeus for the preservation of the same bridge.[230] Having suggested they choose their own awards, Darius met their wishes—Coes was made tyrant of Mytilene, and Histiaeus received Myrcinus. Herodotus makes it evident that Histiaeus' intention was to found a city there. After a time Megabazus persuaded Darius to remove Histiaeus from Thrace, using the argument that it was not good for these lands, so important for the Persians with an abundance of timber, silver mines, and a numerous Greek and barbarian population, to be under the control of such a dangerous man as Histiaeus.

The story told by Herodotus is extensively discussed in secondary literature. Different opinions have been expressed as to the reasons, purposes, and dating of that enterprise.[231] According to the story Megabazus, '*strategos* of Europa' at that time, knew nothing of Histiaeus' actions, and Darius was utterly unaware of the strategic significance of the region to which he sent the Milesian tyrant. Both assumptions seem absurd. Undoubtedly, the foundation of a new city in such a strategically important region was a well designed scheme, and can hardly be viewed as an isolated act realized without Persian help. In fact, as Badian notes, there is no information about Histiaeus' presumable intention to found a Greek colony at Myrcinus.[232]

Histiaeus' mission has to be accepted as part of Darius' policy of establishing and strengthening places in Thrace of strategical importance for the empire: Doriscus, Boryza, and Myrcinus. It can only be guessed why Histiaeus in particular was assigned the task of founding Myrcinus, and not Megabazus, for instance, or even some other Persian within his circle. Herodotus claims that Myrcinus was the Great King's present for Histiaeus for keeping safe the pontoon-bridge over the Istros—a story which is probably not true and rightly

228 Ibid. v.11.1–12.1, 23.1–24.4.

229 Ibid. iv.97.1–6.

230 Ibid. iv.136.3–138.2.

231 Heinlein 1909: 341–343; Blamire 1959: 142–145; Evans 1963: 114–118; Lang 1968: 24–26; Chapman 1972: 555–558; Wallinga 1984: 418–419, 422–423.

232 Badian 2007: 38.

rejected by most scholars.[233] This certainly does not mean that the gift itself is a fiction for, as Blamire correctly notes, even a direct order by the Great King can be considered a gift.[234] Histiaeus was probably the most suitable person for accomplishing the task. Most probably, he was in possession of enough information about the strategic and, in particular, financial advantages that the region of the lower Strymon could offer. At that time Pangaean silver was in circulation coined by Abdera, Thasos, and probably the first tribal emissions, which did not go unnoticed by the Milesian tyrant.[235] Considering this, it may be assumed that Darius' decision to establish a support point in the region of lower Strymon was discussed with Histiaeus, who probably suggested the place of Myrcinus. The Milesian tyrant might actually have had some future plans connected with Myrcinus. Herodotus does not, however, mention anything about an army led by Histiaeus, which may indicate that at the time of his arrival in the lands of the Edoni they had already been conquered by Megabazus. In this case, no matter what Histiaeus' initial intentions were, the power given him by Darius was limited and he was not able to carry out an independent policy in the region. What is more, it is possible that Histiaeus was sent only to lay the foundations of Myrcinus and arrange its government. If that is true, then his recall must be connected with having carried out the task assigned to him, and not with Megabazus' suspicions about an intended revolt. It is true that Herodotus relates his recall merely to Megabazus' suspicions, but it is possible that these suppositions were a response to Histiaeus' later betrayal at the time of the Ionian Revolt, rather than an illustration of the actual state of affairs.[236]

Having conquered the Aegean coast between the Hebrus and Strymon, Megabazus was ordered by Darius to subject the Paeonians and settle them in Asia Minor. With regard to this order, Herodotus tells the well known story

233 Thirlwall 1836: II.393–395; Macan 1895: II.46–47; Heinlein 1909: 341–343; How, Wells 1928: ad VI.40; van Groningen 1950: ad IV.137; Berve 1967: I.82; Burn 1985: 302; Fol, Hammond 1988: 242; Austin 1990: 303; Zahrnt: 1992: 252n44; Cawkwell 2005: 47–48; Surikov 2005: 304–305; Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 289n33. However, there are others who consider the story to be true—Grote 1853: IV.274n2; Rawlinson 1860: III.91n5; Busolt 1888: 16n6; Shuckburgh 1906: 210–211; Cary 1930: 213; Blamire 1959: 142; Evans 1963: 114–116; Lang 1968: 25; Zlatkovskaya 1971: 207; Gillis 1979: 9–12; Bengtson 1996: 140; Cook 2002: 143; Badian 2007: 37n9.

234 Blamire 1959: 143.

235 Delev 2007: 89–90.

236 Hdt. VI.2.1.

of the diligent Paeonian woman and her two brothers, Pigres and Mantyes.[237] The anecdote tells how Pigres and Mantyes hoped that Darius would help them gain power over their fellow Paeonians. For that purpose they arrived in Sardis and waited for the opportune time to show the Great King their sister's talents. Impressed by her ability to do three things at a time—to carry a bowl of water on her head, to hold a horse's bridle in one hand and to spin with the other—he ordered her to be brought before him. To Darius' question where she was from, her brothers, who until that moment were only spectators, answered that they were Paeonians and the woman in question was their sister. After that Darius asked them what people the Paeonians were, where they lived, and why they had come to Sardis. The brothers explicitly stated that they wished to surrender to him, that Paeonia was situated by the river Strymon, which was not far from the Hellespont and that the Paeonians were Teucrian colonists from Troy. Having heard the answers and the confirmation that all the Paeonian women were as hard-working as their sister was, Darius, through an envoy, gave Megabazus an order to conquer the Paeonians and bring them to him (i.e., in Asia Minor). To obey the king's order Megabazus took guides from Thrace and headed for Paeonia.[238]

The authenticity of the story of the Paeonian woman is rightly questioned by scholars.[239] Badian, however, despite ignoring the story as a whole, accepts

237 Ibid. v.12.1–13.3.

238 Ibid. v.14.1–2.

239 The anecdote told by Herodotus bears a similarity to a fragment by Nicolaus Damascenus (*FGrH* 90 F 71), preserved by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. According to Nicolaus' text the action also took place in Sardis but it happened in the time of the Lydian king Alyattes. In this particular case it was a Thracian not a Paeonian woman, living near Sardis not with her two brothers but with her husband. This Thracian woman, similarly to the Paeonian one described by Herodotus, carried a bowl of water on her head, held a horse bridle with one hand while spinning with the other. Impressed by her abilities Alyattes asked her who she was and where she came from. Having heard that she was from a small Thracian town called Myz, the king immediately sent envoys to ask the Thracian king Cotys to send him a great number of people, including children and women. Meyer 1892: 168n1 assumes that the story is identical to Herodotus' and that the differences were a result of Constantine Porphyrogenitus' incorrect quoting. However, he is criticized by Macan 1895: 11.59n2, in whose view it is possible for Herosotus and Nicolaus Damascenus to have used one and the same source, and the story Herodotus tells to be a further developed version or just a fanciful account of the Persian attack on Paeonia. How, Wells 1928: ad v.12 hold the opinion that it is more probable for the story to be an old Lydian one, wrongly related to Darius. Tomaschek 1893: 1.14 shares an interesting view. He says that the name of Pigres appeared only in Caria and Lycia and that is why he concludes that the anecdote told by Herodotus

that the two brothers were actually Paeonian aristocrats who submitted to Darius, an act that was followed by the birth of a strategic conception of an entirely new character.[240] This supposition is interesting, but it was hardly necessary for the Persian strategy in the region of the lower Strymon to be related to the subjection of two Paeonian young men (νεηνίσκοι). What is more, instead of using the two brothers, or some of their Paeonian adherents, as guides, Megabazus had to rely on Thracians, another indication that Herodotus' story of the Paeonian woman and her brothers is of no historic value.

In fact, the Persians were in no need of an official pretext to invade the lands of the Paeonians by the lower Strymon. The true reasons for the attack against the Paeonians might well be connected with presumable raids on the Persian territory (i.e., in the newly-conquered lands of the Edoni). There is one more plausible version according to which the aggression of the Persians will not be the result of provocation but of expansive Persian policy aiming at the elimination of any future Paeonian threat against the Persian territorial possessions of strategic significance located by the Strymon's mouth.

After receiving Darius' order, Megabazus took Thracian guides and started off towards the lands of the Paeonians. In Herodotus' view, the Paeonians, at the news of the Persian army's approach, gathered together and headed for the sea, for they thought this was where Megabazus would launch his attack. Megabazus, however, was aware of the position of the Paeonian army; with the support of his guides invaded the Paeonian cities from the upper road (τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν). At the time of the attack no men were present in the cities and so they were easily conquered. Hearing what had happened, the Paeonians scattered and returned home, where they voluntarily submitted to the Persians. That, however, was not enough to appease Megabazus and thus they were moved to Asia Minor. Herodotus makes it clear that the aforementioned Paeonian tribes consisted of the Siriopaeonians, the Paeoplae, and those Paeonians that peopled the territories spread as far as Lake Prasias.[241] Afterwards Herodotus adds that the Persian general did not succeed in subjecting either those living

was made up after the Paeonians had settled in Phrygia. Regretfully, Tomaschek does not compare Herodotus' anecdote with Nicolaus Damascenus. If it is a Lydian story indeed, wrongly related by Herodotus or his sources to Darius, then it is possible that Nicolaus Damascenus' version contains later additions, for it speaks about the Thracian king Cotys, a name that first recorded a couple of decades after the works of Herodotus and Xanthus.

240 Badian 2007: 38.

241 Hdt. v.15.1–3.

by Pangaeum, the Doberes, the Agrianes and the Odomanti, or those occupying the lake itself.[242]

Herodotus' information about the subjection of the Paeonians and his geographical specifications put difficult problems before scholars. The precise determination of the geographical location of the aforementioned tribes is of paramount importance, for it can provide the basis for exactly defining both the dimensions of the Persian conquest and the road used by Megabazus while invading Paeonian lands. The first group of tribes mentioned by Herodotus—the Siriopaeonians, the Paeoplae, and those whose lands spread up to Lake Prasias—was the first subjected and taken to Asia Minor. It appears that Herodotus considers them all Paeonians—οὕτω δὴ Παιόνων Σιριοπαίονές τε καὶ Παιόπλαι καὶ οἱ μέχρι τῆς Πρασιάδος λίμνης.[243]

The location of the Siriopaeonians is likely the easiest to define. Herodotus speaks of a Paeonian city named Sirrae (ἐν Σίρι τῆς Παιονίης), in which Xerxes on his way to Greece left Zeus' holy chariot.[244] For his own part, Stephanus of Byzantium directly relates the city of Sirrae to the Siriopaeonians.[245] This city is correctly located by scholars near the present-day city of Seres.[246] In that case it can be assumed that the settlements of the Siriopaeonians were concentrated mainly in the plain around Seres.

The second tribe mentioned by Herodotus was the Paeoplae. It is possible for their location to be given a comparatively precise definition. First, Herodotus describes the resistance Megabazus met from the Siriopaeonians, Paeoplae, and Paeonians whose lands spread to Lake Prasias, as well as about their subsequent migration to Asia.[247] The story leaves the reader with the impression that the enumerated tribes occupied one and the same region and, accordingly, were neighbours. This conclusion is confirmed by the description Herodotus gives of the actions of Aristagoras at the beginning of the Ionian Revolt, namely

242 Ibid. v.16.1.

243 Detschew 1976: 353 entertains the idea that the name of the Paeoplae was of Thracian origin. He arrives at the conclusion by comparing their name with the name of the Thracian tribes Paitoi and Trispli. In fact, it is Tomaschek 1893: I.19 who has earlier compared the Paeoplae with the Thracian tribe Trispli, mentioned by Hecataeus (*FGrH* 1 F 183).

244 Hdt. VIII.115.3–4.

245 St. Byz. Σίρις, Σίρις ἐν Παιονίᾳ ἧς τὸ ἐθνικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γενικῆς Σιριοπαίονες.

246 Tomaschek 1894: II.2. 80; Macan 1908: I.2 ad VIII.115; How, Wells 1928: ad V.15 and VIII.115; Hammond 1972: 194; Samsaris 1976: 57, 126–128; Hatzopoulos 2008: 16–17. See, however, some doubts expressed by Papazoglou 1957: 281; 1988: 379.

247 Hdt. V.15.1–3.

sending an envoy to Phrygia to the Paeonians who had been moved from the region of the Strymon.[248] Finally, specifying the route Xerxes followed through Thrace, Herodotus notes that the Great King passed by the Doberes and the Paeoplae living north of Pangaeum.[249]

Considering the reports cited here, it may be assumed that at the end of the sixth and the beginning of the fifth century the Paeoplae peopled the region of the Strymon and were neighbours of the Siriopaeonians. It is not clear, however, whether their settlements were northwest of the Siriopaeonian ones (i.e., in the direction of Lake Butkovo),[250] or southeast, close to the Angites River.[251] What is of paramount importance to the solution to this problem is Herodotus' description of the progress of part of the Persian army and its accompanying geographical clarifications. Herodotus claims that after he passed by the Doberes and the Paeoplae living north of Pangaeum, Xerxes continued west (πρὸς ἑσπέρην) to the river Strymon and the polis of Eion, which Boges ruled at the time. Right after that he notes that the area by Pangaeum was named Phyllis and that it spread west to the Angites River, and south to the Strymon.[252] By defining the geographical frame of Phyllis, Herodotus sets a limit to that particular column of the Persian army that circumvented Pangaeum from the north. It appears that it passed by (παρεξιών) the lands of the Doberes and the Paeoplae and went on towards the Strymon and Eion, but obviously did not cross the Angites' lower stream. If these arguments are correct, then the settlements of the Paeoplae should be located in close proximity to the lower stream of the Angites, as they probably spread northwest to the lands of the Siriopaeonians occupying the region of Sirrae.

Finally, in the quoted passage Herodotus mentions those Paeonians whose settlements spread up to Lake Prasias. The name of their tribe seems unfamiliar to him, and so he uses the more general ethnonym Paeonians. Their location cannot be precisely defined without reference to the location of Lake Prasias—mentioned only by Herodotus—and the mountains of Dysoron and Orbelus as well, situated close to it.[253] The problem of the location of Lake Prasias is extensively discussed in secondary literature. A variety of supposi-

248 Ibid. v.98.1—ἔπεμψε ἐς τὴν Φρυγίην ἄνδρα ἐπὶ τοὺς Παίονας τοὺς ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ.

249 Ibid. VII.113.1—ὑπεροικέοντας δὲ τὸ Πάγγαιον πρὸς βορέω ἀνέμου Παίονας Δόβηράς τε καὶ Παιόπλας.

250 Svoronos 1919: 83; Samsaris 1976: 60n3.

251 Abel 1847: 59–60—'die Siropäoner und Päopler, welche ohne zweifel am unteren Angites und Strimon wohnten.'

252 Hdt. VII.113.1–2.

253 Ibid. v.16.2, 17.2.

tions has been offered, as some scholars identify it with the now non-existent Lake Takhinos,[254] others with Lake Butkovo,[255] with Lake Bolbe,[256] with Lake Doiran,[257] and with Lake Pravi.[258]

Larcher and Mertzidis have identified Lake Prasias with Lake Pravi, which like Lake Takhinos no longer exists. The following paragraphs, however, refer to Hatzopoulos' arguments, who examines an epigraphic inscription unknown to his predecessors. He first analyses Herodotus' report, according to which the Persians, helped by guides, managed to circumvent the Paeonians protecting the road running from the sea. Hatzopoulos concludes that Megabazus first conquered the Siriopaeonians, for Herodotus mentions them first. In his view, in order to reach their settlements the Persian commander-in-chief followed the route that was followed some centuries later by Rhascupolis at the head of Brutus' army, who succeeded in circumventing the Norbanus' positions by the Sapaean Pass.[259] The road went into the plain north of Philippi, from which point, taking the route Drama to Prosotsani to Ano Vrontu, it was possible to reach the Paeonian Sirrae. And since the major purpose of the military operation was the circumvention of the Paeonian positions, Hatzopoulos concludes that, after the Persian army arrived in Sirrae, they headed south, not northwest as Hammond and Papazoglou claim. He denies the possibility that Lake Prasias had anything to do either with Lake Butkovo or Lake Takhinos, and identifies it with the lake some ancient authors say was on the plain of Philippi (i.e., Pravi).[260] Hatzopoulos also takes into consideration a fragmentary epigraphic inscription from the time of Alexander the Great, which likely

254 Leak 1835: III.210–211; Abel 1847: 6on6; Kiepert 1848: 28 and map VII; Stein III: ad V.15; Rawlinson 1860: III.185n3; Desdevises 1863: 49; Vasmatzidis 1867: 15; Dimitsas 1870: 200–204; Abicht 1883: ad V.15; Grundy 1901: 67; Duridanov 1976: 45; Detschew 1976: 377–378; Sokolovska 1986: 175–178; Borza 1995: 89–91.

255 Kiepert 1869: Tab. V (see, however, Kiepert 1848: 28 and map VII); Döll 1891: 34–45; Kazarow 1921: 6n29; 1922: 47; How, Wells 1928: ad V.16; Geyer 1930: 5; Davies 1932: 152; van Groningen 1950: ad V.15; Papazoglou 1957: 260, 281; Gerov 1961: 167; Kanatsoulis 1964: 20; Danov 1969: 201, 307; Hammond 1972: 193–194; Beševliev 1990: 15; Proeva 2004: 15; Manov 2004: 78; Yanakieva 2009: 112–113; Porozhanov 2012: 231; Mitrev 2012: 16; Delev 2014: 22, 198.

256 D'Anville 1762: Graeciae Antiquae; Sickler 1824: 405; Billerbeck 1826: 296.

257 Cramer 1828: 278; Cousinéry 1831: 93; Hrisohoy 1893: 25–40; Svoronos 1919: 20; Casson 1926: 62–63; Merker 1965: Map of Ancient Macedonia; Papageorgiou 1970: 1–22; Samsaris 1976: 12, 14.

258 Larcher 1824: 7nX; Mertzidis 1885: 100–109; Hatzopoulos 2008: 15–20 and 22–27 for the identification of Orbelus.

259 App. *BC* IV.103–104.

260 Theophr. *CP* V.14.5–6; Strabo VII. fr. 36 (Meineke); App. *BC* IV.105; Pliny *NH* XVII.30.

concerns the same lake (τὰ δὲ ἕλη εἰ̣[...] Φιλίππων ἕως γεφύρας). The end of the inscription speaks about a ban on selling timber from a place that, due to the impaired integrity of the inscription, cannot be precisely identified (Δυ[...]ᾳ̣ι or Δυ[...]ι) and that some scholars relate to the Mt Dysoron.[261] This allows Hatzopoulos to identify Dysoron with Menoikion and eventually, on the basis of an additional analysis of the source base, Orbelus with Lekani and Phalakron.[262] Apart from that, analysing Herodotus v.17.2, Hatzopoulos notes that he uses the present tense to describe the short route leading from Lake Prasias to Macedonia and the imperfect when he specifies that Alexander I gained a silver talent a day from the mine close to the aforesaid lake.[263] Thus, having identified Lake Prasias with Pravi and Dysoron with Menoikion, he logically concludes that in Herodotus' time the eastern border of Macedonia reached as far as Menoikion, and at some time during Alexander's reign reached even beyond.

If the identification of Prasias, Dysoron, and Orbelus offered by Hatzopoulos is followed, it will not so much change the scholarly concensus of the sphere of Megabazus' activity—the conquest of the plain by Seres, for example, is not questioned—but rather lead to a re-consideration of the expansion of the Argeadae after the Persians were banished from Eion. Undoubtedly, the analysis of Herodotus v.17.2 is correct,[264] but ancient authors mention nothing about the borders of Macedonia having reached as far as Mt Menoikion. Menoikion is east of the Strymon and north of the Angites, which means that if it was the eastern border of Macedonia, it would have been necessary for Alexander I to have established control not only over Bisaltia but also over the plain east of the Strymon, where there were Paeonian settlements in 480/79,[265] or at least the part of the plain south of the Paeonian Sirrae and the polis of Berge, located southwest of Neos Skopos.[266] What is more, if Hatzopoulos' identification of Lake Prasias

261 For the inscription and the comments on the text see Vatin 1984: 259–270; Missitzis 1985: 3–14; Badian 1989: 64–69; Hammond 1990: 167–175; Borza 1995: 92–94; Hatzopoulos 1996: 25–28; Hammond 1997: 41–46; Pilhofer 2000: 159–167; Xydopoulos (forthcoming).

262 Mertzidis 1885: 8, 65, 71, 96, 106 states the opinion that Dysoron was identical with Bozdag, i.e. Phalakron.

263 Here Hatzopoulos 2008: 19–20 quotes earlier research he has done on the issue, concerning the passage of Herodotus commented on—Hatzopoulos, Loukopoulou 1992: 20–21.

264 Hdt. v.17.2—ἔστι δὲ ἐκ τῆς Πρασιάδος λίμνης σύντομος κάρτα ἐς τὴν Μακεδονίην. πρῶτα μὲν γὰρ ἔχεται τῆς λίμνης τὸ μέταλλον ἐξ οὗ ὕστερον τούτων τάλαντον ἀργυρίου Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἡμέρης ἑκάστης *ἐφοίτα*, μετὰ δὲ τὸ μέταλλον Δύσωρον καλεόμενον ὄρος ὑπερβάντα *εἶναι* ἐν Μακεδονίῃ.

265 Ibid. VIII.115.3–4.

266 For the location of Berge see Bonias 2000: 227–246.

with Lake Pravi is accepted, then Alexander's territorial possesions should have spread beyond Menoikion (i.e., as far as Lake Pravi).

In 480 the Bisaltaean king, who also controlled the lands of the Crestones, had both the courage and self-confidence to refuse to participate in Xerxes' campaign against Greece.[267] The next twenty years were probably the peak of the Bisaltaean kingdom's power. This supposition is confirmed by the presence of sixty-eight Bisaltaean octodrachms in the Decadrachm Hoard, whose coinage dated from 480/75–460.[268] Therefore, the annexation of Bisaltia Thucydides mentions[269] should be dated ca. 460.

There is no information about Macedonian progress to Menoikion and the plain beyond. Thucydides, who makes a summary of the lands the Agreadae had conquered by Perdiccas' time, or even by the very end of Archelaus's rule, limits their expansion east to the Strymon.[270] In *Philip's letter* quoted by Demosthenes can be found information about a conquest of lands east of the Styrmon. It claims that Alexander I conquered the place where the Athenians eventually founded Amphipolis.[271] In Speusippus' *Letter to Philip* are also mentioned, albeit without specific geographical details, territorial acquisitions of Alexander I in the lands of Edoni.[272] These statements, however, reflect the political propaganda of Philip II and cannot serve as evidence that Alexander managed to annex the lands east of the Strymon.

The location of Lake Prasias is directly related to the position of the mountains Dysoron and Orbelus. Mt Orbelus should be in the immediate proximity of the lake, given that Paeonian men brought home three beams any time they took a new wife.[273] The same conclusion is valid for Dysoron, due to Herodotus' specification that the route from Prasias to Macedonia, across that mounta-

267 Hdt. VIII.116.1–2.

268 Fried 1987: 9. See also Kagan 1987: 23, who dates their coinage between 470 and 460.

269 Thuc. II.99.6.

270 Ibid. II.99.1–6. Thucydides does not say where the eastern border of Bisaltia spread to. For his contemporary Herodotus (VII.115.1) it seems to be the Strymon—ὡς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἐπορεύετο ὁ στρατός, ἐνθαῦτα πρὸς ἡλίου δυσμέων ἐστὶ αἰγιαλὸς ἐν τῷ οἰκημένην Ἀργιλον πόλιν Ἑλλάδα παρεξήιε· αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἡ κατύπερθε ταύτης καλέεται Βισαλτίη. During a later period Strabo (VII. fr. 36 Meineke) speaks about, Bisaltia occupied the plain east of the Strymon as well—ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως Βισάλται καὶ μέχρι πόλεως Ἡρακλείας, ἔχοντες αὐλῶνα εὔκαρπον, ὃν διαρρεῖ ὁ Στρυμὼν ὡρμημένος ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ῥοδόπην Ἀγριάνων …

271 Dem. XII.21.

272 Speus. *Letter to Philip* 7—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς ὑπογυίους Ἀλεξάνδρου τῆς Ἠδωνῶν χώρας κτήσεις Μακεδόνες πάντες ἴσασι.

273 Hdt. V.16.2.

tion (ὑπερβάντα), was much shorter (σύντομος κάρτα).[274] If the information Herodotus offers is taken into account and compared with Hatzopoulos' identification, it turns out that Lake Pravi should reach, at one and the same time, both Menoikion, on the one hand, and Lekani and Phalakron, on the other. A lake with such an area does not comply with the reports of the ancient authors Hatzopoulos quotes. Appian is in possession of information about the existence of a bog south of Philippi reaching as far as the sea. He speaks about a fertile plain in the west spreading to Myrcinus, woodlands in the north, and the passes Corpilean and Sapaean in the east.[275] The lake familiar to Strabo cannot be precisely located due to the geographical limits of its excursus,[276] and the information Theophrastus and Pliny give concerns the surroundings of Philippi only—Theophrastus describes water basins in the plain by Philippi that could hardly reach as far as Menoikion.[277] One should also take into consideration the fact that the Angites flows along the east and south slopes of Menoikion and thus separates it from Pangaeum and the plain spreading up to Drama and Philippi, and accordingly from Lake Pravi. Heordotus, however, while giving a description of the route from Prasias to Macedonia says nothing about crossing the Angites, a river he is quite familiar with,[278] but only mentions passing the silver mine and across Mt Dysoron. What is more, he points to the Paeonian lands near the Strymon as the objective of the Persian offensive (ἡ Παιονίη ἐπὶ τῷ Στρυμόνι ποταμῷ πεπολισμένη)[279] and subsequently, with regard to the Ionian Revolt, defines the subjected Paeonians who were later moved to Asia Minor (i.e., the Siriopaeonians, the Paeoplae, and those whose lands spread to Lake Prasias) as τοὺς Παίονας τοὺς ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ.[280]

---

274 Ibid. v.17.2.

275 App. *BC* IV.105 (Mendelssohn)—Φίλιππος δὲ ὡς εὐφυὲς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρίον ὠχύρωσέ τε καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ Φιλίππους προσεῖπεν. ἔστι δὲ ἡ πόλις ἐπὶ λόφου περικρήμνου, τοσαύτη τὸ μέγεθος ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦ λόφου τὸ εὖρος. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἄρκτῳ δρυμούς, δι᾽ ὧν ὁ Ῥασκούπολις ἤγαγε τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον· πρὸς δὲ τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ ἕλος ἔστι καὶ θάλασσα μετ᾽ αὐτό, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἕω τὰ στενὰ τὰ Σαπαίων τε καὶ Κορπίλων, ἐκ δὲ τῆς δύσεως πεδίον μέχρι Μυρκίνου τε καὶ Δραβήσκου καὶ ποταμοῦ Στρυμόνος, τριακοσίων που καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίων, εὔφορον πάνυ καὶ καλόν.

276 Strabo VII. fr. 36 (Meineke)—παρὰ δὲ τὴν παραλίαν τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ Δατηνῶν πόλις Νεάπολις καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Δάτον, εὔκαρπα πεδία καὶ λίμνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ ναυπήγια καὶ χρυσεῖα λυσιτελῆ ἔχον.

277 Theophr. *CP* V.14.5–6—περὶ τὰς Κρηνίδας ἦν τῶν Θρᾳκῶν κατοικούντων. Ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ πεδίον δένδρων πλῆρες ἦν καὶ ὑδάτων; Pliny *NH* XVII.30—circa Philippos cultura siccata regio mutavit caeli habitum.

278 Hdt. VII.113.2.

279 Ibid. v.13.2.

280 Ibid. v.98.1.

It is significant that in Herodotus' view the Paeonians who lived close to Lake Prasias were also from the Strymon region (i.e., the lake itself should be located in the same area).

From what has been said so far, it can be concluded that Prasias may have nothing to do with Lake Pravi. If that is true, then the identification of Dysoron with Menoikion and the identification of Orbelus with Lekani and Phalakron will also have nothing to do with the actual state of affairs. In fact, Dysoron is mentioned only by Herodotus, which makes finding its location a difficult job. It is possible that the Philippi inscription quoted above also speaks about that mountain.[281] If this, however, is accepted, it will not necessarily mean that Dysoron was either close to Philippi or in the control of its citizens.[282]

As to Orbelus, the situation is not clarified by Herodotus, who does not say where he believes the mountain was. Orbelus, in contrast to Dysoron, is mentioned by other ancient authors, but the information they give is insufficient to determine its precise location.[283] It appears that even in ancient times there were different ideas as to exactly how far the borders of Orbelus spread. Yet, it is probable that Orbelus was a mountain in the Strymon region. Pliny claims that Orbelus was in Macedonia, an area whose east border he considered the Strymon.[284] Together with this, he places the Rhodope in Macedonia but also speaks about them while describing Thrace.[285] The fact that a similar clarification of Orbelus is missing may mean that in Pliny's view it was (only) in Macedonia (i.e., west of the Strymon).

According to Ptolemy part of Orbelus served as a border between Upper Moesia and Macedonia, and Macedonia and Thrace as well.[286] In the first case it formed part of the south border of Upper Moesia, and in the second was part of the western border of Thrace. It is clear that this mountain cannot be related to Lekani and Phalakron. This conclusion is confirmed both by

281 Contra Hammond 1997: 45 who offers ἐν Δι[ονύσ]ωι—with ι (not with υ) before the lacuna, which may be related to Dionysus' hill mentioned by Appian (*BC* IV.106—Mendelssohn) and situated close to Philippi—Φιλίππων μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἕτερος λόφος οὐ μακράν, ὃν Διονύσου λέγουσιν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ χρυσεῖα ἔστι τὰ Ἄσυλα καλούμενα.

282 See also Hatzopoulos, Loukopoulou 1989: 97n6. For a different opinion see Missitzis 1985: 12—'in a site which the Philippians must have owned.'

283 For the opinions of the problem see Döll 1891: 20–34; Papazoglou 1957: 257–262; Gerov 1961: 167–168; Papazoglou 1969: 26–28; Papageorgiou 1970: 2–5; Hammond 1972: 198–199; Samsaris 1976: 12–15; Papazoglou 1988: 346–350; Hatzopoulos 2008: 22–27.

284 Pliny *NH* IV.10.35, 38.

285 Ibid. IV.10.35, 11.41.

286 Ptolemy III.9.1 (Nobbe), 11.1 (Nobbe).

Ptolemy's description of part of Thrace's border with Macedonia as across Pangaeum to the mouth of the Nestus, as well by placing Μαιδική in Thrace.[287] Ptolemy is familiar with the Macedonian area Orbelia and the polis Garescus located there.[288] Undoubtedly, this region was near Orbelus. Strabo describes the same area, but with the name Macedonian Parorbelia.[289] He claims that it was close to the Bisaltae and that in its interior along the valley, starting from Eidomene, were situated Callipolis, Orthopolis, Philippoupolis, and Garescus. According to this geographical excursus the Macedonian Parorbelia should be located west of the Strymon.

Other reports that mention Orbelus cannot help locate it, but neither do they contradict its location in the region of the Strymon.[290] While Mela describes Orbelus as a mountain in Thrace, it should be noted that he does the same with the Strymon. As to the often discussed passage of Arrian, which claims that after Amphipolis Alexander the Great, in his progress to Nestus, left Orbelus and 'the city of Philip' to his left, it is difficult to define where according to the author (or his source) the mountain in question was, since it is not clear whether he refers to Philippoupolis in the Macedonian Parorbelia or the polis Philippi, situated east of Pangaeum. If the first variant is accepted, then according to the author the whole of Mt Orbelus was west of the Strymon (i.e., on the left of the Macedonian army), for it is logical to assume that they were moving along that river. If the city in question is Philippi, this will mean that part of Orbelus, at least according to Arrian's source, was located east of the Strymon, for the starting point of the Macedonian army's route was Amphipolis. Arrian, however, sets no geographical limits to Orbelus, which may mean that part of the mountain range extended west of the Strymon.

If it is accepted that Lake Prasias is not Pravi, four possibilities for its location remain: Lake Doiran, Bolbe, Takhinos, and Lake Butkovo. As Hammond notes Lake Doiran is closer to Axius than it is to the Strymon, and the region of Strymon itself is said by Herodorus to be the main target of the Persian attack.[291] This is an indication that Lake Prasias was in the Strymon region and accordingly should not be identified with Lake Doiran or with Lake Bolbe.[292] As far as

287 Ibid. III.11.1, 9 (Nobbe).

288 Ibid. III.13.25 (Nobbe).

289 Strabo VII. fr. 36 (Meineke).

290 Ibid. VII. fr. 10 (Meineke); Diod. XX.19.1; Mela II.17. Arr. *Anab*. I.1.5; Anthol. Pal. VI.114–116.

291 Hammond 1972: 194n1; Hdt. V.13.2. See also V.98.1.

292 The identification of Prasias with Bolbe was rightly rejected by nineteenth-century scholars. Herodotus' definition of the people living in stilt-house communities on Lake Prasias itself as Paeonians corresponds to his own time, and it is not logical to assume that in

the area downstream from the Strymon is concerned, there is no accurate information about the ancient hydrography of the region.[293] It does not become clear from Herodotus' report how far Lake Prasias spread, and the only thing that Thucydides records is that there was a large lake north of Amphipolis.[294] Mela is also aware of the existence of the lake[295] and Arrian even mentions its name, Cercinitis.[296] They all, however, say nothing about the existence of two or more lakes. In contrast, Pliny claims that before reaching the sea the Strymon flowed into seven lakes.[297]

If one accepts that in Herodotus' time the downstream area of the Strymon River formed only a single lake, then it may be assumed that this lake comprised a comparatively large water basin, spreading from Mt Belasitsa almost to where the Angites emptied into the Strymon. Some scholars assume that the Angites flowed into Takhinos in ancient times and, accordingly, locate the shores of this lake north and south of that river.[298] This, however, cannot be valid for Herodotus' time, who explicitly notes that the Angites emptied into the Strymon and not into a lake—ἐπὶ ποταμὸν Ἀγγίτην ἐκδιδόντα ἐς τὸν Στρυμόνα.[299] On the other hand, it appears that in Thucydides' time the lake nearly reached Amphipolis. With regard to Brasidas' campaign against Amphipolis he notes that the penetration of the Spartans as far as the Strymon was not in itself fatal to the Athenians. Athenian ships patrolled near Eion and the Spartans could not cross the river without control over the bridge near the polis because

---

the middle of the fifth century on Lake Bolbe there were Paeonian-like dwellings. Apart from that, if Prasias is identified with Bolbe, then it must be accepted not only that in Herodotus' time did Paeonian lake-dwellings exist on this lake, but also that the lake was not within the borders of Macedonia (Hdt. v.17.2), which hardly reflects the real state of affairs. Finally, the name Bolbe is used by Aeschylus several decades before Herodotus (*Pers*. 492–495—Μαγνητικὴν δὲ γαῖαν ἔς τε Μακεδόνων χώραν ἀφικόμεσθ', ἐπ' Ἀξίου πόρον, Βόλβης θ' ἕλειον δόνακα, Πάγγαιόν τ' ὄρος, Ἠδωνίδ' αἶαν) and is also mentioned later by Thucydides (IV.103.1—ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἐξίησιν ἐς θάλασσαν), i.e. the identification of Prasias with Bolbe is groundless.

293 Edson 1970: 29n70.

294 Thuc. IV.108.1—ἄνωθεν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ.

295 Mela II.30.

296 Arr. *Anab*. I.11.3.

297 Pliny *NH* IV.10.38—in septem lacus (lacuus A E D R). But see Detlefsen 1904: 57—in saeptum lacum.

298 Müller 1975: 7 map 3, 10 map 4; 1987: 34, 127; Samsaris 1976: 14; Borza 1992: 45 map III; 1995: 90. As it becomes clear from the travel notes by Leak 1835: III.182–183 at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Angites did empty into Lake Takhinos.

299 Hdt. VII.113.2.

there was a large lake upstream.[300] Hence, it can be concluded that the lake was not a great distance from both the bridge and polis.[301] This impression is confirmed by another report of Thucydides, according to which the Athenian *strategos* Cleon, after setting up camp for his army on a hill near Amphipolis, viewed the Strymon marshland and the location of the polis from the direction of Thrace.[302]

If the reports by both Herodotus and Thucydides are taken into account, it is logical to assume that, depending on climatic conditions, during some periods the lake spread from Mt Belasitsa to near where the Angites emptied into the Strymon, but at other times (for example, in Thucydides' time) reached as far as Amphipolis. The acceptance of this hypothesis of a single lake formed by the Strymon lowstream is favourable for modern scholars hesitant to identify Lake Prasias with either Lake Butkovo or Lake Takhinos. The hypothesis, however, raises a difficult problem: according to Arrian the lake near Amphipolis and the Strymon mouth was called Cercinitis, not Prasias. Lake Prasias is mentioned by Herodotus, whereas Arrian likely derives from Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, his information about Alexander the Great's twenty-day expedition from the Strymon to Sestus and the Macedonian navy's stay by Lake Cercinitis. The likelihood of the Greeks to have used two different names for the same lake during two chronologically proximate periods of time does not seem great. Thus it can be assumed that in ancient times there were two lakes: Lake Cercinitis, identical to the no longer existent Lake Takhinos, and Lake Prasias, the present-day Lake Butkovo.[303]

300 Thuc. IV.108.1.

301 For the bridge in question see Jones 1977: 72–76.

302 Thuc. V.7.4.

303 Delev 2014: 198 also arrives at the conclusion that Prasias is identical with Butkovo. He uses as an argument an interesting statement by Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Εὐπορία), according to which a ruler named Alexander captured, re-found and re-named the polis of Euporia. Delev assumes that this Alexander was Alexander I, and taking into account the new localization of Heraclea Sintica near Rupite he places Euporia between Lake Butkovo and Neo Petritsi (For the localization of Euporia near Neo Petritsi see Hatzopoulos 2008: 46, 49). According to Delev, this conclusion, as well as the information Herodotus (5.17.2) provides about the control exercised by Alexander I over the silver mine near Prasias, confirms the identification of this lake with Butkovo. If the suggested localization of Euporia is accepted and if this polis was really conquered by Alexander I, this will confirm Thucydides' statement (II.99.4) that during their expansion Macedonian rulers reached the Strymon. Delev's conclusion, however, cannot be taken as proof as to the identification of Prasias with Butkovo. From his analysis it does not become clear why Alexander's advance towards Strymon should be limited only to the direction of Butkovo and ignore the

This location of Prasias is supported by a great number of scholars. It complies with Herodotus' information, according to which the lake was located in the immediate proximity of two mountains—Dysoron, which is Mt Krousia, and Orbelus, which is Mt Belasitsa, or part of it—and its shores and the lake itself were peopled by the Paeonians. What is more, it is not necessary to assume that the spread of Macedonia was too great for the suggested location

opportunity for conquering the lands along the right bank of the river by Lake Takhinos and by the mouth of the Strymon (see also Delev 2014: 205). Thucydides (II.99.4) explicitly specifies that the Argeadae expelled Edoni from the lands situated beyond Axius as far as Strymon, i.e. the so-called Mygdonia—πέραν Ἀξιοῦ μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλουμένην Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. If his statement is followed it can be concluded that in Thucydides' view (contrary to Herodotus VII.115.1) Mygdonia was spread as far as Strymon, and that the Argeadae reached this river at the time they expelled the Edoni from this district (see Vasilev 2011: 102). Taking into consideration the geographical span of Mygdonia (according to Thucydides), and the fact that at this time Crestonia and Bisaltia were independent, the Argeadae most likely reached the Strymon, while pursuing the Edoni, through Rentina Pass. This in itself suggests that the first reach of the Argeadae to Strymon can be referred to this part of its stream, which was between its mouth and the south shores of Lake Takhinos, and not to the region of Neo Petritsi and Lake Butkovo. Only ca. 460 when Bisaltia was subjugated (Thuc. II.99.6), did the possessions of the Argeadae spread to Butkovo. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to reject the possibility that ca. 460 a part of the eastern border of Macedonia was limited to the river Strymon near Neo Petritsi (if this is the place where the polis of Euporia was situated) and near to its mouth. In this case, at the time Macedonia bordered not only on Butkovo, but also on Takhinos, which once more raises the question of the identification of Prasias with one of the two mentioned lakes, and thus makes inconsistent the otherwise original idea of Delev. Finally, it should be mentioned that Delev and Hammond both have doubts about Thucydides' passage (II.99.4), in which he expresses his view that Mygdonia spread to Strymon (Delev 2014: 360—'Тукидид малко неточно разширява на едно място обхвата на Мигдония чак до реката Стримон, но самият той ясно я обособява от Бисалтия.' Hammond 1972: 192n2—'Thucydides said that the conquest was up to the Strymon at the expense of the Edones and (in a separate sentence) that the Macedonians now hold the so-called Mygdonia'). Even if the interpretation suggested above as to Thucydides' passage about the spread of Mygdonia as far as Strymon is rejected and Herodotus' view (VII.115.1) about Bisaltia is accepted, or at least part of it (ὡς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἐπορεύετο ὁ στρατός, ἐνθαῦτα πρὸς ἡλίου δυσμέων ἐστὶ αἰγιαλὸς ἐν τῷ οἰκημένην Ἄργιλον πόλιν Ἑλλάδα παρεξήιε· αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἡ κατύπερθε ταύτης καλέεται Βισαλτίη), this in combination with the evidence of Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Εὐπορία), proves to an even greater degree that the possessions of Alexander I reached the Strymon not only to Lake Butkovo, but also to Lake Takhinos, or at least to its south shores. It can therefore be inferred that the arguments expressed here indicate that the information provided by Stephanus of Byzantium is insufficient to prove the identification of Prasias with Butkovo.

during the time of Alexander I and Perdiccas II, which the sources give no information about. Lastly, the identification of Prasias with Butkovo means that the lands of the Paeonians, reaching as far as the lake in question, spread southeast in the direction of the Paeonian Sirrae where the Siriopaeonians lived.[304]

The second group of tribes mentioned by Herodotus in connection with Megabazus' campaign in Paeonia are those who avoided Persian control—οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος καὶ Δόβηρας καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ Ὀδομάντους καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν λίμνην τὴν Πρασιάδα. The passage cited here causes a number of problems that are difficult to solve. Some scholars support the view that the mention of the Doberes, the Agrianes, and the Odomanti is an interpolation.[305] On the other hand, as Hammond states, these ethnonyms are present in all the available manuscripts, a sign that they are not interpolated. What is more, the Odomanti are mentioned by Herodotus once more, with regard to Xerxes' march, as being in the vicinity of Pangaeum.[306] Strabo's speaking about the Agrianes living close to Pangaeum may serve as an additional argument. Bearing in mind that in the same sentence he speaks about the Persian siege of Perinthus, it may be assumed that the information about the Agrianes is obtained form Herodotus' report.[307] If that is true, then the enumeration of the three tribes situated by Pangaeum will have been from Herodotus, not a later medieval transcriber.[308] Unanswered remains the question whether in the quoted passage, a fourth unnamed tribe is mentioned that also lived in the region near Pangaeum.[309] If such a possibility is granted, it should be accepted that the tribe in question is Paeonian, since it is spoken about right after the enumeration of the Paeonians moved to Asia.[310]

---

304 Considering the arguments offered in the present study, the location of the Paeoplae, the Siriopaeonians, and the Paeonians whose settlements spred up to Lake Prasias, is valid even if one accepts that in Herodotus' time the Strymon lower stream formed only one lake, spreading from Mt Belasitsa almost to the place where the Angites flowed into the Strymon, and that this lake Herodotus names Prasias.

305 Stein III: 12 and ad V.16; Tomaschek 1893: I.21–22; Legrand 1946: 25n4; Schrader 1981: V.33n56.

306 Hammond 1980: 57; Hdt. VII.112.1.

307 Hdt. V.1.1–3, 16.1; Strabo VII. fr. 41 (Meineke).

308 After the present study was already completely edited, I obtained Peter Delev's book and found that, similarly to me, this important observation did not escape his notice. See Delev 2014: 150.

309 Delev 2005: 110–111; 2014: 86–87, 283.

310 Hdt. V.15.3—οὕτω δὴ Παιόνων Σιριοπαίονές τε καὶ Παιόπλαι καὶ οἱ μέχρι τῆς Πρασιάδος λίμνης ἐξ ἠθέων ἐξαναστάντες ἤγοντο ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην; Ibid. V.16.1—οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος καὶ Δόβηρας καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ Ὀδομάντους …

The location of the three tribes in question also faces some problems. The Odomanti's settlements seem the easiest to precisely define. Apart from being mentioned in the passage just analysed, Herodotus speaks about them in connection with Xerxes' march as one of the tribes working in the gold and silver mines in Pangaeum, which means that at the time their settlements were situated close to that mountain, and probably part of them on the mountain itself.[311] Samsaris defends the position that the Odomanti, under the pressure of the Edoni Alexander I had banished east of the Strymon were forced to leave their lands and settle somewhere in the region of the Paeonian Sirrae.[312] That supposition is based on Thucydides, who, with regard to Sitalces' campaign against Perdiccas II and the Chalcidians, defines the Odomanti as inhabitants of the plain beyond the Strymon, together with the Panaeans, the Droans, and the Dersaei,[313] as well as on Livy's claim that they peopled the lands near Sirrae.[314] In Herodotus' time, however (i.e., either at the very end of Alexander's rule, or in the early years of the rule of Perdiccas II), the Odomanti still lived near Pangaeum and worked in the mines situated there—ἐν τῷ χρύσεά τε καὶ ἀργύρεα ἔνι μέταλλα, τὰ νέμονται Πίερές τε καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ μάλιστα Σάτραι. This means that if they were chased away by the Edoni, as Samsaris accepts, it did not happen immediately after the Edoni themselves were banished from Mygdonia—an act committed by Alexander in the years immediately following the Battle of Plataea, or after Eion had been conquered by the Athenians, but at any rate decades later.[315]

The case of the Doberes, due to the nature of Herodotus' report, is more complicated. In the fifth book of his work, with regard to Megabazus' march he defines their location by Pangaeum,[316] while in the seventh book, in connection with the march of Xerxes, they are located north of the mountain.[317] If this information conforms to the real state of affairs, the migration of the Doberes,

311 Ibid. VII.112.1.

312 Samsaris 1976: 61.

313 Thuc. II.101.3—οἱ πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορέαν Θρᾷκες, ὅσοι πεδία εἶχον, Παναῖοι καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ Δρῶοι καὶ Δερσαῖοι.

314 Liv. XLV.4.2—Paulus Aemilius consul cum castra, ut supra dictum est, ad Siras terrae Odomanticae haberet.

315 For the expulsion of the Edoni from Mygdonia see Vasilev 2011: 101–102.

316 Hdt. V.16.1. Leak 1835: III.212, having based his arguments on the existence of the Roman road station Domeros, locates Doberes on the north hillsides of Pangaeum. Abel 1847: 60 also relates the Doberes to Domeros—'päonischen Doberern, die ihren Namen von dem Ort Doberos oder Domeros hatten.'

317 Hdt. VII.113.1.

or part of them, is likely to relate to Mardonius' campaign, since they remained independent until his arrival in Thrace. The Doberes probably settled along the Angites' lower stream and thus became the Paeoplae's neighbours.[318]

Herodotus' mention of the Agrianes also poses some difficult questions. In contrast with the Doberes, Herodotus mentions the Agrianes only once, and thus the problem of their location remains thorny. It is further complicated by Thucydides, who places the Agrianes somewhere along the upper stream of the Strymon.[319] Since Herodotus mentions the Agrianes together with the Odomanti and Doberes in the vicinity of Pangaeum, and then follow those living on Lake Prasias, it is logical for them to be located in the area around that mountain as well. The reference likely is to an Agrianian enclave that was either a result of an earlier, unattested expansion towards Pangaeum or just the opposite, and the expansion was towards the region of the upper Strymon, while some of the Agrianes did not take part in it and remained in their settlements by the aforementioned mountain.

After receiving Darius' order, Megabazus took Thracian guides and started off towards Paeonia. At the news of the Persian army coming in their direction, the Paeonians gathered together and headed for the sea (ἐξεστρατεύσαντο πρὸς θαλάσσης) for they thought that this was the place where Megabazus would launch his attack from. Megabazus, however, with the support of his guides followed the upper road (τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν) and encountered no difficulty in conquering the Paeonian cities, since they had been left unprotected. Having heard what happened, the Paeonians scattered and returned home, where they submitted to the Persian general.[320]

The route the Persian army followed while advancing towards Paeonia is difficult to define precisely. The act of taking guides from Thrace (λαβὼν ἡγεμόνας ἐκ τῆς Θρηίκης) was probably performed by Megabazus after crossing the Hebrus or the Nestus, when he needed local people who knew the area

318 With regard to Sitalces' march Thucydides (II.98.2, 99.1) mentions the Paeonian settlement Doberus (see also Strabo VII. fr. 36—Meineke; Ptolemy III.13.28—Nobbe; St. Byz. Δόβηρος, πόλις Παιονίας) which must be localized somewhere between the present-day cities of Marvinci and Strumitsa. If it is accepted that a part of the Doberes lived in this particular region (Pliny *NH* IV.10.35 speaks about *Doberi*, but it does not become clear whether he means the people of the settlement or the tribe bearing the same name), it is logical to assume that there was also movement of part of them from Paeonia to Pangaeum or vice versa, from Pangaeum to Paeonia, which is not mentioned in the sources. This presumable migration, however, is impossible to be chronologically framed.

319 Thuc. II.96.3.

320 Hdt. V.14.2–15.3.

the army would go through. Herodotus makes it clear that the decision for the 'upper road' to be followed was not taken preliminarily by Megabazus, but was rather a result of the fact that the road coming from the sea had already been guarded by the Paeonians, and the decision was arrived at in accordance with the situation.

Which road, however, is the one leading to the sea kept by the Paeonians, and which is the upper road used by Megabazus? As has been argued above, the campaign against the Paeonians took place after Megabazus had conquered the Aegean coast between the Hebrus and Strymon, as well as the Edoni lands near the Strymon's tributary Angites. If this is true, then the road kept by the Paeonians must be the one joining the mouth of the Strymon to the lands near the lower course of the Angites. From the Paeonian point of view that was the road coming from the sea. Considering that Herodotus does not speak about the Paeonians invading the Peraian lands, but rather about their defensive position, it can be supposed that they concentrated their military power somewhere close to where the Angites empties into the Strymon River.

There are various suppositions as to which road Megabazus used to avoid the Paeonian posts. Hammond, using the *Tabula Peutingeriana* as a source, suggests a route to the Strymon plain with Drama as a starting point and proceeding through Gazoros.[321] Herodotus' specification that Megabazus followed the 'upper road' is an indication that the road in his time, whichever it was, was not unknown. Yet, the road through Gazoros must be far more familiar to his listeners and readers than the northern route suggested by Hatzopoulos: Drama—Prosotsani—Ano Vrontu.[322] The evidence of the participation of Thracian guides in the Persian army is also important. It was far easier for Megabazus, who was in control of the coast, to find guides who could lead the Persian army across Gazoros rather than guides who knew the road lying further to the north of the sea.

Taking into account what has been said above about Megabazus' Paeonian campaign, the following reconstruction of events can be made. Understanding that Megabazus would attack their lands, the united military forces of the Siriopaeonians, the Paeoplae, and those Paeonians whose lands reached Lake Prasias took up a defensive position near the place where the Angites emptied

321 Hammond 1972: 180 map 17, 197; 1979: 57; 1980: 56. The location of Heraclea Sintica near Rupite (Mitrev 2003: 263–272; Lepelley 2004: 223–224) does not contradict the possibility that Megabazus circumvented the Paeonian positions through Gazoros. Doubts concerning the suggested location are expressed by Manov 2004: 78–80.

322 Hatzopoulos 2008: 15n15. It appears that Delev 2007: 90–91 has the same route in mind when he mentions Menoikion—Vrondu—Orvilos.

into the Strymon. When Megabazus became aware of this, he took Thracian guides, entered the lands of the Paeonians through Gazoros, and captured their children and wives. As a result, the defense of the Paeonians collapsed. Megabazus succeeded in reaching Lake Prasias but failed in the attempt to subject its people.

Having surrendered, the Paeonians were moved to Asia Minor.[323] Without doubt, the reason for this act was rooted in their intention to resist the Persian invasion of the region.[324] The lands they occupied were too strategically important to be left to people hostile to the Persians. It is most probable that the order for their exile was given by Darius himself, who at that time resided in Sardis. It is debatable whether Megabazus forcibly moved all the aforesaid tribes or only some part of them.[325] With regard to the Ionian Revolt, Herodotus makes it clear that the newly settled Paeonians peopled τῆς Φρυγίης χῶρόν τε καὶ κώμην.[326] This prompts Hammond to conclude that it was only 'the leading families of the Paeonians' who were moved to Asia Minor and that their lands up to Lake Prasias were given to Thracians loyal to the Persian authority.[327] Balcer, however, posits that it is likely some of the Paeonians were resettled in the interior of the empire, in Parsa[328] (i.e. that the total number of the Paeonians brought to Asia Minor was not small). In this case, he uses as a basis Persepolis' Fortification texts in which, together with many others, the people of Skudra is mentioned. The fact that the name is present in the tables leads Balcer to conclude that a portion of the aforementioned Skudra may be identified with the Paeonians forced into exile by Megabazus, some of which due to reasons unknown moved to the interior of the empire.

Hammond's assertion about the Thracians who were favoured over the Paeonians by the Persians cannot find support in the sources and is rightly crit-

323 Hdt. v.15.3, 17.1, 23.1.

324 Tuplin 2010: 298 assumes that it is possible for Herodotus' story about the Paeonian exile to illustrate the deportation of workers. He notes that this is the only deportation mentioned by Herodotus that is not connected with the punishment of the people deported. However, one should remember that the Paeonians who were deported offered resistance to Megabazus, which was the probable reason for their deportation. For a list of the different deportations mentioned in the sources see Hirsch 1992: 236–237.

325 Sarakinski 2013: 74–77, 166–169 denies the authenticity of the story about the deportation of the Paeonians. In his opinion, under pressure from the Persians and Macedonians, Paeonians took the decision to re-settle further north.

326 Hdt. v.98.1.

327 Hammond 1980: 56–57 and n12.

328 Balcer 1988: 9; 1995: 152.

icized.[329] Herodotus, with regard to Xerxes' march, once more (though indirectly) defines Sirrae as a Paeonian polis,[330] which shows that the Paeonians continued to people their own places, and accordingly their lands were not given to loyal Thracians. As far as the number of the Paeonians forced by Megabazus into exile is concerned, it can hardly be so small that they could have been placed in a single village and its vicinity. It must be noted that numerous Persian cavalry was sent after the Paeonians running towards the coast together with their children and wives, and these were only part of the Paeonians moved to Phrygia (ἐόντων δὲ ἤδη ἐν Χίῳ κατὰ πόδας ἐληλύθεε Περσέων ἵππος πολλὴ διώκουσα τοὺς Παίονας).[331] This in particular, along with the interest Aristagoras had in these people, is a sign that the number of the Paeonians forced by Megabazus into exile cannot be as small as Hammond claims.

The campaign of Megabazus against the Paeonians placed these strategically important lands along the Strymon, spread from its mouth up to Lake Prasias and the Rupel defile, under the Great King's control. Megabazus however did not succeed in crossing the defile. He most probably did not try at all, for Mt Belasitsa is a natural barrier against possible raids from the north. The tribes that remained unconquered were then living at the foot of Pangaeum: the Doberes, the Agrianes, and the Odomanti. It appears that the closeness of the place they occupied to the mountain helped them maintain their independent status. Megabazus' unwillingness to conquer them is a sign that the task assigned to him was mainly to strengthen Persian power on the coasts and in the strategically important region of the lower Strymon, not to gain control of the interior, despite the fact that this is where the gold and silver mines of Pangaeum were. This, however, does not mean that the Great King was deprived of the opportunity, in one way or another, to be financially benefited from the mines in question, since due to Megabazus' campaign the Doberes, Agrianes,

329 Archibald 1998: 87n40.

330 Hdt. VIII.115.3–4—τοὺς δὲ καὶ νοσέοντας αὐτῶν κατέλειπε, ἐπιτάσσων τῇσι πόλισι, ἵνα ἑκάστοτε γίνοιτο ἐλαύνων, μελεδαίνειν τε καὶ τρέφειν, ἐν Θεσσαλίῃ τέ τινας καὶ ἐν Σίρι τῆς Παιονίης καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίῃ. ἔνθα καὶ τὸ ἱρὸν ἅρμα καταλιπὼν τοῦ Διός, ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἤλαυνε, ἀπιὼν οὐκ ἀπέλαβε, ἀλλὰ δόντες οἱ Παίονες τοῖσι Θρήιξι ἀπαιτέοντος Ξέρξεω ἔφασαν νεμομένας ἁρπασθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνω Θρηίκων τῶν περὶ τὰς πηγὰς τοῦ Στρυμόνος οἰκημένων. In this case ἔνθα refers to Sirrae, for it is illogical for Herodotus to relate Thessaly and Macedonia to the Paeonians. Macan 1908: I.2 ad VIII.115 defines the mentioning of Macedonia after Sirrae as being: 'strangely out of place, like an afterthought, a correction, a gloss.' See also the analysis of Tripodi 1986: 243–246.

331 Hdt. V.98.4.

and Odomanti were allowed no access to the Aegean coast and the lower Strymon, and from that moment they were forced to comply with Persian interests.

Persian Envoys in Macedonia

The Persian acquisition of the Strymon led to contact being established with the Macedonian ruler Amyntas, whose territorial possessions at that time spread probably as far as Mt Chortiatis.[332] Herodotus reports that Megabazus, instead of trying to conquer Macedonia by force, sent seven noble envoys to the court of Amyntas to ask for 'earth and water.' Herodotus makes clear that there was a short road from Lake Prasias to Macedonia, as the first place to be reached just after the lake was the mine, which eventually gave Alexander I a silver talent a day, with the next place reached being Mt Dysoron, beyond which lay Macedonia. Having made these geographical specifications, Herodotus continues his story about the Persian envoys. They received a cordial welcome from Amyntas, and 'earth and water' as well, but due to their indecency they, together with the servants who accompanied them, were killed by order of his son Alexander. Immediately the Persians undertook an extensive search for these men. Alexander managed to save his life by bribing and, what was more, by giving Bubares, who was in charge of the search, his sister Gygaea in marriage. Further in his work Herodotus speaks about a baby boy, born to Bubares and the Macedonian princess, and named Amyntas after his grandfather on his mother's side. Many years later the Amyntas in question received the large Phrygian polis of Alabanda as a gift from the Great King.[333]

The story of the murder of the seven Persian envoys and their servants is rightly considered implausible and rejected by scholars. It is a well accepted opinion that the story was made up by Alexander I sometime after the Persian defeat at Plataea (479). By popularizing this fiction the ruler of Macedonia tried to offer the Greeks an excuse both for his participation in Xerxes' expedition on the Persian side and for the already inconvenient Persian–Macedonian marriage contract. What is more, in quite a non-intentional way, the Greek origin of the dynasty is mentioned at this point, ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην Μακεδόνων ὕπαρχος,[334] which also bears a slight political connotation. This very fact shows

332 Vasilev 2011: 99. Contra Xydopoulos 2012: 24–31.

333 Hdt. V.17.1–21.2; VIII.136.1; The same story is told by Justin (VII.3.1–9), whose source is probably Herodotus. In Justin's story there are minor but substantial differences which will be discussed below.

334 Hdt. V.20.4.

that Herodotus' source for the story about the envoys' murder was probably Macedonian. Indeed, Herodotus at a several points adduces Macedonian sources.[335] Furthermore, the Suda directly states that Herodotus visited Macedonia, though it is difficult to say when exactly his journey took place.[336] It is possible that Herodotus, on his visit to Macedonia, communicated with Alexander I or his son Perdiccas II, or with any Macedonian nobles who, as part of the ruling dynasty, were also interested in strengthening their position in the Greek world.[337]

Errington, however, goes further, saying that not only the envoys' murder but the whole story told by Herodotus is a fiction.[338] The only exception, he thinks, is the marriage between Gygaea and Bubares, which in his view, however, dated from 492.[339] His basic arguments relate to the fact that in Herodotus' story it was not Amyntas but his son Alexander who was in control of Gygaea's destiny, which means that he was ruler of the Macedonians at that time and that, due to the envoys' murder, there was no one to inform Darius about the submission of Macedonia. In addition, Errington uses a report of Herodotus as a source, according to which Mardonius subjected the Macedonians and thus added them to the list of the tribes already conquered by the Persians.[340] At

335 Hdt. V.22.1—Ἕλληνας δὲ εἶναι τούτους τοὺς ἀπὸ Περδίκκεω γεγονότας, κατά περ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι; ibid. VII.73.1—ὡς Μακεδόνες λέγουσι; ibid. VIII.138.3—ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων. See also his report on the short route from Lake Prasias to Macedonia (ibid. V.17.2).

336 Suid. Ἑλλάνικος—διέτριψε δὲ Ἑλλάνικος σὺν Ἡροδότῳ παρὰ Ἀμύντᾳ τῷ Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους. Apparently, there is a mistake here for, due to entirely chronological reasons, it was impossible for Herodotus to have visited Macedonia during the reign of Amyntas.

337 Burn 1985: 303 concludes that the source of the story about the murder of the Persian envoys used by Herodotus is Athenian. He relates the popularization of the story to the willingness of the Athenians to clear Alexander's name as a Persian ally with regard to their trade interests in acquiring Macedonian timber. It is possible for Alexander's rehabilitation before the Greek world to have been desired by the Athenians but undoubtedly, such an act was of the greatest benefit to the Macedonian ruler himself, which, together with the arguments provided in the present study, is an indication that it was he who initiated the propaganda.

338 Errington 1981: 139–143; 1986: 17–19. See also Proeva 2004: 97–100.

339 In fact, Chapman 1972: 557 states before Errington that the marriage contract between Gygaea and Bubares was signed after Alexander had become ruler of the Macedonians. However, he provides no arguments to support his supposition. Rosen 1987: 30n14, 40n43 and Erbse 1992: 103–104 also, similarly to Errington, say the marriage dates from 492.

340 Hdt. VI.44.1—τοῦτο δὲ τῷ πεζῷ Μακεδόνας πρὸς τοῖσι ὑπάρχουσι δούλους προσεκτήσαντο· τὰ γὰρ ἐντὸς Μακεδόνων ἔθνεα πάντα σφι ἤδη ἦν ὑποχείρια γεγονότα.

this point a conclusion is made: 'the Macedonians obviously cannot have twice become vassals of the Persians for the first time' (i.e., their subjection was an act performed by Mardonius (492), not by Megabazus). Having ignored Herodotus' story, Errington relies on Syncellus, who says that Alexander gave the Persians 'earth and water'—οὗτος δέδωκε τοῖς Πέρσαις ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν.[341]

In this way, Errington denies the existence of diplomatic contacts between Persia and Macedonia during Amyntas' reign and relates them to the time of his son Alexander's reign, and more precisely to Mardonius' campaign in 492. In accordance with his reconstruction, this was the exact time when Alexander gave his sister in marriage to Bubares, whom Errington considers then to have been the probable satrap of Persian territorial possessions in Europe.

Errington's hypothesis meets with serious criticism from Zahrnt[342] and Badian.[343] Zahrnt notes that Herodotus' information about Macedonia being twice conquered—by Megabazus and by Mardonius—is missing in Errington's report.[344] He rightly asks the question, 'wozu man eine Geschichte hätte in die Welt setzen sollen, die etwas ungeschehen macht, was nach Erringtons Ansicht sowieso nicht geschehen ist.' Here, one may add, that if the marriage contract between Gygaea and Bubares was signed in 492, as Errington claims, and if Alexander intended to use the story about the murder of the Persian envoys as an excuse for it, it was far easier for him to name Mardonius' appearance west of the Strymon a reason rather than to invent a story from his father Amyntas' reign. Such an act, performed under direct military pressure, would probably have been accepted with sympathy by the Greeks, considering that part of them were in active cooperation with Persia during Xerxes' campaign.

Borza accepts the main points of Errington's hypothesis and thus rejects the idea that Amyntas was subjected by the Persians. However, he arrives at the conclusion that at the time of Megabazus' campaign the Persians did establish diplomatic contacts with Macedonia.[345] In Borza's view these relations do not resemble those between vassal and suzerain, but rather bear the features of a bond between two sovereign countries, or at least serve as a sign of their non-antagonistic relation. The marriage between the princess of Macedonia Gygaea and the Persian nobleman Bubares was the immediate result of the negotiations conducted. In addition, Borza, in contrast to Errington, cites

341 Syncellus I. p. 247 B, 262 D (Dindorf).

342 Zahrnt 1992: 248–250; 2011: 762–763.

343 Badian 1994: 108–116.

344 Hdt. VII.108.1—ἐδεδούλωτο γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης πᾶσα καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλέα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὕστερον Μαρδονίου.

345 Borza 1992: 102–104.

Herodotus' report on the reiterated Persian conquest of Macedonia. Since the report contradicts the hypothesis made by Errington and accepted by himself, Borza offers the following solution to the problem: 'had Macedon—the last nation before Thessaly—been enslaved by Megabazus ca. 510, there would be no reason to mention Mardonius.'

Borza's statement unnecessarily complicates the situation. In fact, a solution to the problem can be found in a far simpler way. Herodotus mentions the double conquest of Macedonia because after the Ionian Revolt the Persians lost the authority that had been imposed by Megabazus; with Mardonius' campaign they arranged things the way they used to be. Additionally, as Badian notes, at the time of Megabazus' expedition the only type of relation recognized by the Great King was one of submission. A notable example of this is the pressure under which the Athenian envoys were forced to act in Sardis (507)—an alliance with the Persians was only possible on condition that they gave 'earth and water.'[346]

The marriage between Gygaea and Bubares appears to be perfectly real, for Herodotus speaks about it once more with no regard to the events discussed above. He says that their son, named after his maternal grandfather Amyntas, was presented by the Great King with the Phrygian polis Alabanda to rule.[347] If what has been argued above is taken into account, along with the fact that Bubares was probably the son of Megabazus,[348] then it is logical for his marriage contract with the Macedonian princess to have been signed at the time of his father's activity in the region of the lower Strymon (513/12). This supposition can be indirectly proved by that fact that Gygaea and Bubares' son Amyntas was probably already in his majority (ἐγεγόνεε Ἀμύντης) by the time of the events of 479.[349]

If the supposition made above is true, it must be accepted that Megabazus' mission to Macedonia is also real.[350] In this case, Megabazus, apparently with

346 Hdt. v.73.1–3.

347 Ibid. viii.136.1. At another point of his work Herodotus (vii.195.1) mentions a polis named Alabanda situated not in Phrygia but in Caria. This is the reason why Stein v: ad viii.136 suggests correction according to which the point is not about Alabanda but about the Phrygian polis of Alabastra familiar to Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Ἀλάβαστρα). On the other hand, Ptolemy (iv.5.59—Nobbe) and Pliny (*NH* v.9.61) mention a polis called Alabastra in Egypt, not Phrygia.

348 Hdt. vii.22.2; Badian 1994: 110–111.

349 Macan 1908: i.2 ad viii.136; Borza 1992: 103n15.

350 According to Badian 1994: 112–114, the Macedonian ruler was responsible for the initiative: Amyntas, impressed with the Persian enterprise in Europe, sent his son Alexander to

no plans for military intervention west of the Strymon, intended to peacefully subject Macedonia. Right after he speaks about the Persian mission to Amyntas, Herodotus makes it clear that it was a short route from Lake Prasias to Macedonia, as the first place to be reached just after the lake was the mine that eventually gave Alexander a silver talent a day, and the next was Mt Dysoron, beyond which Macedonia spread. As has already been argued above, the use of the present tense shows that the geographical specification of the eastern border of Macedonia reflects the state of affairs during Herodotus' time, not Amyntas'.[351] If this is so, then this information should be taken to refer to the early years of Perdiccas' rule, when Bisaltia was lost,[352] or to the last years of Alexander's rule, if he was still alive when the people of Bisaltia managed to restore their independence.

Is it then possible for the description of the route to provide no evidence either for Macedonia's borders during Amyntas' reign or for the Persian mission to his court? If such a supposition is made, then it is logical to ask whether the Persian envoys followed the route from Lake Prasias to Macedonia or took another one. Herodotus seems to believe that the envoys did take the route described by him from Lake Prasias to Macedonia. This, however, may be his own conclusion, based on his story of Megabazus' campaign against the Paeonians living in Lake Prasias, as well as due to the fact that during Herodotus' time that road led straight to Macedonia. During Amyntas' time, however, the borders of Macedonia were different, and the Persian envoys may have followed the route that passed Lake Bolbe from the Strymon's mouth to the Thermaic Gulf, part of which was under the control of the Macedonian ruler at that time.[353]

---

negotiate with Megabazus. In this case, Badian tries to reconstruct the events that took place without ignoring the late report of Syncellus (I. p. 247 B, 262 D—Dindorf), according to which it was Alexander, not his father Amyntas, who gave the Persian envoys 'earth and water.' Is it logical, however, that Amyntas initiated his own submission, due merely to the impression of the success of the Persians and without direct military force being threatened? Voluntary submission might lead to paying tribute and demands from the Persians for garrisons in Macedonia, which no doubt would not be in Amyntas' interest.

351 At the same conclusion, but in a different way, also arrives Leak 1835: III.210–212. He identifies Lake Prasias with Takhinos and hence concludes that the description of the route from Lake Prasias to Macedonia refers to the time of Herodotus and Perdiccas II, for Amyntas' territories did not reach as far as the aforesaid lake.

352 For the loss of Bisaltia in the early years of Perdiccas' reign see Hammond 1979: 115, 138. This conclusion is based on the debased coinage of Perdiccas.

353 For the borders of the Macedonia at that time see Vasilev 2011: 97–99.

It is logical to assume that the appointment with Amyntas took place in Aegeae. Amyntas, eager to avoid future conflict with the Persians, gave 'earth and water.' The Persian envoys received not only the desired submission of Amyntas, but also a proposal for marriage between his daughter and Bubares, whose father Megabazus the Macedonians believed to be the man of power in the region. Undoubtedly, permission for that marriage was asked from Darius, who at the time was residing in Sardis and was aware of the events in process.

The marriage alliance between the Persian and Macedonian courts was mutually beneficial. Amyntas was probably guaranteed the retention of his power and was promised some protection from hostile raids, while the Persians, who at the precise moment had no plans for military intervention in Macedonia, gained a loyal vassal and a convenient base for any future invasion into Greece. It is quite another point that Darius at that time most probably had no plans for intervention in Greece at all.

Those scholars who accept that Amyntas submitted to the Great King give different interpretations of the results of his negotiations with the Persians. Hammond thinks that Macedonia was included in the Persian administrative system as part of a satrapy called Skudra.[354] As a source he uses Justin, according to whom soon after the departure of Bubares from Macedonia, Amyntas died.[355] From this Hammond concludes that Bubares was satrap or a counselor of the satrap of Skudra. What is more, Hammond concludes from his later research concerning Justin's sources for the history of Macedonia that as to the murder of the Persian envoys and the marriage between Gygaea and Bubares the source Justin uses is Marsyas of Pella.[356]

Justin's report is extremely uncertain and, considering the information it provides, probably has no independent value. For this reason it cannot be used as evidence that Macedonia was included in the Persian administrative system. It becomes clear upon comparison to Herodotus' text that Justin's (or rather Pompeius Trogus') is merely a paraphrase of Herodotus' story about the murder of the Persian envoys with an added romantic element, according to which Bubares entered Macedonia and, falling in love with Amyntas' daughter, did not undertake any military actions against him, but married her and stayed in the Macedonian court for a long time.[357] As to the possibility that Marsyas of Pella is Justin's source, considering the fact that the chronological span of

354 Hammond 1979: 58–60; 1989: 42. Olmstead 1939: 308; 1948: 157–158; Dandamaev 1989: 151 and Harmatta 1990: 128 also arrive at the same conclusion.

355 Just. VII.4.1—Post discessum a Macedonia Bubaris Amyntas rex decedit …

356 Hammond 1991: 497, 501–502.

357 Badian 1994: 112; Sprawski 2011: 136.

his study includes the earliest history of Macedonia[358] it is logical to assume that the Macedonian historian Marsyas would speak about the story of the murder of the Persian envoys, for it is an illustration of the bravery of the son of a Macedonian ruler who had the courage to oppose the mighty Persians. The story is, however, missing from the extant fragments of Marsyas, which does not allow any conclusions as to whether he is Justin's source, or whether Marsyas himself uses any source other than Herodotus.

From Herodotus' report it can be concluded that Megabazus did not use military force to conquer Macedonia and accordingly did not put garrisons in its territory. This suggests that Macedonia was not reduced to a common satrapy[359] but was given the privileged status of a vassal.[360] Due to the lack of reliable information it is difficult to judge whether Amyntas, as a Persian vassal, was obliged to pay tribute and, if necessary, to send Darius Macedonian troops.

As it can be seen from the case of the Athenian envoys in Sardis, to give 'earth and water' does not necessarily lead to financial liabilities.[361] Neither could Herodotus' sentence ἐδεδούλωτο γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης πᾶσα καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλέα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὕστερον Μαρδονίου[362] serve as evidence that, as a result of Megabazus' expedition, Macedonia was burdened with paying tribute. In fact, Herodotus' statement is an explanation of his preceding sentence, in which he says that Xerxes forced all the people he met on his way from Doriscus to Greece to join his army. Thus, ἐδεδούλωτο γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης

358 Suid. Μαρσύας Περιάνδρου Πελλαῖος.

359 Contra Abel 1847: 149; Svoronos 1919: 33; Casson 1926: 179.

360 Thirlwall 1836: II.205; Kazarow 1922: 43–44; Geyer 1928: 702; 1930: 42; Glotz 1938: 18; Junge 1944: 188n15; Paribeni 1947: 32; Kanatsoulis 1964: 91–94; Edson 1970: 25; Castritius 1972: 2; Schrader 1981: V.15n1, 36n64 and VI.269n211; Walser 1984: 34–35; Balcer 1988: 4–6; Momigliano 1992: 23; Zahrnt 1992: 245–249; Green 1998: 13; Briant 2002: 145; Cawkwell 2005: 52; Heckel 2008: 14; Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 289–290; Olbrycht 2010: 343; Zahrnt 2011: 765; Mari 2011: 85; Vasilev 2011: 100; Müller 2011: 111; Xydopoulos 2012: 22, 27; Hornblower 2013: 109, 115. According to Paspalas (2006: 100) the problem, concerning the relations between the Macedonian rulers Amyntas and Alexander and the Great King remains unsolved. He views the marriage between Gygaea and Bubares as an indication of intensive relations between the two parties. For eventual archaeological evidence of contacts between the subjected to the Great King lands and Macedonia during that early period see Paspalas 2000: 550–551; 2006: 100–101.

361 Hdt. V.73.1–3.

362 Ibid. VII.108.1.

πᾶσα καὶ ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλέα δασμοφόρος reflects the situation in 480 and explains how such a mobilization was possible, while Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὕστερον Μαρδονίου is historical retrospection, aimed at defining when and by whom the Great King's authority over the aforesaid lands was established. Whereas it can be rightly assumed that the Persian territorial possessions in Thrace paid tribute after Megabazus' expedition, the tax dependence of Macedonia remains debatable and the possibility that it was a later result of Mardonius' campaign should not be rejected.

The question of Amyntas' possible obligation to send troops to the Great King when necessary is no less controversial. Information about any Macedonian intervention in the Ionian Revolt is lacking. Yet this was when the Persians most needed the help of their Macedonian vassal. It is tempting to assume that Mardonius penetrated with his army into Macedonia in order to punish Alexander for his (or his father's) unwillingness to send troops to the lower Strymon area. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that such an act would have escaped the notice of Herodotus, whose Macedonian source tried to present Alexander to the Greeks in the most favourable light. Thus, it can be concluded that according to the agreement with the emissaries sent by Megabazus, Amyntas either was not obliged to send troops to the Great King, or to the contrary, he accepted this obligation but for some reason (internal opposition or problems caused by neighbouring tribes) he was not able to fulfil his duties.

Another curious fact worth mentioning is Herodotus' definition of Amyntas as ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην Μακεδόνων ὕπαρχος, which may mean 'satrap of Macedonia.'[363] However, as Balcer's analysis shows, Herodotus uses the title ὕπαρχος when he speaks not only about satraps but also about governors of some cities and even of small areas.[364] It is probably the same with Amyntas, who no doubt in the position of ruler of Macedonia (albeit a vassal of the Great King), and not as a satrap of Persia, offered the rule of Anthemus in 506/5 to the overthrown tyrant of Athens, Hippias.[365]

Persian royal inscriptions also provide no information that can serve as evidence of earlier participation of the Macedonians, in one form or another, in the administrative system of the empire. It is not clear whether the name of Skudra includes the Macedonians. As far as Yaunā takabarā (often identified

363 Ibid. v.20.4. In most codices is written Μακεδων (A B C P V U). For that issue see the discussion by Tripodi 2012: 45–61.

364 Balcer 1988: 1–6. For Herodotus' usage of ὕπαρχος see the analysis of Tripodi 2007: 74–85. See also Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 290n41; Xydopoulos 2012: 30n52.

365 Hdt. v.94.1.

with the Macedonians)[366] are concerned, they appear comparatively late in the Naqsh-i Rustam inscription and probably had nothing to do with the events from Megabazus' campaign.[367]

Persian Power over Thrace

Having conquered the Aegean coast and reached an agreement with Amyntas, Megabazus, leading the subjected Paeonians, transferred to Asia Minor and arrived in Sardis where the Great King was.[368] In Herodotus' view, before heading for Susa, Darius bestowed the title ὕπαρχος (in this case satrap) of Sardis upon his own brother Artaphrenes, and the title of Megabazus' deputy, a purely military title, στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν, upon Otanes.[369]

Darius' expedition in Scythia and Megabazus' in Thrace and Paeonia did not result in the conquest of large areas in Europe. The Greek cities situated on the coast between Byzantium and the mouth of the Strymon were under direct Persian control. The Persians also managed to keep part of the western Pontic coast between Byzantium and the cape of Thynias, or at most up to Apollonia, if it is accepted that Boryza was situated north of Thynias. Apart from these, the lands peopled by the Thracians lying between Strandja and Propontis and those belonging to the Edoni and the Paeonians spreading from the Strymon mouth up to the Rupel defile were also conquered. The status of Miltiades, who according to the conclusions made above remained in the Thracian Chersonese until 496, is unclear. Undoubtedly, his power was limited, for the peninsula was of strategic importance, connecting, together with the Bosporus, the European and Asian territorial possessions of Persia. This is the precise reason why it is not logical to claim that the Thracian Chersonese was left under foreign

366 See Rollinger 2006: 373n37 for the authors.

367 DNa 29 (Kent 1950: 137–138).

368 Hdt. v.23.1. Chapman 1972: 557–558 relates Megabazus' retreat to the revolt of Byzantium mentioned by Herodotus (v.26.1), and suppressed by Otanes. He assumes that the revolt was the reason why Megabazus did not succeeded in completely conquering the Paeonians and why Histiaeus was recalled from Myrcinus. Herodotus, however, does not hint at such a thing. To the contrary, he says that Megabazus, leading the captured Paeonians and encountering no difficulty, headed for the Hellespont from where he transferred to Asia Minor (Hdt. v.23.1). Megabazus' withdrawal and Histiaeus' as well were more probably due to the successful completion of the task they had been assigned.

369 Hdt. v.25.1, 26.1.

control.[370] What is more, this was the place Darius and Megabazus passed through on their way to Asia.[371]

The newly conquered territories were controlled by Persian garrisons in strategically important places. As far as that early period is concerned, Herodotus speaks only of a garrison in Doriscus.[372] Having in mind, however, the failure in Scythia, the resistance offered by the Paeonians, and the revolt of the Hellespontic cities, it seems illogical for all the territories conquered by Megabazus to have been under the control of that fortification alone. Further in his report Herodotus notes that together with the governor of Doriscus there were other ὕπαρχοι all over Thrace and Hellespont (ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ) appointed before Xerxes' campaign against Greece.[373] It is likely that, due to their strategic position, as early as 513/12 garrisons were put not only in Doriscus but also in Sestus and Eion, which in 480 were ruled by the Persian hyparchs Artayctes and Boges.[374] This may also be valid for Myrcinus, if it is accepted that Histiaeus built the fortifications by order of the Great King, as well as for Boryza, which according to Hecataeus was a πόλις Περσέων.[375] It has to be noted however that during the Athenian siege of Eion (476), Boges received help from the local Thracians,[376] which means that if at some time there had been a Persian garrison in Myrcinus, it no longer functioned in the year 476.

The establishment of Persian authority in Europe led also to tax payments from the local Greek cities and from the subjected Thracian and Paeonian tribes. Herodotus says that the Persians were paid tribute by their European

370 For a different opinion see Berve 1967: 1.82, according to whom the campaigns of Megabazus and Otanes did not upset Miltiades' authority over the Thracian Chersonese. The same opinion is held by Isaac 1986: 174–175; Asheri 1990: 157; Tzvetkova 2008: 162–163.

371 Hdt. IV.143.1; V.23.1 See also ibid. V.14.2 where the crossing of the Hellespont by Darius' envoy is noted.

372 Ibid. VII.59.1.

373 Ibid. VII.105.1–106.1.

374 Ibid. VII.33.1, 78.1, 107.1. After analysing Herodotus' report, Tuplin 1987a: 184, 235 questions the presence of a Persian garrison in Sestus even at the time when Artayctes was hyparch there.

375 Caspari 1910: 246 and n40; Fol 1972: 116; 1975: 19 and Izdimirski (forthcoming) hold opinions about the presence of a Persian garrison in Boryza. Kienast 1996: 307 supposes that Megabazus put a garrison in the Paeonian Sirrae. This supposition is criticized by Tuplin 2003: 400n25, who notes that Herodotus' report does not allow the assumption that there was a Persian garrison in Sirrae in 480, no matter whether it is one left there by Xerxes or a garrison residing there before the campaign against Greece.

376 Plut. *Cim.* 7.2.

territorial possessions.[377] The tax receipts from subjected lands, no matter their geographical location, was substantially important for the Persian Empire.[378] Tax payment as a necessary condition for subjected peoples is confirmed in the inscriptions of Behistun and Naqsh-i Rustam.[379] Kraay assumes that part of the tribute from Europe was paid in coinage.[380] To support this supposition, he notes the very large denominations of tribal coinage as an indication that the coins were not meant for the home market. On the other hand, Price thinks that statements of this kind lead to unnecessary simplification of the situation.[381] In his view, the flow of silver in the form of coins to the eastern Mediterranean is the result of commercial activity and, accordingly, has nothing to do with tribute paid to Persia. It should be noted that either hypothesis can be valid for the time between Megabazus' expedition and the start of Ionian Revolt, for part of the tribal coinage characteristic of the region between Axius and Pangaeum was produced at exactly that time.[382]

On condition that the tribute payment was obligatory, and that during that period of time there was no small number of unexhausted silver mines in the lands between Axius and Nestus, it is logical to assume that Europe paid its tribute in the form either of silver bars or coins. However, one should take into consideration the fact that according to Herodotus the tribes living by Pangaeum were subjected neither by Megabazus[383] nor Otanes.[384] This, however, does not mean that the Persians had no access to the silver of Pangaeum. The

377 Hdt. VII.108.1. See also III.96.1 where tributes received from Europe during the reign of Darius are also mentioned without saying whether they first happened in Megabazus' time.

378 Tuplin 1987: 137–158; Briant 2002: 67–70, 388–421.

379 DB I.19 (Kent 1950: 117–119; Schmitt 1991: 50); DNa 18–22 (Kent 1950: 137–138).

380 Kraay 1976: 139.

381 Price 1987: 43–44.

382 For the tribal coinage in the aforesaid region see Imhoof-Blumer 1883: 65–66, 78–82; Head 1887: 169–181; Gaebler 1897: 289–299; Babelon 1907: 1039–1078, 1095–1109, 1113–1126; Head 1911: 194–202; Mushmov 1912: 370–371, 376–379, 385–386, 392–393, 399, 436, 447; Svoronos 1919: 1–28, 36–59, 63–68, 75–90, 100–111; Gaebler 1935: 18–20, 48–50, 55–57, 63–72, 89–92, 144–146; Raymond 1953: 43–59; Zlatkovskaya 1967: 147–158; 1971: 179–189; Price 1974: 2–11; Price, Waggoner 1975: 28–35; Kraay 1976: 138–141, 148–149; Hammond 1979: 69–91; Fried 1987: 1–20; Kagan 1987: 21–28; Price 1987: 43–45; Youroukova 1992: 10–33; Draganov 2000: 27–62, 116–127; Lorber 2000: 113–134; Tacheva 2006: 37–45; Dahmen 2010: 43–47; Psoma, Zannis 2011: 30–38; Delev 2014: 89–95, 99–104, 190–196, 238–268, 282, 304, 306–308, 334–337, 387–392, 452–454.

383 Hdt. V.16.1.

384 Ibid. V.26.1–28.1.

only possible market for the tribes working in the mines were those subjected to the Great King's lands—at that time the whole of the coast from Byzantium to the Strymon, and the downstream of the Strymon as well. This inevitably led to a certain dependence, accompanied by definite yearly taxes.

Some scholars claim that the lands in Europe conquered by Darius and Megabazus formed a new, separate satrapy called Skudra.[385] This conclusion is based on the appearance of the Skudra in the Persian royal inscriptions,[386] as they are often identified with the Thracians, Paeonians, or Macedonians,[387] as well as on the presence of the toponym Σκύδρα/Scydra in Macedonia.[388] Apart from that, Skudra boys/servants first appeared in the Fortification texts about the year of 508/7, which shows that, at that time, their lands were already an inseparable part of the Persian empire. The year that is mentioned is *terminus ante quem* (i.e., here is a dating, separated by five years from the expeditions of Darius and Megabazus in Europe, that accordingly does not contradict the supposition that Skudra belongs to the European lands of the empire).

Some remarks can be made on the suggested hypothesis. For example, it should be noted that Herodotus mentions a polis called Κύδραρα, located in the lands of the Phrygians,[389] which also could relate to the name Skudra. If nothing else, this may mean that it is not impossible for the name Skudra to relate to the Thracians from both Europe and Asia Minor, or even to some Phrygians.[390]

---

385 Flathe 1832: 20; Glotz 1938: 18–19; Olmstead 1939: 308; 1948: 157–158; Wiesner 1963: 89; Kanatsoulis 1964: 92–94; Hammond 1980: 59; Szemerényi 1980: 26; Fine 1983: 268; Walser 1984: 34–35; Schrader 1989: IX.439n655; Dandamaev 1989: 151; Harmatta 1990: 128; Bengtson 1996: 141, 158; Jordanov 2003: 24–26; Scott 2005: 530; Cawkwell 2005: 58n22; Heckel 2008: 14.

386 DSe 29 (Kent 1950: 141–142); DSm 10 (Kent 1950: 145); DNa 29 (Kent 1950: 137–138).

387 See a summary of the various suppositions by Henkelman, Stolper 2009: 293–299.

388 Pliny *NH* IV.10.34; Ptolemy III.13.39 (Nobbe); St. Byz. s.v. Σκύδρα. See also Strabo (VII.7.9), who mentions the polis Κύδραι, belonging to the Brygi.

389 Hdt. VII.30.2.

390 Henkelman, Stolper 2009: 293–299. Finally, they reach the following conclusion: 'If *skudra-* derives from a local, northwest Anatolian toponym or ethnonym, "Skudrian" may be understood as a name that the Persians learned from or gave to people they first encountered in Bithynia or an adjacent region. Its use was subsequently expanded to groups that were (in Persian eyes) related, but lived across the Bosporus. This would imply that "Skudrian" could indeed include groups that Greeks would consider to be "Thracian," but also that both Phrygian and Scythian cultural influences have to be reckoned with, if not that groups actually considering themselves to be Phrygian or Scythian could be summarised under the label "Skudrian." In other words: "Skudrian" reflects a distinctively Persian outlook, just as "Thracian" is largely a Greek construct. Though there may be an overlap with

Even if it is accepted that the name Skudra refers only to European subjects of the Great King, it does not mean that the European lands formed a separate satrapy. In the early inscriptions from Behistun and Persepolis Skudra is absent. In the Persepolis Inscription the 'peoples across the sea' are present, and may refer to the European territorial possessions of Persia.[391] This again, however, does not necessarily refer to an already founded satrapy in Europe: in a linguistic study Cameron demostrates the possibility that it was not the administrative units but the subjected peoples that were enumerated in the Persian inscriptions.[392]

As far as the Greek sources are concerned, it can be seen from Herodotus' report that the lands in Europe conquered by Megabazus were not organized in an individual Persian satrapy. Indicative of this is the fact that Herodotus referred to Megabazus and his successor Otanes with the title of a military commander, στρατηγός, who probably had no administrative power. As Balcer rightly notes, at the time of his appointment Megabazus was a direct dependant upon Darius, who was then residing in Sardis, while Otanes submitted to the Great King's brother Artaphrenes, appointed by the king as satrap of the satrapy whose centre was Sardis.[393]

According to Hammond, Otanes' control spread only over the region of the straits and the Hellespont, while in Thrace another person played the role of commander-in-chief.[394] In this case, Hammond uses as a basis the position which, in Herodotus' view, Otanes occupied, στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν, as well as on the span of his military activity: Byzantium, Chalcedon, Antandrus, Lamponium, Lemnos, and Imbros. Hammond has no other option, for he accepts that the Persian territories in Europe formed one satrapy, whose borders spread from the Danube, in the north, to the Peneus River, in the south. According to his hypothesis, the centre of that satrapy was in the central Thracian plain, near the persent-day Plovdiv (Philippoupolis). Apart from that, he arrives at the conclusion that the Persians built roads in the central Thracian plain, as well as that during their rule over Europe, they favoured the Thracians and the Macedonians over the Greek city-states.[395]

---

what Greeks understood to be "Thracian," it would be unwise to translate *skudra-* as such. Retaining "Skudrian" preserves what is most precious in the royal inscriptions and the Fortification archive: a Persian perspective.'

391 DPe 14–15 (Kent 1950: 136).

392 Cameron 1973: 47–56.

393 Balcer 1988: 10–11. Hdt. v.25.1, 26.1.

394 Hammond 1980: 59.

395 Fol, Hammond 1988: 247–249.

Considering the conclusions arrived at in the present study, Hammond's hypothesis about the territorial expansion of the Persian possessions in Europe can be rightly rejected. It appears that Otanes was appointed *strategos* of all the Persian territorial possessions in Europe as well as of those in Asia Minor, which were in control of the satrap of Sardis. As far as his power in Europe is concerned, his title στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν corresponds to the lands conquered by Megabazus, τὰ παραθαλάσσια.[396] The span of his military activity in the vicinity of the Hellespont and part of the Aegean islands cannot serve as evidence for the limits of his territorial rights, for military actions are carried out only where necessary.

The conclusion that the lands north of Strandja and those along the middle course of the Hebrus remained out of Persian control inevitably raises questions about the policy of Darius and his successor Xerxes towards the tribes who peopled these lands. It is reasonable to assume that as to these tribes Persians pursued mostly (or only?) a diplomatic policy. To a certain extent, this supposition can be confirmed by the archaeological finds near Daskal Atanasovo (south-east of Stara Zagora) and Duvanli (north of Plovdiv and south of Hisar). The dating of the golden phialai from Daskal Atanasovo is debatable: in the first half of the sixth century, at the end of the sixth century, or even in the fifth century.[397] These phialai are accepted as evidence for early diplomatic contacts between the Persians and the local Thracians.[398] If this is the case, then these contacts can be referred to Darius' retreat from Scythia, or the years following this event, with the intention of preventing Scythian raids in the future, or possible problems that could be caused by the Getae or even by some of the smaller tribes, such as the Skyrmiadai and Nipsaei, which possibly remained out of the control of the Great King after his campaign against the Scythians.

As to the archaeological finds from Kukuva Mogila (Duvanli), the silver amphora excavated there is usually dated from the first quarter of the fifth century.[399] This amphora is defined as 'one of the finest examples of the "Achaemenid Court Style" toreutics,'[400] and accepted as proof (just as the abovementioned phialai) of diplomatic contacts between Persians and the local royal

396 Hdt. v.10.1.

397 See the discission by Nikolov 1961: 367–368; Archibald 1998: 177, 318; Stoichev 2008: 124–132; 2009: 21–24.

398 Tacheva 2006: 25; Gergova 2010: 70.

399 Filow 1934: 46–51, 199–206, 229–230; Venedikov, Gerasimov 1973: 85.

400 Archibald 1998: 85. According to Filow 1934: 204 the amphora (except for its handles) has a purely Greek character. He concludes that the amphora descended from the Ionian cities in Asia Minor.

house, either Bessian,[401] or Odrysian.[402] Taking into account the suggested date of the amphora, these contacts should be referred to the time after the restoration of Persian authority accomplished by Megabazus' campaign (492). It is probable that a major reason for Persian attempts to establish friendly relations with the Thracian royal house near Duvanli was the Scythian raid of 496. The problem is that Duvanli is situated far from the supposed route (east of Tundzha River) followed by the Scythian army on its way as far as the Thracian Cherosenese. This means that either the royal house in question exercised control over the lands almost to the Pontic coast, or that the contacts between these Thracians and the Persians had nothing to do with preventing future Scythian raids against Persian possessions in Eupore.

The hypothesis about diplomatic relations between Persians and independent Thracians has value. Taking into account the ongoing political situation (in 513 and 492), it seems reasonable that the initiative came from the Persian side. The lack of literary sources and very scarce archaeological finds must leave open the question about the aims of Persian diplomatic activity, the character of the relations between the Persians and these Thracians, and the power of the anonymous royal house near Duvanli.[403]

401 Venedikov, Gerasimov 1973: 66, 85–86; Petkov 2012: 62.

402 Tacheva 2006: 24–25; Gergova 2010: 69–70.

403 Contra Tacheva 2006: 24–25; Gergova 2010: 69–70.

CHAPTER 2

The Policy of Darius towards Thrace and Macedonia (499/8–492/1)

The Ionian Revolt and the Collapse of Persian Power in Europe

The ancient authors say nothing about Persian territorial possessions in Thrace during the decade preceding the Ionian Revolt. There is no information about either any new conquests or other revolts in the lands subjected by Megabazus. The lack of such information does not necessarily mean that the Persians encountered no difficulty in ruling over the newly annexed territories, yet it is an indication that the situation was relatively peaceful. In 498, the Ionians sailed for the Hellespont intending to separate Byzantium and the other cities situated there from Persian authority,[1] an act which shows that at that time, at least, the region east of the Hebrus was under Persian control. There are no reasons why this particular conclusion should not be valid for the lands conquered by Megabazus west of the Hebrus River as well. It appears that until the Ionian Revolt, the territories belonging to the Great King remained intact. This means that in the last decade of the sixth century the tax incomes from Europe continued to reach the Persian treasury, as well as that the Persian garrisons, no matter their number and placement, went on functioning in European land. The Persian military presence in Thrace during the period probably earned the necessary respect of the Macedonian ruler Amyntas, who remained Darius' loyal vassal.

Relations between Macedonia and Persia during the Ionian Revolt

Information about the policy Amyntas and Alexander carried out towards Persia during the Ionian Revolt is scarce. The only data is indirect, but it allows one to reach certain conclusions on the issue considered. Again, Herodotus is the main source. His statement that the Macedonians were enslaved (ἐδεδούλωτο) twice by the Persians—first by Megabazus and then by Mardonius—shows that at some time between these two expeditions, Darius lost his control over

1 Hdt. v.103.1–2—"Ἰωνες δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων συμμαχίης στερηθέντες, οὕτω γάρ σφι ὑπῆρχε πεποιημένα ἐς Δαρεῖον, οὐδὲν δὴ ἧσσον τὸν πρὸς βασιλέα πόλεμον ἐσκευάζοντο. πλώσαντες δὲ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον Βυζάντιόν τε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλις πάσας τὰς ταύτῃ ὑπ' ἑωυτοῖσι ἐποιήσαντο …

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_004

Macedonia.[2] It is logical that this loss should be connected to the time of the Ionian Revolt, when, as will be discussed later, the Persians were driven away from their European territorial possessions.

Accepting this reconstruction of events raises some difficult questions: Did Amyntas or Alexander dare to reject the vassal status of Macedonia? And what was the reason for this act? The fact that after Mardonius' campaign Alexander was allowed to rule may mean that it was not he, but his father Amyntas who had been responsible for breaking off relations with the Persians. For Amyntas, however, such an act would have been pointless, since his vassal status under the Great King secured his rule over Macedonia. Furthermore, no Persian garrisons were stationed in his lands and it appears that he was allowed to pursue a relatively independent policy—or at least his offer of Anthemus to Hippias leaves this impression.[3] These same considerations are valid for the early years of his son Alexander's rule.

Taking into account the fact that Amyntas would have realized no benefit in rejecting his vassal status before Darius, Heinrichs and Müller assume that he was forced to do so under pressure from Macedonian noblemen, who were not interested in strengthening his power.[4] Thus, the authors conclude that when Mardonius reached Macedonia (492) there was no problem for Alexander in exculpating the actions of his predecessor. This supposition gives a satisfactory explanation of why Darius allowed Alexander to continue his rule over Macedonia. Another version of the events is also possible: during the Ionian Revolt Persia lost control over its territorial possessions in Thrace which resulted in the termination of the relationship with Macedonia. Later, Mardonius restored the status quo in Thrace and progressed with his army towards Macedonia, whose ruler Alexander, as his father Amyntas had done twenty years earlier, voluntarily submitted to the Great King. In this reconstruction of events, it is not necessary to accept that either Amyntas or Alexander rejected his vassal status and carried out visible anti-Persian policy, but simply that, due to the circumstances (the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt and the elimination of the Persian garrisons in Thrace), Macedonia temporarily disengaged from the Persian sphere of influence with all the consequences that followed, namely its second subjugation, which in accordance with Darius' new policy was realized

2 Hdt. VII.108.1. Welzhofer 1891: 149; Macan 1895: II.60; Kazarow: 1922: 45; Geyer 1928: 702; 1930: 43; Glotz 1938: 32; Junge 1944: 188n15; Kanatsoulis 1964: 93; Pajakowski 1983: 248–249, 254; Dandamaev 1989: 170; Zahrnt 1992: 250–251; Badian 1994: 116; Heinrichs, Müller 2003: 290; Müller 2011: 111; Zahrnt 2011: 763n6, 765–766; Vasilev 2011: 100; Hornblower 2013: 109.

3 Hdt. V.94.1.

4 Heinrichs, Müller 2003: 290n43; Müller 2011: 111.

not through a diplomatic mission, but through penetration of the Persian army into its territory.

The second author who offers indirect information is Syncellus. He claims that Alexander gave the Persians 'earth and water'—οὗτος δέδωκε τοῖς Πέρσαις ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν.[5] If it is accepted that this piece of information is not corrupted, then it should relate to Mardonius' expedition and, accordingly, to the second Persian conquest of Macedonia that Herodotus speaks about. Syncellus is a late author, the only one who ascribes this particular act to Alexander, and does so without citing his source.[6] This inevitably raises doubts about his statement. It is more likely that he wrongly ascribes Amyntas' grant of 'earth and water' to his son Alexander; this makes no difference as far as the conclusions made on the repeated conquest of Macedonia are concerned.[7]

The third and final author whose report concerns the problems is Justin. He claims that after Bubares had left Macedonia, Amyntas died. Then he adds that, due to his kinship with Bubares, his successor Alexander enjoyed friendly relations not only with Darius but with Xerxes as well, and that during the time of his campaign against Greece Xerxes made the Macedonian ruler a present of the area between Olympus and Haemus.[8] Basing his arguments on Justin, Hammond reaches the conclusion that during the Ionian Revolt the Persians did not lose control over the Macedonians, nor over their territorial possessions in Thrace.[9] Thus he disregards the information Herodotus gives about the repeated conquest of the Macedonians, and as to the early history of Macedonia, he prefers to follow an unreliable source, as Justin. As has already been

5 Syncellus I. p. 247 B, 262 D (Dindorf).

6 It is claimed in Speus. *Letter to Philip* 3 that the envoys Xerxes had sent to ask for 'earth and water' were killed by the Macedonian ruler Alexander. It is obvious that the report is even far more unreliable than the information Syncellus gives and can hardly confirm it. It is unreasonable to assume that Alexander could allow himself to perform such an act on the eve of the expedition against Greece. What is more, as it can be seen from Herodotus' report, during the campaign Xerxes had no hostile attitude towards Alexander. See the discussion in Natoli's report 2004: 80–82.

7 For a different opinion see Errington 1981: 141, who relies on Syncellus.

8 Just. VII.4.1—Post discessum a Macedonia Bubaris, Amyntas rex decedit, cuius filio et successori Alexandro cognatio Bubaris non Darii tantum temporibus pacem praestitit, uerum etiam Xerxen adeo conciliauit, ut, cum Graeciam, ueluti tempestas quaedam, occupasset, inter Olympum Haemumque montes totius regionis eum imperio donauerit.

9 Hammond 1979: 60, 99; 1989: 43. Borza 1992: 103 also argues for friendly relations between Macedonians and Persians at the time of the Ionian Revolt. Considering his belief that Amyntas did not submit to Megabazus but simply signed an agreement, it is logical for him to a make this conclusion.

noted in the present study, as far as the story of the murder of the Persian envoys and the marriage between Gygaea and Bubares is concerned, this author is absolutely dependent on Herodotus.[10] He has also added a romantic element, claiming that the Persian nobleman gave up his military activity after he fell in love with the daughter of the Macedonian ruler. His argument that Alexander's friendly relations with both Darius and Xerxes were actually due to the love marriage contract, may mean that he had no alternative source to Herodotus, and independently arrives at this conclusion.

The Return of the Paeonians

In Herodotus' view, at the start of the Ionian Revolt and before open conflict with the Persians, the leader of the rebels, Aristagoras of Miletus, sent an envoy to those Paeonians that Megabazus had settled in Phrygia offering passage to the Thracian coast by sea and from there to return home.[11] Embracing the offer, most Paeonians headed rapidly for the sea and managed to reach the island of Chios. The Persians did not react quick enough and the cavalry sent after the running Paeonians could not catch them. The Persians could do nothing but send word to Chios hoping to persuade the Paeonians to come back. The Paeonians refused and with the help of the Chians transferred over to Lesbos; helped by the Lesbians, they reached Doriscus, from where they walked their way home to Paeonia.

Herodotus' story of the return of the Paeonians poses some interesting questions about the reasons for Aristagoras' decision, as well as the stability of Persian power in Europe at that time. According to Herodotus, with the return of the Paeonians to their homes Aristagoras only aimed at doing harm to Darius, and the action itself was of no practical use to him. Scholars view the problem differently. Georges thinks that Aristagoras' intention was to oppose to the hostile Edoni the friendly Paeonians, and thus to provide an influx of white metals necessary for the war from the region of Strymon.[12] There is no doubt that the influx of white metals was of vital importance. However, if the conclusions made in the present study are taken into account, in particular those according to which at the start of the Ionian Revolt the Persian garrisons spread from Pontus to Strymon continued functioning, then the deportation of the Paeonians must be related not to their opposing the Edoni, who were under Persian authority, but rather to an attempt to engage the Persian army in

10 Hdt. v.18.1–21.2; Just. VII.3.2–9.

11 Hdt. v.98.1–4.

12 Georges 2000: 26.

Europe.[13] This is a well considered move, for the Paeonians from Strymon were the only ones who attempted to offer Megabazus resistance, and it is logical to expect that they were ready to oppose the Persians once more with the hope that they could go home. Under favourable circumstances this act might lead to an economic benefit for Miletus, but the fact that it was performed at the very beginning of the revolt (499/8),[14] when no battle had yet taken place, suggests that its purpose at the time was political rather than economic. The disembarkation at Doriscus, and not in a place safer for the escapees, was hardly accidental. It appears that Aristagoras and his allies were trying to provoke conflict between the Paeonians and the local garrison, an intention which failed to satisfy their expectations

The second problem Herodotus' story raises relates to the stability of Persian power in Europe. The fact that the Paeonians landed on the Aegean coast at Doriscus and afterwards succeeded in reaching Paeonia is interpreted differently by scholars. Hammond entertains the opinion that the event is not a sign of the weakness of Persian power in Thrace, but 'shows the spirit of the Paeonians,' who remained unnoticed by the garrison in Doriscus and thus managed to return home.[15] Judging from his supposition about the insignificant number of the deported Paeonians, the conclusion he reaches appears logical. However, if they were greater in number, then it is impossible for their disembarkation at Doriscus to have passed unnoticed. The Persians, even if they were late in hearing about the disembarkation, would have encountered no difficulty in catching up with the Paeonians traveling with their children and wives, and make them fight.

The lack of resistance on the side of the Persians is considered by some scholars a sure sign that at that time the Persian garrisons had already been withdrawn from Europe, or that Persian control had become so weak that they were unable to offer the necessary resistance.[16] There are other suppositions as well. Georges, for instance, concludes that the Paeonians had successfully attacked the garrison in Doriscus, which helped them clear their way home.[17] How and Wells approach the problem in an entirely different way. They think that it is hardly likely for the Paeonians to have been left on the Aegean coast

13 Lang 1968: 31 holds the opinion that Aristagoras' purpose was to consolidate the anti-Persian elements in Thrace and to open a second front to increase the chances of the rebels' ultimate success.

14 Macan 1895: II.66–67 dates the return of the Paeonians back in the early spring of 498.

15 Hammond 1980: 59–60.

16 Macan 1895: II.60–61; Castritius 1972: 10; Badian 1994: 116.

17 Georges 2000: 27.

at Doriscus, for Herodotus describes it as a strong fortress, situated far from the Strymon.[18] Isaac, for his part, assumes that the Paeonians landed on the Aegean coast, west of the Hebrus, in the plain by Doriscus,[19] and not at the fortress itself, which helped avoid direct conflict with the Persian garrison.[20]

Herodotus' story does not support Georges' supposition about defeating the Persian garrison. Any conflict between Persians and Paeonians just before the rebels undertook their own acts would have made a strong impression on their contemporaries, and the memory of the event would not have faded in Herodotus' time. Herodotus is familiar with the story of the Paeonian movement from Asia Minor to Doriscus, with the time of their return, with Aristagoras' initiative, with the help they received from the Chians and the Lesbians, with the way the Persians reacted as well as with the precise place of their disembarkation. The fact that he mentions nothing about a fight between Persians and Paeonians, which undoubtedly would be the climax of his story, probably means that the Paeonians succeeded in returning home without facing any difficulty.

How and Wells' observation about the remoteness of Doriscus from Strymon is well grounded but, if Herodotus is strictly followed, then the Paeonian disembarkation should be placed somewhere either in the plain of Doriscus or at the fortress with the same name. Isaac's supposition about disembarkation in the plain to avoid direct conflict with the fortress garrison does not appear convincing either. As has already been noted, the Paeonians moved on together with their wives and children, and if the Persians had been willing to catch up with them, they could have easily done so after gaining information about their arrival.

Herodotus' story about the return of the Paeonians is an indication of weakened Persian power in Thrace. It is hardly likely that Persian garrisons had already retreated from Thrace, for at that moment the Ionian Revolt was at its very start and no fights with the Persians had yet taken place. At that time, the Ionians were mainly carrying out diplomatic activity, trying to win Athens and Sparta to their cause.[21] The expulsion of the tyrants from Ionian cities,[22] an act performed before the return of the Paeonians, seems hardly important enough for the garrisons to be withdrawn from Europe. Such a retreat would lead to a loss of Persian control over these lands, which is unacceptable from a strategic

18 How, Wells 1928: ad v.98.

19 Hdt. VII.59.1.

20 Isaac 1986: 138n77.

21 Hdt. v.38.2, 55.1.

22 Ibid. v.37.2–38.1.

point of view, bearing in mind that there was no direct military pressure on the part of the Ionians. And last but not least, the Persians even at that moment possessed considerable military resources in Asia Minor, which is proved by the numerous cavalry sent after the Paeonians; because of this it was hardly necessary for the European garrisons to withdraw immediately.

From what has been said so far, it can be concluded that at the time of the return of the Paeonians, the Persian garrisons, whatever their actual number was, continued functioning in the European territories of the empire; but it appears that they were not strong enough to offer the necessary resistance. There is one more possibility, according to which the Persians, perceiving the disembarkation of the Paeonians after it had become a fact, unwilling to complicate the situation further, and realizing the weakness of their European garrisons, decided to let the Paeonians return home. Such a reconstruction of events can provide a satisfactory explanation of the seemingly peculiar fact that the Paeonians, despite their flight from Phrygia and their refusal to return after they had been officially ordered, remained unpunished after the Ionian Revolt had been suppressed. Herodotus is well informed about the Paeonians from the Strymon region and the problems they caused the Persians, in particular[23] the resistance they offered Megabazus, their violent deportation to Asia and return to Paeonia, but mentions nothing about their being subjected to subsequent repressions. It is logical to expect that if the Paeonians had been punished by Mardonius, Herodotus would have been acquainted with the story and would narrate it to his readers. An eventual punishment would be too dramatic an end to ignore. After all, whether with the official permission of the local Persian governor or with his tacit agreement, the Paeonians managed to return home freely.

Aristagoras in Thrace

The next reports about the situation in Thrace at the time of the Ionian Revolt again refer to Aristagoras of Miletus. In Herodotus' view, Aristagoras decided to escape from Miletus, for he was afraid of the Persian counterattack and did not trust in final victory over the Persians. For that purpose, he summoned his fellows and offered to take them to Sardo or to Myrcinus in the land of the Edoni to settle. The logographer Hecataeus entertained a different opinion—Aristagoras sought to fortify the island of Leros, from where, under favourable circumstances, he could eventually return to Miletus. Aristagoras, however,

23 Ibid. v.14.1–15.3; 23.1; 98.1–4. See also v.1.1–3, and viii.115.3–4 as well, which probably concerns the same Paeonians.

having taken all volunteers with him, sailed for Thrace and succeeded in getting hold of Myrcinus. But in Thrace, at the siege of a Thracian polis whose citizens were ready to sign a truce and leave it, he met his death.[24]

Herodotus' story is confirmed by Thucydides and Diodorus, who make some important specifications.[25] Thucydides says that Aristagoras tried to settle in the place of the future Amphipolis thirty-two years earlier than the attempt of the Athenians to do the same, and a further twenty-nine years earlier than the actual foundation of the polis by Hagnon, but was defeated by the Edoni. Diodorus, most probably on the basis of Thucydides, also speaks about Aristagoras' attempt to establish a colony and his defeat by the Edoni, but adds as well that after his death the colonists were pushed away by the same Edoni.

Thanks to the chronology provided by Thucydides and following Herodotus' succession of events, Aristagoras' retreat from Miletus can be rightly dated to the archon year of 497/6.[26] Whether he left Miletus for the reasons given by Herodotus or he was compelled to draw back either because of his waning popularity or because of Histiaeus' appearance, as some scholars think,[27] is a question of no great significance for the present study. What is more important is why Aristagoras choose none other than Myrcinus to retreat to. Evans holds the opinion that, since it was founded by Histiaeus, Myrcinus had been Miletus' possession and for this reason Aristagoras chose to set off in that direction.[28] Considering the conclusions made above that Histiaeus' enterprise in the vicinity of Myrcinus was not his own and was actually conducted by order of the Great King, and fully served Persian interests in the region, then his supposition can be disregarded.

None of the three ancient authors describing Aristagoras' actions mentions any battles between the colonists he led and the Persians. What is more, if the results of the action in the Hellespont by Aristagoras himself (498), as well as the Scythian invasion into the Thracian Chersonese (496), which will be further discussed below, are taken into account, then it can be assumed that at that time the Persians had already been expelled from Europe. In the present study

24 Ibid. V.124.1–126.2.

25 Thuc. IV.102.2–3; Diod. XII.68.1–2.

26 Macan 1895: II.69 dates Aristagoras' retreat from the winter of 497, i.e. at the very end of the year. Badian 2007: 42 places the event in question in the first half of 497, having the idea to relate Aristagoras' departure to Histiaeus' arrival, which he dates no later than the middle of the same year. If the dating suggested by Badian is accepted, then Aristagoras' sailing for Thrace would have been in the archon year of 498/7.

27 Evans 1963: 122–123; Georges 2000: 30–31; Badian 2007: 42.

28 Evans 1963: 117, 122.

the possibility has already been accepted that there was a Persian garrison in Eion as early as 513/12, with the idea that it is illogical for the lands subjected to the Great King from Byzantium to the Strymon to have been controlled by Doriscus alone. If this supposition is true, then the lack of Persian military units in the region of the lower Strymon at the time of Aristagoras' enterprise may be related to the spread of the Ionian Revolt towards the Hellespont[29] (i.e., the Persians themselves decided to withdraw their garrisons with the intention of strengthening their positions in the strategically important Straits). That reconstruction of events is better than imagining a possible conflict between the Persians and the local Thracians, or the Paeonians returning from Asia, given the lack of information about later Persian punitive measures against them.

If in fact during this period the Persians had been banished from Europe, then Aristagoras' retreat to Myrcinus can be defined as an attempt to establish his power in a place far from the front-line. In this situation, Myrcinus was an excellent choice both because of its strategic location as well as the available material wealth nearby, advantages Aristagoras was well aware of, being Histiaeus' son-in-law.

Despite the lack of Persian garrisons, Aristagoras' task was not easy due to the hostility of the local Thracians. It appears that he set off for Thrace with a considerable number of people, as he was able not only to settle in Myrcinus, but also to undertake an attack against the Thracians with the intention to colonize the place where eventually the Athenians would found Amphipolis. From Herodotus' story it becomes clear that Aristagoras succeeded in taking possession of Myrcinus—ἔσχε τὴν χώρην ἐπ' ἣν ἐστάλη.[30] Then he says that Aristagoras was killed at the siege of a fortified city (πόλιν περικατήμενος), whose Thracian citizens were willing to sign a truce and leave. Thucydides and Diodorus specify that the polis where Aristagoras met his death was in possession of the Edoni and was the place at which Athenians later founded Amphipolis.[31] Diodorus adds that after his death, the colonists were pushed away by the Edoni. Thus, until Mardonius' arrival they had fully become masters of the region.

Aristagoras' adventure did not last for more than a year. Thucydides dates the defeat of the Milesian colonists back to the archon year 497/6, and the succession of events given by Herodotus does not allow their sailing to be dated

29 Hdt. v.103.2.

30 Ibid. v.126.1.

31 As How, Wells 1928: ad v.126 rightly note, the fact that Herodotus does not mention Amphipolis means that the story of Aristagoras' death was written earlier than 437, when the Athenians founded a colony there.

earlier than the first half of 497. In that short period of time, despite the lack of Persian garrisons and despite his initial success, Aristagoras did not succeed in establishing his authority in the region of lower Strymon, due to his murder just before the surrender of the Thracians.

The Activities of Miltiades during the Ionian Revolt

Just as in the case of Persian territorial possessions in the region of the lower Strymon at the time of the Ionian Revolt, information about the lands lying east of the river Hebrus is also scarce. In Herodotus' view, after the burning of Sardis and despite the withdrawal of the Athenians from the war, the Ionians decided to enlarge the front of their military actions.[32] For that purpose, probably either in the summer or the autumn of 498,[33] they sailed for the Hellespont, where they managed to separate Byzantium and all the cities situated there from the Persian authority—Βυζάντιόν τε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλις πάσας.[34]

The expulsion of the Persians from Europe provided Miltiades, tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, with the chance to carry out independent policy again. Undoubtedly, the policy he followed at the time of the Ionian Revolt was of an anti-Persian character, which is proved by his fear of the Phoenician navy and his subsequent escape from the Chersonese.[35] It is known from the ancient authors' reports that some time before he escaped from the Phoenicians (494/3), Miltiades had managed to conquer the island of Lemnos and give it to the Athenians. Herodotus does not make clear when exactly Miltiades conquered Lemnos, but notes that at that time the island was peopled by Pelasgians.[36] In contrast to Herodotus, Cornelius Nepos claims that before it was conquered by Miltiades, Lemnos had been occupied by Carians and that the tyrant of the Chersonese managed to impose his authority there at the time (*eisdem temporibus*) of Darius' campaign against the Scythians.[37] Zenobius, like Herodotus, speaks about Pelasgians but dates the conquest of Lemnos to the time of Darius' activity in Thrace.[38] Diodorus, for his part, claims that the Tyrrhenians, because of their fear of the Persians, abandoned Lemnos and gave it to Miltiades as a present.[39] On the basis of the available sources, scholars hold

32 Hdt. v.99.1–103.1.

33 Macan 1895: II.69 dates the Ionian campaign in the Hellespont from the autumn of 498.

34 Hdt. v.103.2.

35 Ibid. vi.41.1.

36 Ibid. vi.137.1–140.2.

37 Nepos *Miltiades*. 1.4–3.1.

38 Zenobius iii.85.

39 Diod. x.19.6.

different opinions on the date of the conquest of Lemnos by Miltiades. Some place the event in the time before the Scythian campaign,[40] others before the Ionian Revolt, but after the death of the Persian protégé Lycaretus,[41] and a third group refers it to the Ionian Revolt itself.[42]

What makes an impression from the ancient authors' reports is that at the time Miltiades conquered Lemnos it had no Persian garrison or governor appointed by them to defend Persian interests. This fact means that Miltiades' actions should be dated either before the start of the Scythian campaign or after the burst of the Ionian Revolt. In the time between the two events, the Thracian Chersonese was under Persian control and, accordingly, its tyrant Miltiades was unable to develop independent policy, which no doubt was necessary for the conquest of the island and, moreover, its transfer to the Athenians. In this situation, Berve's hypothesis about the short-term reign of the Persian protégé Lycaretus and the liberation of the Pelasgians from Persian rule after his death as well as Miltiades' subsequent arrival (510–506) will turn out to be unconvincing. As an additional argument against such a reconstruction of events it may be noted that the death of a Persian governor does not necessarily mean the end of the Persian rule (i.e., if one accepts that Lycaretus died soon after he had been given the position by Otanes, then, having in mind the unlimited access of the Persians to the island at that time, he could easily have been replaced by another governor loyal to the Persians). Apart from that, it appears illogical for the Persians to have given up voluntarily the control they had over that strategically important island, since there is no suggestion of a Pelasgian riot.

---

40 Larcher 1824: 11nG; Hammond 1956: 126–127. Meyer 1892: 16 thinks that the occupation of Lemnos should be related to the time of the Pisistratidae and he even assumes that it could have been an act performed by Miltiades son of Cypselus.

41 Berve 1967: I.82–83, II.568; Castritius 1972: 10; Tzvetkova 2008: 150–151. See also Herbst 1890: 146–147, who dates the conquest of Lemnos before the Ionian Revolt (a little after 507) but does not state it clearly whether, at that time, he considers Lycaretus still alive. Schrader 1989: VIII.35n60—'Lo que sí parece seguro es que Milcíades II (el 'Maratonomaco'), en su calidad de tirano del Quersoneso, vasallo de los persas, incluyó la isla entre sus dominios (cf. VI.140), en una fecha indeterminada de los años 510–500, cediéndola a los atenienses entre 496–493, sin duda para tratar de involucrar a Atenas en la sublevación jonia.'

42 Grote 1853: IV.274n2, 279; Stein III: ad VI.140; Rawlinson 1860: III.91n5; Cox 1876: 77; Duncker 1882: 65n2; Busolt 1888: 19–20; Abbott 1892: 71; 1893: ad V.26, VI.140; Macan 1895: II.61; Bury 1900: 247; Shuckburgh 1908: 195; How, wells 1928: ad VI.137; Glotz 1938: 26; Wade-Gery 1951: 217; Graham 1964: 175n3; Meiggs 1973: 424; Fine 1983: 274–275, 280; Burn 1984: 208–209, 218–219; Isaac 1986: 175; Lewis 1988: 298; Badian 1994: 124; Georges 2000: 38; Mitrev 2012: 68.

Yet, when exactly did Miltiades succeed in conquering Lemnos: before the Scythian campaign or at the time of the Ionian Revolt? If Cornelius Nepos is followed, this act must have taken place just before the Scythian campaign. The chronology, however, given by Nepos in Miltiades' biography can be questioned, since immediately after he speaks about the subjection of Lemnos, he adds—*pari felicitate ceteras insulas, quae Cyclades nominantur, sub Atheniensium redegit potestatem* and then continues with his statement that at the same time Darius crossed over from Asia to Europe.[43] It is true that, a bit later in the text, he makes it clear that the campaign against the Cyclades, and to be more precise against Paros, was realized after the Battle of Marathon,[44] which coincides with Herodotus' chronology,[45] but the point is that Nepos does not make a similar specification of the conquest of Lemnos and thus leaves the problem unsolved. What is more, Nepos often makes rudimentary mistakes as far as Miltiades' biography is concerned; he ascribes him activity that was carried out by his uncle Miltiades, son of Cypselus, and claims that when he stood the trial over the failure of the campaign against Paros he was defended by his brother Stesagoras, who had actually died more than twenty years before.

Nor can Zenobius' late report serve as evidence, since he does not place the conquest of Lemnos before the Scythian campaign, and seems to refer it to Darius' actions in Thrace (i.e., either parallel to the Scythian expedition, or during Megabazus' campaign or even after these events[46]), which, considering the abovementioned arguments, is hardly possible.

In this situation, Herodotus' story is the key to the problem. He is the only author who, though only briefly, describes the conquest of Lemnos by Otanes.[47] In Herodotus' description of the event, there is no information about the presence of Athenians on the island. If Lemnos had really been under their control before Otanes' action, then their eventual conflict with him would have been the first between Athenians and Persians, and, of course, is unlikely to have passed unnoticed by the ancient authors. Instead, Herodotus mentions that the Persians took the island from the local Pelasgians. Therefore, it can be logically concluded that Miltiades' conquest of Lemnos took place at the time of the Ionian Revolt. Undoubtedly, this act was performed after the expulsion of

43 Nepos *Miltiades*. 2.5–3.1.

44 Ibid. 7.1–2.

45 Hdt. VI.132.1–133.1.

46 Zenobius III.85—Ὕστερον δὲ Δαρείου τοῦ Πέρσου περὶ Θράκην ὄντος καὶ πάντα χειρουμένου τὰ πέριξ Μιλτιάδης Ἀθηναῖος ἐκ τῆς Χερρόνήσου ἀφεὶς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος καταλαμβάνει τὴν Λῆμνον …

47 Hdt. V.26.1–27.2.

the Persians from the Hellespont (i.e., after the summer of 498), when Miltiades regained the position he had occupied before the Scythian expedition. In 496, driven by the Scythians, he was forced to leave the Chersonese, which may mean that the conquest of Lemnos was realized some time after his return (i.e., during the period between 496–494), or to the contrary, before his escape from the Scythians (i.e., in the spring or summer of 497, on condition that the Scythian attack is dated from the first half of 496). There is a third possibility, according to which the enterprise would have taken place at the time of the Scythian invasion itself, which may give a satisfactory explanation as to where Miltiades was living after his escape from the Chersonese.

The situation on Lemnos before Miltiades' arrival is not easy to reconstruct. From Herodotus' expression (v.27.2)—οὗτος ὁ Λυκάρητος ἄρχων ἐν Λήμνῳ τελευτᾷ, it can be concluded that Lycaretus died while governor of the island. He mentions nothing about either a violent death or about any successor given his position by the Persians. Diodorus claims that, because of his fear of the Persians, the king of the Pelasgians Hermon presented Miltiades with Lemnos. Zenobius says almost the same; in his view Hermon, frightened by Darius, gave the island to the Athenians as a gift. Taking the analysis above as well as the available evidence into account, it can be assumed that the Persian protégé Lycaretus died at a moment when the Persians were unable to send a deputy to replace him (i.e., at the time of the Ionian Revolt). It is difficult to say whether he was dethroned by the Pelasgians or they merely took advantage of his death to reject Persian authority. Late authors claim that Hermon and the Pelasgians voluntarily gave the island to Miltiades and the Athenians because of their fear of the Persians and in particular of Darius. This is an indication of anti-Persian actions, with possible reference either to the murder of Lycaretus or to the destruction of a local Persian garrison. On the other hand, information about a Persian garrison on Lemnos as well as about Lycaretus' violent death is lacking. In this situation, it is possible for 'Hermon's gift' (Ἑρμώνειος χάρις) to have nothing to do with his fear of Darius, but to have become a fact under the pressure of Miltiades and Athenians. This is how Herodotus describes the subjection of Lemnos.

Thus, it can be concluded that, after Lycaretus' death, due to the difficult position the Persians were in, the Pelasgians occupying Lemnos rejected Persian authority and probably chose as their king Hermon, a person not mentioned by Herodotus. At that time Miltiades was already independent and, taking advantage of the lack of Persian control over the island and expecting no serious resistance from the Pelasgians, he decided to subject it. In comparison with other ancient authors, Herodotus claims that the ones who willingly submitted to Miltiades and left the island were the citizens of Hephaestia, while

those who lived in Myrina refused. Their refusal seems to have placed Miltiades in a difficult situation, for according to Herodotus the polis was under the siege of the Athenians and its citizens surrendered as a result. Due probably to his inability to cope with the situation on his own, he was compelled to call the Athenians, which action, when he eventually stood trial, was described in his defense as a great contribution to Athens.

The participation of the Athenians in the conquest of Lemnos does not contradict Herodotus' statement that after the burning of Sardis they abandoned the Ionians,[48] since in this case they looked only after their own interests. According to the story narrated by Herodotus, the Athenians had had an appetite for that island for many years before Miltiades carried out the campaign.[49] Even if it is accepted that this story is a late fabrication aimed at justifying their conquest of the island, the Athenian interest in the island should be related to Miltiades, son of Cypselos, settling in the Thracian Chersonese, given that Lemnos was on the way to the peninsula.[50] In this situation the fact that a possession that once belonged to the Great King was attacked is hardly of great importance, considering that the Athenians, despite being Darius' vassals,[51] took part in the burning of Sardis and were actually in a state of war with the Persians.[52] Regretfully, Herodotus and other ancient authors do not say what happened to Lemnos immediately after the Ionian Revolt. It is logical to expect that, if just a couple of years earlier the island had been subject to the Persians, they would have tried to regain their control over it, all the more so since at that time it was in the hands of their Athenian enemies. The fact that at the Battle of Artemisium (480) the ship belonging to Antidorus of Lemnos was part of the Persian navy[53] is an indication that after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt, Lemnos once again was under the Great King's control.[54]

The campaign against Lemnos proved to be fatal for Miltiades' future. The act has an explicitly anti-Persian character and is probably the reason for the tyrant of the Chersonese to have preferred some years later (494/3) to leave his

48 Ibid. V.103.1.

49 Ibid. VI.137.4–140.1.

50 During his escape from the Phoenician navy, Miltiades found shelter on Imbros, which at the time was obviously outside Persian control (Hdt. VI.41.1–2). It is logical to assume that from Imbros he headed for Lemnos, and from there to Athens, for Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos had already been conquered by the Persians (Hdt. VI.31.1).

51 Hdt. V.73.1–3.

52 Ibid. V.100.1–102.1.

53 Ibid. VIII.11.3, 82.2.

54 Busolt 1888: 20; Graham 1964: 175–176 and Meiggs 1973: 424 arrive at the same conclusion.

territorial possessions voluntarily, instead of cherishing some hope for mercy from the Great King.

The Invasion of the Scythians

The reports that are examined next show that at the time of the Ionian Revolt the Persians did not exercise control over the Hellespontic region. The evidence refers once more to the personality of Miltiades, and is again provided by Herodotus. The event is the Scythian invasion that spread as far as the Thracian Chersonese and forced Miltiades to leave the peninsula.[55] An analysis of the presumable dating of that event has already been made in the present study and the conclusion arrived at is that it took place in 496.

In secondary literature, doubts concerning the authenticity of Herodotus' statement about the Scythian attack have been expressed. In Macan's view, the Scythians mentioned must be identified with some Thracian tribe.[56] A similar opinion is held by How and Wells, who relate Miltiades' escape to an invasion by a Thracian or Moesian tribe.[57] Porozhanov assumes that these were the Odrysae and that the Scythians, if they did take part in the events at all, were nothing but their allies.[58] Georges, on his part, supports the view that the reference is to Thraco-Scythians, whose leaders were persuaded by Aristagoras to attack the unfriendly Miltiades.[59]

Taking into consideration Herodotus' purposeful mention of the Scythians, it is not necessary to ignore their participation in the attack against the Chersonese. It is likely that the Thracians, too, joined them, driven by the hope of plunder. The Apsinthians are the main candidates for having joined the attack, because they had an old enmity towards the Dolonci,[60] but the Scythians should be considered the leading power. At the time, a Scythian march from the Istros delta to the Chersonese was not impossible. However, the reason for the attack should not be related to the intrigues of Aristagoras, who, after all, did not manage to establish his authority in the region of the lower Strymon and who, at that time, hardly had any special attitude towards the events in the region of the Thracian Chersonese or Miltiades in particular. It is quite probable that the Scythians simply took advantage of the Persian power collapse in Europe in order to reach as far as the Chersonese.

---

55 Hdt. VI.40.1–2.

56 Macan 1895: I. ad VI.40.

57 How, Wells 1928: ad VI.40.

58 Porozhanov 2011: 150–151.

59 Georges 2000: 27, 38.

60 Hdt. VI.36.2.

Herodotus' specification that Miltiades left his lands before the arrival of the Scythians—τούτους ἐπιόντας οὐκ ὑπομείνας ὁ Μιλτιάδης ἔφευγε Χερσόνησον, means that he was not willing to get into a straight fight with them, but rather preferred to flee. Such an act of cowardice would probably have had a negative effect on the image he had among the Dolonci, who, in Herodotus' view, called him back after the Scythian retreat. Where Miltiades was staying at the time of the Scythian invasion, one can only guess. He likely set off for Lemnos at this time, driven by the hope to conquer it. If that is so, then his leaving the Chersonese may not be connected with the Scythian attack, but rather be previously designed and realized before the news of the Scythian progress was brought to Miltiades. Such a reconstruction of events gives a satisfactory explanation why the Dolonci called him back, though he had not stayed to protect them from the invaders, since it appears that they did not consider his leaving a treacherous act against them.

Miltiades' absence from the Chersonese hardly lasted long. According to Herodotus, after the Scythian retreat (ἐς ὃ οἵ τε Σκύθαι ἀπαλλάχθησαν καί μιν οἱ Δόλογκοι κατήγαγον ὀπίσω) he was called back by the Dolonci. If he really tried at that time to impose his authority over Lemnos, this may mean that his return became a fact some months later (i.e., after the arrival of the Athenians at the island). If one accepts that Miltiades was staying somewhere else at the time of the Scythian invasion, then it is possible that his absence was even shorter.

Histiaeus

The last reports on the Persian territorial possessions in Europe at the time of the Ionian Revolt are connected with the activities of Histiaeus of Miletus. In Herodotus' view, as soon as he knew about the burning of Sardis, Darius let Histiaeus leave Susa (498/7),[61] hoping that he would suppress the Ionian Revolt.[62] The details about the relations between the tyrant of Miletus and Artaphrenes, as well as Histiaeus' attempts to return to Miletus,[63] are of no importance for the present study and that is why they will not be analysed. What is more important here is that Histiaeus eventually arrived in Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos. After successfully persuading the Lesbians to provide him with ships, he sailed for Byzantium at the head of eight triremes, where he was involved in pirate activity: he captured Ionian cargo ships coming

61 For the dating of Histiaeus' departure from Susa and his arrival in Sardis see Macan 1895: II.67; Chapman 1972: 560–561; Georges 2000: 28n99; Badian 2007: 42n23.

62 Hdt. V.106.1–107.1.

63 Ibid. VI.1.1–5.1.

from Pontus.[64] Herodotus' report indicates that at the time in the Bosporus region neither the Persians nor the Ionian rebels were able to exercise control over that strategically important place. It appears that Byzantium, which was independent at the time, was unable to stop the activity of Histiaeus, who possessed at least initially only eight ships.

After Miletus had been conquered by the Persians, Histiaeus left Bisaltes of Abydos to be his deputy in the Hellespont, and he together with the Lesbians headed for Chios, where he succeeded in imposing his authority.[65] From there, he sailed for Thasos and laid siege to it. At the news of the animation of the Phoenician navy, he abandoned the siege and arrived in Lesbos. Due to the lack of food, Histiaeus was compelled to cross over to the coast of Asia Minor, where he was captured in battle. Later, by order of Artaphrenes, his body was impaled and his head was sent to Darius (494/3).[66]

The Restoration of Persian Power in the Hellespontic Region

In the spring of 493, the Persian navy, quite easily, managed to subject the islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, situated close to the coast of Asia Minor.[67] While the Phoenicians were still on Tenedos, Miltiades tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese loaded five ships with his possessions and sailed from Cardia. As he was sailing through the Gulf of Melas, he encountered hostile ships and was surrounded by them. Miltiades managed to escape with four of his ships and found refuge on Imbros, which at that time was still free, and from there he managed to reach Athens. The fifth ship, carrying his son Metiochus, was captured. Darius spared Metiochus' life and gave him a house, lands, and a Persian wife.[68]

From Tenedos, the Phoenician navy headed for the Thracian Chersonese. After two successive attacks, the Phoenicians subjected all the cities of the Thracian Chersonese but Cardia.[69] Herodotus does not mention why Cardia was not captured and burnt down as the other cities situated on the peninsula were, despite making it clear that Cyzicus' citizens had signed a preliminary agreement with Oebares and thus managed to escape damage.[70] It is possible that there was a similar preliminary agreement between Cardia and the Per-

64 Ibid. VI.5.2–3, 26.1.
65 Ibid. VI.26.1–2.
66 Ibid. VI.28.1–30.2.
67 Ibid. VI.31.1–32.1
68 Ibid. VI.41.1–4.
69 Ibid. VI.33.1–33.3.
70 Ibid. VI.33.3.

sians unknown to Herodotus, or that the citizens of Cardia were pro-Persian at the time of the Ionian Revolt and so had committed no offences against the Great King. They were, however, unable to prevent Miltiades from leaving the Chersonese by way of their polis, even with the Phoenician navy near Tenedos and about to set off for the peninsula at any time.[71] The fact that they were not punished is another indication of the Persians' friendly attitude towards them.

The cities situated on the north coast of the Propontis were also subjected to the Phoenician attack, along with Byzantium and Chalcedon. The citizens of these two cities, unwilling to submit to the Persians, left their homes and withdrew toward the Pontus.[72] Thus, after an approximately five-year suspension, Darius succeeded in restoring power over his European territories east of the Hebrus. Those lands situated west of the Hebrus would be conquered the next year by the king's son-in-law Mardonius.

Conclusions

From the analysis above, it can be concluded that the onset of the Ionian Revolt and the events that took place afterwards led to a total collapse of Persian power in Thrace, as well as to the practical loss of Macedonia's vassal status. Due to the scarce source base, it is difficult to say whether the Persians withdrew their garrisons themselves, or the garrisons were destroyed by the enemy. The absence of any Persian army in Thrace becomes clear from the events discussed above in reference to key strategic regions such as those of the straits and lower Strymon. It was not later than the summer or autumn of 498 when the Persian garrisons east of the Hebrus were driven away by the Ionians, and those west of that river were likely withdrawn in connection with the Ionian attack against the Hellespont. In any case, when Aristagoras arrived in Myrcinus in 497/6, there were no Persian military installments in the region of the lower Strymon.

The rapid loss of the European territories is an indication that during the period between 512–498 Persian power there was not firmly established. It appears that at the time the Persians did not consider it necessary to maintain a large army in Europe, but rather relied only on garrisons, sent to points strategically important for the empire. To a certain extent, this approach was successful: there is no information about local tribes rioting, and the collapse of the Persian power at the time of the Ionian Revolt is due either to the withdrawal of their garrisons or to a defeat by the Ionians, which in the situation is an external factor. However, the very existence of this factor shows that what

71 Ibid. VI.41.1.

72 Ibid. VI.33.1–2.

was needed for a lasting subjection of the European territories was stronger control and a greater number garrisons to maintain order. This is probably the very task—restoring and consolidating Persian power in Thrace—assigned to the Persian commander-in-chief Mardonius.

Mardonius in Thrace and Macedonia

Having reestablished his authority over the region of the Hellespont, Darius decided once more to annex the lands between the Hebrus and Strymon that had been subject to him before the Ionian Revolt. The major source for these events is Herodotus.[73] In his view, the conquest of the abovementioned territories is an act performed by the young Persian commander-in-chief Mardonius, who was married to one of Darius' daughters. Herodotus claims that Mardonius' main task was to subject Athens and Eretria, and as many other Greek cities as possible. To carry out the task, Mardonius set off for the Hellespont in the spring of 492 leading large land and naval forces. At the head of the infantry he crossed over to Europe and entered the lands west of the Hebrus River. As far as the route taken by the navy to Thasos and the route of the infantry to Macedonia are concerned, Herodotus provides no further details. The information he gives about the events that followed is also sparse. His story makes it clear that the Persian navy peacefully subjected Thasos and then reached Acanthus. Sailing from Acanthus, the Persians tried to circumvent the peninsula of Athos, but were overtaken by a severe storm from the north, which was the reason for the loss of about three hundred ships and over twenty thousand people. At the same time, the infantry camping in Macedonia suffered a crushing defeat as a result of a night attack by the Brygi, in which even Mardonius himself was wounded. Despite this failure, the Brygi were completely subjected, but due to the great loss of people, Mardonius was compelled to retreat ingloriously to Asia.

The Aims of Mardonius' Campaign

Herodotus' report raises some difficult questions regarding the aims, scope, and consequences of Mardonius' campaign. Herodotus clearly defines the Persian commander's purposes: subjection of as many Greek cities as possible, including Athens and Eretria. Using his reports as a basis, some scholars conclude that Mardonius' campaign really aimed at the conquest of Greece, or at least of

73 Ibid. VI.43.1–45.2.

Athens and Eretria.[74] Others, however, doubt the motives given by Herodotus and limit Mardonius' task to only the Thraco-Macedonian region.[75]

Beloch, for instance, notes that, according to Herodotus' story, Mardonius arrived in Cilicia at the very beginning of spring, which, according to his calculations, means that the Persian army managed to reach the Hellespont only in mid-June (i.e., too late for the realization of a campaign against Athens in the same year).[76] Hence, he concludes that by the end of the summer, Mardonius was able to subject only the Aegean coast, and not to attack Athens. Beloch subsequently adds that, if Mardonius had the intention to set off for Athens, he would have had to spend the summer in Lower Macedonia, as he did in Thessaly twelve years later, and not return to Asia as he actually did. Beloch also analyses the information about the catastrophe the navy faced trying to circumvent Athos and, due to Herodotus' specification that some sailors died of cold (οἱ δὲ ῥίγεϊ), dates the event to November or even later ('November oder noch später'). This dating leads him to conclude that the catastrophe at Athos occurred on the navy's way back to Asia (i.e., after the end of the campaign and not at its beginning, as Herodotus claims).[77] Finally, Beloch notes that Mardonius succeeded in subjecting the Brygi, and that his actions from the summer of 492, as a whole, did not betray any intention to conquer Greece. In his view, at that time the plans of the Persians did not include the subjection of Greece, a supposition that he finds confirmed by Datis' expedition, whose only purpose was to punish Athens and Eretria.

The arguments Beloch puts forward appear convincing. His statement that the catastrophe at Athos took place on the navy's return to Asia may be an exception; Herodotus explicitly states that, having set off from Acanthus, the navy tried to circumvent the peninsula (ἐκ δὲ Ἀκάνθου ὁρμώμενοι τὸν Ἄθων περιέβαλλον), but that a violent storm broke from the north, leading to its ruin. How,

74 Grote 1853: IV.313–314; Bury 1900: 248; Grundy 1901: 150–152; Glotz 1938: 32; Paribeni 1947: 34; Dascalakis 1965: 171–172; Balcer 1995: 201; Sarakinski 2013: 186–188.

75 Welzhofer 1891: 145–148; Beloch II.2: 84–85; Macan 1895: I. ad VI.43; Hammond 1980: 60; Schrader 1981: VI.269n209, 271n217 and n219; Fine 1983: 282; Walser 1984: 34–35; Zahrnt 1992: 238–244; Bengtson 1996: 160–161; Briant 2002: 156–157; Scott 2005: 186–187; Zahrnt 2011: 767n16; Vasilev 2011: 100.

76 Beloch II.2: 84–85.

77 Schrader 1981: VI.271n217 shares the same opinion: 'Es probable que el naufragio no ocurriera a la ida, sino cuando la expedición de Mardonio regresaba (por lo que no le obligaría, como sostiene Heródoto, a renunciar a sus planes contra Atenas), a finales del otoño del año 492, lo que explicaría la frialdad del agua. Sin duda, los hombres que no sabían nadar serían asiáticos de tierra adentro (cf. VIII 89).'

then, can Herodotus' statement that some sailors died of cold be explained? The most logical answer is Beloch's supposition that the catastrophe happened during the winter months. On the other hand, if this supposition is accepted, the Persian navy took a minimum of five months to move from the Hellespont to Athos, which seems strange. Considering this discrepancy, Instinsky concludes that Herodotus does not use ῥίγος to mean a particular time of year (i.e., the winter months), but of cold weather in general, regardless of the season. As an additional argument he offers Herodotus' report according to which only some of the crew of the ships died of cold, which may happen at any time of the year. Studying the climate conditions in that region he concludes that the catastrophe at Athos may be placed in August or September and related to the wind, blowing from the north at that time of the year.[78]

When exactly the ruin of the navy happened is a detail that cannot, on its own, reveal what purposes Mardonius had, since eventual progress towards Athens would have been possible that same year or the next. The very fact that not only land but also naval forces took part in his expedition shows that the task Mardonius was assigned was not aimed only at the reestablishment of Persian authority over the lands conquered by Megabazus, but also to the subjection of new territories. This supposition is confirmed by the progress of the Persian army west of the Strymon as well as by the attempt of the navy to circumvent Athos. This attempt in particular indicates that the commanders of the navy aimed at reaching at least as far as the Thermaic Gulf, for it is illogical for its progress to be restricted to the circumvention of Athos, an act that on its own is of no value. As Zahrnt rightly notes, the Thermaic Gulf is the most suitable place for the infantry and the navy to meet.[79] The reaching of the gulf in question, however, may represent merely a certain stage of the progress towards Athens, or instead the logical completion of the entire campaign. The catastrophe at Athos makes it almost impossible to determine Mardonius' purposes. Even if he had aimed at conquering Athens and Eretria and as many Greek cities as possible as well, he could not fulfil his purpose without the support of the navy.

Several arguments can be offered in favour of the hypothesis that Mardonius' campaign was intended to be restricted to the Thraco-Macedonian region. First is Beloch's conjecture that after the subjection of the Brygi Mardonius would have been compelled to winter in Macedonia, if his task in fact related to Athens and Eretria, particularly bearing in mind his late arrival at the Helle-

78 Instinsky 1956: 485–494.

79 Zahrnt 1992: 244.

spont. Instead of this, the Persian commander-in-chief returned to Asia. Second, one can take into consideration the remark made by Macan, who notes that Hippias the ex-tyrant of Athens did not take part in Mardonius' expedition,[80] which may also be accepted as indirect evidence that its major purpose was not the subjection of Athens. A third argument arises from Datis' campaign, the purpose of which judging from Herodotus[81] may be described as a punitive action against Athens and Eretria, including the reestablishment of Hippias' authority. This expedition, then, was not an alternative for carrying out the tasks assigned to Mardonius. Finally, it must be noted that before the start of Mardonius' expedition Darius did not send envoys to Greece to ask for 'earth and water'—as he did just before the campaign led by Datis and Artaphrenes.[82]

Taking the arguments offered so far into account, it may be assumed that Mardonius' ambitions concerned only the Thraco-Macedonian region. Undoubtedly, his first task was to reestablish direct Persian control over the Aegean coast between the Hebrus and Strymon, and over the Paeonians peopling the lower Strymon. What is more, Mardonius had to subject Macedonia again. An army reaching as far as Macedonia would need to conquer the tribes occupying the lands between the Strymon River and the Thermaic Gulf; and the attempt of the navy to circumvent Athos indicates that one of Mardonius' goals was the submission of the poleis situated on the coast of the Chalcidice peninsula as well. Apart from that, the coordinated movement of the navy and infantry suggests the desire for the conquest of the Greek cities located on the northern Aegean coast, and for subjection of Thasos as well, a task assigned to the naval forces only.

It is logical to conclude that Herodotus' statement about Mardonius' purpose being the conquest of Athens, Eretria, and other Greek cities is merely a supposition with no historical basis. Herodotus studies Mardonius' expedition in connection with the wars between Greeks and Persians and considers it a result of Darius' desire for revenge for the burning of Sardis by the Athenians. The conquest of Thasos and the parallel progress of the navy and the infantry, a movement analogous to Xerxes' campaign, may influence Herodotus and probably underlies his firm belief that Mardonius' purpose was to conquer almost the whole of Greece.

80 Macan 1895: I. ad VI.43.

81 Hdt. VI.94.1–2.

82 Scott 2005: 186.

The Span of Mardonius' Activities in Thrace and Macedonia

The second question prompted by Herodotus' story about Mardonius' campaign refers to the span of his activity in the Thraco-Macedonian region. Herodotus says nothing about the actions of the Persian commander-in-chief in the coastal lands between the Hebrus and Strymon. This may mean that the local people (i.e., Thracians and Paeonians), offered no resistance to the advancing Persian army and thus fell under the Great King's control for a second time. The same conclusion appears to be valid for the Greek cities, situated on the Aegean coast. Indeed, a little further in his text, Herodotus retells a speech delivered by Mardonius, which claims that on his way to Macedonia none of the Greeks had the courage to oppose him.[83] The speech is probably an invention of Herodotus himself, but he undoubtedly uses Mardonius as a mouth-piece to provide the information he possesses: the Greek cities on the Aegean coast submitted voluntarily to the Persians.

It is logical to assume that, having crossed over to Europe, the land forces and the navy headed for Doriscus, from which place they moved together towards Abdera. The citizens of this polis submitted and probably acquired the status of one of the main Persian bases in the region—two years later the entire Thasian navy was taken to Abdera by order of the Great King.[84] From there, the Persian navy sailed for Thasos, whose citizens offered no resistance. The subjection of Thasos was hardly accidental. Herodotus notes that at that time the Thasians earned their income from the mines on the island itself and those on the Aegean coast, with income varying from two to three hundred talents per year,[85] which, together with the proximity of the island to the Aegean coast, made its subjection necessary. From Thasos the navy returned to the Aegean coast again, and going past it, reached as far as Acanthus. There is no doubt that all Greek cities, situated between Abdera and Acanthus, as well as the citizens of Acanthus were compelled to recognize the Great King's authority. The catastrophe the navy faced at its attempt to circumvent Athos stopped the process for a while and left the cities of Sithonia and Pallene free, along with at least those situated along the coast close to the Anthemus region.

At the same time, Mardonius made progress to the west, following the coastal road to Neapolis. From Neapolis, there were two possibilities for him: to circumvent Pangaeum either from the south and then reach the Strymon estuary, or from the north and, after crossing the Angites, to enter the lands of

83 Hdt. VII.9A.2, 9B.2.

84 Ibid. VI.46.1.

85 Ibid. VI.46.3.

the Paeonians. Bearing in mind that the navy moved forward along the coast and had met no resistance, it can be assumed that Mardonius circumvented Pangaeum from the north, leaving the subjection of the coast to the naval forces. While circumventing Pangaeum from the north, probably on his way back to Asia and the south, Mardonius succeeded in subjecting the tribes living by that mountain who twenty years earlier (i.e., during Megabazus' expedition), managed to avoid falling under Persian control: the Agrianes, the Odomanti, and the Doberes. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that twelve years later they joined the army led by Xerxes on his way to Greece—ἅμα ἀγόμενος τούτων ἕκαστον τῶν ἐθνέων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος οἰκεόντων.[86] The Pieres who also peopled the land by Pangaeum must be added to the tribes enumerated here, while the Satrae, whom Herodotus explicitly says nobody succeeded in conquering,[87] should not.

After subjugating the tribes living by Pangaeum, Mardonius probably crossed the Angites and entered Paeonian lands. Six years earlier these very Paeonians, fleeing from Asia Minor, had returned home. Despite that act, there is no evidence of their being punished by Mardonius, which, in the present study, is accepted as an indication that after their crossing to Europe, bearing in mind the complicated situation, the Paeonians gained permission to go back to their old settlements. From that point, the Persian commander headed for Myrcinus and Eion, and so once more returned to the coast, where the navy probably awaited him, since it is logical for their entrance into new, previously unconquered lands to take place both by land and sea.

Due to Herodotus' lack of specificity, the progress of the Persian infantry in the lands west of the Strymon is difficult to reconstruct. The only markers Herodotus provides are Mardonius' conquest of Macedonia and the conflict with the Thracian Brygi. In order to estimate the point to which the Persian commander managed to advance, it is necessary to define the location of the Thracian Brygi and, on that basis, to determine whether Mardonius and his army entered Macedonia at all.

The Brygi are mentioned many times by ancient authors, both in mythological and historical contexts, but their settlements are placed in different areas. Proclus puts them in the west close to the lands of the Thesprotians;[88] Appian locates them near Epidamnus;[89] while Apollonius of Rhodes speaks about a

86 Ibid. VII.115.2.

87 Ibid. VII.111.1.

88 Proclus *Chrestomathia* II, *Theleg*. F 1.

89 App. *BC* II.39.

temple to Artemis situated on two Brygian islands (Βρυγηίδες νῆσοι).[90] According to Pseudo-Scymnus, the Brygi lived a bit further to the east, between Lake Lychnitis and the lands of the Enchelii;[91] Stephanus of Byzantium defines them as a Macedonian tribe bordering the Illyrians;[92] and Strabo enumerates them among the tribes occupying the territory between Epidamnus and Apollonia on one side and the Ceraunian mountains on the other.[93] It is Strabo who, once more, in a non-chronologically oriented passage, speaks about the Brygi peopling the region of Mt Bermium,[94] whereas it is possible Pliny localizes them somewhere at the lower course of the Nestus, if it is accepted that his report refers to this tribe, and not to a tribe named Brisi.[95] Herodotus himself locates the Brygi in two different ways: by stating that they attacked Mardonius when he was camping in Macedonia, and by listing them among the tribes from Europe mobilized in Xerxes' army.[96]

On the basis of these reports, scholars offer various locations for the Brygi who attacked Mardonius: in Illyria,[97] between Lake Doiran and the valley of the Strumitsa River,[98] by the Macedonian border,[99] to the east of Macedonia,[100] between the Axius mouth and Chalcidice,[101] between the Strymon and Athos,[102] or in the region of Lake Bolbe.[103]

Perhaps the best way to solve the problem about the location of the Βρύγοι Θρήικες in question is to give preference to Herodotus, for he is the only one who relates the Brygi to Mardonius' expedition and it is he once more who pro-

90 Apoll. Rhod. IV. 330, 470. Tomaschek 1893: I.27 identifies the abovementioned islands with Corcyra and Paxos.

91 Ps.Scym. 429–438.

92 St. Byz. s.v. Βρύξ. But see also s.v. Βρίγες, where Stephanus of Byzantium, following Herodotus, defines them as Thracians.

93 Strabo VII.7.8.

94 Ibid. VII. fr. 25 (Meineke).

95 Pliny *NH* IV.11.40 (Detlefsen)—Bessorumque multa nomina ad Mestum amnem ima Pangaei montis ambientem inter Haletos (Heletos E D), Diobessos, Carbilesos (Carbylesos A), inde Brygas (Brisas A E D R), Sapaeos (Saepeos A, Sapheos E, Saphaeos D R), Odomantos (Adomantos A E D R). For the Brisi see Delev 2014: 225.

96 Hdt. VI.45.1; VII.185.2.

97 Pajakowski 1983: 249–251.

98 Hammond 1979: 61; Scott 2005: ad VI.45.1.

99 Beloch II.1: 18.

100 Zahrnt 1992: 247n23.

101 Stein IV: ad VII.185.

102 How, Wells 1928: ad VI.45.

103 Delev 2007: 92–93; Vasilev 2011: 101.

vides additional information about their location with regard to Xerxes' campaign (i.e., in about the same period of time). Herodotus claims that one night while he was camping in Macedonia (ἐν Μακεδονίῃ), Mardonius was attacked by the Thracian Brygi. At that point it may be asked which Macedonian borders are assumed: those from the time of Mardonius' expedition, or those from Herodotus' own time? An answer may be derived from the passage in which Herodotus enumerates the tribes from Europe mobilized in Xerxes' land army on its way to Thermopylae. They are listed in this order: Thracians, Paeonians, Eordaei, Bottiaei, Chalcidians, Brygi, Pieres, Macedonians, Perrhaebi, Enienes, Dolopes, Magnesians, Achaeans, and those peopling the Thracian coast. A precise geographical order appears to be lacking as far as the east–west direction is concerned, yet, to a certain degree, the abovementioned tribes are grouped on a geographical principle. In the first place, Herodotus notes the collective ethnonyms Thracians and Paeonians. This probably refers to the Paeonians living by the Strymon and Pangaeum, and the Thracians living in the interior. Next, Herodotus enumerates tribes whose settlements were located between the Axius and the Strymon: the Eordaei, the Bottiaei, as well as the Chalcidians. After that he speaks about the Brygi and Pieres, whose location is about to be defined; and then continues with the tribes situated west of the Axius: Macedonians, Perrhaebi, Enienes, Dolopes, Magnesians, and Achaeans. Finally, in accordance with the division of the tribes living in the interior and on the coast made earlier in his study,[104] Herodotus mentions the citizens living on the Thracian coast, who must be identified with the Thracian tribes situated close to the coast, since the Greeks from Thrace and the nearby islands served in the navy.[105]

Taking into consideration the order Herodotus follows to define the location of the Brygi, what is important is the localization of the Pieres. Some scholars hold the opinion that in this case Herodotus' Pieres may refer not to those whose settlements were situated east of the Strymon, but to those Pieres who were not driven away by the Macedonians, and accordingly continued to people the old area of Pieria.[106] Two arguments can be presented to support this supposition. First, if it is accepted that Herodotus enumerates the separate tribes in an east–west order, then his mentioning the Pieres living east of the Strymon will be illogical, since it will contradict the geographical order followed so far. Second, Herodotus mentions the Pieres separate from the Thra-

104 Hdt. VII.110.1, 115.2.

105 Ibid. VII.185.1.

106 Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.185; How, Wells 1928: ad VII.185.

cians and the citizens of the Thracian coast, which may mean that the Pieres, in his view, were those who peopled Pieria in Lower Macedonia and were not driven away by the Macedonians. Thus, if one accepts a western location for the Pieres, it will also be possible for the Brygi, listed just before them, to be located in the territories of the Macedonians situated west of the Axius (i.e., by Mt Bermium—where Strabo localizes them). This presumable location of the Brygi will not contradict Herodotus' specification that they attacked Mardonius while he was camping in Macedonia. What is more, the location of the Brygi by Mt Bermium is the only one according to which the settlements of the Brygi would be within the borders of Macedonia from 492—neither Illyria, nor the lands between Lake Doiran and the Strumitsa or the Chalcidice peninsula would.

Some arguments against the proposed western location of both the Pieres and Brygi can be offered. Strabo's report, which locates the Brygi by Mt Bermium, has no independent value; his source is Herodotus, who identifies the Phrygians with the Brygi and speaks about the deportation of the Phrygians to Asia Minor,[107] and also mentions the gardens of Midas situated below Mt Bermium.[108] Therefore, the location of the Brygi suggested by Strabo refers not to the events from 492 and 480, but to a much earlier period of time. This is the reason for his inability to tell the exact chronological time when the Brygi lived by Mt Bermium, only noting—ὃ πρότερον κατεῖχον Βρίγες Θρᾳκῶν ἔθνος. In addition, it appears impossible that in the year 492, more than one hundred and fifty years since these lands had been conquered by the Argeadae, in the heart of Macedonia there existed an independent Brygian union able to offer such stubborn resistance to the advancing Mardonius—whose very progress up to Bermium seems dubious.

This conclusion is also valid for the Pieres, whose lands, probably, were the first conquered by the Macedonians.[109] The conquest of Pieria belongs to the first stage of the Argead invasion, characterized by the slaughter and expulsion of the local people. It is possible the Macedonians let a small number of the Pieres remain in their homes, though they were hardly so significant in number as to be, about one hundred and fifty years later and in spite of their being an integral part of Macedonia, separately mobilized in the Persian army. In fact, if any Pieres remained in their homes after the Macedonian attack, they were, most probably, rapidly assimilated, due both to their small number

107 Hdt. VII.73.1.

108 Ibid. VIII.138.2–3.

109 Thuc. II.99.3. For the Argead conquest of Pieria see Vasilev 2011: 95–96.

and to their proximity to the Macedonian capital Aegeae. Those areas close to the capital of Macedonia—Pieria, Bottiaea, and Macedonis—should be exposed to the strictest Macedonian control; the existence there of individual political units that the Persians could win over for the needs of their army, apart from their Macedonian allies, is illogical. What is more, if the Brygi lived below Mt Bermium, and the Pieres in Pieria by Olympus, then where did the Macedonians live?

If the Pieres from the passage under discussion (VII.185.2) are identical to the ones by Mt Pangaeum, it is logical to ask why they were enumerated separately, and not together with the Thracians and the residents of the Thracian coast, given that their Thracian origin is not in doubt, nor is the fact that their settlements were situated close to the sea. As has been argued above, Herodotus' use here of the collective ethnonym Thracians stands for the Thracian tribes whose settlements were located in the interior, which explains why the Pieres are mentioned separately. The reference to the residents of the Thracian coast is more complicated. Herodotus does not specify either their origin or the extent of the Thracian coast itself. Indeed, on this point Herodotus contradicts himself, claiming that the residents of the Thracian coast were mobilized in the infantry, while earlier in his study, he makes it clear that the coastal tribes between Doriscus and Acanthus served in the navy.[110] The only possible way to surmount the contradiction without concluding that Herodotus has made a mistake is to identify ὅσοι τῆς Θρηίκης τὴν παραλίην νέμονται with the Thracian coast east of Doriscus, about which to that moment he had mentioned nothing in regard to Xerxes' expedition, except the supply of one hundred ships from the people of the Hellespont.[111] Another possibility is that part of the coastal tribes

110 Hdt. VII.110.1, 115.2.

111 Ibid. VII.95.2—Ἑλλησπόντιοι δὲ πλὴν Ἀβυδηνῶν (Ἀβυδηνοῖσι γὰρ προσετέτακτο ἐκ βασιλέος κατὰ χώρην μένουσι φύλακας εἶναι τῶν γεφυρέων) οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου στρατευόμενοι παρείχοντο μὲν ἑκατὸν νέας, ἐσκευασμένοι δὲ ἦσαν ὡς Ἕλληνες. οὗτοι δὲ Ἰώνων καὶ Δωριέων ἄποικοι. Probably, the expression ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου Herodotus uses does not refer to the Greeks from the western Pontic coast north of Cape Thynias, since according to the conclusions arrived at in the present study the Persians lost control over the lands under discussion just after Darius' campaign against the Scythians and did not seem successful at ever gaining it again. See also the statements made by Rawlinson 1860: IV.70n8; Stein IV: ad VII.95; Abicht 1882: ad VII.95; Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.95; Smith 1908: ad VII.95; How, Wells 1928: ad VII.95. Diodorus (XI.2.1, 3.8), claiming that the Greeks from Pontus together with those of the Hellespont provided Xerxes with ships for the expedition against Greece, is rather too general and, accordingly, cannot be accepted as evidence that Persian control spread over the western Pontic coast north of Cape Thynias or north of Apollonia, if it is accepted that Boryza was situated north of Thynias.

were mobilized in the navy, while those for whom there was no room onboard served in the infantry. Hence, it can be assumed that the Pieres served in the infantry, although they lived close to the coast; owing to their location they were enumerated among the tribes mobilized from Europe, but not included in the collective ethnonym Thracians.

From the analysis above, it can be concluded that the settlements of the Brygi whom Mardonius fought were not situated below Mt Bermium. Hence, it is logical to conclude that Herodotus had in mind the Macedonian borders of his own time when he asserted that Mardonius was camping in Macedonia when he was attacked at night.[112] Thus, taking into account the fact that he lists the Brygi just after the Eordaei, Bottiaei and Chalcidians and before the Pieres living by Pangaeum, then the settlements of the Brygi can rightly be located on the Chalcidice peninsula. Considering the supposition made earlier in the present study that while crossing the Strymon Mardonius followed the coastal road and moved parallel to the navy, his fight with the Brygi and accordingly their location may be located in the northeast of the peninsula—probably by Lake Bolbe, but not far to the south, since the direct route to the Thermaic Gulf, where the navy and the infantry were to gather together, went round the lake. The location of the Brygi suggested here does not contradict the order in which Herodotus enumerates the tribes, for a precise geographical one in an east–west direction is lacking. The collective ethnonyms referring to Thracians and Paeonians are followed by the Eordaei, peopling Mygdonia, the Bottiaei, who at that time were in control of Olynthus, and their neighbors the Chalcidians (Χαλκιδικὸν γένος);[113] next he mentions the Brygi, living in the northeast of the Chalcidice peninsula, and finally the Pieres by Pangaeum. If the collective ethnonyms are excluded from this group, then the tribes from the Eordaei to the Pieres would be once more grouped on a geographical principle, though not in a strict order from the east to the west, but rather as part of the population of the territories between the Axius and Pangaeum.

If the supposition about the location of the Brygi near Lake Bolbe is true, it must be accepted that they attacked Mardonius' camp at the time of his progress to Macedonia. In such a case it is good to ask whether Mardonius succeeded in reaching Macedonia at all. Herodotus presents several indications in that direction. First, he says that Mardonius, at the head of the infantry, managed to conquer the Macedonians, making it clear that at that time the tribes to

112 See also Vasilev 2011: 101; Delev 2014: 84.

113 For Herodotus' understanding of Χαλκιδικὸν γένος see the discussion offered by Harrison 1912: 94–95; Bradeen 1952: 356–366; Zahrnt 1971: 12–13.

the east had already come under Persian control.[114] Second, Herodotus claims that the entire territory up to Thessaly had been conquered twice, by both Megabazus and Mardonius.[115] And finally he notes that Mardonius retreated to Asia after he had conquered the Brygi.[116]

Herodotus' report about the repeated conquest of the Macedonians cannot serve as evidence of Mardonius having entered Macedonia with his army, since Herodotus uses the verb δουλόω to describe both Mardonius' and Megabazus' actions, although the latter did not carry out an aggressive policy west of the Strymon, but only sent envoys to ask for 'earth and water.' In VI.44.1, however, Herodotus is explicit: Mardonius conquered the Macedonians with the help of his infantry and added them to the tribes already conquered living east of them (ἐντὸς Μακεδόνων). Indeed, Herodotus' account of Mardonius' expedition in Thrace and Macedonia is structured this way: he first adduces the purposes of the campaign;[117] he then summarizes the results achieved (i.e., the conquest of Thasos by the navy and of the Macedonians and all the tribes east of them by the infantry[118]) and finally, he speaks about important events that took place at the time of the progress of both army and navy, namely the catastrophe at Athos and the conflict with the Brygi.[119] Bearing in mind this method of presentation and the ultimate result of the actions carried out by the infantry (i.e., the conquest of the Macedonians), it can be accepted that after the conquest of the Brygi Mardonius did not immediately head for Asia, but, following the road past Lake Bolbe, continued west and reached the Thermaic Gulf (i.e., up to the Macedonian border of 492). In this scenario, the tribes that had been conquered before the Macedonians will include not only those conquered by Megabazus, but also those between the Strymon and the Thermaic Gulf, the Brygi and Edoni, whose settlements were probably situated close to Lake Bolbe and, accordingly, on the route of the Persian army moving west. Apart from the Brygi and Edoni, Chalcidians and Bottiaei also lived in the lands between the aforesaid river and the gulf. Due to the lack of precise information, a clear answer as to whether they were conquered by Mardonius cannot be given. The

114 Hdt. VI.44.1.

115 Ibid. VII.108.1.

116 Ibid. VI.45.2.

117 Ibid. VI.44.1—αὗται μὲν ὦν σφι πρόσχημα ἦσαν τοῦ στόλου, ἀτὰρ ἐν νόῳ ἔχοντες ὅσας ἂν πλείστας δύνωνται καταστρέφεσθαι τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολίων.

118 Ibid. VI.44.1—τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῇσι νησὶ Θασίους οὐδὲ χεῖρας ἀνταειραμένους κατεστρέψαντο, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ πεζῷ Μακεδόνας πρὸς τοῖσι ὑπάρχουσι δούλους προσεκτήσαντο· τὰ γὰρ ἐντὸς Μακεδόνων ἔθνεα πάντα σφι ἤδη ἦν ὑποχείρια γεγονότα.

119 Ibid. VI.44.2–45.2.

same goes for the Eordaei, who were probably living in the region of Physka in Mygdonia at that time.[120]

Judging from what has been said so far about Mardonius' expedition, the following reconstruction of events can be made. Perhaps at the beginning of the summer (in June?) of the year 492, Mardonius crossed over to Europe and headed for Doriscus. From Doriscus, the navy progressed parallel to the infantry towards Abdera, where they separated; the navy subjected Thasos, and the infantry continued its way to Mt Pangaeum, circumvented it from the north and, after crossing the Angites, entered the lands of the Paeonians. After the reestablishment of the Great King's power over these territories, Mardonius went down to the Strymon mouth, where, once more, the land and the naval forces gathered together. Taking into account the fact that new territories had to be conquered, this particular union was necessary. The parallel advance of the two forces probably continued up to the place where Lake Bolbe emptied into the sea.[121] From here, the navy sailed for Acanthus while the infantry took the shortest route to the Thermaic Gulf, advancing past Lake Bolbe. Both the land and the naval forces were to encounter difficulty: the infantry was attacked at night by the Brygi, and the navy was wrecked by the strong north winds while trying to circumvent Athos. It is not easy to say which of the two happened first. While Herodotus mentions the wreck of the navy first, this fact cannot be decisive, since he actually speaks about its entire progress from Thasos to the point of the catastrophe, and after that he gives details about the events involving the infantry. Having conquered the Brygi, Mardonius continued towards the Thermaic Gulf. His arrival at the east border of Macedonia forced its ruler Alexander to voluntarily accept the Great King's authority.

The Outcomes of Mardonius' Campaign

A third problem raised by Herodotus' account of Mardonius' campaign concerns the results of his activity in the Thraco-Macedonian region. It is disputable whether Mardonius reduced Macedonia to an ordinary region in the Persian administrative system or restored the vassal status it had acquired during Megabazus' time. Scholars hold different opinions on the question. Those who accept that Macedonia became a part of a Persian satrapy in Europe as early as Megabazus' time think that the same status is also valid during Mardonius' time.[122] Others conclude that Macedonia became part of the Per-

120 Thuc. II.99.5. For Physka see also Ptolemy III.13.36 (Nobbe); St. Byz. s.v. Φύσκος.

121 The place is pointed out by Thucydides (IV.103.1)—ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἐξίησιν ἐς θάλασσαν.

122 Hammond 1979: 59–60.

sian administrative system after the expedition of Mardonius,[123] while a third group entertains the opinion that Alexander achieved the same vassal status his father Amyntas had.[124]

The arguments that are usually offered in support of the position that Mardonius completely conquered Macedonia rely on the appearance of Yaunā takabarā in the Naqsh-i Rustam inscription[125] and on the statement of Herodotus that the Persian commander-in-chief conquered the Macedonians with the help of his infantry.[126] In fact, the first argument cannot be accepted as convincing evidence. The identification of Yaunā takabarā only with the Macedonians is problematic, for in the Thraco-Macedonian region the Macedonians were not the only ones that could be defined by the Persians as Yaunā and depicted as wearing the *petasos*. In fact, Rollinger presumes that Yaunā takabarā did not wear the *petasos*.[127] In such a case, it can be assumed that they did not even people the Thraco-Macedonian region and, accordingly, had nothing to do with the Macedonians. Even if it is accepted that in the Naqsh-i Rustam inscription the Macedonians were referred to by the name Yaunā takabarā, this does not mean that Macedonia had already been reduced to the status of a mere Persian satrapy where Persian garrisons were placed; it only means that its inhabitants paid tribute to the Great King and were subject to him in every way.[128] The Persians viewed the giving of 'earth and water' as recognition of the Great King's authority, no matter whether the subjected people had the privileged status of a vassal, as Macedonia had in Amyntas' time, or were under the direct control of the Persian administrative system.

Herodotus' evidence is of a different nature. He explicitly claims that Mardonius enslaved the Macedonians with his infantry, an act that demonstrated that Darius' intentions for Macedonia were far different from those at the time of

123 Flathe 1832: 21; Kanatsoulis 1964: 92–94; Schrader 1981: VI.269n211; Pajakowski 1983: 250–252, 254; Balcer 1988: 6; 1995: 203. Briant 2002: 157; Cawkwell 2005: 52. Favouring no definite opinion Paspalas 2006: 100 concludes—'By the late 490s Alexander was firmly and publically linked to the Achaemenids.'

124 Scott 2005: 189–190; Delev 2007: 93.

125 DNa 29 (Kent 1950: 137–138). Yaunā takabarā, and so Skudra, are mentioned in a later inscription from Persepolis (A?P 25–26—Kent 1950: 156) ascribed to Artaxerxes II (404–359).

126 Hdt. VI.44.1.

127 Rollinger 2006: 365–400.

128 Hdt. III.96.1—οὗτος Δαρείῳ προσήιε φόρος ἀπὸ τῆς τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς Λιβύης ὀλιγαχόθεν. προϊόντος μέντοι τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἀπὸ νήσων προσήιε ἄλλος φόρος καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ μέχρι Θεσσαλίης οἰκημένων.

Megabazus' campaign. It appears that after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt Darius took the decision to strengthen his power in the European areas of the empire, and one of the elements of this European policy was to place Macedonia under direct Persian control—a decision that also required the subjection of the tribes situated between the mouth of the Strymon and the Thermaic Gulf. If this conclusion reflects the actual state of affairs, then it should be accepted that from this moment on Macedonia became part of the Persian administrative system, and Alexander ruled only by the favour of the Great King. Alexander was therefore far more dependent on Persia during the next thirteen years (492–479) than his father and predecessor Amyntas had ever been.

An indication of this new status is a series of recently published Macedonian coins (see insets) minted at the time of Alexander I, whose obverse displays a horseman with an unusual weapon for a Macedonian—a short sword, probably an *akinakes*.[129] The presence of an *akinakes* is a sign that the coins in question were minted earlier than 479, while their good condition (they are only slightly worn) shows that they were in circulation for a relatively short period of time. For these reasons, this coinage can be safely related to Xerxes' campaign against Greece.[130] If the supposition of Heinrichs and Müller that during his stay in Macedonia in the summer of 480 Xerxes personally presented Alexander with a golden *akinakes* is accepted, then the tetrobols must have been minted in the winter of 480/79[131] (i.e., at the time when the Persian army was encamped in Thessaly and the military actions against the Greeks had temporarily ceased[132]). If this is the case, it should be presumed that Alexander himself was depicted on the coins.[133] The most important thing about these coins, however, is that through them Alexander was able to publicize his strong connections with the Great King to the Greeks, the neighbouring tribes, and the Macedonians. After the Persian defeat at Plataea, however, this connection became inconvenient and the tetrobols with the *akinakes* probably quickly fell into disuse.

From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that, as a result of the campaign of Mardonius, Macedonia was incorporated into the administrative system of Persia, but it was most likely neither reduced to an ordinary (and

129 Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 283–287, 292–294, 306. Fig. 1 (J. Heirichs) Tetrobol, 2,29g.; fig. 2—SNG ABC 11, Tetrobol 2,29g; fig. 3—SNG ABC 7, Tetrobol, 2,19g.; fig. 4—CNG, auc. 60, May 2002, 250, Tetrobol, 2,38g. https://www.cngcoins.com/Coin.aspx?CoinID=19718.

130 Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 285–287.

131 Ibid. 294–295.

132 Hdt. VIII.113.1–3, 115.1, 126.2.

133 Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 295.

FIGURE 1 (*J. Heirichs*) *Tetrobol, 2,29g*

FIGURE 2 *SNG ABC II, Tetrobol 2,29g*

separate) satrapy nor did it become part of some other satrapy. Rather, it became a dependent territory, whose ruler was under an obligation to pay tribute to the Great King and to render assistance with military forces to him when necessary. Due to the scarce source base, the question of whether Persian garrisons were put into Macedonia remains debatable. The abundant food supplies stored there[134] cannot serve as evidence of the constant presence of a Persian army in the country, since these supplies were part of the preparation for Xerxes' expedition. The situation in this case was unusual and it was

134 Hdt. VII.25.2.

FIGURE 3 *SNG ABC 7, Tetrobol, 2,19g*

FIGURE 4 *CNG, auc . 60, May 2002, 250, Tetrobol, 2,38g*

not only logical but necessary for Persian units to enter the vassal territory of Macedonia with the intention of preparing food supplies and exploring the route which the king's army was expected to follow.[135] Furthermore, it should be mentioned that in the years following the Battle of Plataea, the allied Greeks did not attack Macedonia, which is a sign that after the summer of 479 there were no Persian garrisons in the lands subject to Alexander. This may mean that either immediately after the Battle of Plataea the Great King withdrew his

135 Tuplin (1987a: 183) arrives at the same conclusion.

garrisons from Macedonia or that Persian garrisons had never been placed in Macedonia. The second appears more logical for, in the aftermath of the Battle of Plataea, the Persians did not leave their positions in Eion and Doriscus and it is not clear what could have forced them to withdraw their garrisons from Macedonia. Therefore, it can be concluded that, even at the time of Alexander's greatest dependence upon the Great King (492–479), no Persian garrisons were stationed in his lands.

As far as Thrace is concerned, there is hardly any doubt that the Persians occupied the coastal areas and once more forced the local people to pay tribute. Thus, they restored there their power, imposed by Megabazus two decades previous and lost at the time of the Ionian Revolt. Mardonius put garrisons at key points: Sestus, Doriscus, and Eion, and possibly other places not mentioned by name in the sources.[136] Herodotus mentions the food supplies stocked in Leuce Acte and Tyrodiza,[137] which indicates that it is possible garrisons were put there, but it is likely that, as in the case of Macedonia, the supplies were stocked just before the start of Xerxes' expedition.[138]

It appears that at this precise time, Abdera became an important position for the Persians in Europe. Two years after Mardonius' campaign, the Thasians were suspected of preparing to revolt and for that reason they were forced to take their entire navy to Abdera. This situation is an illustration of Darius' trust towards Abdera, which may also be confirmed by Xerxes' treatment of its citizens.[139] What happened to the navy of the Thasians next is unknown, but the ships were unlikely to have been taken to Asia. If it is accepted that they remained in Abdera, then it can be assumed that the polis became a major Persian naval base in the lands west of the Hebrus.

Mardonius not only restored the Persian power between the Hebrus and Strymon but also succeeded in subjecting the tribes around Pangaeum, which until then had managed to remain independent of the Persians, namely the Agrianes, the Odomanti, and the Doberes. They worked in the gold and silver mines of Pangaeum and this, probably, is the main reason why they were conquered. It appears that at this precise moment the Persians showed interest in the production of precious metals from their European territories. Undoubtedly, this was the same reason for the conquest of Thasos, whose citizens earned high incomes from their mines both on the island and the continent. It is possible that the Persians did not appropriate the mines, but only wanted

136 Hdt. VII.106.1–2.

137 Ibid. VII.25.2.

138 Tuplin 1987a: 183.

139 Hdt. VIII.120.1.

a percentage of what they produced, for in 480 the citizens of Thasos were able to spend large amounts of money to feed the Persian army.[140] In this way all the tribes, with the exception of the Satrae, that occupied the lands between the Hebrus and Strymon were subjected by the Persians. What is more, the island of Thasos was conquered by the Great King, and probably so was Samothrace, about which evidence is lacking, but its close proximity to the land as well as the fact that it possessed settlements along the coast[141] would have made it a likely target for the Persians.

Mardonius' campaign led to territorial annexation to the west of the Strymon as well. Herodotus stresses emphatically that the Brygi were conquered, and, in the present study the conclusion has been arrived at that the same happened to the Edoni, who lived west of the river. Judging from the information provided by Herodotus, it is logical to accept that Acanthus, too, came under Persian control. Due to the lack of factual data, the status of the Bottiaei and Chalcidians is impossible to define. Yet, they were part of Xerxes' army, which may mean that they were either conquered on the move by Xerxes or by Mardonius. A third possibility is that their subjection can be related to the time just before Xerxes' expedition, when not only were food supplies stocked in Macedonia, but also the canal by Athos was dug—an activity in which the local people were involved (οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄθων κατοικημένοι).[142]

At this point, it may be asked whether Mardonius' campaign led to the foundation of a separate Persian satrapy in Europe. Analysing the available information, scholars give different opinions. Those who accept that a satrapy called Skudra was founded at the time of Megabazus' expedition quite logically arrive at the conclusion that Mardonius' campaign led to no change of status for the subordinate European territories (i.e., the European satrapy continued its existence).[143] Others hold that with the expedition of Mardonius the Persians first established their European territorial possessions as an individual military and administrative region.[144] A third group shares the consensus that a European satrapy never existed.[145]

140 Ibid. VII.118.1.

141 Ibid. VII.108.2.

142 Ibid. VII.22.1.

143 Hammond 1979: 60; Walser 1984: 34–35; Dandamaev 1989: 166, 170.

144 Junge 1944: 116–117; Castritius 1972: 10–11; Errington 1981: 139, 141–142; 1986: 19.

145 Lenk 1936a: 420; Zlatkovskaya 1971: 23; Balcer 1988: 19–21; Borza 1992: 293; Kienast 1996: 298n46; Stronk 1998–1999: 65–68; Izdimirski 2008: 129–136; Sarakinski 2010: 77–108; Bacheva 2012: 11–26.

Greek sources provide no specific information about the foundation of a Persian satrapy in Europe. This is valid both for the time after Megabazus' campaign and for the period following the expedition of Mardonius. As has already been noted in the analysis of the results of Megabazus' expedition, the Persian royal inscriptions in which the name of the Skudra people is mentioned[146] do not offer a solution to the problem. The conclusion that the Persians only conquered the lands close to the sea, along with the lack of precise information about the establishment of a separate European satrapy, argue in favour of the proposition that the conquered lands in Europe were under the control of a satrap ruling in Asia Minor, probably the satrap of Sardis.

Considering the conclusions made so far, Mardonius' campaign can be rightly defined as successful. Despite the misfortune that befell him—the catastrophe at Athos as well as the resistance offered by the Brygi—the Persian commander-in-chief succeeded in carrying out the tasks he had been assigned, namely to impose Persian power over the territories between the Hebrus and the Thermaic Gulf, to reestablish the vassal status of Macedonia, and to conquer the island of Thasos. It appears that the Great King, through the events which took place at the time of the Ionian Revolt, learned his lesson and strengthened to a significant extent his control over the subjected European lands. Indicative of this is the fact that, two years after Mardonius' campaign, even the slightest suspicion of a future revolt was enough to make Darius want the citizens of Thasos demolish their fortified walls and remove their entire navy to Abdera.[147] The control grew stronger with time, until reaching its climax in the years just before Xerxes' expedition.

146 DSe 29 (Kent 1950: 141–142); DSm 10 (Kent 1950: 145); DNa 29 (Kent 1950: 137–138); XPh 27 (Kent 1950: 151); A?P 25 (Kent 1950: 156).

147 Hdt. VI.46.1, 47.2.

CHAPTER 3

The Policy of Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia (480–479)

The Preparations of Xerxes for the Campaign against Greece

Darius started the preparation of a new punitive act against the disobedient Athenians immediately after the defeat at Marathon. In Herodotus' view the preparation took three years, but the act itself was not performed because of rebellious Egypt and, eventually, because of Darius' death (486).[1] Xerxes, his son and successor, was compelled to fight the Egyptians[2] as well as the Babylonians,[3] and only after the suppression of the revolts did he undertake the realization of the expedition planned by Darius against Greece.

Having learned a lesson from the unsuccessful sea campaign against Athens and Eretria, Xerxes decided to carry out the future expedition with the help both of considerable naval forces and of a large army. Undoubtedly, this act was expected to lead to much more impressive results, since Xerxes was obviously influenced by the success of Darius' progress towards the Istros, as well as Mardonius' towards the Strymon. In fact, as it later proved to be true, the choice of a similar tactic shows that Xerxes did not intend to take unnecessary risks as far as the recession of the infantry from the coast was concerned.

One of the conditions necessary for the successful outcome of a campaign that includes numerous land forces is the presence of good logistical support: the provisions needed for the army must be supplied and the army's ability to reach hostile lands must be guaranteed. The preparations should be made in regions as close as possible to enemy lands. This is the very reason for the lively activity on the Aegean coast, lasting a couple of years.[4] Many preparations

1 Hdt. VII.1.1–3, 4.1.

2 Ibid. VII.7.1–8.1.

3 *FGrH* 688 F 13.26.

4 Herodotus (VII.20.1) claims that Xerxes needed four full years to get all the necessary things prepared for the campaign against Greece, and it was the fifth year when he undertook the enterprise. As Tuplin has brought to my attention, riots broke out in Babylonia during Xerxes' second year (484/3), which, despite being short-lived, were viewed as a serious affair by the Persians. This may mean that the great preparations for the invasion of Greece did not begin earlier than the year 483, which does not exclude the possibility of minor preparations to

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_005

were made, a sign of the greatness of the enterprise and of Xerxes' earnest intentions.

According to Herodotus, three years before the expedition, on Xerxes' orders, the digging of a canal through Athos peninsula started.[5] The purpose of this was to help the Persian navy avoid the dangerous circumvention of the peninsula. The realization of this ambitious project was assigned to Bubares and Artachaees, and the people who dug the canal were recruited from the peninsula itself and from other areas subjected to the Great King. Those same people who dug the canal were also assigned the building of bridges over the Strymon, a task with narrower dimensions but as important as the canal in regard to the unhindered progress of the infantry. For the building of the pontoon-bridges over both the Strymon and the Hellespont, the Phoenicians and the Egyptians had to twist ropes.[6]

Parallel to this activity, large amounts of food were stored for both the army and the pack animals.[7] Herodotus mentions the names of four settlements where this was done: Leuce Acte, where the major share of the food supplies were stored, Tyrodiza, Doriscus, and Eion. He also mentions Macedonia, but does not specify the exact location where the necessary provisions were stored. The most probable place is Therme, for Xerxes camped in it with his entire army.[8]

---

have been made in the previous year. For the problem of the dating of the revolts in Babylonia during Xerxes' reign see Waerzeggers 2003–2004: 150–173.

5 Hdt. VII.22.1–24.1. Demetrius of Scepsis makes the assumption that the Persians, due to the stony soil, did not manage to dig the canal through Athos and make it navigable (Strabo VII. fr. 35 Meineke). Scholars show that Demetrius is wrong, and accordingly it is possible for the canal to have been dug in such a way that the Persian navy could use it. For the issue see Isserlin 1991: 83–91; Isserlin et al. 1994: 277–284; Isserlin et al. 1996: 329–340; Isserlin et al. 2003: 369–385. See also Papangelos, Kamburoglu 1998: 177–188.

6 Hdt. VII.25.1. Herodotus (VII.36.1–5) provides a detailed description of the joining of the pontoon-bridges. For the issue see Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.36; 1908: II.141–146; Obst 1913: 46–48; Hammond 1988: 526–532; Hammond, Roseman 1996: 88–107; Stronk 1998–1999: 59–65.

7 Hdt. VII.25.1–2.

8 Ibid. VII.127.1; Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.25; Schrader 1985: 68n168; Tripodi 2007: 81–82; Zahrnt 2011: 767. Kehne 2002: 36 assumes that it is possible for provisions to have been stored not only in Therme but in bases situated in Pieria as well. Tuplin 1987a: 183 shares the opinion that food was stored in Macedonia in more than a single place: 'perhaps Therma and (some of) the "cities" between there and the R. Axios, a region where the expedition halted for some time (id. 7,121ff.).' See also Heinrichs, Müller 2008: 287n24: 'Unter den Standorten für (geplante) Versorgungsdepots nennt Herodot 7.25.2 ausdrücklich "Makedonien," ohne dies näher zu spezifizieren. Wahrscheinlich waren mehrere Plätze vorgesehen, den Xerxes' Heer (und Flotte) legte auf dem Marsch nach Griechenland eine längere Pause im Raum

Herodotus does not define the precise location of the first two of these settlements, saying only that Leuce Acte was situated in Thrace, and relating Tyrodiza to the Perinthians. It is Scylax who makes clear that Leuce Acte was situated very close to the Thracian Chersonese—μετὰ δὲ τὴν Χερρόνησόν ἐστι Θρᾴκια τείχη τάδε· πρῶτον Λευκὴ ἀκτὴ.[9] Taking into consideration the geographical order followed by Scylax, it can be assumed that, having left the Thracian Chersonese, one finds oneself in Leuce Acte, the first fortress on the route towards Pontus.

Stephanus of Byzantium locates Tyrodiza next to Serreum.[10] However, he does not make clear whether he means the geographical cape, the Samothracian polis, or the fortress bearing the same name.[11] The fact that Herodotus relates Tyrodiza to the citizens of Perinthus is an indication that he is speaking about a neighbouring settlement, and so the identification with both the abovementioned Samothracian polis and the georgaphical cape should be rejected.[12] This conclusion may find support in the Athenian tribute lists, where Tyrodiza as well as Σεριοτειχῖται (i.e., the inhabitants of Serreum) are included in the Hellespontic tax district.[13] Taking this into account Stein concludes that Herodotus' Tyrodiza should be identified with the fortress of Tiristasis mentioned by Scylax.[14] In Scylax's view Tiristasis was situated close to Leuce Acte. If the order of enumeration in the Athenian tribute lists strictly follows the west–east direction, then it may be assumed that Tyrodiza was also in that district, and accordingly that it and Tiristasis were one and the same place—Τυρόδιζα, Νεάπολις, Διδυμοτειχῖται, Περίνθιοι, Δαυνιοτειχῖται, Σηλυμβριανοί, Βυζάντιοι.[15] It is certainly possible, however, that Tyrodiza had nothing to do with Tiristasis, for it seems illogical for food provisions to have been stored in two neighbouring fortresses, bearing in mind as well that Herodotus explicitly notes that the greater part of the stores was kept in Leuce Acte—τὸν δὲ ὧν πλεῖστον ἐς Λευκὴν ἀκτὴν καλεομένην τῆς Θρηίκης ἀγίνεον. Herodotus' expression οἳ δὲ ἐς Τυρόδιζαν

Therme/Thessaloniki ein: Hdt. 7.124.1; 131.1, im Unterschied zu den anderen in diesem Zusammenhang genannten Orten.'

9 Scyl. 67.

10 St. Byz. s.v. Τυρέδιζα.

11 St. Byz. s.v. Σέῤῥειον.

12 Herodotus (VII.59.1–2) locates the cape of Serreum west of the Hebrus.

13 ATL I: 398–399, 428–429, 545–546, 558. A fortress with the name Serreum is mentioned by Demosthenes (VII.37; VIII.64; IX.15; X.8; XVIII.27), Aeschines (III.82), and Livy (XXXI.16.4). Its identification with Σεριοτειχῖται in the Athenian tribute lists remains questionable.

14 Stein IV: ad VII.25; Scyl. 67.

15 Meiggs 1973: 546.

τὴν Περινθίων also points to a fortress close to Perinthus, unless it is accepted that at some time the polis was strong enough to keep the fortress, familiar to Scylax as Tiristasis, under its own control. It should be noted that no matter which of the suggested locations is accepted, Tyrodiza would be off the route the Persian army followed.[16] It appears that the safety Tyrodiza could offer as a fortress to a certain extent made up for the inconvenience its location caused.

The geographical dimensions of the preparations made shows that at the time the stability of Persian power in Europe can in no way be doubted, from Byzantium in the east to the Thermaic Gulf in the west. This conclusion can be indirectly supported by the mobilization of the local tribes realized at the time of the campaign against Greece. The lack of resistance on the part of the locals as well as the adequate preliminary preparations provided the Persian army with the chance to reach Thessaly without encountering difficulty and with no lost of life, a precondition for the successful outcome of the expedition.

From Abydos to Doriscus

In the early spring of 480, having heard that the canal through the peninsula of Athos was dug and the pontoon-bridges were joined together, Xerxes, at the head of a large army, set out from Sardis for Abydos.[17] On the coast by Abydos, at the Great King's request, a thorough examination of the entire army was conducted.[18] On the next day, after sunrise and the performance of the necessary rituals, the transfer of the land forces over to Europe began.[19] In Herodotus' view, the soldiers used the pontoon-bridge on the side of Pontus, while the servants and the pack animals used the one on the side of the Aegean Sea. He provides variant pieces of information about the duration of the

16 Hdt. VII.58.2–3.

17 Ibid. VII.37.1. Herodotus (VII.37.2.) speaks about a solar eclipse at the very beginning of the expedition. Astronomical calculations show that in the spring of 480 the eclipse was not possible to observe from the region of Sardis. The reference is probably to the eclipse from 16 February 478, observable from Sardis, or about the one from 481, which could be observed from Susa and, accordingly, be related to the start of the march of the army from that point. For the issue see Rawlinson 1860: IV.31n2; Stein IV: ad VII.37; Abicht 1882: ad VII.37; Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.37; II.400–401; How, Wells 1928: ad VII.37.

18 Hdt. VII.44.1.

19 Ibid. VII.54.1–55.3.

crossing: first, he claims that it took the army two days,[20] then he makes clear that the crossing took seven days and nights,[21] and finally he speaks about a whole month.[22] It is logical to assume that the month in question does not refer only to the army's crossing the pontoon bridges, but is likely a round period of time that includes the passage from Abydos to Doriscus and the stay in either settlement as well. While enumerating the forces that for two days crossed over to the European coast, Herodotus pays no attention to the commissariat, and accordingly these two days may concern the army units only, whereas the seven days and nights include the commissariat as well. It should be noted, however, that there would hardly have been an incessant crossing for seven days and nights of people and animals across the pontoons, which would have been a difficult logistical task, but rather an operation performed only in daylight and that, as a whole, lasted seven days.

After crossing over to the Aegean coast somewhere between Sestus and Madytos,[23] Xerxes set off directly for Doriscus with his infantry, while his navy was ordered to circumvent the Thracian Chersonese and wait for the land forces near Sarpedon. Herodotus provides no details about the whole of the route of the Persian army from Sestus to Doriscus.[24] He mentions nothing in particular about the expedition to Agora[25] while the route from Agora to Doriscus is comparatively detailed: after passing Agora, the army circumvented Melas and crossed the river bearing the same name, passed by Aenos and Lake Stentoris, and arrived in Doriscus. Herodotus fails to note the crossing of the river Hebrus, but speaks about Lake Stentoris, which was probably at its mouth.[26] Herodotus says nothing about the Persian army's crossing Leuce Acte and Tyrodiza, where food supplies had been stored. For this reason, Maurice assumes that there were multiple places called Leuce Acte, and that the one

20 Ibid. VII.55.2–3.

21 Ibid. VII.56.1.

22 Ibid. VIII.51.1—ἕνα αὐτοῦ διατρίψαντες μῆνα, ἐν τῷ διέβαινον ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην.

23 Ibid. VII.33.1–34.1. On the basis of the information provided by Herodotus Müller 1994: 35–36 makes the supposition that the pontoon-bridges over the Hellespont reached as far as the European coast at Poyraz Tepe, and that that is the very place where the Persian army eventually disembarked. Maurice 1930: 216–217, taking into account the number of the ships used for joining the pontoon, arrives at the conclusion that the Persian army disembarked at the small gulf north of Madytos.

24 Hdt. VII.58.1–3.

25 For the possible route see Casson 1926: 214–215; Maurice 1930: 217–219; Müller 1994: 36 and 37 map 11.

26 Pliny *NH* IV.11.43 locates 'portus Stentoris' (tentoris—A E D R) between the Hebrus and Aenos.

where the provisions were stored was situated at the mouth of the river Melas.[27] Even if one accepts this supposition, the omission of Tyrodiza—which as has been argued above should be located relative to the Thracian Chersonese not towards the Hebrus but towards Pontus—still remains unsolved. It is in fact possible that Leuce Acte and Tyrodiza were used only as places to store provisions that were then eventually taken to a place convenient for the army. Taking into account the proximity to the Thracian Chersonese, such a task would have been easy to carry out.

After his arrival in Doriscus, Xerxes ordered his ships brought to the coast and his soldiers counted.[28] According to Herodotus, the number of the land forces was 1,700,000 people and the number of the ships 1,207.[29] A bit further he draws the general conclusion that the soldiers who served in the army of Xerxes were 2,641,610 in number and together with the support units numbered 5,283,220 people.[30] This is as unreliable as the information provided by other ancient authors.[31] For that reason, scholars have made various calculations in order to conclude that the number of the infantry, and to a lesser degree of the navy, must be reduced several times.[32]

It is unlikely for the stay at Doriscus to be accidental, since at that precise point the greater part of food supplies necessary for the campaign against Greece was stored and the army was examined. While enumerating the individual peoples comprising the Persian army at Doriscus, Herodotus mentions nothing about the European contingents. As becomes clear later in his study, the European soldiers were recruited as the army moved through areas peopled by different tribes. On the way westward, as far as Macedonia, the Persians were to cross a subjected territory and accordingly the progress was expected to be free.

---

27 Maurice 1930: 219–220.

28 Hdt. VII.59.1–2.

29 Ibid. VII.60.1, 89.1.

30 Ibid. VII.185.3–186.2.

31 Aesch. *Pers*. 341–343; *FGrH* 688 F 13.27; Isoc. VI.100; XII.49; Nepos *Them*. 2.4–5; Diod. XI.3.7–9; Aelian *VH* XIII.3; Just. II.10.18.

32 See the discussion by Welzhofer 1892: 157–158; Beloch II.1: 38–39; II.2: 70–74; Munro 1902: 294–300; Macan 1908: II.150–167; Tarn 1908: 202–206; Obst 1913: 90–91; How, Wells 1928: appendix XIX. 2–4; Maurice 1930: 210–235; Munro 1930: 271–276; Glotz 1938: 48–50; Hignett 1963: 345–355; Burn 1984: 326–329; Hammond 1988: 532–536; Dandamaev 1989: 193–195; Balcer 1995: 238–242; Tuplin 1997: 366–373; Green 1998: 58–64; Briant 2002: 527; Cook 2002: 168–173; Wallinga 2005: 32–46; Lazenby 2007: 90–96.

From Doriscus to Therme

Herodotus' description of Xerxes' march from Doriscus to Therme is quite detailed.[33] In an east–west order he enumerates several cities, regions, rivers, lakes, and tribes by name. This particular part of his work is purely geographically oriented and can be viewed as an important addition to his major purpose, namely to inform his readers about the route of the Persian army to Greece. It appears that his information was gained through personal experience,[34] as well as from the works of his predecessors, the logographers. Jacoby holds the opinion that Hecataeus is Herodotus' main source.[35] Obst, for his part, harbours doubts about Jacoby's conclusions.[36] First, he says that Hecataeus describes Galepsus as a Paeonian polis, while Herodotus considers it Greek.[37] Second, in the same passage Herodotus claims that Olynthus was a Greek city—a piece of information that could not be gained from Hecataeus, for in his time this polis was in the possession of the Bottiaei.[38] The arguments offered by Obst are sound, but one should not ignore the fact that Herodotus knew the works of Hecataeus, and it is quite possible that he, on the basis of his personal experience, merely updated some of his predecessor's data.

Is it possible for any of Herodotus' information about the Persian army's movements to have been obtained from a Persian source? Herodotus claims that the Persian army moved from Doriscus to Acanthus in three columns,[39] but at the same time the majority of the geographical names he uses refer to the coast, especially to the Doriscus–Pistyrus route (i.e., to the march of one of the three columns only). This suggests that an official Persian source probably was not used, for otherwise one would expect the progress of the other two columns to be fairly detailed as well. The information about the progress of the Persian army in three columns, with Xerxes in the middle, could have been gained from a local source or from Herodotus' predecessors, the logographers. On the other hand, the list of the commanders of the three army corps as well

33 Hdt. VII.108.1–115.3, 121.1–127.1.

34 Ibid. VI.47.1. For the possibility that Herodotus was familiar with part of the Aegean coast of Thrace by autopsy see Jacoby 1913: 259–261.

35 Jacoby 1912: 2713–2715. See also Herrmann 1911: 382–384; Zahrnt 1971: 7–10; Hammond 1979: 98; Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 67–69; Zahrnt 2008: 108–115.

36 Obst 1913: 59n1.

37 *FGrH* 1 F 152; Hdt. VII.122.1.

38 Hdt. VII.122.1; VIII.127.1.

39 Ibid. VII.121.2–3.

as their genealogy indicates a Persian source.[40] Herodotus mentions scribes who recorded all the peoples present at the examination of the Persian army near Doriscus.[41] Even if one accepts the statement as plausible, it is still quite right to ask what chance Herodotus had to have been in reach of this official document? If Herodotus used Persian sources, they are likely to have been either people who took part in the events or their relatives, rather than any official documents. This information, however, probably only concerns the leading staff of the Persian army, and does not relate to the route they followed through Thrace.

Taking into account the way Herodotus structures his report, the expedition from Doriscus to Therme can be roughly divided into three stages: from Doriscus to Pistyrus,[42] from Pangaeum to the Strymon[43] and from the Strymon to Therme.[44] According to Herodotus, after leaving Doriscus the Persian army passed by Samothracian fortresses,[45] of which Mesambria[46] was the farthest west, and continued its way to the Lisos River,[47] which was said to flow between Mesambria and Thasian Stryme.[48] He notes that in ancient times, this area

40 Ibid. VII.82.1; VII.121.2–3; Boteva 2008: 125; 2011: 751.

41 Hdt. VII.100.1.

42 Ibid. VII.108.1–111.2.

43 Ibid. VII.112.1–114.2.

44 Ibid. VII.115.1–127.1.

45 The city of Sale, spoken about a bit earlier in his work (Hdt. VII.59.2), should be added to the list of the Samothracian fortresses which Herodotus does not mention by name. Sale is also mentioned by Livy (XXXVIII.41.8) and noted in IB. 602.9 (*mutatio Salei*). The location of this polis is controversial. See Isaac 1986: 131; Tuplin 2003: 392—Sale (roughly = modern Alexandroupolis).

46 Mesambria is only mentioned by Herodotus (VII.108.2) and Stephanus of Byzantium (St. Byz. s.v. Μεσημβρία), who follows him. Kazarow 1918: 33 locates Mesambria by Shabla Dere; Casson 1926: 92 identifies it with the present-day city of Makri; and Perdrizet 1909: 35 identifies it with the city of Drys, not mentioned by Herodotus, but familiar to Hecataeus (*FGrH* 1 F 160). Zahrnt 2008: 87–115 holds the opinion that this polis never existed and its mention by Herodotus is due to carelessness.

47 Herodotus' report, according to which the river Lisos flowed between the cities Mesambria and Stryme, is considered reliable. On the other hand, his statement about the Lisos flowing east of Maronea is often doubted. According to Müller 1975: 4 the Lisos should be identified with the Philouri, since it is the only river of significance west of Mesambria. This supposition is also confirmed by Tuplin 2003: 387—'There is no river east of Mt Ismaros substantial enough for the claim that it was drunk dry to be interesting, so the Lisos ought to be the Philouri.' Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 65 identify it with Yala Dere.

48 The location of Stryme is unknown. The polis is often located west of the Philouri mouth (Müller 1975: 4 map 1; Tuplin 2003: 387–388 and map). See also Isaac 1986: 70–71 and

used to be called Gallaice and in his time was named Briantice. After Xerxes crossed the river, which had been dried up by his soldiers, he went by the cities Maronea, Dicaea, Abdera, and the nearby Ismarid[49] and Bistonian lakes. Next, the army crossed the river Nestus and passed by the Thasian cities on the continent, near one of which, Pistyrus, there was a salt lake whose waters were drained by the pack animals. At this point Herodotus adds that the Thracian tribes who possessed the lands that Xerxes' army crossed were the Paitoi, the Cicones, the Bistones, the Sapaei, the Dersaei, the Edoni, and the Satrae. Those who lived by the seaside were conscripted into the navy, while the ones that peopled the interior, excluding the Satrae, were joined to the infantry.

The first aspect of Herodotus' report, then, concerns the locations of the cities, lakes, and rivers that the Persian army passed on their way. These were all closely situated to the coast and related to the route followed by only one of the columns. The second aspect concerns the Thracian tribes in the region, whose precise location is to be defined below. It is generally accepted that the aforesaid tribes were enumerated in an east–west geographical order, which is confirmed to some degree by other ancient authors.

The Paitoi were the first noted by Herodotus. Bearing in mind that the starting point of the expedition of the Persian army was Doriscus, it can be concluded that according to Herodotus their settlements were west of that place. At the time it is possible they spread as far west as the cape of Serreum, since in Herodotus' view the area between Doriscus and the cape of Serreum was possessed by the Cicones in ancient times,[50] suggesting this was no longer true in his own time. Arrian, moreover, mentions a region called Παιτική located between the rivers Melas and Hebrus.[51] This may mean that the Paitoi moved at some time east of the Hebrus, or that in Herodotus' time they had already peopled either side of the lower stream of that river. The second supposition appears more probable since, for the name Παιτική used for the lands between the Melas and the Hebrus to have been officially confirmed by the end of the fourth century, the time from which Arrian's sources dated, it is necessary for the Paitoi to have occupied this territory for quite a long period (i.e., since Herodotus' time, at least).

Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 55–86. The polis is familiar to Stephanus of Byzantium, too (s.v. Στρύμη), who, on the basis of Androtion, locates it in Thrace.

49 The location of the Ismarid lake is unknown. According to Herodotus the lake was situated between the cities Stryme and Maronea. Müller 1975: 4 map 1; Tuplin 2003: map; and Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 59 identify it with Lake Mitrikon.

50 Hdt. VII.59.2.

51 Arr. *Anab*. I.11.4.

West of the Paitoi were the Cicones. Herodotus mentions them three times in his work. First, he notes that in ancient times (τὸ παλαιόν) they possessed the lands between Doriscus and the cape of Serreum, where the Samothracian polis Sale and the polis of Zone were.[52] From the cited report it can be concluded that during Herodotus' time they were no longer in control of that region and that, in his view, the control had been lost in a rather remote period of time. In this particular situation, the stated spread of Ciconian power up to Doriscus and the Hebrus, is probably an echo from the epic tradition, in which the Cicones were mentioned immediately after the Hellespontic Thracians and before the Paeonians of Axius.[53]

Herodotus' second mention of the Cicones appears once again to refer to the area between Doriscus and the cape of Serreum.[54] He claims that, having started from Doriscus, Xerxes passed by the Samothracian fortresses, of which Mesambria was the remotest in the west. A geographical excursus follows, according to which Stryme was next to Mesambria, as the river Lisos drained by the Great King's army flowed between the two poleis.[55] Next, he sums up that in the past this land was called Gallaice, in his time Briantice[56] and right after that he specifies—ἔστι μέντοι τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ τῶν λόγων καὶ αὕτη Κικόνων. The quoted clarification may leave the reader with the impression that even in Herodotus' time that region belonged to the Cicones. Yet, this contradicts his statement that it was in ancient times when the Cicones were in possession of the territory. Herodotus probably implies that, no matter what names the land bore, Gallaice or Briantice, the land by right belonged to the Cicones, who in the middle of the fifth century either did not live there at all, or had no control of it and, accordingly, were dependent on some other tribe.

Herodotus' statement καὶ αὕτη Κικόνων is an interesting addition. It may be accepted as a sign that, apart from the lands between Doriscus and the cape of Serreum, other territories also belonged to the Cicones, probably those situated between the aforesaid cape and the Bistonian lake.[57] It is possible that

52 Hdt. VII.59.2.

53 Hom. *Il.* II.844–850. The locations given by Mela (II.28), who places the Cicones around the Hebrus, and by Pliny (*NH* IV.11.43), who notes that the region of Aenos was once in control of the Cicones (Ciconum quondam regio), are to a certain degree also dependent on the epic tradition.

54 Hdt. VII.108.3.

55 For this excursus see the analysis made by Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 63–65.

56 Pliny (*NH* IV.11.41.) locates a tribe named Priantae close to the Hebrus, and Livy (XXXVIII. 41.8) mentions a *Priaticus campus*, situated west of Sale.

57 There are evidences for the presence of the Cicones in this region (Hom. *Od.* IX.39–40;

Herodotus' third mention of the tribe is related to these Cicones in particular. As has already been noted, he claims that Xerxes' army crossed the lands belonging to several tribes, which the Cicones were among, and recruited those who lived on the coast into the navy, and the ones peopling the interior into the infantry.[58] The statement that the Great King not only passed through the lands of the Cicones but also mobilized them suggests that Herodotus views them as a tribe, still living in these lands in the year 480.[59]

Thus the conclusion may be arrived at that, according to Herodotus, in ancient times the lands between Doriscus and Serreum were in control of the Cicones. In 480 their settlements were west of the cape of Serreum and in Herodotus' time they either no longer lived to the east of the cape in question, or there was only a Ciconian enclave that was unable to affect the political processes in the region. The existence of a Ciconian enclave in the area may be supported by a fragment of Hecataeus, preserved in Stephanus of Byzantium's report—Ζώνη· πόλις Κικόνων. Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπηι.[60] From other fragments of Hecataeus quoted by Stephanus it becomes clear that this author has knowledge of the population of the poleis situated on the north Aegean coast.[61] This may mean that, by defining Zone as a Ciconian polis, Hecataeus reflects the real state of affairs at the end of the sixth and the beginning of the fifth century, as he does about the Persian polis of Boryza.[62] Due to lack of further information about the issue, it is difficult to say to what extent Herodotus' information is dependent on Hecateus.

The Bistones can be certainly located by the Bistonian lake, which according to Pseudo-Scymnus bore their name.[63] An excerpt by Strabo says that in an earlier period of time (i.e., before the arrival of the Greeks) the city of Abdera had been peopled by the Bistones.[64] This probably is the reason why they are

---

Ps.Scymn. 676–677; Strabo VII. fr. 44 Meineke). The quoted reports by Pseudo-Scymnus and Strabo probably do not refer to their time, but to a rather distant period in the past.

58 Hdt. VII.110.1.

59 Delev 1983: 224–225 and Velkov 1991: 23 arrive at the same conclusion. Contra Fol 1976: 18–19, who defines all the information about the Cicones Herodotus provides as a 'pure reminiscence.'

60 *FGrH* 1 F 161.

61 Ibid. F 146, 152.

62 Ibid. F 166. The precise location of Zone is unknown. The ancient settlement near Shabla Dere, identified in early literature with Mesambria, is already identifeied with Zone. The earliest Greek finds from that settlement refer to the sixth century, as it is assumed that a pre-Greek one also existed (Loukopoulou 2004: 881–882; Tiverios 2008: 107–109, 115–116).

63 Ps.Scymn. 673–675.

64 Strabo VII. fr. 44 (Meineke).

often located between the Nestus mouth and Xantheia.[65] Yet, one can only guess whether at the time of Xerxes' expedition and accordingly in Herodotus' time, the settlements of the Bistones reached as far west as the Nestus.

If Herodotus' order of enumeration is followed, then the Sapaei should be located west or northwest of the Bistones. To a certain degree, this location can be confirmed by Pliny, who later locates the Sapaei somewhere near the lower stream of the Nestus,[66] as well as by Appian who, with regard to events in 42, mentions a Sapaean pass and a Sapaean mountain.[67] Appian makes clear that the pass was east of Philippi and that Brutus and Cassius found a way around the occupied pass over the course of four days, with the help of Rhascupolis. In the evening of the fourth day they reached the Harpessus River, which emptied into the Hermus; from that place they needed only a day to reach Philippi. It appears that the roundabout route went north-northwest out of Philippi; for Appian claims in his description of the city that there were woods north of it through which Rhascupolis led the armies of Brutus and Cassius. Though the location of the rivers Harpessus and Hermus is difficult to define, the very mention of the one-day trek from the Harpessus to Philippi is an indication that this is a river from the Nestus region rather than near the Hebrus, and so the lands of the Sapaei were by the river Nestus. In this particular case, the question is not about the political expansion of the Sapaean king's territories but about the tribal core of the Sapaei—a supposition proved true by the name Sapaean applied to the pass and mountain. Apart from that, from Appian's story it can be concluded that in the first century the settlements of the Sapaei occupied not the coast but the interior. This supposition may be confirmed by a report of Strabo, who explicitly says that the Sapaei peopled the interior lands.[68]

If during the first century the Sapaei inhabited the interior then it is logical to ask what the situation in Herodotus' time was. He explicitly states that those of the tribes who lived by the seaside were recruited into the navy and the ones occupying the interior, excluding the Satrae, into the infantry. When Herodotus refers to these interior tribes (again, excluding the Satrae), he uses the plural—οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες πεζῇ ἀναγκαζόμενοι εἵποντο, which means that two more tribes at least, apart from the Satrae, did not live close to the coast. It is clear from the analysis made so far that the Paitoi, the Cicones and the Bistones lived by the coast. Two of the other four tribes should not be taken into

65 Tomaschek 1893: 1.40–41; Detschew 1976: 72.

66 Pliny *NH* IV.11.40.

67 App. *BC* IV.87, 103, 105. For the various locations of the Sapaean Pass see Parissaki 2000–2003: 345–362, where some of the earlier opinions on the issue are presented.

68 Strabo VII. fr. 44 (Meineke)—Σαπαῖοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ὑπερκείμενοι.

consideration: the Satrae, because of Herodotus' remark, and the Sapaei, due to their debatable location. There remain the Dersaei, whose precise location is also questioned, and the Edoni, who, as will became clear later in the present research, peopled the coast. Thus it can be concluded that apart from the Satrae, of the tribes enumerated by Herodotus the Dersaei and the Sapaei are the ones occupying the interior. Taking also into account the reports by Strabo and Appian, it can be concluded that in Herodotus' time the settlements of the Sapaei were situated on either side of the river Nestus, probably north of the present-day city of Chrisoupolis. It is likely that they spread as far east as the present-day Xanthi, and at the most to Philippi in the west.

The tribe mentioned next by Herodotus is the Dersaei. Given the order in which they are enumerated, they should be located west or southwest of the Sapaei, somewhere in the plain occupying the territory between Philippi, Drama, and Pangaeum, but not further west than the east slopes of Pangaeum, which was the starting point of the second stage of the progress of the Persian army. To define the location of this tribe, attention is often paid to Thucydides' reports, which are chronologically closest to Herodotus'. In his view, the invasion of the army of the Odrysae into the lands of the Chalcidians and the Bottiaei frightened the Thracians living in the north and occupying the plains beyond the Strymon (i.e., east of the river): the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droans, and the Dersaei.[69] Here πρὸς βορέαν Θρᾷκες specifies the location of the mentioned Thracian tribes defined by the location of the Chalcidians and the Bottiaei attacked by the Odrysae (i.e., they lived north of them). This shows that the settlements of these four tribes should be located in the plain situated on the east bank of the river Strymon, spreading from Amphipolis in the south to Sirrae in the north—and not by Philippi and Neapolis. The expression πέραν Στρυμόνος also supposes a location closer to the Strymon. The location of two of the tribes at least is also confirmed by other sources. Livy locates the Odomanti by Sirrae[70] and Stephanus of Byzantium defines the Panaeans as an Edonian tribe, living not far away from Amphipolis (οὐ πόῤῥω Ἀμφιπόλεως).[71] A similar specification of the Droans and the Dersaei is not drawn by later authors.

As has already been said in the present study, the location of the Odomanti offered by Thucydides illustrates the situation in his own time. When Hero-

69 Thuc. II.101.3—οἱ πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορέαν Θρᾷκες, ὅσοι πεδία εἶχον, Παναῖοι καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ Δρῶοι καὶ Δερσαῖοι …

70 Liv. XLV.4.2—Paulus Aemilius consul cum castra, ut supra dictum est, ad Siras terrae Odomanticae haberet.

71 St. Byz. s.v. Παναῖοι.

dotus does his research (in the middle of the fifth century) they were still living near Pangaeum and working in the mines situated there—ἐν τῷ χρύσεά τε καὶ ἀργύρεα ἔνι μέταλλα, τὰ νέμονται Πίερές τε καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ μάλιστα Σάτραι. Eventually, for one reason or another, they left their homes and settled in the region of Sirrae. It appears that the same destiny was shared by the Dersaei, who are located east of Pangaeum according to Herodotus, and in the plains beyond the Strymon according to Thucydides. It may be claimed that the migration of the Odomanti took place no earlier than the middle of the fifth century; however, due to lack of information concerning the Dersaei, establishing a similar chronological frame is a risky enterprise. If it is accepted that they migrated together with the Odomanti, it may mean that by locating them to the east of Pangaeum, Herodotus reflects the state of affairs at the time of Xerxes' expedition as well as of his own. If the Dersaei had drawn towards the Strymon, pressed by the Edoni banished from Mygdonia (i.e., in the years immediately following the conquest of Eion by the Athenians in 476), this would be a sign that Herodotus uses information provided by a predecessor, probably Hecataeus.[72]

The next tribe in Herodotus' list is the Edoni. According to Hesychius, the old name of Thasos was Ὀδωνίς,[73] which may mean that before the arrival of the Greeks at least part of the population peopling the island was Edonian. This, for its part, leads to the supposition that there were settlements of the Edoni on the Thracian coast opposite. Their presence there was probably the result of the migration processes taking place, which might be confirmed by the fact that the Edoni lived both by the Strymon and in Asia Minor.[74] During the first half of the seventh century the main enemy of the Thasian colonists were not the Edoni, but the Saioi.[75] It appears that from that time forward, the east settlements of the Edoni spread at most to Neapolis. It is that eastern group of the Edoni, living on the coast between Pangaeum and Neapolis, that Herodotus mentions with regard to the passage of Xerxes' army. Consequently, the number of the Edoni living in the aforesaid area probably increased, for their tribesmen whom the Macedonian ruler Alexander had banished from Mygdonia settled there. It is

72 Hecataeus (*FGrH* 1 F 175) mentions the tribe of the Δάρσιοι, which may be identical to Herodotus' Δερσαῖοι.

73 Hesych. s.v. Ὀδωνίς· ἡ Θάσος τὸ πάλαι (Ὠδονίς).

74 St. Byz. s.v. Ἄνταν̓δρος; Pliny *NH* v.30.123. See also the reports on the Mygdones and a region in Asia Minor called Mygdonia—Strabo vii.3.2; xii.4.4, 8.10; Pliny *NH* v.30.126; Paus. x.27.1; Aelian *VH* viii.5; and Salust. *Hist*. iii. fr. 70 (Maurenbrecher); Strabo xii.3.22, 8.11; Pliny *NH* v.32.145; Solin 40.9; St. Byz. s.v. Μυγδονία.

75 Strabo x.2.17; xii.3.20; Eust. *comm. Dion.Per*. 533 (Bernhardy).

possible that the Edoni lived by that part of the coast for a long time, for several centuries later Ptolemy includes the cities Neapolis and Oisime in the territory of Edonis.[76]

The last of the tribes mentioned by Herodotus is the Satrae. Herodotus explicitly states that they were extremely warlike and that nobody succeeded in conquering them. He defines their location in two ways: first, he claims that they lived in the high mountains covered with woods and snow, and second, that they together with the Pieres and the Odomanti worked in the mines of Pangaeum.[77] What is more, he adds that the oracle of Dionysus, situated in the highest mountains, was in their possession, and that it was the Bessi that made the predictions.[78]

Various suppositions have been made as to where the Satrae should be located and what exactly should be meant by Satrae.[79] While enumerating the tribes whose lands the Persian army passed through on their way to Pangaeum, Herodotus mentions the Satrae last, as he explicitly notes that they occupied the interior—οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν μεσόγαιαν οἰκέοντες καταλεχθέντες τε ὑπ᾽ ἐμεῦ, πλὴν Σατρέων οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες πεζῇ ἀναγκαζόμενοι εἵποντο. This probably means that they lived in the territories west or northwest of the Dersaei, not in the plain situated to the east of Pangaeum but somewhere in the mountains—οἰκέουσί τε γὰρ ὄρεα ὑψηλά. The information about the Pieres, the Odomanti, and most of all the Satrae working in the mines of Pangaeum can be hardly accidental. It is logical to accept that they peopled the mountain in question. Herodotus himself, at another point of his work, once more confirms the location of the Odomanti and the Pieres, both of which, with regard to Megabazus' expedition and Xerxes', he locates by Pangaeum.[80] However, a specification of this kind about the Satrae is missing, which according to Sarafov means that they were not locals, but worked in the Pangaean mines as hired labourers whose settlements were in Rhodope.[81] For the location in question he relies on the expres-

76 Ptolemy III.13.9 (Nobbe).

77 Hdt. VII.111.1—οἰκέουσί τε γὰρ ὄρεα ὑψηλά, ἴδῃσί τε παντοίῃσι καὶ χιόνι συνηρεφέα; VII.112.1—τὰ νέμονται Πίερές τε καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ μάλιστα Σάτραι.

78 Ibid. VII.111.2—οὗτοι οἱ τοῦ Διονύσου τὸ μαντήιόν εἰσι ἐκτημένοι· τὸ δὲ μαντήιον τοῦτο ἔστι μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων, Βησσοὶ δὲ τῶν Σατρέων εἰσὶ οἱ προφητεύοντες τοῦ ἱροῦ …

79 For a review of the different opinions see Sarafov 1974: 123–149. See also Delev 2014: 431–435.

80 Hdt. V.16.1; VII.112.1 See also Thucydides (II.99.3) for the location of the Pieres after they were banished by the Macedonians.

81 Sarafov 1974: 150–151, 171. Sarafov (1974: 150–151, 153) considers Herodotus' passage V.16 unreliable and that is why, with a slight hesitation, he is inclined to assume that the

sion οἰκέουσί τε γὰρ ὄρεα ὑψηλά, ἴδῃσί τε παντοίῃσι καὶ χιόνι συνηρεφέα, which in his view corresponds to the west Rhodope, as well as on ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων, concerning the location of the oracle of Dionysus.[82] Since Herodotus uses the Rhodope in the singular in all cases,[83] Sarafov accepts that in this situation ὄρεα ὑψηλά means 'high mountain massif,' 'high mountain range.'[84]

The supposition that the Satrae lived in the Rhodope appears well-supported. Is it necessary, however, to reject the possibility that part of them occupied Mt Pangaeum itself? When Herodotus describes events and facts related to Pangaeum and the Rhodope he does not hesitate to mention the names of these mountains.[85] In the case of the Satrae he only notes οἰκέουσί τε γὰρ ὄρεα ὑψηλά, ἴδῃσί τε παντοίῃσι καὶ χιόνι συνηρεφέα. Hence, it can be assumed that he is either unaware of their precise location, or their settlements were situated on more than one mountain. Due to the lack of definite information, it cannot be specified how far the Rhodope spread according to Herodotus. He, however, views Pangaeum (1956 m) as a high and large mountain—μέγα τε καὶ ὑψηλόν.[86] Therefore, it is possible that when Herodotus points out ὄρεα ὑψηλά as a place where the Satrae lived, he has in mind not only the southwest Rhodope and their foothills, but part of Pangaeum as well. If that supposition is true, then it should be accepted that the Satrae worked in the Pangaean mines as local people, not as seasonal workers as Sarafov claims. The other, undoubtedly greater, part of them occupied the southwest part of the Rhodope and its foothills. The location suggested here conforms to Herodotus' statement that on their way to Greece the Persian army crossed the lands of the Satrae: their left wing and centre circumvented Pangaeum from the south and from the north, respectively, and the right wing was likely to have followed the route Drama—Prosotsani—Ano Vrontu, or the one passing through Gazoros.

What the Satrae were is still a controversial issue. Sarafov reaches the conclusion that the Satrae were not a tribe, but a group of small tribes, united in their pursuit of political independence and ambition to preserve the Thracian religion. According to his hypothesis, their settlements spread from the region

---

settlements of the Odomanti did not spread up to Pangaeum and accordingly, similarly to the Satrae, they were not locals but hired labourers.

82 Ibid. 1974: 158.

83 Hdt. IV.49.1—ἐκ δὲ Παιόνων καὶ ὄρεος Ῥοδόπης Σκίος ποταμὸς μέσον σχίζων τὸν Αἶμον ἐκδιδοῖ ἐς αὐτόν; ibid. VIII.116.1—ὃς οὔτε αὐτὸς ἔφη τῷ Ξέρξῃ ἑκὼν εἶναι δουλεύσειν, ἀλλ' οἴχετο ἄνω ἐς τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ῥοδόπην …

84 Sarafov 1974: 161.

85 Hdt. V.16.1; VII.112.1–113.1, 115.2; IV.49.1; VIII.116.1.

86 Ibid. VII.112.1.

of the middle and upper Nestus to Pirin and Rila. To support this view, he notes that according to Herodotus nobody succeeded in subjecting the Satrae, adding that it was not possible for a small tribe to have exercised control over the oracle of Dionysus. He finds evidence for their greatness in number in Herodotus' statement that they were warlike, as well as in the fact that in VII.110.1 (πλὴν Σατρέων οἱ πάντες) and VII.111.1 (Σάτραι δὲ οὐδενός κω ἀνθρώπων ὑπήκοοι ἐγένοντο) he does not use the name Σάτραι with the definite article, which may suggest not a small tribe, but a large group of Thracians. As an additional argument Sarafov offers Herodotus' expression Βησσοὶ δὲ τῶν Σατρέων, which according to him shows that the Bessi were part of the Satrae. Lastly, he draws a sign of equality among the Satrae, Dii, and Bessi and, concludes that these were different names of one and the same group of Thracians.[87]

As to the hypothesis Sarafov suggests, some well grounded remarks can be made. It should be noted that Herodotus includes the Satrae in the list of the Thracian tribes whose lands Xerxes' army passed by—*ἔθνεα δὲ Θρηίκων* δι' ὧν τῆς χώρης ὁδὸν ἐποιέετο τοσάδε, Παῖτοι, Κίκονες, Βίστονες, Σαπαῖοι, Δερσαῖοι, Ἠδωνοί, Σάτραι; he views them as a tribe, not as a group of small, separate tribes. What is more, in the next sentence he does not make a distinction between the Satrae and the rest of the tribes in the list—τούτων οἱ μὲν παρὰ θάλασσαν κατοικημένοι ἐν τῇσι νηυσὶ εἵποντο· οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν μεσόγαιαν οἰκέοντες καταλεχθέντες τε ὑπ' ἐμεῦ, πλὴν Σατρέων οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες πεζῇ ἀναγκαζόμενοι εἵποντο.[88] The lack of the definite article Sarafov registers in VII.110.1 (πλὴν Σατρέων οἱ πάντες) and VII.111.1 (Σάτραι δὲ οὐδενός κω ἀνθρώπων ὑπήκοοι ἐγένοντο) cannot serve as evidence either, for this sets no precedent in Herodotus' report. The way he mentions the Trausi is the same in V.3.2–4.1 (πλὴν Γετέων καὶ Τραυσῶν) and V.4.1. (Τραυσοὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Θρήιξι ἐπιτελέουσι). The Trausi, however, had no great political importance and their name can hardly be viewed as a group of several tribes.[89]

The expression used by Herodotus Βησσοὶ δὲ τῶν Σατρέων could actually mean that the Bessi were part of the Satrae. As it has already been shown, however, Herodotus defines the Satrae as a tribe, not as a group of separate tribes, while of the Bessi he only claims that they were part of the Satrae and

87 Sarafov 1974: 160–188. The opinion Sarafov entertains is also held by Fol 1976: 20–21. He, however, defines the Bessi as a *mighty clan*, which exercised both royal and priestly power. Tacheva 1995: 10–11 also accepts that the Satrae is a collective ethnonym but she is reserved as to the identification among the Satrae, Bessi, and Dii.

88 Hdt. VII.110.1.

89 Apart from Herodotus, it is Livy (XXXVIII.41.5–6) who mentions the Trausi. See also Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Τραυσοὶ) and Hesychius (s.v. Τραυσός).

prophets in the oracle of Dionysus. Considering this, it may be assumed that the reference is to a priestly clan from the tribe of the Satrae, called *Bessi*, and not about a separate tribe bearing that name. Undoubtedly, due to the character of the activity the clan of the Bessi did, they enjoyed huge popularity among their tribesmen, and probably not only among them. It appears that later the name of that famous clan replaced the ethnonym Satrae, and after that spread over the neighbouring Thracian tribes and even over almost all the Thracians.[90]

Apart from Herodotus, Hecataeus also defines the Satrae as a separate tribe. The fragments, though not word for word, are quoted by Stephanus of Byzantium. The first speaks about Satrae,[91] and the second about Satrocentae,[92] who should also be related to the Satrae. Thus it can be concluded that the two ancient authors who mention the Satrae define them as a tribe, not as a group of tribes. This, of course, does not mean that they were a small tribe. Yet, their number should not be exaggerated, for Herodotus does not offer any precise information about their size, and he mentions them last in the list of the Thracian tribes whose lands Xerxes' army crossed—and so they probably occupied a limited area in the southwest Rhodope and its foothills and a part of Pangaeum. What is more, they lived high in the mountains, territory that was hardly densely populated. It is probably due to the fact that their settlements were high in the mountains, and not to their greatness in number, that they preserved their independence up to Herodotus' time and, accordingly, were in control of the oracle of Dionysus.

The identification of the Satrae, the Dii, and the Bessi with each other, as suggested by Sarafov, is also questionable. As it has already been noted, a relationship between the Satrae and the Bessi did exist, but in this particular case it is unlikely to have been about a group of separate tribes, which initially bore the name mentioned first, and later the second one, but rather only about a tribe and its priestly clan. As to the Dii, they are only mentioned by Thucydides, Tacitus, and probably Pliny, but none of these authors relates them to the Satrae. Pliny may have been familiar with the Dii under the name of Diobessi, but the information he gives reflects the state of affairs in a later period of time, when the Bessi included several smaller Thracian tribes—*Thracia sequitur, inter validissimas Europae gentes, in strategias* L *divisa. Populorum eius quos nominare non pigeat amnem Strymonem accolunt dextro latere Denseletae et*

90 A similar supposition is also made by Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.110. The ancient authors who mention the Bessi are quoted by Tomaschek 1893: I.72–79; and Detschew 1976: 57–59.

91 *FGrH* 1 F 157.

92 Ibid. F 181.

Maedi ad Bisaltas usque supra dictos, laevo Digerri Bessorumque multa nomina ad Mestum amnem ima Pangaei montis ambientem inter Haletos, Diobessos, Carbilesos, inde Brygas (*Brisas A E D R*)*, Sapaeos, Odomantos*.[93] It is not clear from the quoted passage whether the grouping 'Haletos, Diobessos, Carbilesos' presented one part of 'Bessorumque multa nomina,' or were something completely different. The compound name Diobessi, no matter whether the Dii were known under that name or it is just used for part of the Bessi, points to the first possibility. In neither case, however, can it be accepted as evidence for an identity between the Dii and the Bessi, and thence the Satrae.

The attempts to identify the Satrae with the Dii on the basis of their geographical location can be also questioned. Thucydides first mentions the Dii with regard to Sitalces' expedition against Perdiccas II and the Chalcidians. He notes that in preparation for the expedition the Odrysian king hired the swordsmen (μαχαιροφόροι) Dii, who, he explicitly claims, were independent (αὐτόνομοι) and lived for the most part in the Rhodope (τὴν Ῥοδόπην οἱ πλεῖστοι οἰκοῦντες).[94] What is more, he adds that, some of them voluntarily followed the Odrysian king, obviously in hope of plunder. A bit further, Thucydides once again returns to the Dii, without mentioning their name, claiming that the most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from the Rhodope,[95] namely the Dii. Thucydides also mentions the Dii (Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους) in Book Seven.[96] Here he says they were hired by the Athenians, who intended to send them to Sicily with the navy Demosthenes led, but due to their late arrival in Athens and their high salaries they were sent back to Thrace.

The information about the Dii Thucydides provides cannot serve as evidence for their identification with the Satrae. Similarities did exist. In the first place, both Herodotus and Thucydides describe the Satrae and the Dii, respectively, as warlike people; and second, it may be accepted that most of both tribes lived in the Rhodope. Of course, bellicosity cannot be a criterion, especially as Herodotus appears to adopt the stereotype according to which the people living in the infertile lands in the mountains were warlike, while those occupying the flat land were soft.[97] As to the location of the two tribes, it appears that Herodotus places the Satrae in Pangaeum and the southwest Rhodope, while Thucydides places the Dii in the Rhodope in general. The fact that the Dii were

93 Pliny *NH* IV.11.40 (Detlefsen).

94 Thuc. II.96.2.

95 Ibid. II.98.4.

96 Ibid. VII.27.1–2, 29.1–30.3.

97 Hdt. IX.122.1–4.

hired by Sitalces is a sign that their settlements were situated close to his kingdom. In Thucydides' view, during the time of Sitalces' rule, the lands between the mountains of Haemus and the Rhodope, and the coast from Abdera to the Istros, were part of the Odrysian kingdom.[98] It is obvious that the Odrysian king had no control over the Rhodope, which, however, his territorial possessions surrounded to the north, east, and southeast, since only the southwest part of that huge mountain had no direct contact with them. As has already been clarified this is exactly where the Satrae lived; whereas the Dii, who were explicitly said to have occupied the Rhodope, should be located either in the north, in the east, or in the southeast part of that mountain range to be able to join Sitalces' army. As far as the same period of time is concerned, their location may be defined to a certain extent by taking into consideration that they were later (413) hired by the Athenians as well. This suggests a location further to the south (i.e., in the southeast Rhodope or in the part of the mountain situated above the polis of Abdera). It should be noted that in the case of the Athenians, Thucydides does not make clear whether the mercenaries came from Rhodope, or whether they were part of those who did not live in the abovementioned mountain, which raises doubts as to their southern location. It can be confirmed by Pliny only, who locates the Diobessi somewhere by the Nestus, but it is not clear whether he refers to the Dii, or only to one part of the Bessi; and what is more, his report reflects the state of affairs during a later period of time. The information offered by Tacitus is also late, in reference to the revolt of the Coelaletae, Odrysae, and Dii against Rhoemetalces and Trebellenus Rufus (AD 21), the guardian of Cotys' children.[99] What is more, he does not precisely define the geographical location of the Dii.

According to Herodotus' explicit remark, the Persian army moved from Doriscus to Acanthus in three columns.[100] The first, headed by Mardonius and Masistes, followed the coastline together with the navy; the second, headed by Tritantaechmes and Gergis, advanced through the interior; and the third, to which Xerxes himself belonged and which was headed by Smerdomenes and Megabazus, moved between the other two.[101] Due to the difficulty of describing three separate routes from Doriscus to Acanthus, Herodotus' statement about the three-column progress often raises doubts. Macan, for instance, arrives at

98 Thuc. II.96.1, 97.1. For the borders of the Odrysian kingdom during Sitalces' reign see Vasilev 2011a: 30–31.

99 Tac. *Ann*. III.38.

100 Hdt. VII.121.2–3.

101 Maurice 1930: 227 arrives at the conclusion that Xerxes, together with the corps of the immortals and his entourage, followed the coastal road.

the conclusion that only two of them progressed by land, while the third was put onto ships and thus sailed with the navy.[102] Herodotus, however, is explicit that the three regiments advanced by land and the one closest to the coast was accompanied by the navy (μίαν αὐτέων ἔταξε παρὰ θάλασσαν ἰέναι ὁμοῦ τῷ ναυτικῷ).

Hammond offers another solution: the army column that according to Herodotus progressed through the interior moved through the central Thracian plain; in other words, it circumvented the Rhodope from the north, and then, either following the way through the present-day cities Samokov, Kjustendil, and Valandovo entered Amphaxitis, or through Razlog and Petric reached the bed of the river Strymon.[103] The route Hammond offers is in conformity with his hypothesis about the great territorial expansion of the Persian lands in Europe—he refers to the central Thracian plain as 'the heart of the satrapy.' The circumvention of the Rhodope mountain chain from the north appears less possible, not only because it would lead to a detour, but because the Odrysae, already well-known in Herodotus' time, were missing from the list of the allied tribes. What is more, a march into Macedonia through Amphaxitis resembles the route that Sitalces followed some decades later.[104] No ancient author, including Thucydides, draws a parallel between the route followed by Sitalces and that taken by one of Xerxes' army corps. All this may mean that in the summer of 480 the entire Persian army moved south of the Rhodope.

Herodotus' geographical description is not enough to precisely define the route of the three army corps. The coastal route of the army is the easiest to follow. However, details are difficult to give. Tuplin for instance claims that it is possible to circumvent Mt Ismaros from the south, as well as to find three routes which the individual corps of the Persian army could have followed from Doriscus to the plain of Komotini.[105] In contast, Müller arrives at the conclusion that it is impossible for Mt Ismaros to have been circumvented from the sea, and that the smooth road north of Mesambria and leading to the

102 Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.121.

103 Hammond 1988: 538. Boteva 2008: 125–126; 2011: 753–754 is apt to agree on the route suggested by Hammond, on condition that here, it is not in reference to subjection, but to preliminarily established relations with the local Thracians, and in particular with the Odrysae. Anderson 1898: 211–252 was the first to make the assumption that the right wing of the Persian army progressed along the valley of the Hebrus river and, following the Axius downstream entered Macedonia. His supposition is accepted by Munro 1902: 300.

104 Thuc. II.98.1–2.

105 Tuplin 2003: 388, 392–395, 405.

Komotini plain was followed.[106] The progress of the Persians through the plain mentioned above to Bistonian lake in three columns should have encountered no difficulty.[107] Müller accepts that the lake was circumvented from the north, which means that the columns of the Persian army got closer or even merged into a whole.[108] On the other hand, Tuplin holds the opinion that at that time there was a road on the south side of the lake and accordingly the left wing of the army followed it, while the other two columns circumvented the lake from the north following two different roads, the first close to the shore and the other in the interior.[109]

After the Bistonian lake, the left column of the Persian army reached Abdera. According to Herodotus the locals were on the verge of ruin, for they had to maintain the Persian army. The story leaves the reader with the impression that Xerxes himself was present at the feast given by the citizens of Abdera.[110] Herodotus, however, states as well that Xerxes went with the middle column,[111] which may mean that while advancing towards Greece, the Great King did not visit that polis. This is confirmed in another passage of Herodotus, who, using the citizens of Abdera as a source, notes that while returning to Asia, Xerxes signed a friendship contract with their city and awarded them with a golden sword and a gilt tiara.[112] This act indicates that this was his first visit to the city and that at the time of his progress towards Greece he moved through the interior.

From Abdera the left column crossed the river Nestus and reached Neapolis. The other two columns probably crossed the valley south of Xanthi and joined the left column at Neapolis.[113] Tuplin offers a different version. According to him, the right column followed the route Xanthi—Stavroupolis—Paranestion—the Angites valley, while the central column followed the route join-

106 Müller 1975: 4; 1987: 37. Zahrnt 2008: 91n5 holds the same opinion. For that early stage of the progress of the Persian army see also Loukopoulou, Psoma 2008: 64–65

107 According to Müller (1975: 5; 1987: 35, 37), due to the lagoons and the marshlands, the part of the army advancing along the coast was forced to head for the interior, and thus to leave the coastal cities on their left. He concludes that this column circumvented Lake Ismarid from the north, while the other two moved further to the north and crossed the valley of Komotini. On Tuplin's map (2003: map), two roads circumventing Lake Ismarid are marked, one circumventing it from the north and the other from the south.

108 Müller 1975: 5, 10 map 4; 1987: 35, 37.

109 Tuplin 2003: 405 and n34.

110 Hdt. VII.120.1–2.

111 Ibid. VII.121.2–3.

112 Ibid. VIII.120.1.

113 Müller 1975: 6, 10 map 4; 1987: 35.

ing Stavroupolis to the plain of Philippi (by way of Lekani, Platamon, and Polyneron).[114] The route offered by Tuplin coincides with Herodotus' statement that the Persian army went through the land of the Sapaei and then immediately through the land of the Dersaei, if its continuation is taken into account.

The second stage of the progress of the Persian army across Thrace includes the trek from Pangaeum to the Strymon. Herodotus starts his story anew with the fortresses of the Pieres, Phagres and Pergamus. In his view, Xerxes passed by them leaving Pangaeum on his right. Meanwhile, he passed by the Paeonians living in the north, Doberes, and Paeoplae; after crossing the region of Phyllis, he reached the Strymon River and the city of Eion. By this river, the Magi offered white horses as sacrifice to the gods and performed rituals, and in the area 'Nine Ways' they buried alive nine local girls and boys. A bit further in his work, Herodotus says that on his way to Greece Xerxes left Zeus' holy chariot in the Paeonian Sirrae.[115]

If Herodotus is strictly followed, it should be accepted that the progress of the Persian army from Pangaeum to the Strymon was also made in three columns. The geographical signs he provides may confirm his statement. Undoubtedly, the left column circumvented Pangaeum from the south and on its way to the Strymon mouth crossed the lands of the Pieres, passing by their fortresses Phagres and Pergamus. The central part of the army, which Xerxes belonged to, circumvented Pangaeum from the north, going downstream of the Angites. Judging from Herodotus' text, it can be concluded that Xerxes advanced downstream of the river close to the place where it flowed into the Strymon, and from that point headed for Eion. The question that can be asked at this point is: how does this route comply with what Herodotus states about Xerxes' leaving Zeus' holy chariot in the Paeonian Sirrae? If one accepts that the story of the chariot is true, then there will be two possible answers. The first will be that, having circumvented the north hillsides of Mt Pangaeum, Xerxes continued his way towards Sirrae and after a short stay there headed for Eion. According to the second, the road taken by Xerxes would be the one described by Herodotus (i.e., across the region of Phyllis towards the Strymon mouth and Eion). In this situation, Zeus' chariot would be taken to Sirrae by the right wing of the army and not by Xerxes himself. To reach Sirrae as an individual unit, this part of the army might follow the north Drama—Prosotsani—Ano Vrontu trek or the much more convenient and accordingly preferred route across the

114 Tuplin 2003: 395–397, 405–406.

115 Hdt. VIII.115.4.

friendly territory of Gazoros. The trek across the region of Sirrae is confirmed by the recruitment of the Paeonians into the land forces.[116]

The third stage of the progress of the Persian army includes the trek from the Strymon to Therme. Herodotus claims that after crossing the Strymon, the Persian army passed by the Greek city Argilus and by the temple of Poseidon, then went through the plain of Syleus and by the city of Stagirus, finally arriving in Acanthus. During his stay in Acanthus, Xerxes ordered his navy to sail for Therme, the place appointed for the land and naval forces to reunite. Xerxes himself, at the head of the infantry, also set off for Therme. In order to arrive there, he took an inland road, which went through Paeonia and Crestonia. Some further information about the road to Therme followed by the Persians may be gained from two other passages of Herodotus. In the first of them it is said that the Eordaei, Bottiaei, and τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος were recruited into the Persian infantry,[117] while in the other passage the king of the Bisaltae and the Crestones is said to have denied submission to the Persians and retreated into the Rhodope. His six sons decided to take part in the campaign against Greece, for which they were later blinded by order of their father.[118]

Herodotus' information about the progress of the Persian army from the Strymon to Therme raises some difficult questions. He claims that from Doriscus to Acanthus the army moved in three columns, which should mean that from Acanthus to Therme the three army corps united and advanced together towards the Thermaic Gulf. This reconstruction of the route followed by the Persian army seems doubtful. Why was it necessary for the entire army to gather together in the city of Acanthus, so far away from the shortest route to Therme? Moreover, is it possible to accept that from the Strymon to Acanthus the army continued in three separate columns, as he claims? Above all, is it logical for the whole of the army to have gone through Paeonia and Crestonia on their way to Therme?

If Herodotus' report is taken into account, then the route of the Persian army from the Strymon to Therme can be reconstructed in various ways. As a starting point may serve his statement that Xerxes himself visited Acanthus. Xerxes' visit to Acanthus should not be questioned. It was probably the result of his desire to see the canal by Athos, and is confirmed both by the Median clothing he gave the citizens of the city and by Artachaees' burial, which so impressed them that even in Herodotus' time they carried on offering him sacrifice.[119]

116 Ibid. VII.185.2; IX.32.1

117 Ibid. VII.185.2.

118 Ibid. VIII.116.1–2.

119 Ibid. VII.116.1–117.2—τούτῳ δὲ τῷ Ἀρταχαίῃ θύουσι Ἀκάνθιοι ἐκ θεοπροπίου ὡς ἥρωι, ἐπονομάζοντες τὸ οὔνομα.

Having in mind Xerxes' visit to Acanthus as well as the statement that he moved with the second column, it may be assumed that at 'Nine Ways' at least two of the three of them joined together.[120] Next, they crossed the Strymon over the pontoon-bridges, advanced by the coast and reached the place where Lake Bolbe issued into the sea. There are two possibilities from that point: the two columns continued together towards Acanthus, or one of them continued on its own and following the road by Lake Bolbe and Koronea headed for Therme. The presence of the Brygi and the Eordaei in the Persian army shows that the Persians used the aforesaid road, but the order it happened can be only guessed. Yet, the second version appears more probable, for the arrival of a numerous army in Acanthus with the entire commissariat seems pointless.[121]

The progress towards Therme of that part of the army that reached Acanthus is also controversial. Herodotus claims that to reach Therme Xerxes took an inland road (τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ) that went through Paeonia and the lands of the Crestones.[122] He also speaks about a curious detail—while the army was following that road, the camels, loaded with provisions, were attacked by lions.[123] At that point the following question may be rightly asked: what was the point of Xerxes' following this out of the way road to Therme, and why were the camels taken to Acanthus and afterwards, by the detour road, to Therme? The answer probably involves the progress of the right wing of the army, which will be mentioned below.

Thus it can be assumed that the part of the army that reached Acanthus returned to Lake Bolbe and from there headed for Therme. Due to the mention of the Bottiaei and τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος as part of the Persian land forces, there is one more possibility, according to which the army at Acanthus, or more probably only part of it, reached Therme following the coast of the Chalcidice peninsula, and accordingly established contact with the navy.[124] However, one

120 Müller 1975: 7–8, 10 map 4; 1987: 34 concludes that the army united into a whole at 'Nine Ways.' Kienast 1996: 311 says that at that point Xerxes together with his guard moved from the central column of the army into the left one.

121 Müller 1975: 8–9, 10 map 4 accepts that the major part of the army progressed towards Therme on the road of the south shore of Lake Bolbe, while Xerxes, at the head of a small contingent set off for Acanthus. Hammond 1988: 539 holds the opinion that Xerxes reached Acanthus with the column following the coast, while the cavalry and the commissariat continued their way to Therme, following the road going by lakes Bolbe and Koronea.

122 Hdt. VII.124.1.

123 Ibid. VII.125.1.

124 Macan 1908: II.139; Müller 1975: 10 map 4, 11; Hammond 1979: 128 map 4.

should not reject the possibility for the Bottiaei and τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος to have been recruited not into the infantry but into the navy. In such a case, the passage of the army along the coast of the peninsula will have to be rejected.

If it is accepted that the right wing of the Persian army reached Sirrae, there are two possible versions of its progress towards Therme, as well. According to the first, this part of the army set off for the area 'Nine Ways' and united with the other two columns. After crossing the Strymon, it went by the west shore of the river as far as the valley of Kumli and from there it went down south through Palatianon towards the valley of the Echedoros River, from that point reaching Therme.[125] According to the second one, from Sirrae the right wing headed for Lake Prasias, circumvented it from the north, crossed the valley of Kumli and the Stena Dov Tepe, and then from the region of Lake Doiran it went down south to the bed of the Echedoros River and Therme.[126]

Both the routes went through the lands of the king of the Bisaltae. Herodotus defines the land by the Greek polis Agrilus, as well as the territory above, as Bisaltia.[127] What is more, he adds that the king of the Bisaltae was also king of Crestonian land and that the Echedoros River took its source from the land of the Crestones.[128] The geographical information Herodotus provides shows that the territories subjected to the anonymous king of the Bisaltae were situated west of the Strymon River—in the interior rather than close to the seaside.[129] It appears that at that time, east of the Strymon, between the point at which the Angites empties into it and Mt Belasitsa, there were only Paeonian settlements, and no Bisaltaean ones.[130]

How does this location corresponds to the statement that the king of the Bisaltae, unwilling to join the Persians, retreated upwards into the Rhodope (οἴχετο ἄνω ἐς τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ῥοδόπην)? Herodotus mentions the Rhodope chain

125 For this trek see Hammond 1972: 194–195; 1979: 128 map 4; 1988: 539. Müller 1975: 9, 11 and 10 map 4 assumes that part of the army went about the same way.

126 Hammond 1979: 128 map 4.

127 Hdt. VII.115.1—ὡς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἐπορεύετο ὁ στρατός, ἐνθαῦτα πρὸς ἡλίου δυσμέων ἐστὶ αἰγιαλὸς ἐν τῷ οἰκημένην Ἄργιλον πόλιν Ἑλλάδα παρεξήιε· αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἡ κατύπερθε ταύτης καλέεται Βισαλτίη.

128 Ibid. VII.124.1, 127.2; VIII.116.1.

129 For the approximate territorial dimensions of Crestonia and Bisaltia see Hammond's map (1972: 180 map 17).

130 As it can be seen from Strabo's report (VII. fr. 36 Meineke), in later periods of time the settlements of the Bisaltae were situated on both sides of the Strymon—ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως Βισάλται καὶ μέχρι πόλεως Ἡρακλείας, ἔχοντες αὐλῶνα εὔκαρπον, ὃν διαρρεῖ ὁ Στρυμὼν ὡρμημένος.

in his work at one more point only to specify that the river Scius (Κίος A B C P) sprang from it.[131] Undoubtedly, this is the present-day river Iskar, which springs from Mt Rila and which is familiar to Thucydides by the name of Ὄσκιος.[132] This fact, however, is of no great help in understanding Herodotus' geographical frame for the Rhodope. He mentions Mt Orbelus, which, as argued above, can be identified with Mt Belasitsa, or at least with that part of it situated by Lake Butkovo. In such a case, the king of the Bisaltae, to be able to retreat 'up' in the Rhodope, should cross the Strymon River or look for safety in the farthest east spurs of Belasitsa, if it is accepted that in Herodotus' view, or his sources', they were also part of the Rhodopes.

The information provided by Herodotus, though far from precise, allows the route the Persian army followed from Doriscus to Therme to be more or less reconstructed. It can be only guessed whether Xerxes' army progressed towards Acanthus in three columns. The geographical signs given by Herodotus as well as the research of scholars suggests that, as far as the Strymon at least, progress in this order is possible, while the arrival of the entire army in Acanthus appears pointless. This may mean two things: either Herodotus' information about the advance of the Persian army in three columns has no real historic grounds and accordingly should not be taken into account; or that after the army separated at Doriscus, all the available land forces once more gathered together on their arrival at Therme, where they camped, and not at Acanthus.

On the way to Therme, the Persian army crossed friendly territories, which gave it the chance not only to achieve the desired aim with no loss of life, but also to enlarge its number by recruiting men from each tribe it met on its way. The policy of mobilizing the local population, in this case the Greeks peopling the coastal cities, was carried out by the leading navy staff as well. Its route, at least as far as the Acanthus–Therme trek, is described by Herodotus in detail,[133] but is not within the focus of the present study, and so will not be further discussed.

The Advice of Alexander at Tempe

While the army of the Great King was still in Asia, the representatives of the Greek cities gathered at the Isthmus to decide how to cope with the circum-

131 Hdt. IV.49.1—ἐκ δὲ Παιόνων καὶ ὄρεος Ῥοδόπης Σκίος ποταμὸς μέσον σχίζων τὸν Αἶμον ἐκδιδοῖ ἐς αὐτόν.

132 Thuc. II.96.4.

133 Hdt. VII.122.1–124.1.

stances. According to Herodotus, envoys from Thessaly arrived at the Isthmus. Their purpose was to persuade the Greeks gathered there to send an army to help prevent the Persians from invading Thessaly.[134] Herodotus makes it clear that the envoys were sent by the Thessalians contrary to the intentions of the pro-Persian Aleuadae, whom he defines as among the initiators of the campaign against Greece.[135] His story continues with the statement that the Greeks agreed to help the Thessalians, and for that purpose they sent an army of about 10,000 heavily armed men who were assigned the task to hold the Tempe pass. The Thessalians, who arrived with their cavalry, joined the army. Herodotus makes no mention of any overall commander of the army that was sent. He only says that the Athenian corps was led by Themistocles and the Spartan by Euaenetus, who was not of royal origin.[136] Next, he claims that the Greeks camped in Tempe for few days and decided to retreat.[137] Herodotus offers two different explanations as to why this decision crucial for the future of the Thessalians was taken. The first refers to the piece of advice given to the Greeks by the Macedonian ruler Alexander, who through envoys warned them about the great number of the Persian army and navy as well as their inability to oppose the Persians. The second is Herodotus' personal conclusion, according to which the Greeks followed the advice of the Macedonian ruler after they understood that there was another pass from Upper Macedonia to Thessaly, through the lands of the Perrhaebi, by the city of Gonnus.

Alexander's role in the story is confirmed by another source. Speusippus' *Letter to Philip II* reads that the Macedonian ruler informed the Greeks camping by Heracleium about the treachery of the Aleuadae and Thessalians.[138] Speusippus based his report on the authority of Herodotus and Damastes but does not clarify who the source of the information in this particular case is. Since it cannot be Herodotus, it becomes clear that Speusippus obtained information from Damastes, who was more or less his contemporary.[139] More information is provided by Diodorus and Plutarch, but they mention nothing about Alexander's advice.[140]

The actions of Alexander are important to the present study. In what capacity did he give the Greeks advice and why would he have done so? He may have

134 Ibid. VII.172.1.
135 Ibid. VII.6.2.
136 Ibid. VII.173.1–2.
137 Ibid. VII.173.3–4.
138 Speus. *Letter to Philip* 3–4.
139 Suid. s.v. Δαμάσης.
140 Diod. XI.3.1–2; Plut. *Herod. Malign.* 31.

advised the Greeks as a Greek man concerned about their shared destiny, as a vassal of the Great King, or as a ruler of Macedonia pursuing his own interests. Some scholars consider his actions to be the result of a secret agreement with the Aleuadae,[141] others believe that they were inspired by Themistocles,[142] a third group have doubts about the role the Macedonian ruler played according to Herodotus.[143] Without a doubt, the settling of the Greek corps in Tempe, if one trusts Herodotus, or in Heracleium, if Speusippus is followed, puts Alexander in a difficult position. If the Greeks succeeded even for a while in holding that position, he would be compelled to provide food for the large Persian army and to tolerate its presence in his own territory. Such a situation would be extremely disadvantageous to him and he was willing to do anything to avoid it. On the other hand, however, if he managed to persuade the Greeks to withdraw, Alexander may have received good reports from either antagonistic side—from the Great King for the help he offered him to win over the Thessalians and the free entry into their lands, and from the Greeks for the rescue of their corps. What is more, this act would undoubtedly gain the approval of the pro-Persian Aleuadae, who had an interest in the Persians' safe passage into Thessaly. Bearing this in mind, it can be assumed that Alexander acted as a Macedonian ruler who, though Xerxes' vassal, pursued his own interests, which in the particular situation coincided not only with Persian interests, but also with those of the Aleuadae—and probably with those of the Spartans and of Themistocles, who relied on a different strategy aiming at the defense of Greece. This favourable concurrence of events proved advantageous to him during the war itself as well as after it, when he did not miss a chance to brag about his service for the Greek cause.

From Macedonia to Thessaly: The Crossing of Petra Pass

The retreat of the Greek corps provided the Persian army with the opportunity to freely invade Thessaly through the Tempe pass. According to Herodotus, however, Xerxes intended to enter Thessaly from 'the upper road,' going across the lands of the Macedonians, living above, and reaching the lands belonging to the Perrhaebi near Gonnus, for he received information that this was the safest way.[144] To get to know the situation on the ground, Xerxes sailed for the

141 Robertson 1976: 120.

142 Cole 1978: 43.

143 Macan 1908: II.251.

144 Hdt. VII.128.1.

Peneus mouth at the head of the navy. He then spent many days in Pieria while a third of his army was clearing a road over the Macedonian mountain where the entire army had to go into Thessaly.[145] A bit further in his work, Herodotus confirms that the road through Gonnus was the one the Persians used.[146]

This suggested route of the Persian army raises some difficult problems regarding Herodotus' geographical idea of Upper Macedonia, of the location of the Macedonian mountain, as well as his statement that the whole Persian army entered Thessaly following a road that reached as far as Gonnus. Herodotus gives several hints that can help find a solution to the problem. They are as follows:

1. VII.128.1.—Herodotus says that Xerxes intended to march by the 'upper road' (τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν) which went through the lands of the Macedonians living above (διὰ Μακεδόνων τῶν κατύπερθε οἰκημένων) and reached the lands of the Perrhaebi by Gonnus (ἐς Περραιβοὺς παρὰ Γόννον πόλιν). What is more, he adds that this was the safest way (ἀσφαλέστατον).
2. VII.131.1.—Herodotus claims that Xerxes spent many days in Pieria while a third of his army was clearing a road over the Macedonian mountain (ὄρος τὸ Μακεδονικόν) and adds that the whole army had to go this way.
3. VII.173.4—Herodotus expresses a personal opinion according to which the Greeks camping by Tempe abandoned their position after they understood that the Persians might enter Thessaly through another pass, going from Upper Macedonia to the lands of the Perrhaebi by Gonnus (τὴν ἄνω Μακεδονίην διὰ Περραιβῶν κατὰ Γόννον πόλιν). After that he makes it clear that the whole army used precisely that road.

From the passages quoted here, it becomes clear that Herodotus thinks that the whole of the Persian army followed only one road to enter Thessaly, and that it went through Upper Macedonia and reached Gonnus, in the lands of the Perrhaebi. In order to make it clear which particular road Herodotus has in mind, it is first necessary to define the location of the Macedonian mountain. Bearing in mind that Xerxes was in Pieria while the army was clearing a road over the mountain, it is logical to identify it with the Pierian mountains, or with Olympus, or Lower Olympus. Herodotus' idea is that Olympus and Lower Olympus comprise a mountain chain, separated from Mt Ossa by the river Peneus. He is

145 Ibid. VII.131.1.

146 Ibid. VII.173.4.

aware that Olympus bordered Thessaly[147] as well as Lower Macedonia[148] and defines Olympus and Ossa as Thessalian mountains.[149] This probably means that, for Herodotus the 'Macedonian mountain' is not Olympus or its north spurs, but the Pierian mountains. In such a case, at least some of the settlements of those διὰ Μακεδόνων τῶν κατύπερθε οἰκημένων should be in the Pierian mountains themselves, and this should also be the place where at least part of the region ἄνω Μακεδονίη should be located.[150]

Hence, it may be assumed that τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν refers to the road through the Petra Pass which separated Olympus from the Pierian mountains, since it is illogical to have cut a new road through the mountains in discussion. It appears that at that time the route through the Petra Pass was unsuitable for a large army and its entire commissariat to take, since it took the Persians many days to get it ready for their purposes. Moreover, according to Herodotus Xerxes was told that this was the safest way. If the concern was about the specific features of the road, a reasonable preference for the Petra Pass may be confirmed by the description Titus Livy gave of the difficulties of crossing the Tempe pass.[151] If the danger to be avoided was instead rooted in current political circumstances, then the invasion of the Persian army into Thessaly from the point furthest north, as well as Herodotus' report that Xerxes did not go through Tempe pass, may mean that he had no doubts as to the loyalty of the tribes peopling the lands between the Petra Pass and the Peneus River.

Some scholars think it is illogical for the Persian army to enter Thessaly through a single pass, and they correspondingly assume that the army went through two or even three passes: Volustana, Petra, and Tempe.[152] Geyer holds the opinion that the Persian army went through the passes Volustana and Petra. In his view, part of the army progressed along the Chaliacmon upstream until

147 Ibid. VII.129.1.

148 Ibid. VII.173.1—ἀπίκετο ἐς τὰ Τέμπεα ἐς τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἥ περ ἀπὸ Μακεδονίης τῆς κάτω ἐς Θεσσαλίην φέρει παρὰ ποταμὸν Πηνειόν, μεταξὺ δὲ Ὀλύμπου τε ὄρεος ἐόντα καὶ τῆς Ὄσσης.

149 Ibid. VII.128.1—ὄρεα τὰ Θεσσαλικά, τόν τε Ὄλυμπον καὶ τὴν Ὄσσαν, μεγάθεϊ τε ὑπερμήκεα ἐόντα, διὰ μέσου τε αὐτῶν αὐλῶνα στεινὸν πυνθανόμενος εἶναι, δι' οὗ ῥέει ὁ Πηνειός …

150 See also Rosen 1978: 12–13; Zahrnt 1984: 346–347, 353. See also Stein IV: ad VII.131—'weshalb hier die pierischen Berge als οὖρος Μακεδονικόν bezeichnet sind.'

151 Liv. XLIV.6.8. Yet, see Grote's (1861: V.68n2) and Macan's (1908: I.1 ad VII.128) objections, who arrive at the conclusion that the description made by Titus Livy relates to the fortification of the pass in a later period of time.

152 Stein IV: ad VII.128, 173; Abicht 1882: ad VII.128; Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.128; Smith 1908: ad VII.128; How, Wells 1928: ad VII.128; Geyer 1930: 46; Munro 1930: 292; van Groningen 1955: ad VII.128; Schrader 1985: 170n614, 174n624; Hammond 1988: 546–547; Tuplin 2003: 401n26; Lazenby 2007: 115–116.

it reached the first of the aforementioned passes. He is criticized by Hammond, who defines Geyer's suggested route as 'a long detour' and clarifies on the basis of personal experience that the river defile was impassible for army troops.[153] He himself offers a route as indirect as the aforesaid one: Pella—Edessa—Kara Burun—Servia—Volustana and the trek Verria—Zoodokos Pege—Servia—Volustana.[154] Having in mind that the Petra and Volustana passes are hardly several dozens kilometres distant from one another, and that both led to the furthest north of Thessaly, then the parallel use of both would only make sense if one was kept by the enemy. Taking into account the friendly situation in the region as well as the fact that the Petra and Tempe passes were free to go through, then a lengthy detour into Thessaly through Volustana turns out to be entirely unnecessary.

In contrast to Volustana, it was not necessary to take roundabout routes for the Tempe Pass to be used; it was only necessary to go along the coast until it reached the river Peneus. This route is suitable, for it provided the army with the chance to advance parallel to the navy. According to Herodotus, however, the Tempe Pass was not used by even a single, minor portion of the Persian army. He claims that while the infantry was camping near Therme, Xerxes sailed for the mouth of the Peneus at the head of the navy, and after his investigation took the way back.[155] Even if the Great King himself took no part in this reconnaissance mission,[156] the mission itself is logical, taking into consideration that until a few months earlier the position near Tempe had been occupied by Greeks. It is possible that the inspection of the pass as well as the information gained from local informers made the Persian leadership conclude that it was not a good idea to take the road through Tempe. Judging from Livy's description of the pass as to the dangers one might encounter, it is absolutely logical to make such a conclusion.

There was another road leading from Lower Macedonia to Thessaly, the Veroia—Litochoron—Nezero—Gonnus route. Pritchett expresses the opinion that this was the route the Persians followed.[157] Indeed, this would have been a direct route to Gonnus in conformity with Herodotus' description of τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν. The road, however, went between Olympus and Lower Olympus. As has already been noted, Herodotus considered this mountain massif Thessalian, not Macedonian. Bearing this in mind, along with the conclusion arrived at

153 Hammond 1979: 100n2.

154 Hammond 1988: 546.

155 Hdt. VII.128.1–2, 130.1–3.

156 Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.128; Hignett 1963: 108.

157 Pritchett 1961: 369–375.

above about the location of Upper Macedonia and of the Macedonian mountain, it may be concluded that this is not the route described by Herodotus.[158]

Scholars who believe that the Persian army entered Thessaly following three separate routes generally cite Herodotus' report according to which one third of the Persian army (τῆς στρατιῆς τριτημορίς) was clearing a road over the Macedonian mountain. Hence, it is logical to ask what the other two thirds of the army did, and thus the conclusion is arrived at that they headed for different passes. In such arguments, however, Herodotus' specification about clearing the way over the Macedonian mountain is taken out of its original context, which is about setting the road into good condition to allow the whole of the army and commissariat to advance. Herodotus himself has no information about the division of the Persian army into three parts, and claims that their entire staff followed one and the same route. Having in mind that particular specification, as well as the analysis made above concerning the use of the Volustana Pass and the Veroia—Litochoron—Nezero—Gonnus route, it can be concluded that it is reasonable for the whole army to have gone from Upper Macedonia to Thessaly through the Petra Pass.[159]

The Return of Xerxes through Macedonia and Thrace

After the defeat at Salamis (September, 480), Xerxes decided to return to Asia and assign Mardonius the task to carry on with the war against the Greeks. In Herodotus' view, the whole Persian army first retreated to Thessaly for a winter camp.[160] From that point, Xerxes together with the corps led by Artabazus, headed for the Hellespont.[161] The journey lasted forty-five days, in which period nearly the whole army died of hunger, plague, and dysentery.[162] According to the information Herodotus provides, Xerxes returned by land through Thessaly and Macedonia, on through the Paeonian Sirrae and Abdera, and thus reached

158 Pritchett 1961: 375, on the basis of a discussion with Vanderpool, reaches the conclusion that when Herodotus speaks about Upper Macedonia he means the plain of Katerini.

159 Leak 1835: III.342–343; Rawlinson 1860: IV.121n5–6; Grote 1861: V.82n1; Robertson 1976: 112–114; and Borza 1992: 107, 290–291 arrive at the same conclusion. Zahrnt 1984: 364 is not definite whether it was the Petra Pass or the route offered by Pritchett. In two later works, Zahrnt 2011: 769; and 2011a: 265 assumes that it is possible for the Persian army to have been divided into several parts and to have entered Thessaly following different routes.

160 Hdt. VIII.113.1–3.

161 Ibid. VIII.126.1.

162 Ibid. VIII.115.1–3. Cornelius Nepos (*Them.* 5.2) speaks about a thirty-day march.

the Hellespont.[163] Herodotus mentions one other version of Xerxes' return, which he himself considers unconvincing, according to which the Great King accompanied by many Persian nobles travelled the distance from Eion to the Asian coast on a Phoenician ship.[164]

Aeschylus also provides information about Xerxes' retreat.[165] In his *Persae* he claims that part of the Persian army headed for Boeotia, where they died of thirst, while another part to which Xerxes belonged took the following route: the land of the Phocians, Doris, the Melian Gulf, the lands of the Achaeans, the cities of the Thessalians, the land of the Magnesians, the land of the Macedonians, the river Axius, Lake Bolbe, Mt Pangaeum, the land of the Edoni, the Strymon, and Thrace. A bit further, he adds that Xerxes fled across the plains and the dangerous roads of Thrace (αὐτὸν εἰσακούομεν Θρήκης ἄμ πεδιήρεις δυσχίμους τε κελεύθους).[166] Aeschylus presents an apocalyptic picture according to which nearly the entire Persian army withdrawing to Asia was destroyed by thirst, exhaustion, and hunger, and some of the Persians perished while trying to cross the frozen Strymon.

Undoubtedly, the information provided by Aeschylus and Herodotus about the total destruction of the Persian corps accompanying the Great King is unreal. There is no reason why the Persians in retreat would have had difficulty in finding provisions. In Thessaly and Macedonia there was everything necessary for satisfying the needs of both the soldiers accompanying Xerxes and those with Mardonius who made camp there for the entire winter.[167] The Persian control over the coast between Eion and the Hellespont was stable, and the revolt of the poleis from Pallene hardly threatened the retreat of the Great King on the way along Lake Bolbe. What is more, it is logical to assume that revolt broke out only after Xerxes' passing through Chalcidice, which may have been viewed by the locals as a flight. In fact, Herodotus refutes his own arguments and Aeschylus' by describing Artabazus' actions at the time of his return to Thessaly: he had an army mighty enough to conquer Olynthus and lay siege to the city of Potidaea for as long as three months.[168]

The route followed by Xerxes on his way back to Asia cannot be precisely defined. Hammond notes that Aeschylus speaks about the lands of the Magnesians (Μαγνητικὴν γαῖαν) as part of the route that had been followed. He arrives

163 Hdt. VIII.115.3, 120.1.
164 Ibid. VIII.118.1–119.1.
165 Aesch. *Pers.* 480–514.
166 Ibid. 564–567.
167 Hdt. VIII.113.1–3, 115.1, 126.2.
168 Ibid. VIII.126.1–129.3.

at the conclusion that the entire Persian army moved together as far as Thessaly, and from there one portion, headed by Xerxes and Artabazus, crossed the lands of the Magnesians and entered Macedonia through the Tempe pass.[169] Considering Aeschylus' order of enumeration (the poleis of the Thessalians, the land of the Magnesians, and the land belonging to the Macedonians), Hammond's conclusion seems logical. It does not contradict Herodotus, according to whom Xerxes left Mardonius in Thessaly and headed rapidly for the Hellespont.[170] Herodotus, however, mentions nothing about the land of the Magnesians. His specification that the Great King made a hasty retreat from Thessaly to the Hellespont (ἐπορεύετο κατὰ τάχος ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον) may mean that he entered Macedonia through the pass of the Macedonian mountain, which in the present study has been identified with the Petra pass. Months earlier, with regard to the advance towards Greece, that pass had been adapted for the large Persian army; it is logical for Xerxes, if he did intend to reach the Hellespont as soon as possible, to have used the pass in question. Considering the approaching winter, Herodotus' statement about the hasty advance of the Persians probably corresponds to the real state of affairs. As to the visit to Sirrae, it appears that for some reason or another it was necessary, but the circumvention related to it was not so great as to delay the army's crossing over to the Asian coast.

According to Aeschylus, after crossing Macedonia and the river Axius, Xerxes took the road going by Lake Bolbe to reach the Strymon. The information appears authentic, due mostly to the fact that this is the shortest trek from the Thermaic Gulf to the mouth of the Strymon. It may be assumed that, similar to the advance towards Greece, the river was then passed over at the 'Nine Ways' area. Herodotus mentions two different versions of Xerxes' advance towards Asia. According to the first, after his arrival in Eion, the Great King charged Hydarnes with the army, and he himself boarded a Phoenician ship and, going through a journey full of danger, managed to land on the Asian coast. Herodotus does not trust this story, for he knows that on his way back to Asia Xerxes visited Abdera.

According to the second version, which sounds far more authentic, from the Strymon mouth Xerxes headed for Sirrae with the intention to get back Zeus' chariot, left there several months before.[171] He left the sick soldiers there and, passing by Pangaeum, reached Abdera, then reached the Hellespont, from

169 Hammond 1988: 586.

170 Hdt. VIII.115.1.

171 Ibid. VIII.115.3–4.

where he transferred safely over to Asia. Xerxes signed a friendship contract with the citizens of Abdera and gave them a golden akinakes and a gilt tiara.[172] With regard to his arrival there, Herodotus narrates another story which he does not rely on at all: in his time the citizens of Abdera claimed that, running away from Athens, when he arrived in their polis the Great King unfastened his belt for the first time, for he felt safe there. However, as has already been said above, from Thessaly to the Hellespont, Xerxes and the Persians he led passed through a safe land. Even if the story of the belt-unfastening is true, it would have nothing to do with the Great King's safety at that moment, and would be an act that was probably misunderstood by the citizens of Abdera.[173]

It appears that the news of the defeat at Salamis and the subsequent retreat of Xerxes had an immediate effect; the citizens of Potidaea, as well as of the rest of the cities of Pallene, started to rebel.[174] At the news of this event, Artabazus, who was on his way back from the Hellespont, took immediate action, laying siege to Potidaea.[175] Meanwhile, suspicious of disloyalty, he conquered Olynthus and killed its people. The city, which had been peopled by the Bottiaei, was put under the charge of Critobulus of Torone and the Chalcidians. The case of the siege of Potidaea was not that favourable—after three months passed Artabazus still had no success. The attempt to conquer the city through treachery also ended unsuccessfully. If Herodotus' story is true, then an opportunity to successfully end the siege came when the sea receded for a while. Taking advantage of that, the Persians decided to undertake an attack on precisely that side, but there was a sudden high tide that destroyed the advancing army. The result from this misfortune was that Artabazus gave up the siege and set off for the summer encampment of the main Persian forces. The abandoning of the siege of the rebellious Potidaea and the whole peninsula of Pallene as well was an unusual act, that, bearing in mind the importance of the future campaign, can be explained by Artabazus' desire not to lose time and join Mardonius.

Alexander's Activities during the Greco–Persian War (480–479)

During the Persian invasion in Greece to the defeat at Plataea, the Macedonian ruler Alexander is mentioned with regard to four different events: once

172 Ibid. VIII.120.1.

173 For that issue see also Lenfant 2002.

174 Hdt. VIII.126.2–3.

175 Ibid. VIII.127.1–129.3.

by Justin and three times by Herodotus. In Justin's view, during the campaign against Greece, Xerxes presented the Macedonian ruler with the lands between Olympus and Haemus: *post discessum a Macedonia Bubaris, Amyntas rex decedit, cuius filio et successori Alexandro cognatio Bubaris non Darii tantum temporibus pacem praestitit, uerum etiam Xerxen adeo conciliauit, ut, cum Graeciam, ueluti tempestas quaedam, occupasset, inter Olympum Haemumque montes totius regionis eum imperio donauerit*.[176] Some scholars rely on Justin's report but question the territorial span of the lands presented by Xerxes.[177] As Zahrnt notes, Herodotus provides no such information.[178] But he does say that in the spring of 479 Mardonius, on Xerxes' behalf, offered the Athenians to choose the territory they would rule.[179] The suggestion was made through the Macedonian ruler Alexander's mission to Athens, as he acquainted the Athenians with both the advantages of an eventual alliance with the Great King and the disadvantages of its rejection. Considering Herodotus' study, it would have been best at this point to note that during his stay in Europe, Xerxes had presented Alexander with lands—and that the Macedonian ruler's benefit might set an example and influence the ultimate decision of the Athenians. The fact that Herodotus says nothing about Xerxes' generous gift compromises Justin's statement, at least to some degree, despite the fact that Herodotus, or his Macedonian source, would have had no interest in proclaiming the close relations between Alexander and Xerxes during the campaign against Greece. The specific geographical frame Justin provides of the territories presented by the Great King—between Olympus and Haemus—suggests that this may be propaganda from the later reign of Phillip II, aiming to justify Macedonian expansion into Thrace.[180]

Herodotus' first reference to Alexander is in regard to the events in Boeotia during the summer of 480. He claims that when the army led by Xerxes entered Boeotia, the local cities were rescued by the men whom Alexander sent (ἄνδρες Μακεδόνες) and adds that this was to show the Great King that the Boeotians were on his side.[181] Here, as with the story of the advice Alexander gave at Tempe, Herodotus is extremely brief. While, however, Herodotus has his own explanation for the withdrawal of the Greeks from Tempe, which, in his view,

176 Just. VII.4.1.

177 Geyer 1930: 45; Edson 1970: 26 with n49; Hammond 1979: 63–64; 1989: 43–44. Delev 2014: 325. See also the analysis of Rosen 1987: 33–35, 42–43.

178 Zahrnt 1984: 364–365.

179 Hdt. VIII.140α2.

180 Momigliano 1992: 25.

181 Hdt. VIII.34.1.

probably minimizes the Macedonian ruler's services—he warned about the great multitude of the Persian army, but said nothing about the road through Upper Macedonia—a similar explanation about the rescue of the Boeotians is missing. The easiest way to solve the problem is to accept that Herodotus' brevity is due to the openly pro-Persian character of Alexander's act, thanks to which the Boeotians shifted to the Persian side with no difficulty. To a certain extent, however, he excuses the Macedonian ruler, emphasizing that the rescue of the Boeotian poleis was his doing. What is more, Herodotus pays special attention to Alexander's mission in Athens, which fully served the Persian interests. It appears that his unwillingness to give further information about the situation that he probably gained from his Macedonian source is not due to Alexander's pro-Persian activity. Here his brevity may be explained by the fact that Alexander helped the Boeotians—the only Greeks who fought willingly the Battle of Plataea on the side of the Persians, according to Herodotus.[182]

The story about the rescue of the Boeotian poleis by the Macedonians raises three important questions: what the reason for their mission was, what character it had, and why they were the ones chosen to accomplish it. Considering Herodotus' statement that the Macedonians rescued the Boeotians from the oncoming Persians, it may be assumed that their mission resulted from the participation of some Boeotians in the Battle of Thermopylae on the enemy side, for which the Persians killed some, and branded others with the royal sign.[183] The fact that the Macedonians met the Persians entering Boeotia shows that they were sent there just after the battle and probably used a direct route that did not go through Phocis, whose burning hampered for at least a short time the advance of the Great King's army. The sending of the Macedonians to Boeotia after the Battle of Thermopylae is an indication of two things. First, it may not have been an independent decision of Alexander's, but rather a direct order from Xerxes. And second, it is logical to assume that in order to have been able to set out immediately for the Boeotian poleis and arrive there before the Persians, the Macedonians not only had to use a short route, but also to have been in the Persian camp during the battle itself. It is possible that at the time even

182 Ibid. IX.67.1. According to Plutarch (*Herod. Malign.* 31) Aristophanes of Thebes claims that the Thebans denied Herodotus the money he wanted and prohibited him from discourse and argumentation with their young men. If the information is true, then Herodotus' brevity as to the rescue of the Boeotians by Alexander may find its satisfactory explanation here. Aristophanes' statement is not confirmed by other sources, which means that it is too risky to draw conclusions on its basis as to Herodotus' attitude towards the Boeotians, and to his brief narration of the act of the Macedonian ruler.

183 Hdt. VII.202.1, 205.3, 222.1, 233.1–2.

Alexander himself was there, for according to Herodotus it was he who sent them to Boeotia.

From what Herodotus says, the very presence of the Macedonians in the Boeotian poleis is a guarantee of the pro-Persian attitude of their citizens. This shows that the character of the Macedonian mission was to gauge the public opinion among the Boeotian poleis after the Battle of Thermopylae, with the goal of securing their support for the Persian cause. The following year, Mardonius sent Alexander on a similar but far more important mission to the Athenians. In the case of the Boeotians, the Macedonians not only examined the public feeling and mustered support, but waited to inform Xerxes about the situation, which according to Herodotus was equal to rescuing the Boeotian poleis from ruin. Judging from that point of view, it can be concluded that when Herodotus speaks about ἄνδρες Μακεδόνες in the Boeotian poleis, the information he has is not about the presence of garrisons in them, as it is often claimed,[184] but about the Macedonian envoys only.[185]

Why were the Macedonians in particular assigned that task? The role they played as guarantors of the Boeotians shows that Xerxes had confidence in the Macedonian ruler Alexander and so his loyalty at that time was not doubted. Alexander, however, was not the only loyal ally of the Great King. It was not the Macedonians but the Thessalians who at Thermopylae rescued the Boeotians from certain death.[186] The Thessalians, however, had an old enmity with the Boeotians, and so were not suitable for the role of an arbiter of their cities' destiny.[187] Considering this, Alexander's loyalty, his kinship with the Persians, and his neutral attitude towards the Boeotians are a good reason why his people completed the task.[188]

Alexander appears for the second time in Herodotus' story in connection with the events before the Battle of Plataea.[189] In this case, Mardonius, hop-

184 Rawlinson 1860: IV.242—'Macedonian garrisons'; Macan 1908: I.2 ad VIII.34; van Groningen 1955: ad VIII.34; Kanatsoulis 1964: 95; Hammond 1979: 98n3; Schrader 1989: VIII.65—'soldados macedonios'; Badian 1994: 117–118; Proeva 2004: 98, 104; Fearn 2007: 119.

185 The same opinion is hold by Stein V: ad VIII.34; Munro 1902: 319; Shuckburgh 1903: 105–106; How, Wells 1928: ad VIII.34; Munro 1930: 301; Burn 1984: 427; Hammond 1989: 44; Scaife 1989: 130; Bowie 2007: 126 ad VIII.34.1; Olbrycht 2010: 345; Sprawski 2010: 138–139.

186 Hdt. VII.233.1–2.

187 Plut. *Cam*. 19.2; *Herod. Malign*. 33; Paus. IX.14.2.

188 For a different opinion see Sprawski 2010: 139, who supposes that the help the Macedonians offered the Boeotians is due to contacts preceding the event, which were possibly based on Alexander's status as *proxenos*.

189 Hdt. VIII.136.1–144.5.

ing to win over the Athenians, sent Alexander there to offer an alliance. In Herodotus' view, the Persian commander chose Alexander because his sister was married to the Persian man Bubares and also because he was a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians. After his arrival, the Macedonian ruler offered Mardonius' suggestions, made on Xerxes' behalf. If they entered into an alliance with the Persians, the Athenians would receive forgiveness for past actions, along with their land, which they could rule in accordance with their own laws (ἐόντες αὐτόνομοι), other lands that they themselves would chose, and their sanctuaries that had been burnt down would be restored. Alexander advised the Athenians to accept the advantageous offer, emphasizing that it was impossible to win the war against the Great King. His speech was followed by the one from the Spartans, who asked the Athenians not to betray Greece, saying that Alexander—a tyrant himself—had to help another tyrant, but it was not good for them to do the same. The Athenians dismissed the suggestion of the Persians, and threatened Alexander that in the future it would be better not to come before them to make such offers. They promised the Spartans that they would neither sign a contract with Xerxes nor would they betray Greece.

The fact that the Macedonian ruler was sent to the Athenians shows that he had won Mardonius' trust. At the time Alexander was undoubtedly the most appropriate to accomplish this important mission. He not only was a loyal Persian ally from the very start of the war, but also had kinship ties with the Persians and was a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians as well. It was his friendship with the Athenians that was the main reason for his appointment. Mardonius expected him not only to put forwards the Great King's suggestions, but also to exercise the influence he was believed to have over the Athenians, to persuade them to make an alliance with the Persians. The task was not contrary to Alexander's own interests, for the speech he delivered in Athens followed the course desired by the Persians, while the advice he gave the Athenians as their *proxenos* and *euergetes* might be taken as concern for their destiny. The Macedonian ruler probably hoped that the case would be similar to that at Tempe and the task he was assigned would bring only benefits in the future, regardless of the decision of the Athenians. Instead, he received explicit threats, which shows either that he had little influence over the Athenians and that what he had done was not appreciated, or that the situation was so difficult that anyone advising an alliance with the Persians was considered hostile.[190]

190 That the situation was tense is also proved by the murder of the Athenian Lycidas and his family, committed because, after the arrival of the second Persian envoy mission, he voiced the opinion that they had to accept the Great King's offer (Hdt. IX.4.1–5.3).

Whenever the story of Alexander's mission in Athens is studied, it is inevitably asked when and why he was appointed as *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians. Various suppositions are made. It is assumed that the appointment relates to the time of the Pisistratidae,[191] that Alexander helped the Athenians to enter into an alliance with the Great King (507),[192] that he provided them with the timber they needed to build ships for the war against Aegina (483/2) and the Persians,[193] or even that Herodotus speaks about the position of the Macedonian ruler given after the Persian retreat from Greece.[194] The possibility is also analysed that Alexander became a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians either at the time of the Ionian Revolt, or after Darius' death, or just after his giving the advice at Tempe.[195]

The hypothesis according to which Alexander did not occupy the position of *proxenos* and *euergetes* while he was carrying out his mission in Athens is based mainly on two passages of Demosthenes. The first claims that after the Battle of Plataea, the Macedonian ruler Perdiccas defeated the retreating Persians, for which he was granted Athenian citizenship.[196] The second passage is similar, except that Demosthenes—if it really is his speech—claims that Perdiccas did not obtain citizenship, but ἀτέλεια.[197] Whether intentionally or not, Demosthenes wrongly ascribes this status to Perdiccas, since without a doubt it should be related to Alexander. As will become clear further in the present study, there was probably no conflict between Macedonians and Persians immediately after the Battle of Plataea, which of its own leads to rejection of the main argument supporting the suggested hypothesis. As has already been mentioned, the choice of Alexander for the mission in Athens was due mainly to the fact that, because of his position, he was allowed to give advice to the Athenians. Therefore, Herodotus' information should not be rejected that in the spring of 479 the Macedonian ruler was a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians.

---

191 Blakesley 1854: 392n280.

192 Badian 1994: 121–127.

193 Edson 1970: 25–26; Borza 1987: 41–42; Hammond 1989: 44; Scaife 1989: 135; Borza 1992: 108–110; Sarakinski 2013: 232–234. A similar opinion is also held by Cole 1978: 42: 'It seems highly probable that Alexander had been honoured at Athens for making available all the timber she required from about 500 onwards.'

194 Geyer 1930: 44; Xydopoulos 2006: 57n92. For that possibility see also Macan 1908: I.2 ad VIII.136.

195 Macan 1908: I.2 ad VIII.136; Dascalakis 1965: 170–171; Wallace 1970: 199n13; Cole 1978: 41–42.

196 Dem. XXIII.200.

197 Ibid. XIII.24.

Herodotus notes that, having understood that Alexander was a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians, and taking into account his kinship ties with the Persians, Mardonius sent him to Athens. Within the context of the events, the expression ἅμα δὲ ὁ Μαρδόνιος πυθόμενος ὅτι πρόξεινός τε εἴη καὶ εὐεργέτης ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔπεμπε leaves the reader with the impression that the Persian commander only recently gained the information about the Macedonian ruler's status, probably from Alexander himself. If that is so, then the honour given to him by the Athenians should not be related to the events from the time of the Ionian Revolt, for in 492 Mardonius subjected Macedonia again and would probably have discovered at that time any such honors given to Alexander. This conclusion is also valid with regard to the envoy mission in Sardis in 507, not least because at that time Alexander was comparatively young; it would be illogical for his father Amyntas to involve his son in important international activity requiring the intervention of a person who had as much authority before the Athenians as before the Persian court. In fact, Amyntas and Alexander hardly had anything to do with the event in Sardis, an act presented by Herodotus as performed by the Athenians themselves.[198]

When exactly, then, did Alexander become a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians? It is possible for *proxenia* to have been a right of heritage, and so inherited from Amyntas. It is also possible for Alexander to have been appointed both *proxenos* and *euergetes* at one and the same time. In order to become *euergetes* it is likely that Alexander did the Athenians a favour at a time when they badly needed it. The honour he was given might have something to do with the naval project of Themistocles (483/2), by providing the Athenians with the large amount of first-class timber[199] necessary for its realization.[200] This operation could have brought the Macedonian ruler both financial and political benefits. Yet, how could such an act correspond to Alexander's vassal status and the presence of the Persian garrison in Eion? According to Meiggs, the close position of the Persians prevented the Macedonian ruler from providing the Athenians with timber.[201] His view is criticized by Borza, who notes that Macedonia was not within the area of Persian military activity, which gave the Macedonian ruler the chance to use the resources of Olympus and the Pierian mountains in the interests of the Athenians, without being noticed.[202] What is more, following Wallace, Borza believes that with Darius' death Macedonia

198 Hdt. v.73.1–3.

199 Theophr. *HP* iv.5.5.

200 Hdt. vii.144.1.

201 Meiggs 1982: 121–125.

202 Borza 1987: 41–42; 1992: 109–110.

possibly lost its vassal status, which was not regained until Xerxes' campaign against Greece. As an additional argument he offers the fact that Themistocles' naval project was meant to build ships for the expected war against Aegina, not against Persia—an act whose purpose was to conceal from the Persians the primary reason for building the navy.

Borza, however, omits to note that according to Herodotus' information the Persians stored food supplies in Macedonia itself.[203] Even if in this situation the provision of timber to Athens remained a secret, there would always have been some Greeks to inform the Persians about the treachery of the Macedonian ruler. The statement that Alexander could justify his actions by claiming that he had supplied the Athenians with timber for a war not with the Persians but with Aegina is also implausible. The Themistoclean naval program was approved in 483/2, at the exact time when the Great King was making preparations for war against Athens; any excuse offered by the Macedonian ruler in this context would have seemed utterly absurd. As for the possibility that Alexander's vassal status was valid under Darius only, it can be asked whether it was necessary for Xerxes himself, six years after Darius' death, to arrive in Macedonia to settle relations with Alexander—Darius subjected Amyntas without ever visiting Macedonia.

Furthermore, it is not reasonable to assume that if Alexander had really supplied the Athenians with the timber they badly needed for the war against the Persians, this act would have remained unknown to Herodotus. Rather, it can be taken as certain that his Macedonian source would have mentioned this remarkable event and that Herodotus would not have omitted it from his work. In Herodotus' opinion the decision of the Athenians to fight by sea was the decisive factor that saved Greece from the Persian yoke.[204] If Alexander had supplied the Athenian navy with Macedonian timber, he would not only have been appointed *euergetes* by the Athenians, but he also would have become the secret protector of the Greeks who had provided an invaluable service in the victory over Persians. The fact that Herodotus makes no mention at all of any of this probably means that the benefaction of the Macedonian ruler to Athens and his subsequent appointment as an Athenian *euergetes* had nothing to do with the Themistoclean naval program.

There is one more possibility, often discussed (and as often ignored), according to which it may be assumed that Alexander became a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of the Athenians due to the advice he gave at Tempe. Considering Hero-

203 Hdt. VII.25.2.

204 Ibid. VII.139.1–6.

dotus' study, this is the very point at which it should have been made clear that the Athenians had a special attitude towards him. The fact that this is not done may mean that at that time he had no special status, but rather achieved it for his advice. On the other hand, if this is so, it would have been logical for Herodotus to say that as a result of his actions Alexander became a *proxenos* and *euergetes*, something which he does not do. What is more, one may object that the advice given at Tempe was of no particular import to the Athenians, and accordingly could hardly be the reason why the Macedonian ruler was given the status he enjoyed at the time of his envoy mission in Athens. Thus the question remains open for future discussion.

The third time the Macedonian ruler was mentioned after the Persian invasion of Greece relates to events on the eve of the Battle of Plataea.[205] According to Herodotus, the night before the battle Alexander arrived on horseback at the Greek camp and informed the Athenian guards of his wish to speak to their *strategoi*.[206] When the *strategoi* in question came, he told them about his Greek origin as well as his concern for the destiny of the whole of Greece, and informed them that Mardonius intended to undertake an attack in the morning. Yet if for some reason Mardonius did not attack, he advised them not to attack first, for the Persians would soon run out of provisions. Finally, he added that if the Greeks were successful in winning the war, it would be good they not to forget the danger he was exposing himself to at that particular time. Next, Herodotus adds that at the news of the information gained from Alexander, the Spartan commander-in-chief Pausanias suggested changing places with the Athenians, for Spartans did not know how the Persians fought. They agreed, but the Boeotians informed Mardonius about this act, and he immediately arrayed the Persians against the Spartans. Another rearrangement of the army followed, organized once more by Pausanias, according to which the armies took their initial places.[207]

The story of Alexander's nocturnal visit is viewed differently by scholars. Some consider it true,[208] others reject it,[209] and a third group believe that the

205 Ibid. IX.44.1–45.3.

206 According to Plutarch (*Arist.* 15.2) Alexander insisted on speaking to Aristides.

207 Hdt. IX.46.1–47.1.

208 Geyer 1930: 45; Glotz 1938: 89; Dascalakis 1965: 194–198; Edson 1970: 26; Scaife 1989: 131n7; Dandamaev 1989: 218; Erbse 1992: 101; Badian 1994: 118–119; Xydopoulos 2006: 55–56. Van Groningen 1955: ad IX.44 without specifying whether he accepts as real the story in question assumes that before the Battle of Plataea there was a contact between Alexander and the Athenians.

209 Woodhouse 1898: 43–44; Paribeni 1947: 36; Hignett 1963: 316–317; Borza 1992: 110; Momiglia-

Macedonian ruler acted as a Persian agent.[210] The fact that Alexander arrived at the Greek camp unaccompanied as well as his personal participation in the events in question appears extremely doubtful. At that time the Macedonian army was not an important factor and therefore it is not logical to assume that they camped separately from the Persians and their Greek allies. According to Herodotus, the Macedonian ruler arrived at the Greeks' camp from the Persian camp.[211] Thus, the question may be put as to how Alexander and his horse managed to escape unnoticed from the Persian camp and get back to it later? And why would he risk losing his throne and his life to do it himself, since he could send a loyal man (as at Tempe), which would in no way make his service to the Greeks less significant.

If it is accepted that Alexander's embassy was a real event, it could be assumed that Alexander again followed Mardonius' instruction and so defended the interests of the Persians. In such a case, the Macedonian ruler risked nothing by going to the Greeks at night. He was able to look not only after Persian interests but his own as well, for he had no companion and spoke only to the Athenian *strategoi*, a guarantee of confidentiality. This would have provided him with the chance to appear benevolent in the eyes of both the Greeks and the Persians, and thus to secure his position regardless of the outcome of the battle. On the other hand, it appears that Mardonius, eager to fight as soon as possible, had no strategic interest in the advice Alexander had given the Greeks. What is more, as result of his mission in Athens Alexander had already been compromised to some extent in regard to the Athenians and Spartans,[212] and would hardly be the best one to advance Persian interests on the eve of battle. This is surely rather a fiction aimed at justifying the actions of the Macedonian ruler, whose soldiers during the battle itself fought against the Athenians.[213] Herodotus says nothing about simulated actions on their part, as he does about the greater part of the Greeks in the Persian army.[214] It appears that until the very end of the battle Alexander was carrying out the duties of a loyal vassal.

---

no 1992: 25; Lazenby 2007: 230–231; Vasilev 2010: 58; Zahrnt 2011: 773. Certain doubts are voiced by Macan 1908: I.2 ad IX.45; II.373–374; Kazarow: 1922: 46.

210 Barron 1988: 605–606; Green 1998: 258–260.

211 Hdt. IX.44.2.

212 Ibid. VIII.142.1–143.3.

213 Ibid. IX.31.5.

214 Ibid. IX.67.1.

The Withdrawal of Artabazus through Macedonia and Thrace

After the defeat at Plataea, the remnants of the Persian army led by Artabazus retreated to Asia Minor. According to Herodotus, on their way back they went through Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace to arrive in Byzantium, from where they moved to Asia by sea.[215] Herodotus states clearly that the Persians took a direct route across the interior, and that many of them were killed by the Thracians or died on the way of hunger and exhaustion, but mentions nothing about conflict between Macedonians and Persians. Demosthenes, however, notes that after the Battle of Plataea, the retreating Persians were attacked and defeated by the Macedonian ruler, who he wrongly names Perdiccas.[216] The other source to mention this event is the late author Aristodemus.[217] It appears that Demosthenes is not his source, for according to Aristodemus it was Alexander, not Perdiccas, who attacked the Persians. What is more, he clarifies with information missing from Demosthenes' report—πάντας αὐτοὺς γενομένους κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἐφόνευσεν. Military actions between Alexander and the Persians are also mentioned in the well-known *Philip's Letter*.[218] It claims that Alexander was the first (i.e., before the Athenians) to conquer the place where Amphipolis was eventually founded and as a result he took Persian prisoners and dedicated a gold statue of himself in Delphi.

On the basis of this information some scholars conclude that the Macedonian ruler did defeat the retreating Persians.[219] The fact that information of this kind is missing from Herodotus' report, however, raises doubts as to the information provided by Demosthenes and Aristodemus. Herodotus is quite familiar with Alexander's actions at the time of the Persian invasion and one

215 Ibid. IX.89.1–4.

216 Dem. XIII.24; XXIII.200. In another speech (XII.9), Demosthenes makes a similar mistake, claiming that the Odrysian king Sitalces obtained Athenian citizenship. According to Thucydides (II.29.5; 67.2) it was his son Sadocus who acquired Athenian citizenship. Aristophanes (*Ach.* 138–150) also claims that Athenian citizenship was given not to Sitalces but to his son. For the problem of Alexander and Perdiccas see also Cole 1977: 25–29, who holds the opinion that the mistake Demosthenes has made has nothing to do with the name of the Macedonian ruler, but relates to the reason for which he obtained Athenian citizenship. The author's idea is that it was Perdiccas who obtained Athenian citizenship, but for some reason Demosthenes relates that act with a conflict between Macedonians and Persians just after the Battle of Plataea.

217 *FGrH* 104 F 1.3.1.

218 Dem. XII.20–21.

219 How, Wells 1928: ad IX.89; Geyer 1930: 45; Dascalakis 1965: 200–201, 204–205; Edson 1970: 26; Kosmidou 2011: 442.

may expect that he would mention this significant event, since it would depict the last and most important features of the Macedonian ruler's personality. Other important factors should be taken into account as well. First, immediately after the Battle of Plataea, Artabazus retreated to Thessaly and Macedonia and would have possibly arrived there at the same time as the Macedonian ruler, or just after him if one accepts that the Macedonian cavalry had made a hasty retreat (i.e., the Macedonians would not have had the time to prepare an immediate reaction).[220] Second, at that time Alexander hardly had the war potential necessary for carrying out the task that Demosthenes and Aristodemus ascribe to him. Finally, due to the political circumstances, an attack against the retreating Persians, successful or not, might lead to a Persian counterattack. At that time, Thrace still functioned as a Persian military base, and the garrison in Eion was not far from Macedonia. What is more, Alexander could hardly predict the future development of the military relations between the Greeks and the Persians; it would have been much better for him to do nothing, instead of undertaking an attack against the army of the Great King.

Hammond also holds the opinion, that after the Battle of Plataea Alexander did not confront the retreating Artabazus, but at the same time relies on the information the aforementioned *Philip's Letter* provides, and thus concludes that at a certain time between 478 and 476/5 the Macedonian ruler carried out an attack against the Persians, conquered the 'Nine Ways,' and celebrated the success by dedicating a gold statue of himself in Delphi.[221] It is true that the existence of the gold statue is confirmed by Herodotus, but he does not relate it to a conflict between the Macedonians and the Persians, and mentions nothing about Alexander's annexation of the 'Nine Ways.'[222] What is more, the ancient

220 According to Herodotus (IX.89.1), when Artabazus arrived in Thessaly, the Thessalians knew nothing yet about the outcome of the Battle of Plataea, i.e. he arrived there before the Aleuadae and the Macedonian ruler. Thus it can be assumed that, when Artabazus was crossing Macedonia, Alexander was not within his possessions and consequently, was not able to attack the retreating Persians. On the other hand, on the basis of this story alone, it is too risky to try to define the order the Persians, Macedonians, and Thessalians followed in their retreat. For that issue see also Macan 1908: I.2 ad IX.89; How, Wells 1928: IX.89.

221 Hammond 1979: 101 and n4, 102; 1989: 45. The same opinion is also held by Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2007: 347–349. Borza 1992: 120–121 and 121n52 is hesitant as to the exact date of the event, whereas Proeva 2004: 112n26 and Hornblower 2011: 97 are inclined to date it back to the year 478. Errington 1986: 230n16 relates the annexation of 'Nine Ways' to the 460s but does not make it clear from whom Alexander took the area under discussion away—either from the Persians or from the local Thracians. Psoma 2002: 34–35, 42–43 presumes that Alexander's acquisition of the lands east of the Strymon were made about 463.

222 Hdt. VIII.121.2. Blakesley 1854: 383n240 holds the opinion that it is about a statue of

authors who speak about the siege of Eion by the Athenians[223] and their successive attempts to colonize 'Nine Ways'[224] say nothing about the presence of a Macedonian army in that strategically important region. This is another indication that the information about the conflict between Macedonians and Persians given in *Philip's Letter* quoted above has no historical support. The statement appears to be the result of Phillip's propaganda, which aimed to justify the annexation of Amphipolis by asserting that the dedication of the statue to Alexander in Delphi was the consequence of his victorious campaign against the Persians.[225]

According to Herodotus, Artabazus had a safe trek across Thessaly and Macedonia but was attacked by the Thracians. Herodotus does not say which tribes exactly the Thracians belonged to. If this information corresponds to real events, then it does not refer to the Thracians that peopled the lands by the Strymon mouth, for three years later they provided the Persian garrison in Eion with provisions at the time when it was under Greek siege.[226] The Persians would therefore have been attacked either by some of the Thracian tribes living between Eion and Doriscus, which at the time had been under Persian control, or by those peopling the south hillsides of the Rhodope, who were independent and, taking into account the lands they occupied, did not fear an eventual Persian attack.

Herodotus' statement that part of the retreating Persian army died of hunger and exhaustion appears exaggerated. It is probably influenced by the story of Xerxes' return to Asia, discussed above. By the time of their arrival in Eion it was hardly possible for the Persians to lack provisions. It was more difficult to walk the way from Eion to Doriscus and from Doriscus to Byzantium, but the distance was not so long as to cause death from hunger to part of the army. On the other hand, casualties from exhaustion were possible if the Persian army had made rapid progress from Plataea to Byzantium.

Alexander the Great and respectively, this part of Herodotus' text is added by a late publisher of his text. According to Solinus (9.13–14) Alexander sent a gold statue not only to Delphi but to Olympia as well—cui Alexander Amyntae filius dives habitus, nec inmerito: ita enim affluenter successus eius proficiebant, ut ante omnes Apollini Delphos, Iovi Elidem statuas aureas dono miserit.

223 Hdt. VII.107.1–2; Thuc. I.98.1; Diod. XI.60.2; Plut. *Cim.* 7.1–3; Polyaen VII.24; Paus. VIII.8.9; Schol. Aeschin. II.31.

224 Thuc. I.100.3; IV.102.2; Nepos *Cim.* 2.2; Diod. XI.70.5, XII.68.2.

225 See also Perdrizet 1910: 17n3; Kazarow 1922: 47n1; Mari 2002: 37–39; Vasilev 2010: 58n89; Delev 2014: 106, 196–197; Zahrnt (forthcoming); Xydopoulos (forthcoming).

226 Plut. *Cim.* 7.2.

Herodotus provides no precise information about the route followed by Artabazus. He only makes clear that the Persians took a short cut across the interior (τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ). At this point he uses the same expression as he does when he speaks about Xerxes' march from Acanthus to Therme.[227] This prompts Hammond to conclude that Artabazus withdrew through Paeonia and Sirrae.[228] Such a detour seems pointless, considering the fact that Eion was still in possession of the Persians, and the Greek navy was expected to attack the Hellespont first, for that was where the pontoon-bridges had been joined and so at that time posed the greatest threat to Greece. What is more, in the passage quoted, Herodotus says nothing about Paeonia and Sirrae in particular, but only that on their way to Thrace the Persians crossed Thessaly and Macedonia. A different supposition is made by Macan, according to which the abovementioned road through the interior refers to the route from Therme to Acanthus, and probably from Acanthus to Doriscus.[229] But here again, as with Sirrae, it would appear pointless to reach Acanthus and would only delay Artabazus' retreat to Asia.[230]

If it is supposed that the road through the interior refers to Thrace and if the expression Herodotus uses is strictly followed—καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἀπικνέεται ἐς Βυζάντιον, then the most logical conclusion is that he means an inland road from Eion to Byzantium—a route that may be rejected due to the presence of the garrison in Doriscus safeguarding the coastal route. Indeed, it only makes sense for a route crossing the interior of Thrace to have been followed if the coastal Greek poleis no longer acknowledged the Great King's authority. The ancient authors, however, mention nothing about a revolt of these poleis. It appears that at this time they were still respectful of the garrisons in Eion and Doriscus and remained loyal to Xerxes, which allowed Artabazus to follow the costal route.

Tuplin adopts a different approach to the problem. In his view, a careful analysis of the text shows that when Herodotus speaks about the interior route, he probably means the advance of the Persians before their arrival in Thrace.[231] The passage under discussion does offer the possibility for the suggested view to be accepted—ταῦτα δὲ εἴπας ἀπήλαυνε σπουδῇ τὴν στρατιὴν

227 Hdt. VII.124.1.

228 Hammond 1979: 101.

229 Macan 1908: I.2 ad IX.89.

230 This conclusion is also valid for the Therme–Acanthus route suggested by Shuckburgh 1887: ad IX.89 and How, Wells 1928: ad IX.89.

231 Tuplin 2003: 401n26. See also Flower, Marincola 2002: 261 ad IX.89.4—'"inland road", i.e. through Macedonia, rather than by the coast road.'

διὰ Θεσσαλίης τε καὶ Μακεδονίης ἰθὺ τῆς Θρηίκης, ὡς ἀληθέως ἐπειγόμενος καὶ *τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ*. καὶ ἀπικνέεται ἐς Βυζάντιον, καταλιπὼν τοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ ἑωυτοῦ συχνοὺς ὑπὸ Θρηίκων τε κατακοπέντας κατ᾽ ὁδὸν ... Here the phrase καὶ ἀπικνέεται ἐς Βυζάντιον signifies the ultimate point of the route and may have nothing to do with the road inside. On that condition, it may be assumed that τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ only refers to the lands before Thrace (i.e., to Thessaly and Macedonia), which Herodotus specially mentions, and the route passing along Lake Bolbe and eventually reaching the Strymon. Undoubtedly, the crossing through the middle of the territory of Thessaly and Macedonia is due to Artabazus' desire to make a hasty retreat using the well-known, safe passage through the Petra Pass, if the conclusions drawn above in the present study are correct.

It is possible that Artabazus took the following route on his way to Asia: through Petra Pass he entered Macedonia, from there he passed by Lake Bolbe, crossed the Strymon, and reached Eion. Next, he circumvented Mt Pangaeum to the south, and following the coast wherever possible, particularly in the region of the friendly city of Abdera, reached Doriscus. It is logical to assume that Artabazus visited Doriscus, which seems to have been the strongest Persian fortress in Europe. From Doriscus he set off for the still loyal city of Byzantium, where he crossed over to Asia. It is possible that on his way to Byzantium Artabazus either crossed Leuce Acte and Tyrodiza, where the previous year provisions for the future expedition had been stored, or else followed the route far from the coast.

CHAPTER 4

The Expulsion of the Persians from Europe

The Battle of Plataea, for the time being at least, put an end to Persian ambitions to conquer Greece. The Persians, however, were still in possession of the coastal lands between Byzantium and the mouth of the Strymon and were also in control of the Hellespont and Bosporus, which, under favourable circumstances, would provide them with the opportunity to invade Greece once more. At the time, the authority of the Great King in Europe was based on garrisons located at strategically important points such as Sestus, Doriscus, and Eion; it may be assumed as well that there were other fortified places whose names the sources do not mention.[1] To prevent a second Persian invasion, it was important for the Greeks to establish control over the Straits and to eliminate the garrisons in question. To achieve these aims it was necessary to gain control over the Aegean Sea and to destroy the Persian navy, which was still powerful enough to defend the Persian positions in the northern Aegean. At the Battle of Mycale, the Greeks, led by the Spartan king Leutychides, succeeded in defeating the Persian force and burning their navy, which had been beached beforehand.[2] This provided the Greeks with temporary naval superiority and the opportunity for an immediate attack on the Persian territories in Europe. It was natural for their first aim to be the region of the Hellespont, for it was this area where the pontoon-bridges used to cross over to the European coast had been joined together.[3]

The Capture of Sestus

On the way to the Hellespont unfavourable winds forced the united Greek navy to cast anchor by Lectum. From Lectum the Greeks sailed for Abydos to find the pontoon-bridges torn apart. It turned out, then, that the chief aim of the naval operation had already been fulfilled and, accordingly, the Peloponnesians decided to return to Greece, led by Leutychides. The Athenians, however, led by Xanthippus, did not return home but instead headed for Sestus, which they laid

1 Hdt. VII.106.1–2.

2 Ibid. IX.96.1–106.1.

3 Ibid. IX.106.4.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_006

siege to.[4] Their reasons for this action were likely connected to the fact that only fourteen years previously the Athenian Miltiades had exercised control over the cities of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered the peninsula their territory and decided to take advantage of the favourable circumstances to reestablish their authority there. What is more, the equipment needed for the joining of the pontoon-bridges was already in Sestus, taken there by Oeobazus of Cardia.[5]

According to Herodotus it was only the Athenians who took up the siege of Sestus.[6] He does not specify whether the islanders, who were probably part of the allied Greek navy,[7] decided to stay or return home, though, as Meiggs points out, their interest would have prompted them to join the Athenians in this enterprise.[8] The versions Thucydides and Diodorus offer are different. Thucydides claims that Sestus was attacked by the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont,[9] while Diodorus mentions the Ionians and the islanders.[10] It is understandable that the different versions have led to different suppositions by modern scholars.[11] Regardless, whether on their own or together with their allies the Athenians sailed for Sestus. At that time, this city, as well as the neighbouring area, was ruled by Artayctes.[12] Herodotus describes Sestus as the strongest fortress in the region and makes it clear that, at the news of the arrival of the Greeks in the Hellespont, a great number of people from the nearby cities crowded there. That fact put Artayctes in a difficult situation, for the arrival of the Greeks was unexpected to him and accordingly there were not enough provisions stored in the city to withstand a prolonged siege.[13]

The siege proved to be a long one. The coming of autumn made the Athenian soldiers resentful and they wanted to go home.[14] The commanders did not yield to the pressure and stated that the siege would last until the fortress fell or until

4 Ibid. IX.114.1–2.
5 Ibid. IX.115.1.
6 Ibid. IX.114.2.
7 Ibid. IX.106.4.
8 Meiggs 1973: 35n1.
9 Thuc. I.89.2.
10 Diod. XI.37.4–5.
11 ATL III: 190–191; Hignett 1963: 261–262; Hammond 1967: 46–47; Meiggs 1973: 35; Hornblower 1991: ad I.89.2.
12 Hdt. IX.116.1.
13 Ibid. IX.115.1, 116.3.
14 Ibid. IX.117.1.

the army was recalled by the Athenians. The strengthening of the siege as well as the lack of provisions drove the citizens of Sestus into a desperate situation. Artayctes and Oeobazus, together with the rest of the Persians, managed to leave the city in the night. On the next day, the locals gave the fortress up to the Greeks.[15] Oeobazus was captured by the Apsinthians, most probably in the area of the Thracian Chersonese, who offered him as a sacrifice to their god Plistorus. His companions were not spared either, although Herodotus notes they met a different death.[16] Artayctes, who abandoned Sestus a little later than Oeobazus, was captured at Aegospotamoi, together with his companions. Some of them were killed and others were taken prisoner in Sestus. Artayctes himself was nailed to a plank, hanging over the place where the Persians had joined the pontoon-bridge or over a hill above the city of Madytos. Before facing his own death he was compelled to watch his son being stoned to death.[17]

Herodotus claims that the taking of Sestus was the last thing the Greeks did that year (κατὰ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο).[18] It is not clear, however, which year this was—the Attic year or the year in which the military actions were performed, which usually began when spring came. Thucydides, for his part, makes it clear that the Athenians spent the winter or, at least they waited until it came, in front of the walls of the city under siege.[19] The fact that the siege lasted three months at least, and possibly many more, during which period no help was received from the Great King, shows that at this time the Persians did not have the potential necessary for the defense of their European territories. It appears that the European garrisons could only defend their own positions and could not help one another. Help of this sort was only possible from an army sent from Asia, but such an army never arrived in Sestus. The circumstances were therefore extremely favourable for the Greeks, who had the opportunity to dictate what would happen and to eliminate the European garrisons one by one at whichever time which they considered most suitable. But instead of taking advantage of their success, they retreated from Sestus and sailed for their homes with large amounts of booty, including the equipment necessary for the pontoon-bridges.

With the conquest of Sestus, the Athenians took possession of the shortest and most convenient route from Asia to the garrisons in Doriscus and Eion.

15 Ibid. IX.118.1–2.

16 Ibid. IX.119.1.

17 Ibid. IX.119.2, 120.4.

18 Ibid. IX.121.1.

19 Thuc. 1.89.2. See the discussion on Thucydides' expression ἐπιχειμάσαντες by Rawlinson 1860: IV.393n4 and Macan 1908: I.2 ad IX.121.

What is more, from here on they were able to exercise some control over navigation through the Hellespont and, in favourable circumstances, to expand their territorial possessions all over the Thracian Chersonese, and accordingly threaten the Persian garrison in Doriscus. For the Persians the loss of Sestus was unpleasant but not fatal, since Byzantium was still under the control of the Great King. This means that he still had the opportunity to transport a large army over to Europe, something which the Greeks feared. On the other hand, the Persians did not seem to have sufficient ships in the Propontis and the Pontus for the completion of such an action. At this time, in fact, the powers in the region of the Propontis were temporarily equal—a situation which the campaign against Byzantium changed in the next campaign season.

The Capture of Byzantium

In the spring or early summer of 478, the united Greek navy, led by the Spartan regent Pausanias, sailed for Cyprus. After the successful completion of the campaign on the island, the Greeks headed for Byzantium.[20] The attack on this city was the likely result of the conquest of Sestus and illustrated the Greeks' strong desire to establish control over the Straits. It is logical to expect that after Sestus fell, Xerxes would do all he could to keep Byzantium, for the eventual loss of that city might turn out to be disastrous for his European territorial possessions. The ancient authors, however, provide no details about the siege and conquest of the city, which, in Meiggs' view, is a sign of the lack of serious resistance offered by the Persians.[21] In the taking of Byzantium, some Persians of noble blood were captured, including relatives of Xerxes. According to Thucydides, Pausanias sent them in secret to the Great King, using a sham escape as an explanation for their absence.[22]

The loss of Byzantium was a serious blow to Persian interests in Europe. As a result of its capture, the Greeks were now in possession of the two most convenient and direct routes from Asia to Europe, which made Persian contact with their garrisons in Thrace most difficult. If the new situation was maintained for a longer period of time, it would mean that these garrisons would have to rely only on their own resources if they wanted to survive. The conquest of Byzantium was of paramount importance to the Greeks since control over this city

20 Thuc. 1.94.1–2.

21 Meiggs 1973: 39.

22 Thuc. 1.128.5.

meant control over the Bosporus and, consequently, over cargo ships going out of and into the Black Sea.[23] This action, as well as the capture of the Persian garrison in Sestus, was particularly important for Athens, whose citizens would count more and more on Pontic grain in the future.

The Capture of Eion

The conquest of Sestus and Byzantium did not mean an end to the Persian presence in Europe. The Thracian coast between the Strymon and the Hebrus was still under Persian control through the two strong garrisons placed in Eion and Doriscus. The garrison in Eion played a strategically important role. It was not only the Persian garrison situated furthest west in Thrace but it also prevented the Athenians from gaining access to the first-class timber found in the region of the lower Strymon. What is more, immediately by Eion was Mt Pangaeum with its gold and silver mines. All this made Eion a prime target for the Athenians and their allies.

In Thucydides' view, the Athenian attack on Eion was the first action of the Delian League.[24] This event is usually dated in the archon year of 476/5, the year of Phaidon's archonship in Athens.[25] The conquest of Eion proved to be a dif-

23 According to Polybius' report (IV.43.3–44.11), due to the currents of the Bosporus, the entry to the Black Sea was controlled by Byzantium only and not shared with Chalcedon. If one may rely on what an anecdote told by Herodotus (IV.144.1–2) says, the Persian commander-in-chief Megabazus already noticed that Byzantium had a much more favourable site than Chalcedon. See also Strabo VII.6.2—ᾗ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω φασὶ τοῖς κτίσασι τὸ Βυζάντιον ὕστερον μετὰ τὴν ὑπὸ Μεγαρέων Χαλκηδόνος κτίσιν χρηστηριαζομένοις προστάξαι ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἵδρυσιν ἀπεναντίον τῶν τυφλῶν, τυφλοὺς καλέσαντα τοὺς Χαλκηδονίους, ὅτι πρότεροι πλεύσαντες τοὺς τόπους, ἀφέντες τὴν πέραν κατασχεῖν τοσοῦτον πλοῦτον ἔχουσαν, εἵλοντο τὴν λυπροτέραν; Tac. *Ann*. XII.63—Namque artissimo inter Europam Asiamque divortio Byzantium in extrema Europa posuere Graeci, quibus Pythium Apollinem consulentibus, ubi conderent urbem, redditum oraculum est, quaererent sedem caecorum terris adversam. ea ambage Chalcedonii monstrabantur, quod priores illuc advecti, praevisa locorum utilitate, peiora legissent.

24 Thuc. I.98.1.

25 Smart 1967: 136–138 places the conquest of Eion by Cimon in the archon year of 470/69. His supposition seems to be accepted by Cole 1978: 47. The suggested dating does not correspond to Thucydides' statement that the first action of the Delian League was to conquer Eion. It is not logical for the allies to be idle during the first seven years of the League, when the enthusiasm for the League was supposed to be at its greatest.

ficult enterprise. Information about this campaign is provided by Herodotus[26] and Plutarch.[27] Plutarch gives comparatively detailed information about the start of the military actions while Herodotus avoids the details unnecessary for his story and focuses his attention instead on the bravery of the local hyparch Boges and his loyalty to the Great King. According to Plutarch there were at this time several noble Persians in Eion, Xerxes' kinsmen (Περσῶν ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους καὶ συγγενεῖς βασιλέως), who oppressed the Greeks there. This is why Cimon sailed for Eion with the intention of conquering it. At first, he pushed the Persians who had opposed him out and locked them in the fortress. This act does not seem to have been particularly effective, for the Athenian commander-in-chief was compelled to fight the local Thracians, who provided the Persians with provisions. It was not until these Thracians were expelled that the garrison in Eion was entirely isolated, and from that moment on the Persians could only rely on their own resources. In Herodotus' view, the commander Boges, despite having the chance to do so, did not surrender, for fear of disgracing himself before the Great King.[28] When he ran out of provisions he piled up a great pyre and slew the whole of his family, his servants, and concubines and cast them into the fire. After that he threw all the gold and silver he possessed into the Strymon and he himself jumped into the fire. For these acts he was glorified by the Persians even in Herodotus' time, and his sons were respected by Xerxes. Herodotus' story was recounted briefly by Plutarch, with the difference that he called the Persian commander-in-chief Butes (Βούτης). This Persian was known to Pausanias as Boes (Βοής).[29] Thucydides notes that the citizens of Eion were subjected,[30] and Plutarch explicitly says that the city was given to the Athenians to settle there.[31]

As far as the siege of Eion is concerned, two things attract attention. First, the fact that the local garrison received no help from other Persian garrisons probably means that there were no such garrisons nearby. It appears that immediately after the Battle of Plataea the Persians lost control over the lands west of the Strymon. The same conclusion may be valid for the lands of the Paeonians by the Paeonian Sirrae. It is probable that in the lands east of the Strymon, along the Aegean coast up to Neapolis, there were no garrisons to

26 Hdt. VII.107.1–2.

27 Plut. *Cim.* 7.1–2.

28 For the possibility that Herodotus used an Asian source at this point see Blakesley 1854: 243n309 and Macan 1908: I.1 ad VII.107.

29 Paus. VIII.8.9.

30 Thuc. I.98.1.

31 Plut. *Cim.* 7.3—καλλίστην οἰκῆσαι παρέδωκε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις …

help the Persians besieged in Eion. If this is correct, it should be accepted that the Persian authority west of Nestus relied only on the garrison in Eion or, if there were others, their military potential was insignificant. Secondly, the help offered by the local Thracians shows that they preferred a Persian presence in the region to Athenian settlements.

The conquest of Eion was an event of paramount importance both for the Persians and the Athenians, and for the local Thracians and Macedonians. The Persians lost one of the two strongest garrisons they possessed in Thrace and therefore from this moment on they could not influence events taking place in the area of the lower Strymon and the Chalcidice. As far as the Athenians were concerned, they hoped that their control of Eion would enable them to gain access both to the first-class timber they needed to build ships and to the mines of Pangaeum. Their ambition made them eager to colonize the 'Nine Ways' region—an act that the local Thracians could not accept. With the settling of the Athenians in this region, the Thracians received a dangerous and aggressive neighbour, with whom they would have hostile relations for several decades. The expulsion of the Persians from the lower Strymon region put an end to the vassal dependence of Macedonia (It is possible that this vassal status had been rejected as early as 479 or 478) and thus provided its ruler with the opportunity to focus his attention on expansion towards Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Bisaltia as far as the Strymon River.

The Persian Counterattack (?)

Modern historians have frequently discussed the possibility of a Persian counterattack bringing Sestus and Byzantium once again under Persian control. This supposition can be only confirmed indirectly by an excerpt of Ion of Chios quoted by Plutarch in his biography of Cimon.[32] According to Plutarch, Ion claimed that after he had arrived in Athens as a young boy, he was invited to dinner at Laomedon's at which Cimon was also present. As it grew darker, their conversation focused on the exploits of the commander-in-chief. Cimon himself spoke about a clever trick of his, which he carried out on the Athenian allies. After the allies, together with the Athenians, had captured a great number of barbarians from Sestus and Byzantium, he was called to divide the booty. Cimon placed the captives on one side and their adornments on the other. Owing to the fact that the allies did not approve of his way of distributing the

32 Ibid. 9.1–4.

booty, he asked them to take what they wanted. Having followed the advice of Herophytus of Samos, they took the adornments and left the captives to the Athenians. Eventually, it turned out that the choice they had made was not a good one, for the relatives of the prisoners from Phrygia and Lydia paid much more than the adornments were worth to ransom them. Thus Cimon managed to get a sum of money sufficient to support his navy for four months and, furthermore, had some gold left over for the needs of Athens.

This passage from Plutarch raises two difficult questions. First, whether Ion's report about Cimon's division of the booty from Sestus and Byzantium, which took place at one and the same time, is an accurate representation of events. Second, if the information given in Plutarch's report is accurate, when should the campaign led by Cimon against the two poleis in question be dated? The reason why Ion's statements are questioned (ἐκ Σηστοῦ καὶ Βυζαντίου πολλοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων αἰχμαλώτους λαβόντες) is due to the fact that each suggested dating of the event he describes is for a variety of reasons highly vulnerable. This is why some scholars believe that the information Ion provides is not accurate and offer a different reconstruction of the events.[33] There are enough grounds to support this conclusion. Despite some degree of uncertainty over the chronology, it can be claimed with certainty that more than twenty years separated the writing of Ἐπιδημίαι from the dinner at Laomedon's, when Ion, who was also present, was very young (μειράκιον). This long period makes one think that it was possible for Ion to have made an unintentional mistake, for no other reason than the remoteness of the event which he took part in himself (i.e., the dinner at Laomedon's). One should also take into account the possibility that Cimon, either because of the effect the wine had had on him, or because of his willingness to show off, could have exaggerated his exploits. Lastly, a mistake could have been made not by Ion but by Plutarch, who at other points of his work speaks about Cimon's participation in separate campaigns against Byzantium and the Thracian Chersonese.[34]

These arguments, despite their validity, are not enough for Ion's report to be categorically rejected. It does not seem very probable that Plutarch confused the events of the campaign against Byzantium with those of the expedition against the Chersonese. Neither can the long period of time separating the conversation in question from the writing of the Ἐπιδημίαι, serve as a convincing argument, since to arrive at this conclusion scholars need to judge whether or not Ion remembered rightly what he heard Cimon say. The same conclusion

33 Meyer 1899: 64–65. See also Jacoby 1947: 2n4—'Ion's memory may have played him false.'

34 Plut. *Cim.* 6.4–5, 14.1.

is valid too for the view that Cimon exaggerated his exploits. In addition, the fact that, according to Ion, this distinguished Athenian commander defined the stratagem employed against the allies as σοφώτατον cannot remain unnoticed. This, if nothing else, shows that he highly valued the stratagem and was proud of it, which suggests that it was hardly an exaggeration. If it is accepted that there is some exaggeration, however, it should be related to the proportions of the booty taken from Sestus and Byzantium, rather than to the statement that it was divided at one and the same time and, accordingly, was the result of a single campaign against the two poleis.

If it is accepted that a single campaign against Sestus and Byzantium was mounted, which Cimon led with, if not the whole of the army, at least the Athenians and their allies, then it is logical to ask when the event should be dated. It appears that the expeditions led by Xanthippus (479) and Pausanias (478) are out of the question, since, according to Herodotus and Thucydides, after the conquest of Sestus by Xanthippus the Greeks did not attack Byzantium, but instead returned home.[35] Herodotus explicitly states that they took with them the captured booty, including the equipment for the pontoon-bridges (τά τε ἄλλα χρήματα ἄγοντες καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν γεφυρέων). The booty was probably divided immediately and not about a year later (i.e., after the conquest of Byzantium), which is an indication that the event had nothing to do with Ion's story. Apart from this, there is no evidence that Cimon took part in the Battle of Mycale or in the siege of Sestus that followed.[36] He was one of the most prominent Athenian commanders and it is difficult to believe that the ancient authors would not note such an important stage of his career.

In his biography of Cimon, Plutarch briefly speaks about the campaign led by the Athenian commander in the Thracian Chersonese against the Persians who were unwilling to retreat and the Thracians who were helping them.[37] This expedition, which is usually dated about the mid-460s, will be discussed later, and so at this point only the possibility that the anecdote of Ion could have something to do with it will be analysed. The fact that Cimon managed to establish Athenian control over the entire Thracian Chersonese (πᾶσαν ᾠκειώσατο τῇ πόλει τὴν Χερρόνησον) may mean that during the campaign under discussion he attacked and conquered Sestus. If that is true, then it should be accepted

35 Hdt. IX.121.1; Thuc. I.89.2.

36 In his biography of Cimon, Cornelius Nepos (*Cim.* 2.2–4) claims that in the Battle of Mycale the Athenian commander defeated the Phoenician–Cyprian navy and captured two hundred ships, after which he enjoyed the same remarkable success on land. In fact, Nepos is describing here the Battle of Eurymedon but wrongly relates the events to Mycale.

37 Plut. *Cim.* 14.1.

that at some time before the events described above, the Persians succeeded in regaining control over Sestus through an offensive that the sources do not mention. On the other hand, Cimon's expedition is likely to have had nothing to do with Sestus, since the information Plutarch provides is a summary with no mention of this city. The major problem here, however, is not so much Cimon's attack against Sestus while conquering the Chersonese, but rather the lack of information about Byzantium in Plutarch's story; in his account, the Athenian commander-in-chief sailed from Athens towards the Chersonese and, after he successfully carried out his task on the peninsula, sailed for Thasos, whose citizens had started to rebel, unwilling to bear the burden of Athenian authority.[38] Furthermore, if one accepts that Cimon conquered both Sestus and Byzantium in the mid-460s, this would mean that in the years just preceding, the Persians had realized a campaign of large dimensions that re-established their control over the Straits. It should be expected that such an event would be extensively discussed in the sources. However, there is no information either about Persian actions against the strategically important Straits or about Athenian counteractions, which casts doubt on the relation between Ion's information and the story presented by Plutarch.

Most modern scholars who accept that Ion's report does reflect the real state of affairs conclude that it refers to the expulsion of the Spartan regent Pausanias from Byzantium. Pausanias had been to Byzantium twice, the first time when he led the united navy of the Greeks that managed to conquer the city (478). In Thucydides' view, due to his arrogant attitude towards the allies, as well as his adoption of the pro-Persian policy he was accused of, he was recalled to Sparta. He was brought to trial there and found innocent of the major accusation of being in contact with the Persians; he was, however, never given the position of an army leader after this affair.[39] Consequently, he left for the Hellespont as a private person, without asking permission of the Spartans.[40] Having settled in Byzantium once more, he continued to behave arrogantly. It was for this reason that the Athenians had to banish him by force.[41] Cimon's participation in these events is confirmed by Plutarch (οἱ σύμμαχοι μετὰ τοῦ Κίμωνος ἐξεπολιόρκησαν αὐτόν), who connects the expulsion of Pausanias to his murder of a Byzantian girl called Cleonice.[42]

38 Ibid.—Ἀθήνηθεν ἐκπεπλευκότος; 14.2—ἐκ δὲ τούτου Θασίους μὲν ἀποστάντας Ἀθηναίων.

39 Thuc. 1.94.1–95.6.

40 Ibid. 1.128.3.

41 Ibid. 1.131.1.

42 Plut. *Cim.* 6.4–5.

According to Justin, Pausanias founded Byzantium and ruled it for seven years.[43] On the basis of that statement, some scholars date the expulsion of Pausanias to the year of 472/1 or 471/0.[44] Others ignore the information provided by Justin and date the event several years earlier, in 477/6 or 476/5.[45] In fact, the acceptance of either dating raises the same questions: is it possible that at the time Byzantium was conquered by Cimon there were some residents from Phrygia and Lydia; and why do the sources lack any information about Persian control being re-established over Sestus, as well as its being conquered by the Athenians for the second time?

The captives from Byzantium were hardly Persian soldiers. Thucydides mentions Persian and Egyptian spearmen accompanying Pausanias on his way through Thrace (during his first stay in Byzantium),[46] but Ion's anecdote speaks about people from Phrygia and Lydia, whose number does not seem to be small (πολλοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων). In addition, if in Thucydides' time there was information about a Persian garrison put into Byzantium by Pausanias, one could expect that Thucydides would have said so, as he mentions all the other things the Spartan regent was charged with. This would have been an act that could not have gone unmentioned and accordingly would be strong evidence of his pro-Persian policy. The fact that Thucydides, who pays special attention to this stage of Pausanias' career, mentions nothing of the affair, probably means that, as far as the domestic affairs of Byzantium are concerned, the Spartan regent relied only on himself and placed no Persian garrison in the city. Given that Ion does not mention the status of the captives, the possibility that they were merchants (rather than soldiers) cannot be rejected.

The presumable reestablishment of Persian authority over Sestus and its re-conquest by the Athenians are mentioned by no ancient authors, including Herodotus and Thucydides. The probable reason for the omission may be related to the working method adopted by each author. Herodotus' *Histories* ends with the conquest of Sestus (479) by Xanthippus (i.e., the second conquest

43 Just. IX.1.3—condita primo a Pausania, rege Spartanorum, et per septem annos possessa fuit …

44 Meyer 1899: 59–61; Beloch II.2: 185–188; Kahrstedt 1921: 323–324; Olmstead 1948: 266; Lippold 1965: 339–341; Fornara 1966: 267–271; Smart 1967: 137; Herzfeld 1968: 351; Meiggs 1973: 71–73, 466–468; Rhodes 1992: 46; Lewis 1992: 100; 1992a: 499; Badian 1993: 86–88, 100; Rhodes 2006: 20.

45 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893: 145–146; Busolt 1897: 96n1; Walker 1927: 50, 466–467; Glotz 1938: 120; Gomme 1945: 394; Jacoby 1947: 2n4; ATL III: 159, 175; White 1964: 144; Parshikov 1968: 135n51; Lazenby 1975: 239–240; Balcer 1995: 309; Bengtson 1996: 197.

46 Thuc. I.130.1.

of the city is beyond the chronological span of his work). It is true that he often mentions events that took place after 479, but as far as the Persian garrisons in Thrace are concerned, similar specifications are only made about those situated in Eion and Doriscus, and then only because of the outstanding bravery of their governors.[47] Hence, the conclusion may be reached that during the second conquest of Sestus the commander of the local garrison did nothing special to distinguish himself, and so Herodotus ignores the event.

Thucydides himself did not have the intention of mentioning all the events which took place during the Pentekontaetia; his goal, rather, was to show how the Athenians established their empire during the period from the Battle of Mycale to the Peloponnesian war.[48] This is particularly true of the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace; he mentions only the conquest of Sestus, Byzantium, and Eion and he describes these only briefly.[49] It appears that other Athenian campaigns against the Persian strongholds in Thrace that were similar, for instance, to the campaign against the Thracian Chersonese described by Plutarch, or to the repeated attempts at the conquest of Doriscus Herodotus describes, were of no importance for Thucydides' narrative of the growth of Athenian power—and, accordingly, he does not mention the second conquest of Sestos.[50]

---

47 Hdt. VII.106.1–107.2.

48 Thuc. I.89.1–2, 97.2.

49 Thuc. I.89.2; 94.2; 98.1.

50 For the method adopted by Thucydides for the description of the events of the Pentekontaetia see ATL III: 158n11 and Meiggs 1973: 444–446. The editors of ATL (III.159–160, 175) arrive at the conclusion that Cimon's conquest of Sestus was an insignificant operation. On the basis of a fragment of Ephorus or from an epitome of his work (*FGrH* 70 F 191 frg. 6), they date the banishment of Pausanias from Byzantium and the expulsion of the Persians from Sestus 'after midsummer of 477' and reach the conclusion that Byzantium was the Delian League's first conquest, though Thucydides (I.98.1) claims Eion was the city attacked first after the establishment of the League. They ignore this discrepancy on the basis of the supposition that Thucydides viewed the operation against Eion as the beginning of a large-scale campaign against the Persians, in contrast to Pausanias' banishment from Byzantium, which he considered an event concerning the home affairs of the Greeks only, and an eventual second attack on Sestus as a less important expedition. If the later dating of Pausanias' banishment is accepted, then the question arises as to why the Athenians should have tolerated his pro-Persian policy for as many as seven years. For that issue see Beloch II.2: 186, who holds the opinion that the Athenians tried to avoid any unnecessary confrontation with Sparta, since the Delian League was not yet strong enough. For the possibility that Pausanias did not openly carry out such a pro-Persian policy as Thucydides claims, see Beloch II.2: 154–159 and Fornara 1966: 261–267. See also Lang 1967: 82–83 for

From what has been established so far, it can be concluded that if the information Ion gives about Cimon's division of the booty from Sestus and Byzantium at one and the same time does reflect the real state of affairs, then the most logical thing to do would be to connect it to Pausanias' expulsion, no matter which dating of this event is taken to be accurate. Due, however, to the lack of sufficient information, as well as the doubts which have been expressed about Ion's information, the question of when—if at all—Sestus (and Byzantium?) was once more conquered by the Persians and then came into the control of the Athenians for a second time remains open for further discussion.

The Expulsion of the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese

The scarce source base does not allow Athenian actions against the Persian strongholds remaining in Thrace after the conquest of Eion to be reconstructed. It is difficult not only to specify the date of the Athenian attempts at their capture but also to establish what the attitude of the Greek cities situated on the Thracian coast to that process was. From a report by Plutarch it becomes clear that part of the Persian forces did not leave the Thracian Chersonese but called on the Thracians who lived 'above' to help (τοὺς Θρᾷκας ἄνωθεν ἐπεκαλοῦντο).[51] The task of defeating them was undertaken by Cimon, who sailed from Athens at the head of a small navy. In the naval battle that followed, the Athenian commander-in-chief, despite having only four ships, managed to defeat and capture the thirteen ships of the enemy. Having expelled the Persians and defeated the Thracians, he succeeded in establishing Athenian control over the peninsula. In Plutarch's biography of Cimon, this event is placed after the account of the Battle of Eurymedon and before the account of the revolt of Thasos. If this order of events is correct, then the conquest of the Thracian Chersonese should be dated to the mid-460s. The information provided by Plutarch, both about the actions of the Athenians on the peninsula and their chronology may be indirectly confirmed by an Athenian casualty list that records deaths (Athenians, Madytioi, Byzantioi, and citizens at least from one other city) both in the Hellespont and on Thasos.[52]

---

the view that Pausanias performed a secret task assigned to him by Sparta. For a critique of the conclusions made by the editors of ATL see Meiggs 1973: 467–468.

51 Plut. *Cim.* 14.1.

52 *I.G.* i.^{2} 928; *SEG* X.405; Bradeen 1967: 321–328. See also Kolbe 1937: 249–254; ATL III: 108–110; Gomme 1945: 297; Meiggs 1973: 20; Rhodes 1992: 46; Zahrnt 2007: 738.

At this point, just as in the case of the siege of Eion, what attracts one's attention is the fact that the Persians were helped by the local Thracians. In Hammond's view this help consisted of recruitment of Thracians from the central part of Thrace, which according to his hypothesis was under Persian control at that time.[53] As demonstrated previously, the Persians most probably had never been in control of the central part of Thrace and therefore could not have recruited Thracians from there. Instead, these Thracians should be identified with some of the tribes inhabiting the lands near the coast between the Hebrus and Byzantium.[54] It is not clear from the text of Plutarch whether they were subject in some way to the Persians or were fully independent. The thirteen Persian ships are also of interest, but it can be only guessed at whether they were sent by some of the Asian satraps or were built in Europe.

Plutarch's narrative gives the impression that control of the Chersonese was not important. Cimon sailed from Athens at the head of a very small navy (ὀλίγων παντάπασι τριήρων) and fought the battle that followed with four ships while the Persians fought with thirteen. Moreover, this event is eclipsed by the Battle of Eurymedon and the revolt of the Thasians, and is not mentioned by other ancient authors, further proof of its insignificance. On the other hand, the final result of the expedition as described by Plutarch—the driving away of the Persians, the victory over the Thracians, and the conquest of the entire Thracian Chersonese (πᾶσαν ᾠκειώσατο τῇ πόλει τὴν Χερρόνησον)—is an indication that it is possible that this enterprise was far greater in scale and that, accordingly, greater powers were involved.

Doriscus

According to Herodotus, the only Persian governor in Europe who withstood the Greek attacks was Mascames.[55] In 480, Xerxes placed him in command of Doriscus. For his bravery, Xerxes sent him gifts every year, and Artaxerxes also honoured Mascames' successors in this way. Herodotus does not specify the exact time when the Persians lost control over Doriscus. Undoubtedly, this event should be dated after the conquest of Eion by the Athenians, for this was the first act after the foundation of the Delian League, while only Sestus and Byzantium had been attacked before its foundation. Herodotus'

53 Hammond 1980: 61.

54 Zahrnt 1997: 96n21.

55 Hdt. VII.106.1–2.

statements πέμπεσκε δὲ ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος and τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμοί κω ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελεῖν, πολλῶν πειρησαμένων, are indications of a long period of time. It is likely that the repeated attempts at conquering Doriscus started in the years after the conquest of Eion and continued intermittently for at least ten years. As long as Mascames was alive the Greeks did not manage to take the fortress. It appears that during the reign of Artaxerxes, who came to the throne in 465, Mascames was no longer alive, since, according to Herodotus, the new Persian king sent gifts to his successors. In this case, it is of paramount importance whether the aforementioned gifts were sent to Doriscus or to Persia. As far as Boges is concerned, Herodotus makes it clear that his sons who had survived and were living in Persia were highly honoured by Xerxes.[56] As to Mascames' successors, the specification of Persia is missing, which may mean that some of them took control of Doriscus and received gifts from Artaxerxes every year (i.e., it is possible that even after the year 465 the fortress was still under Persian control).[57] Some time afterwards, but no later than the Peace of Callias (450/49), the Persians lost Doriscus. It is logical to assume that from that moment on the Thracians had possession of the fortress, since it is not described as belonging to the Delian League.[58] This particular situation seemed to satisfy the Athenians and they did not try to force the local Thracians out—indeed, under Thracian control, Doriscus lost its strategic importance for the Athenians. Considering that neighbouring Aenos was a member of the Athenian *arche*,[59] and taking the fortress itself offered no economic benefit, any conflict with the Thracians became completely unnecessary.

56 Ibid. VII.107.1.

57 Hammond 1979: 103; 1980: 61 and Zahrnt 1997: 96n21 also state that the loss of Doriscus should be dated after 465. According to the editors of ATL (III: 215n92), Mascames' successors were drawn out of Doriscus after the Peace of Callias had been negotiated (450/49). The same conclusion has also been reached by Cawkwell 2005: 136n2, who believes, however, that, in this particular case, Mascames himself was drawn out. Dandamaev 1989: 231 holds the opinion that: 'when Herodotus wrote his *Historiae* during the second half of the fifth century BC, Doriscus was still subject to the Persians.' His opinion is shared by Jordanov 2003: 30.

58 Köhler 1889: 92; Oberhummer 1905: 1567; Zahrnt 1997: 96n21.

59 Meiggs 1973: 550–551.

Conclusion

The following paragraphs present the most important conclusions of this work relevant to the policies of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia. For the sake of convenience, they have been divided according to the corresponding chapters in the text.

Darius' Policy towards Thrace and Macedonia (514–512)

The first part of this chapter addresses a number of issues associated with the Scythian campaign of Darius. It appears that the main objective of the Great King was not to subjugate the Pontic Scythians, but rather to deal a crushing blow to them and thus preclude any possibility of their making raids in the Caucasus in the future, and also to disrupt the relations between them and the Asian Sacae, who were a permanent source of problems for the Persian Empire. The fact that the attack on the Pontic Scythians was carried out through the Bosporus, and not through the Caucasus, logically entails the conclusion that one of the objectives of Darius was to subordinate a part of Thrace and to fix the frontier of Persia at the Istros River delta—a river that could act, with a reliable guard in place, as a serious obstacle to the belligerent, but landbound Scythians.

The first part of the chapter also rejects the assertion that a land campaign of the Persian army had preceded the Scythian march of Darius and resulted in the subordination of the Hellespontic cities and the Thracian lands located between Byzantium, Salmydessus, and Arteskus. At the same time, it can safely be argued that a year or two prior to the campaign, the tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, Miltiades, and that of Byzantium, Ariston, acknowledged the authority of Darius, but that this came about bloodlessly, by the giving of 'earth and water.' For purely strategic reasons (securing the rear of the army in the event of a campaign failure), it is possible that the Persian detachments landed on the European shore of the Bosporus immediately before the march in question, and possibly in the Thracian Chersonese. It is presumed that for the Hellespontic cities diplomatic activities consisting of the demand for 'earth and water' were carried out, while in the case of the neighboring Thracians and those in the mainland this appears implausible. The naval operation described by Ctesias as having been led by Ariaramnes, the satrap of Cappadocia, seems to have logical grounds, but due to the controversial reputation of this author his statement remains debatable.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004282155_007

In the course of its advance against Scythia, the Persian army did not stay close to the coast but skirted Strandja from the west. Upon the retreat of Darius, the Scythians did not pursue him and their raid as far as the Thracian Chersonese might relate to the time of the Ionian Revolt. The aims of Darius' campaign were not achieved—the Persians retreated from Scythia without engaging the Scythians in a regular battle and failed to establish the border on the Istros delta.

The focus of the second part of the first chapter is on the actions of Megabazus in Thrace and Paeonia and on his diplomatic activity towards Macedonia. The chapter concludes that the campaign of Megabazus against the Hellespontic cities and that of Otanes against Byzantium and Chalcedon were carried out simultaneously, and that the enterprise of Histiaeus in Myrcinus was conducted under Darius' orders. Megabazus did not send troops to Macedonia, but only Persian envoys to demand 'earth and water.' As a result of this mission, the Macedonian ruler Amyntas became a vassal of the Great King, but in the territories subordinate to him no Persian garrisons were stationed. It remains debatable as to whether Amyntas was forced to pay tribute to the Persians from that moment on.

With respect to Thrace, there can be no doubt that part of it fell under Persian military and administrative control. Following the Scythian campaign, the northern Persian border in Thrace reached at its utmost the Strandja mountain range and the confluence area of the Maritsa, Tundzha, and Ardas rivers. The Persians were also in control of the Pontic coast from Byzantium to the cape of Thynias, or at most up to Apollonia, if it is accepted that Boryza was situated north of Thynias. In the aftermath of Megabazus' campaign, the entire coast from Byzantium to the mouth of the Strymon came under the rule of the Persians and the land on the left bank of the river from its mouth to the Lake Butkovo, as well as the Ruepel Gorge. The tribes living by Pangaeum—the Doberes, the Agrianes, and the Odomanti—remained free. The subjugated territories had to pay tribute and were controlled by garrisons stationed in strategically important locations. For this early stage of Persian rule, there is available only a report about a garrison at Doriscus, but it is a logical assumption that Persian units were placed also in Eion and Sestus and (less likely) in Edonian Myrcinus and the Persian polis of Boryza. Persian royal inscriptions and Greek authors cannot serve to prove the formation of a separate satrapy under the name Skudra from the newly acquired territories in Europe. Based on some archaeological finds, it can be presumed that diplomatic contacts were established with the neighboring Thracian tribes who remained independent from the Persians after the Scythian campaign. Due to the scarcity of those finds, the nature of these relations remains debatable.

Darius' Policy towards Thrace and Macedonia (499/8–492/1)

The first part of this chapter analyses the possibility of Persian control over the European territories having been completely lost during the Ionian Revolt. From the account of Herodotus, it is clear that at some time between the campaigns of Megabazus and Mardonius, the Macedonian ruler, for one reason or another, rejected his vassal status before the Great King. It makes sense that this event should be connected precisely to the revolt of the Ionians. Perhaps in this case, it was not a matter of a visible termination of the relationship with the Persians, but of temporary disengagement from the Persian sphere of influence, taking advantage of the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt and the elimination of the Persian garrisons in Thrace.

The complete loss of the Thracian possessions of Persia may be corroborated by numerous reports of Herodotus. According to the conclusions this study reaches, however, the escape of the Paeonians from Asia Minor, their disembarkation at Doriscus, and subsequent passage to the area of the Strymon, cannot serve as a proof of the retreat of the Persian garrisons from Thrace at the very outset of the Ionian Revolt. It appears that in view of the complicated military situation, the Doriscus garrison was under orders not to engage the Paeonians, and the Paeonians were allowed to return to their native places. On the other hand, the retreat of Aristagoras to Myrcinos and his actions there indicate that in 497/6 the Persians no longer exercised control over the area of the lower Strymon. The same conclusion holds true for the lands situated to the east of the Hebrus—the Scythians reached the Thracian Chersonese without confrontation, presumably in 496. The independent policy of the tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, Miltiades, found expression in the conquest of Lemnos, and the actions of Histiaeus at the very end of the Ionian Revolt are also an indication of the complete loss of Persian possessions in Thrace. Due to the scarce source base, it is difficult to assess whether the Persians withdrew their garrisons of their own accord or they were annihilated by their adversaries.

The second part of the second chapter has as its special focus the campaign of Mardonius. The objectives of the Great King were probably limited to the restoration of his rule over the Thraco-Macedonian region. Moreover, the presence of the fleet and the advance of the infantry indicates that Mardonius had to subjugate Thasos and the Chalcidice peninsula, and therefore the goals of this campaign were not just to strengthen the Persian influence in Macedonia, but also to increase the extent of its subjection to the Persian Empire. The disaster suffered by the navy at Mt Athos and the difficulty in subjugating the Brygi were not fatal for the accomplishment of the objectives. As a result of the campaign of Mardonius, Macedonia was incorporated into the administrative

system of Persia, but it did not become a separate satrapy and was not controlled by any of the satrapal centers. Rather, it became a dependent territory, whose ruler was under obligation to pay tribute to the Great King and to render assistance with military forces when necessary. No Persian garrisons were stationed in the lands subject to the Macedonian ruler.

Persia not only restored and reinforced its control over the lands conquered by Megabazus in the aftermath of the Mardonius campaign, but also acquired new territories. The Brygi were certainly subjugated, as were the citizens of Thasos and possibly those, too, of Samothrace and the polis of Acanthus. It is logical to assume that the Doberes, the Agrianes, and the Odomanti living by Mt Pangaeum were also at this time overtaken by a similar fate. It is hard to make a precise account of the conquests in the Chalcidice. It is possible that, in addition to the Brygi, the Bottiaei and the Chalcidians had also fallen under the dominion of Persia, but their subjugation cannot be safely ascertained until Xerxes' campaign against Greece. In view of these facts, it can be concluded that, despite the difficulties accompanying the campaign, Mardonius was able to accomplish the objectives he was tasked with, namely to restore, strengthen, and expand the power of the Great King in the Thraco-Macedonian region. The acts of Mardonius, however, did not result in the emergence of a satrapy from the Persian territorial acquisitions in Europe. It appears that no such aims were harboured in the plans of Darius and Xerxes, or if they were, for one reason or another, they were never implemented.

Xerxes' Policy towards Thrace and Macedonia (480–479)

The large-scale preparations completed by Xerxes in the Thraco-Macedonian region for the forthcoming campaign against Greece show that in the late 480s the stability of the Persian rule in the lands between Byzantium and Therme was beyond any doubt. The information provided by Herodotus affords the possibility of retracing the route followed by the Persian army from Doriscus to Therme. His claim that the army advanced to Acanthus in three columns probably does not correspond to the actual state of affairs, since in view of the geographical position of this polis, it does not seem to make sense to gather the entire army in it. This could mean that the statement of Herodotus had no basis in fact. If, however, it is assumed that the Persians did actually advance in three columns, then it ought to be admitted that after their split at Doriscus the land forces were reunited only at Therme.

On its way to Thessaly, the Persian army not only sustained no losses in manpower, but also, because of the recruitment of soldiers from the local Thra-

cians, Paeonians, and Greeks, even increased its numerical strength. From the narrative of Herodotus, it becomes clear that the entire Persian army crossed from Macedonia to Thessaly through the Petra Pass. The same pass was used by the corps escorting Xerxes on his way to Asia Minor following the Battle of Salamis.

During the campaign against Greece in 480/79, the Macedonian ruler Alexander acted as a faithful vassal of the Great King and was loyal in fulfilling his obligations to him. Apart from that, he sought to pursue his own interest wherever possible and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully in most cases, to put himself in a favourable light before the Greeks. On the whole, his advice was of benefit mostly to the Persians, in whose army he fought against the Athenians at Plataea. It was precisely because of his pro-Persian behavior in these fateful years that in the aftermath of the war Alexander was forced to invent stories to exculpate his actions. One of these fictional stories narrates his nocturnal visit to the Athenian camp on the eve of the Battle of Plataea. The gift mentioned by Justin as given to him by Xerxes—the lands between Olympus and Haemus—does not seem to be factual either. Perhaps it came into circulation with the propaganda originating at the time of Philip II, which aimed to substantiate his aspirations towards the Chalcidice peninsula and Thrace.

After the Battle of Plataea, the Persian army led by Artabazus entered Macedonia through the Petra Pass and made an undisturbed passage through the territory of the country. Alexander did not offer resistance to the retreating Persians and did not conquer the 'Nine Ways' region either in 479 or in the period 478–476/5. The well-known *Philip's Letter*, alleging that Alexander was the first to conquer the area where Amphipolis was subsequently founded, might have been another product of Philip II's propaganda aiming to legitimize the occupation of this strategically important polis.

The Expulsion of the Persians from Europe

With the capture of Sestus (479) and Byzantium (478) by the Athenians and their allies, the Persian garrisons in Europe were disconnected from the Persian territory in Asia. This enabled the Greeks to eliminate them individually at whichever times they considered most suitable. In 476/5, Cimon conquered Eion, an event that ended Persian power west of the Nestus River and which presumably ended the vassal status of Macedonia, though it is possible that this happened as early as 479 or 478. The Persians possibly organized a counteroffensive and reoccupied Sestus (and Byzantium?), but the absence of reliable information renders the issue debatable. In the mid-460s, Cimon expelled the

Persians from the Thracian Chersonese, but the garrison at Doriscus remained in Persian hands even after 465. Not until 450/49, when the Peace of Callias had been negotiated, can it be certain that the Persians, in some way or another, had lost control over this fortress. From then on Doriscus remained in possession of the Thracians, for it is not listed as a member of the Delian League.

Works Cited

Abbott, E. 1892. *A History of Greece: From the Ionian Revolt to the Thirty Years' Peace 500–445 BC*. Part II. London.

————. 1893. *Herodotus Books V and VI: Terpsichore and Erato*. Oxford.

Abel, O. 1847. *Makedonien vor König Philipp*. Leipzig.

Abicht, K. 1862. *Herodotos: Für den schulgebrauch erklärt*. Zweiter Band. Buch III und IV. Leipzig.

————. 1882. *Herodotos: Für den schulgebrauch erklärt*. Vierter Band. Buch VII. Dritte verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig.

————. 1883. *Herodotos: Für den schulgebrauch erklärt*. Dritter Band. Buch V und VI. Dritte verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig.

Ajanov, G. 1946. Г. Аянов, 'Стари пътища и селища край тях през Странджа и Сакар,' *ИБАИ* 15, 94–113.

Alonso-Núñez, J.M. 1987. 'An Augustan World History: The "Historiae Philippicae" of Pompeius Trogus,' *G&R* 34, 56–72.

Aly, W. 1931. 'Strabon,' in *RE*, Zweite Reiche. Siebter Halbband, 76–155.

————. 1951. 'Plinius,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster Halbband, 294–299.

Anderson, W.C.F. 1898. 'A Journey from Mount Athos to the Hebrus,' in *Commemoration Volume of Firth College*. Sheffield, 211–252.

Archibald, Z. 1998. *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace: Orpheus Unmasked*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Armayor, O.K. 1978. 'Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?,' *HSCPh* 82, 45–62.

————. 1980. 'Sesostris and Herodotus' Autopsy of Thrace, Colchis, Inland Asia Minor, and the Levant,' *HSCPh* 84, 51–74.

————. 1985. *Herodotus' Autopsy of the Fayoum: Lake Moeris and the Labyrinth of Egypt*. Amsterdam.

Asheri, D. 1990. 'Herodotus on Thracian Society and History,' in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*. Tome XXXV, 131–163.

ATL (B. Meritt, H. Wade-Gery, M. McGregor), 1939–1950. *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Vol. I–III. Harvard, Princeton.

Austin, M.M. 1990. 'Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546–479 BC,' *CQ* NS 40, no. 2, 289–306.

Babelon, E. 1907. *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines: Deuxième partie; Description historique*. Tome premier. Paris.

Bacheva, G. 2012. 'Detecting a Satrapy: The Skudra Case,' in *Thracia XX: In Honour of the 40th Anniversary of the Institute of Thracology*. Sofia, 11–26.

Badian, E. 1989. 'History from "Square Brackets,"' *ZPE* 79, 59–70.

————. 1993. *From Plataea to Potidaea: Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentecontaetia*. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore.

———. 1994. 'Herodotus on Alexander I of Macedon: A Study in Some Subtle Silences,' in *Greek Historiography*. Simon Hornblower (ed.). Oxford, 107–130.

———. 2007. 'Persians and Milesians in Thrace at the end of the 6th Century BC,' in *Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Thracology*. Komotini-Alexandroupolis 18–23 October 2005. Athens, 36–43.

Bakker, E.J., de Jong, I.J.F., van Wees, H. (eds.) 2002: *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden, Boston, Köln.

Balcer, J.M. 1972. 'The Date of Herodotus IV.1 Darius' Scythian Expedition,' *HSCPh* 76, 99–132.

———. 1988. 'Persian Occupied Thrace (Skudra),' *Historia* 37, 1–21.

———. 1995. *The Persian Conquest of the Greeks 545–450 BC*. Konstanz.

Barron, J.P. 1988. 'The Liberation of Greece,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. IV, 592–622, Cambridge University Press.

Bauer, A. 1899. *Die Forschungen zur Griechischen Geschichte 1888–1899*. München.

Beck, M. (ed.) 2014. *A Companion to Plutarch*. Wiley Blackwell.

Beloch, K.J. (1914^2, 1931^2). *Griechische Geschichte*. Zweiter Band, erste und zweiter Abteilung. Strassburg, Berlin-Leipzig.

Beneker, J. 2009. 'Nepos' Biographical Method in the Lives of Foreign Generals,' *CJ* 105, 109–121.

Bengtson, H. 1996. *Griechische Geschichte: Von den Anfängen bis in die römische Kaiserzeit*. Unveränderter Nachdruck der 5., durchges. u. erg. Auflage. München.

Berve, H. 1967. *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*. Band I–II. München.

Beševliev, V. 1975. 'Ein Rätsel der antiken Geographie Thrakiens,' *SB* 10, 19–22.

———. 1990. В. Бешевлиев, 'Следи от предтракийски език,' *ИНМВ* 26, 9–20.

Bichler, R. 2004. 'Ktesias 'korrigiert' Herodot: Zur literarischen Einschätzung der *Persika*,' in *Ad Fontes! Festschrift Gerhard Dobesch*, hg. v. Herbert Heftner—Kurt Tomaschitz, Wien, 105–116.

Bigwood, J.M. 1976. 'Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus,' *Phoenix* 30, 1–25.

———. 1978. 'Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars,' *Phoenix* 32, 19–41.

Billerbeck, J. 1826. *Handbuch der alten Geographie*. Leipzig.

Blakesley, J.W. 1854. *Herodotus, with a Commentary*. Vol. II. London.

Blamire, A. 1959. 'Herodotus and Histiaeus,' *CQ* NS 9, no. 2, 142–154.

Bonias, Z. 2000. 'Une inscription de l'ancienne Bergè,' *BCH* 124, 227–246.

Borza, E. 1987. 'Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks,' *PAPhS* 131, no. 1, 32–52.

———. 1992^2. *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*. Princeton, New Jersey.

———. 1995. 'Some Toponym Problems in Eastern Macedonia,' in *Studia in Honorem Georgii Mihailov*. Institute of Thracology Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski.' Sofia, 89–95.

Boshnakov, K. 2004. *Pseudo-Skymnos* (*Semos von Delos?*). Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden.

Boteva, D. 2008. Д. Ботева, 'Военните успехи на Мегабаз в Тракия и предвижването на Ксеркс от Дориск до Акант: връщане към Херодот,' *Анали* кн.2–4, 121–128.

————. 2011. 'Re-reading Herodotus on the Persian Campaigns in Thrace,' in *Herodot und das Persische Weltreich*. Akten des 3. Internationalen Kolloquiums zum Thema 'Vorderasien im Spannungsfeld klassischer und altorientalischer Überlieferungen,' Innsbruck, 24–28 November 2008. Herausgegeben von Robert Rollinger, Brigitte Truschnegg, Reinhold Bichler. Wiesbaden, 735–759.

Boteva-Boyanova 2000. Д. Ботева-Боянова, *Проблеми на тракийската история и култура: Нов поглед върху сведения на Херодот и Тукидид*. София.

Bowie, A.M. 2007. *Herodotus Histories*. Book VIII. Cambridge University Press.

Bradeen, D. 1952. 'The Chalcidians in Thrace,' *AJPh* 73, no. 4, 356–380.

————. 1967. 'The Athenian Casualty List of 464 BC,' *Hesperia* 36, 321–328.

Briant, P. 2002. *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Winona Lake, Indiana (English translation).

Brown, T. 1978. 'Suggestions for a Vita of Ctesias of Cnidus,' *Historia* 27, 1–19.

Burn, A.R. 1984^2. *Persia and the Greeks the Defence of the West, c.546–478 BC*. Duckworth.

————. 1985. 'Persia and the Greeks,' in *CHI*, Vol. II, 292–391, Cambridge University Press.

Bury, J.B. 1897. 'The European Expedition of Darius,' *CR* 11, no. 6, 277–282.

————. 1900. *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great*. London.

Busolt, G. 1888. *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia. 2. Teil: die perserkriege und das attische Reich*. Gotha.

————. 1897. *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia. Band III. Teil I: die Pentekontaëtie*. Gotha.

Cameron, G. 1973. 'The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters,' *JNES* 32, no. 1–2, 47–56.

————. 1975. 'Darius the Great and His Scythian (Saka) Campaign, Bihistun and Herodotus,' *Acta iranica* 1, 77–87.

Canfora, L. 2006. 'Biographical Obscurities and Problems of Composition,' in *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. Antonios Rengakos, Antonis Tsakmakis (eds.). Leiden, Boston, 3–31.

Cary, M. 1752. *Histoire des rois de Thrace et de ceux du Bosphore Cimmerien eclaircie par les medailles*. Paris.

Cary, M. (B. Gray, M. Cary) 1930. 'The Reign of Darius,' in *CAH*, First Edition, Cambridge at the University Press. Reprinted, with slight corrections. Vol. IV, 173–228.

Caspari, M.O.B. 1910. 'On the Γῆς Περίοδος of Hecataeus,' *JHS* 30, 236–248.

Casson, S. 1915. 'The vita Miltiadis of Cornelius Nepos,' *Klio* 14, 69–90.

————. 1926. *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria: Their relations to Greece from the earliest times, down to the time of Philip son of Amyntas*. Oxford University Press.

Castritius, H. 1972. 'Die Okkupation Thrakiens durch die Perser und der Sturz des athenischen Tyrannen Hippias,' *Chiron* 2, 1–15.

Cawkwell, G. 2005. *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*. Oxford University Press.

Chapman, G.A.H. 1972. 'Herodotus and Histiaeus' Role in the Ionian Revolt,' *Historia* 21, no. 4, 546–568.

Chernenco, E.V. 1984. Е.В. Черненко, *Скифо-персидская война*. Киев.

Clarke, K. 1997. 'In Search of the Author of Strabo's Geography,' *JRS* 87, 92–110.

CNG. 2002. auc. 60, May 2002, 250, https://www.cngcoins.com/Coin.aspx?CoinID=19718.

Cobet, C.G. 1883. 'Hecataei Milesii scripta ψευδεπίγραφα,' *Mnemosyne* 11, 1–7.

Cole, J.W. 1977. 'Not Alexander but Perdikkas (Dem. 23.200 and 13.24),' *GRBS* 18, no. 1, 25–32.

———. 1978. 'Alexander Philhellene and Themistocles,' *L'Antiquité Classique* 47, 37–49.

Cook, J.M. 2002. *The Persians*. London. Sixth printing.

Cousinéry, M.E.M. 1831. *Voyage dans la Macédoine, contenant des recherches sur l'histoire, la géographie et les antiquités de ce pays*. Tomme premier. Paris.

Cox, G.W. 1876. *The Greeks and the Persians*. New York.

Cramer, J.A. 1828. *A Geographical and Historical Description of Ancient Greece with a Map and a Plan of Athens*. Vol. I. Oxford.

D'Anville, J.B.B. 1762. *Graeciae Antiquae: Specimen Geographicum*. Autor d'Anville, Regiae Humaniorum Litterarum Academiae, et Scientiarum Petropolitanae Socius, MDcclxii, Apud Auctorem, In Aedibus Regiis, vulgo les Galeries du Louvre. Published 12 May 1794. by Laurie & Whittle *№* 53, Fleet Street London.

Dahmen, K. 2010. 'The Numismatic Evidence,' in *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Joseph Roisman, Ian Worthington (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell, 41–62.

Dandamaev, M.A. 1989. *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (English translation). Leiden, New York, Kobenhagen, Köln.

Danov, H. 1969. Х. Данов, *Древна Тракия*. София.

Dascalakis, A. 1965. *The Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians*. Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniche.

Davies, O. 1932. 'Ancient Mines in Southern Macedonia,' *JRAIGBI* 62, 145–162.

Debnar, P. 2005. 'Fifth-Century Athenian History and Tragedy,' in *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*. Justina Gregory (ed.). Blackwell publishing, 3–22.

Delev, P. 1983. 'Les Odryses et les Kikones: Problèmes de géographie historique,' *Pulpudeva* 4, 220–226 (Semaines philippopolitaines de l'histoire et de la culture thrace. Plovdiv, 3–17 octobre 1980).

———. 2005. 'Stratifying Herodotus: Local Tribes between the Lower Axios and the Nestos,' in *Thracia* XVI, 105–121.

———. 2007. 'The Edonians,' in *Thracia* XVII 85–106.

———. 2014. П. Делев, *История на племената в Югозападна Тракия през I хил. пр. Хр*. Университетско издателство "Св. Климент Охридски," София.

Desdevises, Th. 1863. *Géographie ancienne de la Macédoine*. Paris.

Detlefsen, D. 1904. *Die geographischen Bücher (II, 242–VI Schluss) der Naturalis Historia des C. Plinius Secundus mit vollständigem kritischen Apparat*. Berlin.

Detschew, D. 1976. *Die Thrakischen Sprachreste*. 2. Auflage mit Bibliographie 1955–1974 von Zivka Velkova. Wien.

Dewald, C., Marincola, J. (eds.) 2006. *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus*. Cambridge University Press.

Diels, H. 1876. 'Chronologische Untersuchungen über Apollodorus Chronika,' *RhMPh* 31, 1–54.

———. 1887. 'Herodot und Hekataios,' *Hermes* 22, 411–444.

Dieterich, A. 1894. 'Aischylos,' in *RE* 1, 1065–1084.

Dimitsas, M. 1870. M. Δήμιτσας, *Ἀρχαία Γεωγραφία τῆς Μακεδονίας*. Αθήνησι.

Dionisotti, A.C. 1988. 'Nepos and the Generals,' *JRS* 78, 35–49.

Döll, M. 1891. *Studien zur Geographie des alten Makedoniens*. Stadtamhof.

Dorati, M. 1995. 'Ctesia falsario?,' *Quaderni di Storia* 41, 33–52.

———. 2011. 'Lo storico nel suo testo: Ctesia e la sua 'biografia',' in *Ktesias' Welt*, Josef Wiesehöfer, Robert Rollinger, Giovanni B. Lanfranchi (eds). Harrassowitz Verlag Wiesbaden, 81–109.

Draganov, D. 2000. Д. Драганов, *Монетите на македонските цари. Част I: От Александър I до Александър Велики*. Ямбол.

Dueck, D. 1999. 'The Date and Method of Composition of Strabo's "Geography,"' *Hermes* 127, 467–478.

———. 2000. *Strabo of Amasia: A Greek Man of Letters in Augustan Rome*. London.

Dueck, D., Lindsay, H., Pothecary, S. (eds.) 2005. *Strabo's Cultural Geography: The Making of Kolossourgia*. Cambridge University Press.

Duncker, M. 1877. *Geschichte des Alterthums*. Vierter Band. Vierte verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig.

———. 1882. *Geschichte des Alterthums*. Band VII. Dritte, vierte und fünfte Auflage. Leipzig.

Duridanov, I. 1976. И. Дуриданов, *Езикът на траките*. София.

Edson, Ch. 1970. 'Early Macedonia,' in *Ancient Macedonia* I, 17–44.

Erbse, H. 1992. *Studien zum Verständnis Herodots*. Berlin-New York.

Errington, M. 1981. 'Alexander the Philhellene and Persia,' in *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*. Thessaloniki, 139–143.

———. 1986. *Geschichte Makedoniens*. München.

Evans, J.A.S. 1963. 'Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt,' *AJPh* 84, no. 2, 113–128.

Fearn, D. 2007. 'Narrating ambiguity: Murder and Macedonian allegiance (5.17–22),' in

Reading Herodotus. A Study of the logoi in Book 5 of Herodotus' Histories. E. Irwin, E. Greenwood (eds.). Cambridge University Press, 98–127.

Fehling, D. 1971. *Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot*. Herausgegeben von Heinrich Dörrie und Paul Moraux. Band 9. Berlin, New York.

FGrH (F. Jacoby, 1923–1958). *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Berlin.

Filow, B. 1934. Б. Филов, *Надгробните могили при Дуванлий в Пловдивско*. София.

Fine, J. 1983. *The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History*. Harvard University Press.

Flathe, L. 1832. *Geschichte Macedoniens und der Reiche, welche von macedonischen Königen beherrscht wurden. Erster Theil: Von der Urzeit bis zum Untergange des persisch-macedonischen Reiches*. Leipzig.

Flower, M.A., Marincola, J. 2002. *Herodotus Histories*, Book IX. Cambridge University Press.

Fol, A. 1972. А. Фол, *Политическа история на траките*. София.

———. 1975. А. Фол, 'Проучвания върху гръцките извори за древна Тракия. Тракия в периегезата на Хекатей,' *ГСУФИФ*, 1972–1973, LXVI, Книга III—История, 17–33.

———. 1975a. А. Фол, 'Thraco-Scythica: Проблемы письменных источников о V веке до н.э.,' В: *Studia Thracica 1*, 160–165.

———. 1976. А. Фол, 'Проучвания върху гръцките извори за древна Тракия II. Тракийският логос на Херодот,' *ГСУИФ*, 1973–1974, LXVII, 5–26.

Fol, A., Hammond, N.G.L. 1988. 'Persia in Europe, apart from Greece,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Vol. IV, 234–253.

Fornara, Ch. 1966. 'Some Aspects of the Career of Pausanias of Sparta,' *Historia* 15, no. 3, 257–271.

———. 1971. 'Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication,' *JHS* 91, 25–34.

Fried, S. 1987. 'The Decadrachm hoard: an introduction,' *BAR International Series* 343, 1–20.

Gaebler, H. 1897. 'Zur Münzkunde Makedoniens. II: Die Münzen der Derronen,' *ZN* 20, 289–299.

———. 1935. *Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands: Makedonia und Paionia*. Band III. Berlin.

Gardiner-Garden, J.R. 1987. 'Dareios' Scythian Expedition and its Aftermath,' *Klio* 69, no. 2, 326–350.

Geller, M.J. 1990. 'Babylonian Astronomical Diaries and Corrections of Diodorus,' *BSOAS* 53, no. 1, 1–7.

Georges, P. 1987. 'Darius in Scythia: The Formation of Herodotus' Sources and the Nature of Darius' Campaign,' *AJAH* 12, 97–147.

———. 2000. 'Persian Ionia under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered,' *Historia* 49, 1–39.

Georgiev, V. 1977. В. Георгиев, *Траките и техният език*. София.

Gergova, D. 2010. 'Orphic Thrace and Achaemenid Persia,' in *Achaemenid Impact in the*

Black Sea Communication of Powers. J. Nieling, Ellen Rehm (eds.). Aarchus University Press, 67–86.

Gerov, B. 1961. Б. Геров, 'Проучвания върху западнотракийските земи през римско време,' *ГСУФФ*, 54, 3, 155–406.

Gerov, B. 1978. Б. Геров, 'Плиний Стари като извор за тракийските земи,' Филология, 3, 3–20.

Geyer, F. 1928. 'Makedonia. VII. Geschichte,' in *RE*, 697–771.

———. 1930. *Makedonien bis zur thronbesteigung Philipps II*. München und Berlin.

Gibson, R.K., Morello, R. (eds.) 2011. *Pliny the Elder: Themes and Contexts*. Leiden, Boston.

Gillis, D. 1979. *Collaboration with the Persians*. Wiesbaden.

Glotz, G. 1938. *Histoire Grecque: La Grèce au V^e^ siècle.* Tome II. Paris.

Gomme, A.W. 1945. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: Introduction and Commentary on Book I*. Vol. I, Oxford at the Clarendon Press.

Graham, A.J. 1964. *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*. New York.

Grayson, A. 1975. *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts. Toronto Semitic Texts and Studies 3*. Tornoto.

Green, P. 1998[2]. *The Greco-Persian Wars*. With a New Introduction. University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.

Grossstephan, J. 1915. *Beiträge zur Periegese des Hekatäus von Milet*. Inaugural-Dissertation der hohen philosophischen Fakultät der Keiser Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg. Strassburg.

Grote, G. 1853[2]. *History of Greece*. Vol. IV. New York.

———. 1861[2]. *History of Greece*. Vol. V. New York.

Grundy, G.B. 1901. *The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries: A Study of the Evidence, Literary and Topographical*. London.

Gundel, H. 1951. 'Plinius,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster Halbband, 285–294.

Hammond, N.G.L. 1956. 'The Philaids and the Chersonese,' *CQ* NS 6, no. 3–4, 113–129.

———. 1967. 'The Origins and the Nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 BC,' *JHS* 87, 41–61.

———. 1972. *A History of Macedonia*. Vol. I, Oxford.

———. 1979 (Hammond, N.G.L., Griffith G.T.) 1979. *A History of Macedonia*. Vol. II, Oxford at the Clarendon Press.

———. 1980. 'The Extent of Persian Occupation in Thrace,' *Chiron* 10, 53–61.

———. 1988. 'The Expedition of Xerxes,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. IV, 518–591, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1989. *The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History*. Clarendon Press. Oxford.

———. 1990. 'Inscriptions Conserning Philippi and Calindoea in the Reign of Alexander the Great,' *ZPE* 82, 167–175.

———. 1991. 'The Sources of Justin on Macedonia to the Dead of Philip,' *CQ* NS 41, no. 2, 496–508.

———. 1997. 'The Lakes on the Lower Strymon and Mt. Dionysos,' *AW* 28, 41–46.

Hammond, N.G.L., Roseman, L.J. 1996. 'The Construction of Xerxes' Bridge over the Hellespont,' *JHS* 116, 88–107.

Hanslik, R. 1951. 'Plinius,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster halbband, 341–392.

Harmatta, J. 1954. 'A recently discovered Old Persian inscription,' *AAASH* 2, 1–14.

———. 1976. 'Darius' Expedition against the SAKĀ TIGRAXAUDĀ,' *AAASH* 24, 15–24.

———. 1990. 'Herodotus, Historian of the Cimmerians and the Scythians,' in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*. Tome XXXV, 115–130.

Harrison, E. 1912. 'Chalkidike,' *CQ* 6, 93–103.

Hatzopoulos, M. 1996. *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*. Vol. II. Epigraphic Appendix (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 22). Athens.

———. 2008. 'Retour à la vallée du Strymon,' in *Thrakika Zetemata* I (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 58), Athenes, 13–54.

Hatzopoulos, M., Loukopoulou, L. 1989. *Morrylos cité de la Crestonie* (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 7), Athenes.

———. 1992. *Recherches sur les marches orientales des Téménides. Ière partie* (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 11). Athenes.

Head, B. 1887. *Historia numorum: A Manual of Greek Numismatics*. Oxford.

———. 1911. *Historia numorum: A Manual of Greek Numismatics*. New and Enlarged Edition. Oxford at the Clarendon Press.

Heckel, W. 2008. *The Conquests of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge University Press.

Heinlein, S. 1909. 'Histiaios von Milet' *Klio* 9, 341–351.

Heinrichs, J., Müller, S. 2008. 'Ein persisches Statussymbol auf Münzen Alexanders I. von Makedonien,' *ZPE* 167, 283–309.

Henkelman, W.F.M., Stolper, M.W. 2009. 'Ethnic identity and ethnic labelling at Persepolis: the case of the Skudrians,' in *Organisation des pouvoirs et contacts culturels dans les pays de l'empire achéménide. Actes du colloque organisé au Collège de France par la "Chaire d'histoire et civilization du monde achéménide et de l'empire d'Alexandre" et le "Réseau international d'études et de recherches achéménides"* (GDR 2538 CNRS), 9–10 novembre 2007, sous la direction de Pierre Briant et Michel Chauveau. Paris, 271–329.

Herbst, L. 1890. 'Die Arbeiten über Thukydides: Fünfter und letzter Artikel,' *Philologus* 49, 134–180.

Herington, C.J. 1967. 'Aeschylus in Sicily,' *JHS* 87, 74–85.

Herrmann, M. 1911. 'Hekataios als mutmassliche geographische Quelle Herodots in seiner Beschreibung des Xerxeszuges,' *Klio* 11, 382–384.

Hershbell, J. 1993. 'Plutarch and Herodotus—the Beetle in the Rose,' *RhMPh* 136, 143–163.

Herzfeld, E. 1968. *The Persian Empire: Studies in geography and ethnography of the ancient Near East*. Wiesbaden.

Hignett, C. 1963. *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece*. Oxford.

Hirsch, S. 1992. 'The Deportation of the Paeonians: Strategies and the Experiences of Thracian Deportees,' in *VI Symposium Internazionale di Thracologia*. Firenze 11–13 maggio 1989. Roma, 230–239.

Hirschfeld, G. 1896. 'Artiskos,' in *RE*, Vierter Halbband, 1458.

Höck, A. 1891. 'Das Odrysenreich in Thrakien: Im Fünften und Vierten Jahrhundert v. Chr,' *Hermes* 26, 1, 76–117.

Hoddinott, R.F. 1981. *The Thracians*. New York.

Hornblower, S. 1991. *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Vol. I. Books I–III, Oxford.

———. 2011. *The Greek World 479–323 BC*. Fourth Edition, London and New York.

———. 2013. *Herodotus Histories*. Book V. Cambridge University Press.

How W., Wells J. 1928. *A Commentary on Herodotus: With Introduction and Appendixes*. Vol. I–II, Oxford.

Hrisohoy, M. 1893. M. Χρυσοχόου, *Η Πρασιάς λίμνη: Μελέτη γεωγραφική και ιστορική αναγνωσθείσα εν τω συλλόγω Παρνασσώ*. Εν Αθηναις.

Imhoof-Blumer, F. 1883. *Monnaies Grecques*. Amsterdam.

Instinsky, H. 1956. 'Herodot und der Erste zug des Mardonios Gegen Griechenland,' *Hermes* 84, no. 4, 477–494.

Isaac, B. 1986. *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest*. Leiden.

Isserlin, B.S.J. 1991. 'The Canal of Xerxes: Facts and Problems,' *ABSA* 86, 83–91.

Isserlin B.S.J., Jones R.E., Papamarinopoulos S., Uren J. 1994. 'The Canal of Xerxes on the Mount Athos Peninsula: Preliminary Investigations in 1991–2,' *ABSA* 89, 277–284.

Isserlin B.S.J, Jones R.E., Papamarinopoulos S, Syrides G.E., Maniatis Y., Facorellis G., Uren J. 1996. 'The Canal of Xerxes: Investigations in 1993–1994,' *ABSA* 91, 329–340.

Isserlin B.S.J., Jones R.E., Karastathis V., Papamarinopoulos S., Syrides G.E., Uren J. 2003. 'The Canal of Xerxes: Summary of Investigations 1991–2001,' *ABSA* 98, 369–385.

Izdimirski, M. 2008. М. Издимирски, 'Персийската администрация в древна Тракия,' *Анали*, кн.2–4, 129–136.

———. (forthcoming). М. Издимирски, 'Бориза—един персийски 'полис' в Тракия,' В *България и Иран в огледалото на историята*. Научна конференция—София, 17–18 май 2011г. (под печат).

Jacoby, F 1912. 'Hekataios,' in *RE* VII, 2667–750.

———. 1913. 'Herodotos' in *RE*, Suppl. 2, 205–520.

———. 1922. 'Ktesias,' in *RE*, XI, 2032–2073.

———. 1947. 'Some Remarks on Ion of Chios,' *CQ* 41, no. 1/2, 1–17.

Jireček, C. 1877. *Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe: Eine historisch-geographische Studie*. Prag.

Jochmus, A. 1854. 'Notes on a Journey into the Balkan, or Mount Haemus, in 1847,' *JRGS* 24, 36–85.

Jones, N. 1977. 'The Topography and Strategy of the Battle of Amphipolis in 422 BC,' *CSCA* 10, 71–104.

Jordanov, K. 2003. К. Йорданов, 'Achaemenido-Thracica: опити за политически и административен контрол (ок. 515–466г.пр.Хр.),' *История* 5, 21–34.

———. 2009. 'Political History of Northeastern Thrace from the mid-6th Century until 323/322 BC,' *Thracia* XVIII, 217–253.

Junge, P. 1944. *Dareios I: König der Perser*. Leipzig.

Kagan, J. 1987. 'The Decadrachm Hoard: Chronology and Consequences,' *BAR International Series* 343, 21–28.

Kahrstedt, U. 1921. 'Sparta und Persien in der Pentekontaetie,' *Hermes* 56, 320–325.

Kanatsoulis, D. 1964. Δ. Κανατσούλης, *Ἡ Μακεδονία μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Ἀρχελάου. I: Ἐξωτερικὴ πολιτική*. Θεσσαλονίκη.

Kazarow, G. 1918. 'Zur Archäologie Thrakiens,' *AA* 33, 3–63.

———. 1921. Г. Кацаров, *Пеония: Принос към старата етнография и история на Македония*. София = Географска библиотека № 3.

———. 1922. Г. Кацаров, *Цар Филип II Македонски: История на Македония до 336г.пр.Хр*. София.

Kehne, P. 2002. 'Zur Logistik des Xerxesfeldzuges 480 v. Chr.,' in *Stuttgarter Kolloquium zur Historischen Geographie des Altertums* 7, 1999. Stuttgard, 29–47.

Keiper, Ph. 1877. *Die Perser des Aeschylos als Quelle für altpersische Altertumskunde*. Erlangen, Verlag von Andreas Deichert.

Kent, R. 1950. *Old Persian, Grammar: Texts, Lexicon*. American Oriental Society. New Haven, Connecticut.

Kienast, D. 1996. 'Der Wagen des Ahura Mazda und der Ausmarsch des Xerxes,' *Chiron* 26, 285–313.

Kiepert, H. 1848. *Historisch-geographischer Atlas der alten Welt, zum Schulgebrauch bearbeitet und mit erläuternden Bemerkungen begleitet* von H. Kiepert. Weimar.

———. 1869. *Atlas Antiquus: Zwölf Karten zur alten Geschichte entworfen und bearbeitet* von Heinrich Kiepert. Fünfte neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage.

Klotz, A. 1913. 'Die Epitoma des Livius,' *Hermes* 48, 542–557.

———. 1952. 'Pompeius Trogus,' in *RE* 21, 2300–2313.

Köhler, U. 1889. 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der Pentekontaetie,' *Hermes* 24, no. 1, 85–100.

Kolbe, W. 1937. 'Diodors Wert für die Geschichte der Pentekontaetie,' *Hermes* 72, no. 3, 241–269.

Kosmidou, E. 2011. 'Macedonian and Thracian relations in northern Greece after the Persian wars with particular reference to the coinage and politics of Alexander I,' in *Travaux de symposium international le livre. La roumanie. L'Europe*. Troisième édition—20 à 24 Septembre 2010. Tome IV: La quatrième section—latinité orientale—éditeur bibliothèque de Bucarest. Bucarest, 439–452.

Kraay, C. 1976. *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*. London.

Kraft, K. 1964. 'Bemerkungen zu den Perserkriegen,' *Hermes* 92, no. 2, 144–171.

Kroll, W. 1918. 'Iunianus,' in *RE*, Neunzehnter halbband, 956–958.

———. 1951. 'Plinius,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster Halbband, 285, 294, 299–341.

Kuhrt, Amélie 2007. *The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources of the Achaemenid Period*. Vol. I. London.

Kyriakou, P. 2011. '*The Past in Aeschylos and Sophocles*,' Berlin.

Lambert, W.G. 1978. *The Background of Jewish Apocalyptic*. London.

Lang, M. 1967. 'Scapegoat Pausanias,' *CJ* 63, 79–85.

———. 1968. 'Herodotus and the Ionian Revolt,' *Historia* 17, no. 1, 24–36.

Laqueur, R. 1937. 'Forschungen zu Thukydides,' *RhMPh* 86, no. 4, 316–357.

Larcher 1824. *The History of Herodotus, literally translated into English*; *illustrated with notes, explanatory and critical, from Larcher, Rennell, Mitford, Schweigheuser, modern books of travel, to which is added Larcher's table of the chronology of Herodotus*. Vol. II, Oxford.

Lazenby, J.F. 1975. 'Pausanias, Son of Kleombrotos,' *Hermes* 103, no. 2, 235–251.

———. 2007[2]. *The Defence of Greece 490–479 BC*. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Eastbourne.

Leak W.M. 1835. *Travels in Northern Greece*. Vol. III. London.

Legrand, Ph.-E. 1945. *Hérodote: Histoires; Livre IV Melpomène*. Paris.

———. 1946. *Hérodote: Histoires; Livre V Terpsichore*. Paris.

Lenfant, D. 2002. 'Pourquoi Xerxès détacha sa ceinture (Hérodote, VIII.120),' *ARTA*, 2002.004. (http://www.achemenet.com/ressources/enligne/arta/pdf/2002.004.pdf)

———. 2004. *Ctésias de Cnide: La Perse. L'Inde. Autres fragments*. Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

———. 2007. 'Greek Historians of Persia,' in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. John Marincola (ed.). Blackwell Publishing, Vol. I, 200–209.

Lenk, B. 1931. 'Mesambria,' in *RE*, 1072–1074.

———. 1936. 'Thynoi,' in *RE*, 734–735.

———. 1936a. 'Thrake,' in *RE*, 414–452.

———. 1937. 'Odrysai,' in *RE*, 1900–1903.

Lepelley, C. 2004. 'Une inscription d' 'Heraclea Sintica' (Macédoine) récemment découverte, révélant un rescrit de l'empereur Galère restituant ses droits àla cité,' *ZPE* 146, 221–231.

Levene, D.S. 2007. 'Roman Historiography in the Late Republic,' in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. John Marincola (ed.). Blackwell Publishing, Vol. I, 275–289.

Lewis, D.M. 1988. 'The Tyranny of the Pisistratidae,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. IV, 287–302, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992. 'Mainland Greece, 479–451 BC,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. V, D.M. Lewis, J. Boardman, J.K. Davies, M. Ostwald (eds.), 96–120, 499–503, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992a. 'Chronological Notes,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. V, D.M. Lewis, J. Boardman, J.K. Davies, M. Ostwald (eds.), 499–503, Cambridge University Press.

Lippold, A. 1965. 'Pausanias von Sparta und die Perser,' *RhMPh* 108, no. 4, 320–341.

Lorber, C. 2000. 'The Goats of 'Aigai',' in *Pour Denyse: Divertissements numismatiques*. S. Mani Hurter, C. Arnold-Biucchi (eds.). Bern, 113–134.

Loukopoulou, L. 1989. *Contribution à l'histoire de la Thrace propontique* (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 9). Athenes.

———. 2004. 'Thrace from Nestos to Hebros,' in *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Mogens Hansen, Thomas Nielsen (eds.). Oxford, 870–884.

Loukopoulou L., Psoma S. 2008. 'Maroneia and Stryme Revisited. Some Problems of Historical Topography,' in *Thrakika Zetemata* I (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 58), Athenes, 55–86.

Luschnat, O. 1970. 'Thukydides,' in *RE*, Suppl. 12, 1085–1354.

Macan R.W. 1895. *Herodotus the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books with Introduction, Notes, Appendices, Indices, Maps*. Vol. I–II. London and New York.

———. 1908. *Herodotus the Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books with Introduction, Text, Apparatus, Commentary, Appendices, Indices, Maps*. Vol. I part I–II, Vol. II, London.

Manov, M. 2004. М. Манов, 'Къде е Хераклея Синтика? Още веднъж за един епиграфски паметник от Югозападна България,' *Археология*, год. XLV, кн. 3–4, 78–81.

Mari, M. 2002. *Al di là dell'Olimpo: Macedoni e grandi santuari della Grecia dall'età arcaica al primo Ellenismo* (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 34). Atene.

———. 2011. Archaic and Early Classical Macedonia. in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD*. Robin J. Lane Fox (ed.). Leiden, Boston, 79–92.

Marincola, J. 2001. *Greek Historians*. Cambridge University Press.

Markle, M. Markle III. 1976. 'Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' *Philippus* and Speusippus' *Letter to Philip*,' *JHS* 96, 80–99.

Masetti, K. 1982. К. Мазети, 'Война Дария I со скифами и вавилонская пророческая литература,' *ВДИ*, кн. 3, 106–110.

Maurice, F. 1930. 'The Size of the Army of Xerxes in the Invasion of Greece 480 BC,' *JHS* 50, part 2, 210–235.

Meiggs, R. 1973^2. *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford.

———. 1982. *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World*. Oxford.

Merker, I. 1965. 'The Ancient Kingdom of Paionia,' in *Balkan Studies* 6, 35–54.

Mertzidis, S. 1885. Σ. Μερτζίδης, *Αι χώραι του παρελθόντος και αι εσφαλμέναι τοποθετήσεις των: Έρευναι και μελέται τοπογραφικαί υπό αρχαιλογικο-γεωγραφικο-ιστορικήν έποψιν*. Εν Αθήναις.

Meyer, E. 1892. *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte: Zur älteren griechischen Geschichte*. Halle, Erster Band.

———. 1897. 'Bithynia,' in *RE*, 1897, 510–524.

———. 1899. *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte: Zur Geschichte des fünften Jahrhunderts v. CHR*. Halle, Zweiter Band.

Mihailov, G. 1991. 'Thrace before the Persian Entry into Europe,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, Vol. III, part 2, 591–618, Cambridge University Press.

Missitzis, L. 1985. 'A Royal Decree of Alexander the Great on the Lands of Philippi,' *AW* 12, 3–14.

Mitrev, G. 2003. 'Civitas Heracleotarum: Heracleia Sintica or the Ancient City of the Village of Rupite (Bulgaria),' *ZPE* 145, 263–272.

———. 2012. Г. Митрев, *Долината на Струма през античността: Племена и селища*. Асеновград.

Momigliano, A. 1992. *Philippe de Macédoine: Essai sur l'histoire grecque du IV^e^ siècle av. J.C.* (French translation).

Mommsen, Th. 1869. 'Zur Lebensgeschichte des Jüngeren Plinius,' *Hermes* 3, 31–139.

———. 1870. 'Cornelius Tacitus und Cluvius Rufus,' *Hermes* 4, 295–325.

Müller, D. 1975. 'Von Doriskos nach Therme: Der Weg des Xerxes-Heeres durch Thrakien und Ostmakedonien,' *Chiron* 5, 1–11.

———. 1987. *Topographischer Bildkommentar zu den Historien Herodots: Griechenland im Umfang des heutigen griechischen Staatsgebiets*. Tübingen.

———. 1994. 'Von Kritalla nach Doriskos: Die Persische Königsstrasse und der Marschweg des Xerxesheeres in Kleinasien,' *IM* 44, 17–38.

———. 1997. *Topographischer Bildkommentar zu den Historien Herodots: Kleinasien und angrenzende Gebiete mit Südostthraken und Zypern*. Tübingen.

Müller, S. 2011. 'Die frühen Perserkönige im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Makedonen und in der Propaganda Alexanders d.Gr.,' *Gymnasium* 118, 105–133.

Munro, J.A.R. 1902. 'Some Observations on the Persian Wars. 2. The Campaign of Xerxes,' *JHS* 22, 294–332.

———. 1930. 'Xerxes' Invasion of Greece,' in *CAH*, First Edition, Reprinted, with slight corrections. Vol. IV, 268–316, Cambridge at the University Press.

Münzer, F. 1897. *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius*. Berlin.

Mushmov, N. 1912. Н. Мушмов, *Античните монети на Балканския полуостров и монетите на българските царе*. София.

Natoli, A. 2004. *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Franz Steiner Verlag = Historia Einzelschriften 176.

Neujahr, M. 2005. 'When Darius Defeated Alexander: Composition and Redaction in the Dynastic Prophecy,' *JNES* 64, 2, 101–107.

Nicolov, D. 1961. Д. Николов, 'Златни фиали от с. Даскал Атанасово, Старозагорско,' В *Изследвания в памет на Карел Шкорпил*. София, 367–368.

Niebuhr, B.G. 1847. *Vorträge über alte Geschichte, an der Universität zu Bonn gehalten*. Berlin.

Nieling, J. 2010. 'Persian Imperial Policy Behind the Rise and Fall of the Cimmerian Bosporus in the Last Quarter of the Sixth to the Beginning of the Fifth Century BC,' in *Achaemenid Impact in the Black Sea: Communication of Powers*. J. Nieling, Ellen Rehm (eds.). Aarchus University Press, 123–136.

Niese, B. 1878. 'Beiträge zur Biographie Strabos,' *Hermes* 13, 33–45.

———. 1883. 'Straboniana,' *RhMPh* 38, 567–602.

Oberhummer, E. 1905. 'Doriskos,' in *RE*, 1566–1567.

Obst, E. 1909. 'Hat Miltiades am Skythenzug teilgenommen?' *Klio* 9, 413–415.

———. 1913. *Der Feldzug des Xerxes*. Leipzig.

———. 1932. 'Miltiades,' in *RE*, 1679–1705.

Olbrycht, M. 2010. 'Macedonia and Persia,' in *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Joseph Roisman, Ian Worthington (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell 2010, 342–369.

Olmstead, A. 1939. 'Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem,' *CPh* 34, no. 4, 305–322.

———. 1948. *History of the Persian Empire*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago & London.

Pajakowski, W. 1983. 'Einige Bemerkungen zur Lokalisierung der persischen Provinz (Satrapie) Skudra,' *Eos* 71, 243–255.

Papangelos I., Kamburoglu E. 1998. Ι. Παπάγγελος, Ε. Καμπούρογλου, "Ιστορικὲς καὶ ἀρχαιογεωμορφολογικὲς ἔρευνες γιὰ τὴν διώρυγα τοῦ Ξέρξου στὴν χερσόνησο τοῦ Ἄθω,' *Τεκμήρια* 4, 177–188.

Papageorgiou, M. 1970. Μ. Παπαγεωργίου, "Ἔστι ἐκ τῆς Πρασιάδος λίμνης σύντομος κάρτα ἐς τὴν Μακεδονίην (Ἡροδ. V,17),' *Μακεδονικά* 10, 1–22.

Papazoglou, F. 1957. Ф. Папазоглу, *Македонски градови у римско доба*. Скопје.

———. 1969. *Srednjobalkanska plemena u predrimsko doba* (*tribali, autarijati, dardanci, skordisci i mezi*). Sarajevo.

———. 1988. *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine*. *BCH* Suppl. 16, Paris.

Paribeni, R. 1947. *La Macedonia sino ad Alessandro magno*. Milano.

Parissaki, M. 2000–2003. Μ. Παρισάκη, 'Τὰ στενὰ τῶν Κορπίλων καὶ τῶν Σαπαίων. Ἡ ἐπανεξέταση ἑνὸς τοπογραφικοῦ προβλήματος,' *ΗΟΡΟΣ* 14–16, 345–362.

Parshikov, A. 1968. А. Паршиков, 'Павсаний и политическая борьба в Спарте,' *ВДИ* no. 1, 126–138.

Paspalas, S. 2000. 'On Persian-Type Furniture in Macedonia: The Recognition and Transmission of Forms,' *AJA* 104, 531–560.

———. 2006. 'The Achaemenid Empire and the north-western Aegean,' *AWE* 5, no. 1–2, 90–120.

Pearson, L. 1939. *Early Ionian Historians*. Greenwood Press, Publishers Westport, Connecticut.

———. 1942. *The Local Historians of Attica*. Published by the American Philological Association Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Pelling, C.B.R. 1979. 'Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives,' *JHS* 99, 74–96.

Perdrizet, P. 1909. 'Le Σαμοθραικικός d'Antiphon et la Pérée Samothracienne,' *REG* 22, 33–41.

———. 1910. 'Scaptésylé,' *Klio* 10, 1–27.

Petkov, P. 2012. П. Петков, *Военно-политически отношения на тракийските владетели в европейския югоизток между 230/229 г. пр. Хр.—45/46 г. сл. Хр*. Издателство Фабер.

Pilhofer, P. 2000. *Philippi: Katalog der Inschriften von Philippi*. Band II. (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 119). Tübingen.

Porozhanov, K. 2011. К. Порожанов, *Одриското царство, полисите по неговите крайбрежия и Атина от края на VI век до 341 г.пр.Хр. = Studia Thracica* 14. Благоевград.

———. 2012. К. Порожанов, *Тракийската цивилизация в началата на два континента и по крайбрежията на три морета = Thracia Antiqua* II. София.

Pothecary, S. 1997. 'The Expression "Our Times" in Strabo's Geography,' *CP* 92, 235–246.

———. 1999. 'Strabo the Geographer: His Name and its Meaning,' *Mnemosyne* 52, 691–704.

Powell, J.E. 1935. 'Notes on Herodotus-II (Continued),' *CQ* 29, no. 3–4, 150–163.

Price, M. 1974. *Coins of the Macedonians*. London.

———. 1987. 'The coinages of the northern Aegean,' *BAR International Series* 343, 43–52.

Price M., Waggoner N. 1975. *Archaic Greek Coinage the Asyut Hoard*. London.

Prien, C. 1850. 'Ueber die Perser des Aeschylos,' *RhMPh* 7, 208–245.

Pritchett, W.K. 1961. 'Xerxes' Route over Mount Olympos,' *AJA* 65, no. 4, 369–375.

———. 1993. *The Liar School of Herodotus*. Amsterdam.

Proeva, N. 2004. Н. Проева, *Историја на Аргеадите*. Скопје.

Prontera, F. 1972. 'Per l'interpretazione di Erodoto VI 40,' *PP* 27, 111–123.

Pryzwansky, M. 2009. 'Cornelius Nepos: Key Issues and Critical Approaches,' *CJ* 105, 97–108.

Psoma, S. 2002. Σ. Ψωμα, 'Το Βασίλειο των Μακεδόνων πριν από τον Φίλιππο Β': Νομισματικής και Ιστορική Προσέγγιση,' στο: *Η Ιστορική Διαδρομή της Νομισματικής Μονάδας στην Ελλάδα*. Αθήνα, 25–45.

Psoma S., Zannis A.G. 2011. 'Ichnai et le monnayage des Ichnéens,' *Τεκμήρια* 10, 23–46.

Rawlinson, G. 1860. *The History of Herodotus*. In four volumes. Vol. III and IV. New York.

Raymond, D. 1953. *Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 BC*. New York.

Rengakos A., Tsakmakis A. (eds.) 2006. *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. Leiden, Boston.

Rhodes, P.J. 1992. 'The Delian League to 499 BC,' in *CAH*, Second Edition, D.M. Lewis, J. Boardman, J.K. Davies, M. Ostwald (eds.), Vol. V, 34–61, Cambridge University Press.

———. 2003. 'Herodotean Chronology Revisited,' in *Herodotus and his World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of Geogre Forrest*. Peter Derrow, Robert Parker (eds.). Oxford University Press, 58–72.

———. 2006. '*A History of the Classical Greek World 478–323 BC*,' Blackwell Publishing.

Robertson, N. 1976. 'The Thessalian Expedition of 480 BC,' *JHS* 96, 100–120.

Rollinger, R. 2006. 'Yaunā takabarā und Maginnāta Tragende 'Ionier': Zum Problem der 'Griechischen' Thronträger-figuren in Naqsch-I Rustam und Persepolis,' in *Altertum und Mittelmeerraum: Die antike Welt diesseits und jenseits der Levante; Festschrift für Peter W. Haider zum 60. Geburtstag*. Oriens et Occidens 12, Stuttgart, 365–400.

Rosen, K. 1978. 'Die Gründung der makedonischen Herrschaft,' *Chiron* 8, 1–27.

———. 1987. 'Alexander I., Herodot und die Makedonische Basileia,' in *Zu Alexander d.Gr. Festschrift G. Wirt zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. Herausgegeben von W. Will unter Mitarbeit von J. Heinrichs. Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert—Amsterdam, 25–51.

Rostovtzeff, M. 1922. *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press.

Russell, D.A. 1968. 'On Reading Plutarch's "Moralia,"' *G&R* 130–146.

Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, C. 2007. 'Arts and Politics in the Macedonian Court before Alexander,' in *Ancient Macedonia VII: Macedonia from the Iron Age to the Death of Philip II*. Papers read at the Seventh International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 14–18, 2002. Thessaloniki, 345–356.

Saïd, S. 2005. 'Aeschylean Tragedy,' in *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*. Justina Gregory (ed.). Blackwell publishing, 215–232.

Samsaris, D. 1976. Δ. Σαμσάρης, *Ιστορική γεωγραφία της Ανατολικής Μακεδονίας κατά την αρχαιότητα*. Θεσσαλονίκη.

Sarafov, T. 1974. Т. Сарафов, 'Тракийските сатри. (Принос към етногенезиса на тракийските племена),' *ГСУФЗФ* 67, no. 1, 119–189.

Sarakinski, V. 2010. 'The Fallacy of the European Satrapy,' *ZA* 60, 77–108.

———. 2013. В. Саракински, *Persomacedonica: Македонија и Персија пред Александър*. Универзитет "св. Кирил и Методиј" Филозофски Факултет.

Scaife, R. 1989. 'Alexander I in the Histories of Herodotos,' *Hermes* 117, no. 2, 129–137.

Schenkeveld, D.M. 1976. 'Strabo on Homer,' *Mnemosyne* 29, 52–64.

Schmitt, R. 1991. *The Bisitun Inscriptions of Darius the Great: Old Persian Text* (*Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum. Part I: Inscriptions of Ancient Iran. Vol. I; The Old Persian Inscriptions. Texts I*). London.

Schöll, R. 1878. 'Zur Thukydides-Biographie,' *Hermes* 13, no. 4, 433–451.

Schorpil, K. 1934. К. Шкорпил, 'Исторически бележки за черноморската област на Балканския полуостров,' *Морски сговор* 11, no. 1, 9–11.

Schrader, C. 1981. *Heródoto Historia: Libro V Terpsícore; Libro VI Érato*. Biblioteca clásica gredos, 39. Madrid.

———. 1985. *Heródoto Historia: Libro VII Polimnia*. Biblioteca clásica gredos, 82. Madrid.

———. 1989. *Heródoto Historia: Libro VIII Urania; Libro IX Calíope*. Biblioteca clásica gredos, 130. Madrid.

Scott, L. 2005. *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6*. Leiden, Boston.

SEG (1949). *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Volumen decimum.

Shuckburgh, E.S. 1887. *Herodotos: IX 1–89 (Plataea) with introduction and notes*. Cambridge.

———. 1903[3]. *Herodotos: VIII. Urania*. Cambridge.

———. 1906. *Herodotos: IV. Melpomene*. Cambridge.

———. 1908[4]. *Herodotos: VI. Erato*. Cambridge.

Sickler, D.F.C.L. 1824. *Handbuch der alten Geographie für Gymnasien und zum selbstunterricht: Mit steter Rücksicht auf die numismatische Geographie und die neuesten besseren Hülfsmittel*. Cassel im Verlag bei J.J. Bohné.

Sihler, E.G. 1877. 'On Herodotus's and Aeschylus's Accounts of the Battle of Salamis,' *TAPhA* 8, 109–122.

———. 1923. 'Strabo of Amaseia: His Personality and His Works,' *AJPh* 44, 134–144.

Smarczyk, B. 2006. 'Thucydides and Epigraphy,' in *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. Antonios Rengakos, Antonis Tsakmakis (eds.). Leiden, Boston, 495–522.

Smart, J.D. 1967. 'Kimon's Capture of Eion,' *JHS* 87, 136–138.

Smith, Ch. (Smith Ch., Laird A.) 1908. *Herodotus Books VII and VIII*. Edited with introduction and notes by Charles Forster Smith and Arthur Gordon Laird. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago.

SNG ABC. 2000. *Macedonia I: Alexander I—Perseus*. Athens.

Sokolovska, V. 1986. В. Соколовска, 'Да ли је Прасијада Бутковско језеро и Дисорон Круша планина?,' *Старинар* 37, 175–178.

Sprawski, S. 2011. 'The Early Temenid Kings to Alexander I,' in *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Joseph Roisman, Ian Worthington (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell, 127–144.

Steele, R.B. 1917. 'Pompeius Trogus and Justinus,' *AJPh* 38, 19–41.

Stein, H. (1859–1862). *Herodotos*. Band III–V. Buch V–IX. Berlin.

———. 1868. *Herodotos*. Zweiter Band. Buch III und IV. Mit zwei Karten von Kiepert und einigen Holzschnitten. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Berlin.

———. 1871. *Herodoti Historiae*. Tomus II. Berolini.

Stem, S. 2012. *The Political Biographies of Cornelius Nepos*. The University of Michigan Press.

Stenzel, J. 1929. 'Speusippos,' in *RE*, 1929, Zweite reihe (R–Z), Dritter band, 1636–1669.

Stoichev, R. 2008. Р. Стойчев, 'За датировката на фиалите от с. Даскал Атанасово, Старозагорско,' В *Studia in Honorem Alexandrae Dimitrova-Milcheva: Югоизточна Европа през античността VI в. пр. Хр.—началото на VII в. сл. Хр.* София, 124–132.

———. 2009. Р. Стойчев, 'Фиала мезомфалос в Тракия: Опит за класификация,' *Студии културно наследство* 1. Издателство на Нов български университет. София.

Stronk, J. 1998–1999. 'Crossing the Straits: The Persians in Thrace,' *Talanta* XXX–XXXI, 55–72.

————. 2007. 'Ctesias of Cnidus, a Reappraisal,' *Mnemosyne* 60, 25–58.

————. 2010. *Ctesias' Persian History: Part I. Introduction, Text and Translation*. Düsseldorf.

Struve, V.V. 1949. В.В. Струве, 'Дарий I и скифы причерноморья,' *ВДИ* кн.4, 15–28.

————. 1952. В.В. Струве, 'Хронология VI в. до н. э. в труде Геродота,' *ВДИ* кн. 2, 60–78.

Summerer, L. 2005. 'Achämeniden am Schwarzen Meer: Bemerkungen zum spätarchaischen Marmorkopf aus Herakleia Pontike,' *ANES* 42, 231–252.

Surikov, I.E. 2005. И.Е. Суриков, *Античная Греция: Политики в контексте эпохи*. М.: Наука.

Svoronos, J. 1919. *L'hellénisme primitif de la Macédoine: prouvé par la numismatique et l'or du Pangée*. Athènes.

Syme, R. 1969. 'Pliny the Procurator,' *HSCPh* 73, 201–236.

————. 1988. 'The Date of Justin and the Discovery of Trogus,' *Historia* 37, 358–371.

Szemerényi, O. 1980. *Four old Iranian Ethnic Names: Scythian—Skudra—Sogdian—Saka*. Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien.

Tacheva, M. 1995. М.Тачева, 'За бесите и техните племенни територии,' *Минало* кн.1, 9–15.

————. 2006. М. Тачева, *Царете на древна Тракия: Книга първа*. София.

Tarán, L. 1981. *Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the related Texts and Commentary*. Leiden.

Tarn, W.W. 1908. 'The Fleet of Xerxes,' *JHS* 28, 202–233.

Thirlwall, C. 1836. *The History of Greece*. Vol. II. London.

Titchener, F. 2003. 'Cornelius Nepos and the Biographical Tradition,' *G&R* 50, 85–99.

Tiverios, M. 2008. 'Greek Colonisation of the Northern Aegean,' in *Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas*. Gocha R. Tsetskhladze (ed.). Vol. II, 1–154, Leiden-Boston.

Todd, O.J. 1922. 'On the Date of Herodotus' Death,' *CQ* 16, no. 1, 35–36.

Tomaschek, W. 1893. *Die Alten Thraker: Eine ethnologische Untersuchung I; Uebersicht der Stämme*. Wien.

————. 1894. *Die Alten Thraker: Eine ethnologische Untersuchung II; Die Sprachreste*. Wien.

Tonev, M. 1942. М. Тонев, 'Приноси към историята на траките,' *Беломорски преглед* 1, 179–226.

Tripodi, B. 1986. 'La Macedonia, la Peonia, il carro sacro di Serse (Herodot. 8, 115–116),' *GIF* 38, no. 2, 243–251.

————. 2007. 'Aminta I, Alessandro I e gli hyparchoi in Erodoto,' in *Ancient Macedonia VII: Macedonia from the Iron Age to the Death of Philip II*. Papers read at the

Seventh International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 14–18, 2002. Thessaloniki, 67–85.

———. 2012. Ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην, Μακεδὼν ὕπαρχος? Ancora su Hdt. 5, 20, 4,' *ASNSP* 4/1, serie 5, 45–61.

Tuplin, C. 1987. 'The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire,' *BAR International Series*, 343, 109–166.

———. 1987a. 'Xenophon and the Garrisons of the Achaemenid Empire,' *AMI* 20, 167–245.

———. 1997. 'Achaemenid Arithmetic: Numerical Problems in Persian History,' *Topoi* Suppl. 1, 365–421.

———. 2003. 'Xerxes' March from Doriscus to Therme,' *Historia* 52, 385–409.

———. 2010. 'Revisiting Dareios' Scythian Expedition,' in *Achaemenid Impact in the Black Sea: Communication of Powers*. J. Nieling, Ellen Rehm (eds.). Aarchus University Press, 281–312.

Tzvetkova, J. 2008. Ю.Цветкова, *История на Тракийския Херсонес* (*от Троянската война до времето на римското завоевание*). Издателство Фабер.

Unger, E. 1915. 'Die Dariusstele am Tearos,' *AA* 30, 3–16.

Van Groningen, B.A. 1950. *Herodotus' Historiën: Met inleiding en commentaar; Commentaar op boek IV–VI*. Leiden, Brill.

———. 1955. *Herodotus' Historiën: Met inleiding en commentaar; Commentaar op boek VII–IX*. Leiden, Brill.

Van der Spek, R.J. 2003. 'Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship,' in *A Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg*. Wouter Henkelman, Amélie Kuhrt (eds.). Nederlands instituut voor het nabije oosten Leiden, 289–346.

Vasilev, M. 2010. М. Василев, 'Произходът на Аргеадите,' В *Научни известия*. Югозападен университет "Неофит Рилски." Правно-исторически факултет, Благоевград, г.VI, кн.1–2, 45–61.

———. 2011. 'Thucydides II,99 and the early expansion of the Argeadae,' *Eirene* 47, no. 1–2, 93–105.

———. 2011a. 'The Military-Political Campaign of Sitalces against Perdiccas II and the Chalcidians (431–429 BC),' *ZA* 61, no. 1–2, 15–38.

Vasmatzidis, I. 1867. Ι. Βασματζίδης, *Η Μακεδονία και οι Μακεδόνες προ της των Δωριέων καθόδου: εθνογραφική διατριβή συνταχθείσα κατά τας αρχαίας πηγάς*. Εν Μναχωι.

Vatin, C. 1984. 'Lettre adressée à la cité de Philippes par les ambassadeurs auprès d'Alexandre,' in *Πρακτικὰ τοῦ Η΄ Διεθνοῦς Συνεδρίου Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ Λατινικῆς Ἐπιγραφικῆς*. Vol. I, Athens, 259–270.

Velkov, V. 1963. В. Велков, 'Пътища по Западното Черноморие в предримската епоха (VI–I век),' *ИВАД* 14, 25–33.

———. 1968. 'Über den antiken Namen des Flusses Arda,' *ИИБЕ* 16, 79–85.

———. 1991. 'Thracian Tribal Names mentioned by Hecataeus,' *TAB* 6, 21–24.

Venedikov, I. 1970. 'La campagne de Darius contre les Scythes à travers la Thrace,' in *SB* 1, 25–32.

Venedikov I., Gerasimov T. 1973. И. Венедиков, Т. Герасимов. *Тракийското изкуство*. София.

Viviers, D. 1993. 'La chronologie du règne de Miltiade le jeune en Chersonèse de Thrace: À propos d'Hérodote VI 40,' *RhMPh* 136, no. 3/4, 222–238.

Waddy, L. 1963. 'Did Strabo Visit Athens?,' *AJA* 67, no. 3, 296–300.

Wade-Gery, H.T. 1951. 'Miltiades' *JHS* 71, 212–221.

Waerzeggers, C. 2003–2004. 'The Babylonian Revolts Against Xerxes and the 'End of Archives'," *AFO* 50, 150–173.

Walker, E.M. 1927. 'The Confederacy of Delos 478–463 BC,' in *CAH* First Edition, J.B. Bury, S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock (eds.), Vol. V, 33–67, 466–467 (notes), Cambridge at the University Press.

Wallace, M.B. 1970. 'Early Greek 'Proxenoi'," *Phoenix* 24, no. 3, 189–208.

Wallinga, H. 1984. 'The Ionian Revolt,' *Mnemosyne* 37, no. 3/4, 401–437.

———. 2005. *Xerxes' Greek Adventure: The Naval Perspective*. Brill, Leiden, Boston.

Walser, G. 1984. *Hellas und Iran: Studien zu den griechisch-persischen Beziehungen vor Alexander*. Darmstadt.

Welcker, F.G. 1837. 'Ueber die Perser des Aischylos,' *RhMPh* 5, 204–249.

Wells, J. 1909. 'The Genuineness of the Γῆς περίοδος of Hecataeus,' *JHS* 29, 41–52.

Welzhofer, H. 1891. 'Zur Geschichte der Perserkriege,' *JCPh* 37, 145–159.

———. 1892. 'Zur Geschichte der Perserkriege,' *JCPh* 38, 145–166, 657–674, 729–751.

West, S. 1985. 'Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests,' *CQ* NS 35, no. 2, 278–305.

Westlake, H.D. 1936. 'The Medism of Thessaly,' *JHS* 56, 12–24.

White, M. 1964. 'Pausanias and His Sons,' *JHS* 84, 140–152.

Wiesehöfer J., Rollinger R., Lanfranchi G. (eds.) 2011. *Ktesias' Welt*. Wiesbaden.

Wiesner, J. 1963. *Die Thraker*. Stuttgart.

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. 1877. 'Die Thukydideslegende,' *Hermes* 12, 326–367.

———. 1893. *Aristoteles und Athen*. Erster Band. Berlin.

Winnington-Ingram, R.P. 1983. *Studies in Aeschylus*. Cambridge University Press.

Wissowa, G. 1900. 'Cornelius Nepos,' in *RE* 4, 1408–1417.

Woodhouse, W.J. 1898. 'The Greeks at Plataiai,' *JHS* 18, 33–59.

Xydopoulos, I.K. 2006. I.K. Ξυδόπουλος, *Κοινωνικές και πολιτιστικές σχέσεις των Μακεδόνων και των άλλων Ελλήνων*. Θεσσαλονίκη.

———. 2007. *Η εικόνα των Θρακών στην κλασική ιστοριογραφία*. Αθήνα.

———. 2012. 'Anthemus and Hippias. The Policy of Amyntas I,' *ICS* 37, 21–37.

———. (forthcoming). I.K. Ξυδόπουλος, 'Τα ανατολικά σύνορα της Μακεδονίας επί Αλεξάνδρου Α',' in *Collective Volume in Honour of Prof. Stella Drougou*.

Yanakieva, S. 2009. С. Янакиева, *Тракийската хидронимия* = Studia Thracica 12. София.

Yardley, J.C. 2000. 'Justin on Tribunates and Generalship, Caesares, and Augusti,' *CQ* NS 50, 632–634.

———. 2003. *Justin and Pompeius Trogus: A study of the language of Justin's epitome of Trogus*. University of Toronto.

Youroukova, I. 1992. Й. Юрукова, *Монетите на тракийските племена и владетели*. София.

Zahrnt, M. 1971. *Olynth und die Chalkidier: Untersuchungen zur Staatenbildung auf der Chalkidischen Halbinsel im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr*. München.

———. 1984. 'Die Entwicklung des makedonischen Reiches bis zu den Perserkriegen,' *Chiron* 14, 325–368.

———. 1992. 'Der Mardonioszug des Jahres 492 v.Chr. und seine historische Einordnung,' *Chiron* 22, 237–279.

———. 1997. 'Die Perser in Thrakien,' in *Actes. 2e Symposium International des Etudes Thraciennes: 'Thrace Ancienne'* 20–27 Septembre 1992. Komotini, 91–98.

———. 2006. 'Macedonia and Thrace in Thucydides,' in *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. Antonios Rengakos, Antonis Tsakmakis (eds.). Leiden, Boston, 589–614.

———. 2007. 'Athens Ambitionen an Thrakiens Südküste Während der Pentekontaëtie,' in *Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Thracology: Thrace in the Graeco-Roman World* (Komotini-Alexandroupolis, October 2005). Athens, 737–744.

———. 2008. 'Gab es in Thrakien zwei Städte namens Mesambria? Überlegungen zur samothrakishen Peraia,' in *Thrakika Zetemata* 1 (ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 58), Athenes, 87–120.

———. 2011. 'Herodot und die Makedonenkönige,' in *Herodot und das Persische Weltreich: Akten des 3. Internationalen Kolloquiums zum Thema 'Vorderasien im Spannungsfeld klassischer und altorientalischer Überlieferungen,'* Innsbruck, 24–28 November 2008. Herausgegeben von Robert Rollinger, Brigitte Truschnegg, Reinhold Bichler. Wiesbaden, 761–777.

———. 2011a. 'Alexanders Einmarsch in Thessalien (336 v. chr.),' *Hermes* 139, 262–266.

———. (forthcoming). 'Macedonia under Persian Rule,' in *A Companion to the Achaemenid Persian Empire*, Bruno Jacobs, Robert Rollinger (eds.).

Ziegler, K. 1951. 'Plinius,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster Halbband, 271–285.

———. 1951a. 'Plutarchos,' in *RE*, Einundvierzigster Halbband, 636–962.

Zlatkovskaya, T. 1967. Т. Златковская, 'Южнофракийские племенные союзы VI–Vвв. до н. э.,' *ВДИ* кн.2, 147–158.

———. 1971. Т. Златковская, *Возникновение государства у фракийцев VII–Vвв. до н.э*. Москва.

Index

Abdera 146, 159, 172, 194, 196–197
Abydos 71, 165–166
Acanthus 146, 160, 185–186
Aegeae 114
Aenos 171n53, 226
Aeschylus 5, 195–196
Agrianes (river) 60, 65
Agrianes (tribe) 103, 105
Alabanda 109, 112, 112n347
Alabastra 112n347
Aleuadae 189–190
Alexander I 101n303, 109, 111, 125–126, 156, 189–190, 197–209
Amphipolis 99–101
Amyntas 109–116, 125–126
Angites 87, 93, 97, 100
Antidorus 137
Apollonia (city in Thrace) 59–62, 65–67, 80
Appian 97, 173–174
Ariaramnes 45–46
Aristagoras 82, 127–128, 130–133
Aristodemus (historian) 207
Ariston 54–56
Arrian 99–101, 170
Artabanus 50
Artabazus 194–197, 207–211
Artaphrenes 117, 140
Artaxerxes I 225–226
Artayctes 213–214
Artescus 47, 50–51, 59, 63–66
Asia Minor 40–41, 89–92, 97, 107, 117, 129–130, 140, 207
Athenians 45n23, 133–137, 180–181, 198, 200–206, 212–214, 216–226
Athens 142–145, 201–206
Athos 143–144, 163
Axius 149–150

Behistun inscription 40n6, 46, 58, 119, 121
Belasitsa 108
Bermium 150
Bessi 178–180
Bisaltae 187
Bistones 172–173
Boeotians 198–200, 205
Boges 217, 226
Bolbe 99n292, 152–154, 186, 195–196, 211
Boryza 77–78, 80–82, 118
Bosporus (Thracian) 43–44, 58–59, 83, 117, 140, 216n23
Bottiaei 160, 168, 174, 186–187, 197
Briantice 170–171
Brutus 173
Brygi 142, 147–154, 186
Bubares 109–112, 114, 126–127
Butkovo 94, 101, 101n303

Cardia 140
Cappadocia 46
Cassius 173
Caucasus 44
Cercinitis, lake 100–101
Cerna Voda 67
Chalcedon 76n179, 80, 83–86, 141, 216n23
Chalcidians 152, 160, 174, 197
Chalcidice 152, 186, 195, 218
Cicones 171–172
Cimon 217–221, 224–225
Crestones 186–187
Crestonia 102n, 185
Ctesias 13–15, 41, 45–46, 71–72, 81, 83

Damastes of Sigeon 189
Daskal Atanasovo 122
Deinon 76n180
Delian League 216, 225–226
Demetrius of Scepsis 163n5
Demosthenes (orator) 202, 207–208
Dersaei 174–175
Dii 179–181
Diobessi 179–181
Diodorus 131–133, 136, 213
Dionysius of Byzantium 55
Dionysus (oracle) 176–179
Doberes 93, 104–105, 108, 147, 159
Doiran (lake) 99
Dolonci 139
Doriscus 72–74, 118, 127–129, 154, 166–167, 211, 225–226
Duvanli 122–123
Dysoron 93, 95–98, 102, 109, 113

Echedoros 187
Edoni 102n, 104, 130–132, 174–176
Eion 118, 147, 159, 184, 195–196, 208–211, 216–218
Eretria 142–145
Euaenetus 189
Euporia 101n303

Galepsus 168
Gallaice 170–171
Gazoros 106–107, 185
Gergis 181
Getae 67, 74–76
Gonnus 190–191
Gygaea 109–112

Haemus 67
Hani 48–49
Harpagus 40
Harpessus 173
Hebrus 64–65, 73, 87, 166–167, 170–171, 173, 182n103
Hecataeus 3–4, 77–82, 130, 168, 172, 179
Hegesipyle 53
Heraclea Sintica 101n303
Heracleium 190
Hermon 136
Hermus 173
Herodianus 77
Hesychius 175
Hippias 116, 145
Histiaeus 87–89, 118, 131, 139–140
Histria 67

Imbros 54–55, 85n213, 121, 137n50, 140
Ismaros (mountain) 182
Ion of Chios 218–220
Ismarid lake 170n49, 183n107
Istros 42–44, 54, 59, 61–63, 65–68, 71

Justin 23–25, 41, 114, 198, 222

Krousia 102
Kukuva Mogila 122

Lectum 212
Lekani 97–98
Lemnos 133–137
Lesbos 127, 139–140.
Leuce Acte 159, 163–164, 166–167, 211
Leutychides 212
Lisos 169n47, 171
Livy (Titus) 104, 174, 192
Lycaretus 84n213, 134, 136
Lydia 219, 222

Macedonia (upper) 189, 191, 194, 199
Madytos 166, 214
Magnesians 195–196
Mantyes 90
Mardonius 125, 141–150, 152–155, 159–161, 194–198, 200–201, 203, 205–206
Mascames 225–226
Massagetae 44, 46
Megabazus 47–50, 56–57, 65, 71–73, 84–92, 105–109, 111–124, 216n23
Mela 99–100
Menoikion 95–98
Mesambria (Aegean coast) 169, 171, 172n62, 182
Mesambria (Pontic coast) 66, 75, 76n179
Miletus 40, 128, 130–131, 139–140
Miltiades (the Younger) 51n57, 53, 68–70, 117, 133–141
Mycale (battle) 212, 220
Mygdonia 102n, 104
Myrcinus 87–89, 118, 130–132

Naqsh-i Rustam inscription 74–75, 117, 119, 155
Neapolis 146, 174–176, 183
Neo Petritsi 101n303
Nepos (Cornelius) 16–18, 133, 135, 220n36
Nestus 99, 105, 148, 173–174, 178, 181
Nicolaus Damascenus 90n239
Nine Ways 184, 186–187, 196, 208–209, 218
Nipsaei 51, 66, 74, 76, 122

Odessos 67
Odomanti 103–104, 147, 174–176
Odrysae 63, 74–75, 138, 174
Oeobazus 214
Olympus 191–193, 198, 203
Olympus (lower) 191, 193
Olynthus 152, 168, 195, 197
Orbelus 93, 95–96, 98–99, 102, 188
Ossa 191–192

Otanes (conqueror of Samos) 40, 55n68
Otanes (son of Sisamnes) 54–56, 57n74, 76n179, 83–86, 117, 121–122

Paeonia 90, 103, 105, 127–128, 130, 185–186, 210
Paeonians 85, 87, 89, 90–91, 93–94, 97–98, 102–103, 105–108, 117–118, 127–130, 147, 149, 184–185
Paeoplae 91–93, 106, 184
Paitoi 170
Paleokomi 87
Pallene 195, 197
Panaeans 104, 174
Pangaeum 87, 93, 97, 99, 103–105, 108, 119, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 154, 159, 174–177, 179–180, 184, 211, 216, 218
Parorbelia, (Macedonian) 99
Pausanias (Spartan regent) 205, 215, 221–222
Pelasgians 133–136
Peneus 121, 191–193
Perdiccas II 103–104, 110, 113n351, 180, 202
Perinthus 52, 57, 73, 79, 84–86, 103, 164–165
Perrhaebi 189–191
Petra Pass 192–194, 196, 211
Peuke 67
Phalakron 95, 97–98
Philippi (city) 97–99, 173–174
Phoenicians 140
Phrygia 93, 108, 112n347, 127, 219, 222
Phrygians 150
Phyllis 93, 184
Pieres 147, 149–152, 176
Pieria 149–151, 191
Pierian mountains 191–192
Pigres 90
Pistyrus 170
Platea (battle) 199, 205
Pliny (the Elder) 20–21, 60, 78, 97–98, 100, 105n318, 148, 173, 179, 181
Plistorus 214
Plovdiv 121
Plutarch 22–23, 189, 199n182, 205n206, 217–221, 224–225
Polyaenus 83
Pontus 75, 80–81, 127, 140–141, 164, 215
Potidaea 195, 197
Prasias 91–103, 107–109, 113, 187
Pravi (lake) 94–99
Propontis 40, 55n68, 76, 82–83, 215
Pseudo-Scymnus 62, 76n179, 148, 172
Ptolemy (Claudius) 65n128, 98–99, 112n347, 176
Ptolemy, son of Lagus 101

Rentina Pass 102n
Rezovska 62, 79–80
Rhascupolis 173
Rhodope 98, 176–177, 179–182, 185, 187–188, 209
Rila 188
Rupel defile 108, 117

Sacae 44, 46, 74, 75n176
Saka paradraya 74–75
Sakā tigraxaudā 44, 58
Sale 169n45, 171
Salmydessus 47, 50–51, 61–63, 78–80
Samos 40
Sapaean mountain 173
Sapaean pass 94, 97, 173
Sapaei 173–174
Sardis 45n23, 83, 88, 90, 107, 112, 114–115, 117, 121–122, 137, 139, 161, 165, 203
Satrae 147, 160, 170, 173–174, 176–181
Satrocentae 179
Scius 188
Scydra (settlement) 120
Scylax 164
Scytharbes 41, 45, 71
Serreum (cape) 170–172
Sestus 72–73, 101, 118, 159, 166, 212–216, 218–225
Shabla Dere 169n46, 172n62
Simonides 60
Siriopaeones 91–94, 106
Sirrae 92–95, 108, 118n375, 174–175, 184–185, 187, 196, 210, 217
Sitalces 181–182, 207n216
Skudra 107, 114, 116, 120–121, 155n125, 160–161
Skunkha 46
Skyrmiadai 51, 59, 65–66, 74, 76, 79, 122
Sparta 70, 129, 221, 223n50
Spartans 70, 100, 190, 201, 205–206, 221
Speusippus 15–16, 189

Stephanus of Byzantium 73n169, 77, 79n188, 92, 101n303, 164, 169n46, 170n48, 174
Strandja 61, 66–67, 73–77, 79, 82
Stryme (city) 169n48, 171
Susa 59, 139, 165n17
Syncellus 111, 126

Tabula Capitolina 48, 58–59, 62, 106
Takhinos 99–101, 102n
Tearus 50, 59–64, 66, 73
Teke 65
Tempe 189–193, 196, 198, 204–205
Tenedos 140–141
Teres 79
Thasians 146, 159, 225
Thasos 140, 142, 145–146, 154, 159–161, 175, 221, 224
Themistocles 189–190
Theophrastus 97
Thermaic Gulf 113, 144–145, 152–154, 185, 196
Therme 163, 185–188, 193
Thermopylae (battle) 199–200
Thessalians 189, 200, 208n220
Thessaly 143, 153, 156, 165, 189–197, 208–211
Thracian Chersonese 52–54, 57–58, 68–73, 75, 117, 133–140, 164, 166–167, 213–215, 220–221, 224–225
Thucydides 10–13, 96, 100–101, 102n, 104–105, 131–132, 154n121, 180–181, 188, 207n216, 213–217, 221–223
Thynias (area) 79
Thynias (cape) 79–82
Thynias (settlement) 78
Tiristasis 164
Tonzos 47, 50, 65
Trausi 178
Tyrodiza 159, 164–167, 211

Veleka 80
Volustana 192–193

Xanthippus 212, 220
Xenophon 61–62, 79

Yaunā takabarā 116, 155

Zenobius 133, 135–136
Zone 171–172